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This thesis explores a puzzling phenomenon that has emerged from the recent turn towards 
pursuing criminal justice for grave abuses in the midst of internal conflict. Despite the rise of 
the anti-impunity norm as a sovereignty-constraining force, governments proactively engage 
with the norm, even during internal conflicts in which their very legitimacy is in jeopardy. 
How and why does the usage, or ‘deployment,’ of the anti-impunity norm by elite actors 
influence the political dynamics of internal armed conflicts? This thesis answers this question 
through case study analysis of the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, in which governments 
implemented anti-impunity measures nationally and invited the International Criminal Court 
to investigate in their countries. It argues that national authorities in both countries used the 
anti-impunity norm as a resource to further the government’s short-term political objectives 
in its legitimation strategy in the context of internal conflict. This was achieved through norm 
exploitation, a concept coined in this thesis, or how actors can draw benefits from the norm’s 
specific enforcement features and functions in order to further a given objective. Capitalising 
on the state’s centrality within the norm’s enforcement, officials strategically deployed 
measures that both supported and undermined the imperative to prosecute grave abuses in 
order to favour certain narratives over others and to help shape power relations between 
parties. This thesis offers a novel lens through which to understand the relationship between 
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This thesis explores a puzzling phenomenon that has emerged from the recent turn towards 
pursuing criminal justice for grave abuses in the midst of internal conflict. Despite the rise of 
the anti-impunity norm as a sovereignty-constraining force, governments proactively engage 
with the norm, even during internal conflicts in which their very legitimacy is in jeopardy. How 
and why does the usage, or ‘deployment,’ of the anti-impunity norm by elite actors influence 
the political dynamics of internal armed conflicts? This thesis answers this question through 
case study analysis of the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, in which governments 
implemented anti-impunity measures nationally and invited the International Criminal Court 
to investigate in their countries. It argues that national authorities in both countries used the 
anti-impunity norm as a resource to further the government’s short-term political objectives in 
its legitimation strategy in the context of internal conflict. This was achieved through norm 
exploitation, a concept coined in this thesis, or how actors can draw benefits from the norm’s 
specific enforcement features and functions in order to further a given objective. Capitalising 
on the state’s centrality within the norm’s enforcement, officials strategically deployed 
measures that both supported and undermined the imperative to prosecute grave abuses in order 
to favour certain narratives over others and to help shape power relations between parties. This 
thesis offers a novel lens through which to understand the relationship between the anti-











Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
“This is a fundamental break with history. The old era of impunity is over. In its place, slowly 
but surely, we are witnessing the birth of a new ‘age of accountability.’”  
- Former UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon1 
 
“Where accountability was once the rare exception, it is increasingly a strongly held 
expectation; today, it is the absence of accountability initiatives—such as with respect to on-
going atrocities in Syria— that garners attention. We are, in many ways, witnessing the dawn 
of a new era of accountability and respect for the rule of law.” 
- Judge Theodor Meron2 
 
 
The Problématique    
 
 This thesis examines a particular puzzle. Since World War II, a new norm has emerged 
linking the fields of international relations and international law: the anti-impunity norm. 
Stemming from the relatively recent turn to criminal law within human rights advocacy, the 
anti-impunity norm refers to the idea that individuals who commit the most egregious human 
rights abuses must be held criminally accountable through investigation, prosecution, and 
punishment. Fuelled especially by outrage at the massive human suffering that the world 
witnessed during World War II, apartheid in South Africa, and the ethnic cleansing in Rwanda 
and the former Yugoslavia, this normative shift views past treatments of such abuses, ranging 
from general impunity to executions or summary trials of perpetrators, as no longer acceptable.  
 Though the phrase ‘ending impunity’ has only been widely used in English since 1986, 
it has become a central feature of current conceptions of international justice and is now “one 
	
1 United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 2010. 
2 Meron 2016, 7. 
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of the unique ethical signatures of our time.”3 The adoption of new treaties and legal standards, 
the creation of new domestic, regional, and international institutions, and the increase in human 
rights trials relating to individual criminal accountability for these crimes, driven particularly 
by transnational networks of human rights activists, constitute a “justice cascade”4 that has led 
to the view that ending impunity is now “a legal, political, and pragmatic imperative.”5 This 
thesis explores the intriguing phenomenon of the recent increase in state engagement with the 
anti-impunity norm, particularly in the politically volatile contexts of internal armed conflicts. 
This phenomenon is indeed puzzling in light of the norm’s emergence as a move to limit and 
constrain sovereignty and the pursuit of politics as usual. To shed new light on this puzzle, this 
thesis explores how and why does the usage, or ‘deployment,’ of the anti-impunity norm by 
elite actors influence the political dynamics of countries affected by internal conflict.      
 Before further presenting the puzzle and the research question at the heart of this thesis, 
it is important to identify the key elements of the anti-impunity norm. The anti-impunity norm 
as defined here is very similar, though not entirely the same, to what other scholars refer to as 
“the global accountability norm,”6 “the new justice norm,”7 “international justice norms,”8 “the 
nonimpunity norm,” 9  the “impunity norm,” 10  the transitional justice norm,” 11  the “anti-
impunity norms,”12 the “international criminal law norms,”13 and “norms against international 
criminal law impunity.”14 First, it is not generally applicable to all human rights violations and 
transgressions under international law, but rather pertains to accountability for a specific set of 
human rights violations - war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide - that are 
“characterized by the directness and gravity of their assault upon the human person, both 
corporeal and spiritual.”15 So grave that they cannot be deemed legitimate acts of state, these 
acts have been deemed particularly shocking by the international community and are thus of 
	
3 Moyn 2017, 69. 
4 Sikkink 2011. 
5 Engle, Miller, and Davis 2017, 3. 
6 Mallinder 2012.  
7 Sikkink 2011, 13. 
8 Rodman 2019, 18. 
9 Bower 2019. 
10 Pensky 2016. 
11 Subotić 2009. 
12 Rodman 2019, 15. 
13 Simmons and Jo 2019, 18. 
14 Simmons and Jo 2019, 23.  
15 Ratner, Abrams, and Bischoff 2009, 14. 
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international concern. Second, stemming from the shift from states to individuals as the primary 
subjects of international criminal law, these human rights violations must be treated as crimes 
committed by individuals. Importantly, reflecting the notion that standards should be universal 
and that all individuals should be treated equally, individuals are to be held accountable 
regardless of their status or any other characteristics. Third, the anti-impunity norm calls for a 
particular type of accountability: criminal accountability. The appropriate mechanism for 
addressing the responsibility for alleged acts of atrocity is regularised criminal proceedings, 
reflecting the importance of the protection of the rights of the accused. 16 By “impunity,” this 
thesis thus refers to the situation in which an individual is exempt from the criminal legal 
process, and punishment if warranted, that is normally due for the act the individual allegedly 
committed.17   Linking these second and third elements, the impunity enjoyed by a given 
individual perpetrator is a violation of the equality of individuals, as that individual is treated 
preferentially compared to other persons and other circumstances. Fourth, as elaborated in 
Chapter 2, the anti-impunity norm, as conceptualised in this thesis, can be understood as a 
political expectation, based on extensive though not comprehensive legal obligations, that 
states must take measures to hold alleged perpetrators criminally accountable for grave abuses 
in domestic jurisdictions and, when unable or unwilling, cooperate with investigations and 
prosecutions in international criminal courts. The norm is enforced through a decentralized but 
interconnected system of accountability mechanisms, primarily through domestic courts with 
international courts as backup subsidiary institutions.18    
 This thesis thus focuses on the particular visions of accountability and justice that form 
part of the prescriptive aspect of the anti-impunity norm and constitute only one dimension of 
a larger shift in ideas of addressing human rights violations. If accountability is understood as 
	
16 Sikkink 2011: 13; Bower 2019, 90; Drumbl 2007; Mégret 2017 
17 This definition is slightly different than the definition that appears in The United Nations 
Principles to Combat Impunity, in which impunity refers to “the impossibility, de jure or de 
facto, of bringing the perpetrators of violations to account—whether in criminal, civil, 
administrative or disciplinary proceedings—since they are not subject to any inquiry that might 
lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced to appropriate 
penalties, and to making reparations to their victims.” (Krahenhann 2018, 34) The anti-
impunity norm is not necessarily against the impossibility of bringing perpetrators to account 
due to the absence of inquiries but rather, more precisely, for holding perpetrators to account 
through criminal proceedings and thus against the non-occurrence of investigations and, if 
warranted, prosecution and punishment and the enjoyment by the perpetrators of the lack of 
punishment. 
18 Sikkink 2011, 19. 
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“practices where some actors hold other actors to a set of standards and impose sanctions if 
these standards are not met,” 19  it can encompass many possible forms of accountability, 
including political accountability or non-criminal legal accountability. The type of individual 
and criminal accountability prescribed by the anti-impunity norm is narrower.20 Similarly, the 
vision of justice within the “atrocity paradigm” calls for criminal justice to be pursued through 
both domestic and international courts, and by extension views injustice as a failure to 
investigate and prosecute.21 This vision of justice is just one of various conceptions of justice 
within the field of transitional justice, including restorative justice, reparative justice, “political 
justice” and “survivor’s justice.”22 Indeed, states have increasingly established various judicial 
and non-judicial mechanisms, including trials but also truth commissions, reparations 
programmes, state apologies, lustration or vetting measures, and legal reforms. While the 
adoption of these measures undoubtedly form part of the larger story of how a country deals 
with past, and sometimes ongoing, abuses, this study’s focus on judicial mechanisms enables 
sharp analysis of one key, and often most controversial, part of the story. For this thesis, the 
term “anti-impunity norm” is thus more precise than “global accountability norm,” “the new 
justice norm,” and “global justice norm” as used by other scholars referring to the same idea.23 
More broadly, the vision of justice within the anti-impunity norm is distinct from other types 
of global justice, including distributive justice, social justice, gender justice, and environmental 
	
19 Sikkink and Kim 2013, 270. 
20 This focus on criminal accountability within the definition of the anti-impunity norm used 
in this thesis is slightly narrower than similar studies. For instance, Subotić explores the norm 
that war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide should be adjudicated in a court of law 
or another type of justice institution,” such as a truth commission. Subotić 2009, 15.   
21 Douglas 2016, 44. 
22 Mamdani 2015. See also Nouwen and Werner 2015 for further discussion of the ways in 
which justice can be defined and understood in conflict-affected contexts.  
23 While the other terms are not necessarily inappropriate, there are additional reasons for 
choosing the term “anti-impunity norm” over others. Moreso than the prefix “non,” the prefix 
“anti” explicitly evokes the idea that the move away from the traditional impunity model is 
indeed a struggle and a fight against the long-term status quo. Further, several authors, 
including Rodman and Simmons and Jo, refer to a plurality of norms. For instance, Simmons 
and Jo identify “core ICL norms” as composed of “individual criminal accountability and no-
impunity norm,” or the idea that “individuals should be held accountable for egregious human 
rights violations” and that certain crimes have been identified in international criminal law as 
“international crimes” (Simmons and Jo 2019, 18). While the anti-impunity norm can indeed 
be analysed as constituted of various sub-norms (norms including the equality of individuals, 
the right to life, the right to a fair trial, the right to a fair and effective remedy…), the broad 
normative imperative can also be understood as a singular idea: that individuals should be held 
criminally accountable for international crimes, namely crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
and genocide. 
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justice. 24  While featuring a narrow understanding of accountability and justice, the anti-
impunity norm nevertheless represents what some scholars describe as a “revolution in 
accountability.”25   
 As part of the contra-sovereignty zeitgeist, the anti-impunity norm is premised on an 
opposition between politics and law. While ‘politics’ has been defined in a wide variety of 
manners, this thesis builds from Koskenniemi’s definition of politics as a “matter of furthering 
subjective desires.”26 ‘Politics’ can here be understood as a matter of advancing subjective 
aims, with the objective of benefitting some at the expense of others. The presumed opposition 
between politics and law expects law to serve as “an instrument for suspending the political.” 
27 Put differently, law is seen as “hold[ing] out the promise of at least relative neutrality and 
relative depoliticization – compared with partisan mud-slinging, dirty tricks, and armed 
conflict.”28 Representing what Hurd deems the “enchanted” view of law, this view assumes the 
turn to international legal norms and institutions adds desirable aspects such as rationality, 
procedure, fairness, or accountability to a prior condition that was dominated by power by 
providing a set of rules to settle disputes and thus promotes international stability and human 
rights.29 When viewed as an “an ‘autonomous system’ of concepts and institutions that may be 
used to oppose and limit state power,”30 law is thus deemed as a fight against politics or, put 
differently, anti-political. By extension, the anti-impunity norm is also based in the presumed 
binary between politics and law, and law’s ability to constrain politics. The movement that 
contributed to the norm’s emergence viewed past approaches to international conflicts as 
having been “unacceptably political.”31 Anti-impunity is deemed as anti-political.32  
International criminal law is thus deemed in opposition to sovereignty, as sovereignty 
traditionally enables the pursuit of politics without scrutiny and is used as a shield against 
condemnation for the commission of human rights abuses based on international law, and 
	
24 Mégret 2015, 78. 
25  Sriram 2010.   
26 Koskenniemi 1990, 5. 
27 De Hoon 2017, 609. 
28 Luban 2010, 2. See also Simpson 2007, 140.  
29 Hurd 2016, 96-97. 
30 Crawford and Koskenniemi 2012, 4-5. This view reflects Hurd’s conception of the enchanted 
vision of international law.   
31 Koskenniemi 2002, 12.  
32 Ferguson 1994, 255-256 as cited in Miller 2017, 159-160.   
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action to stop those abuses.33 Indeed, the incorporation into domestic and international legal 
regimes of the duty to hold individuals criminally accountable for grave abuses reduces 
governments’ freedom of action.34 Through a sense of state-based and collective responsibility 
to ensure criminal justice for international crimes committed by individuals against individuals, 
the anti-impunity turn prioritises the individual and thus reflects a move away from, and 
somewhat above, the state. As developed further in Chapter 2, the substantive norms within 
the relevant bodies of law, including international human rights law, international humanitarian 
law, and international criminal law, have the effect of limiting sovereignty by delimiting the 
legal conduct of states and by imposing a fragmented duty to prosecute abuses. Further, the 
institutions that have been created as part of the system of international criminal justice limit 
sovereignty as they “intrude on one of the most sacred areas of state sovereignty: criminal 
jurisdiction.”35 As one example of such institutions, the International Criminal Court (ICC) - a 
permanent, independent, and supranational institution with jurisdiction over crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide, and the crime of aggression - represents in many ways a step 
away from a state-centric international system and towards the construction of an international 
constitutional order and a universal community of humankind.36 Most clearly, the ICC takes 
away the right of states to decide when and how to conduct investigations and prosecutions.  
From an instrumental standpoint, the effort to hold individuals criminally accountable 
for grave crimes as a sovereignty-constraining force undergirds the idea, promoted by the 
United Nations, human rights advocates, and scholars, that doing so favours the end of 
hostilities as the presumed anti-politicality of law is assumed to neutrally regulate and constrain 
politics. This dovetailing of peace and justice gradually evolved from pursuing criminal 
accountability for grave crimes after conflict to doing so during conflict, based on the view that 
limiting the impunity of perpetrators of grave human rights abuses signals to parties to the 
conflict that using any means necessary to further their aims would entail legal consequences.37 
To be sure, the view of international criminal accountability as a means to address conflict is 
not universally held by international criminal lawyers. Many argue, from a deontological 
perspective, that justice must be done for the sake of upholding norms. Yet, as scholars 
including Moyn and Schabas note, international criminal law has indeed become “an 
	
33 Mills 2015, 208. For more, see Teitt 2017, 326; Brown 2015, 158.  
34 Kim and Sharman 2014, 420. 
35 Cassese 1998, 11.  
36 Hurd 2010, 235; Weller 2002. 
37 Rodman 2014, 439.  
 12 
overwhelmingly important feature of how conflicts are resolved”38 as justice is “said to make 
an important contribution when nasty regimes are replaced or when protracted conflict with an 
ethnic dimension is being calmed.”39  
This linkage was most evident in the early 1990s, as the creation by the UN Security 
Council under its Chapter VII mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1993 and 
1994, respectively, highlights how enforcing individual criminal accountability was integrated 
as part of the response to the crises in the Balkans and in Rwanda. This was based on a 
definition of international crimes as “those international criminal law normative proscriptions 
whose violation is likely to affect the peace and security of humankind or is contrary to 
fundamental humanitarian values, or which is the product of state action or a state-favoring 
policy.”41 This linkage is also reflected in the ICTY’s mandate and website, which states “[t]he 
Tribunal has laid the foundations for what is now the accepted norm for conflict resolution and 
post-conflict development across the globe, specifically that leaders suspected of mass crimes 
will face justice.”42 While the ICTY and ICTR were created as ad hoc, time-limited, and 
situation-specific tribunals, the idea that justice should be pursued as a means to restore peace, 
rather than only after the end of hostilities, gained new prominence with the establishment of 
the permanent ICC.43 The view that the Court is the pinnacle of dovetailing peace and justice 
is reflected in the words of the former ICC Prosecutor, “The [Rome] Statute ensures that the 
law will guarantee lasting peace, and that impunity for the worst perpetrators is no longer an 
	
38 Moyn 2017, 68.  
39 Schabas 2016, 5-6. See also Bass 2000, 284. 
41 Bassiouni 2003b, 24.  
42 Describing its creation, the ICTY states that the findings of the UN Commission of Experts 
“led the Security Council to decide that it would establish an international tribunal for persons 
responsible for these crimes in order to stop the violence and safeguard international peace and 
security.” [emphasis added] (ICTY n.d. “About the ICTY” and “The Tribunal – 
Establishment”) Regarding the conflict in the Balkans, the UN SC Resolution 827 (1993) was 
passed while the hostilities were ongoing. Regarding the conflict in Rwanda, the UNSC 
Resolution 955 (1994) expresses the same rationale. “Convinced that in the particular 
circumstances of Rwanda, the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of 
international humanitarian law would enable this aim to be achieved and would contribute to 
the process of national reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace.” UN SC 
Resolution 955 (1994). 
43 The concept of ‘peace’ used in this thesis refers to ‘negative peace,’ or the absence of 
violence.  
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option.”44 For Bassiouni, the ICC was created to “remind governments that realpolitik, which 
sacrifices justice at the altar of political settlements, is no longer accepted.”45  Of the ten 
investigations currently open, six were opened while the conflict was still highly volatile.46 
 Resting on the same vision of law as a rule to rein in realpolitik, holding individuals 
criminally accountable for grave abuses is also often deemed to boost government legitimacy. 
The notion that curbing impunity would imbue “the new order with legitimacy and authority”47 
gained traction as shifts in the constitutive standards of sovereignty developed towards an ethos 
of ‘sovereignty as responsibility.’ Building upon UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s 
Agenda for Peace of 1992, this concept views the state as accountable to its own population as 
well as to the society of states for the protection of its population and that “respect for human 
rights, therefore, is an essential element of responsible sovereignty.”48 Sovereignty has never 
been as absolute and uncompromised as this simplistic portrayal implies.49 Yet, deepening 
support for the idea that sovereign statehood entails a responsibility to not only protect 
populations from, but also provide redress for, grave abuses means that the parameters of 
sovereign legitimacy have changed.  
  Thus, in light of the high sovereignty costs that the anti-impunity norm is considered to 
impose on states,50  states would reasonably be extremely averse to launching national or 
international investigations into perpetrators of abuses, especially in situations of conflict 
where all sides, including government forces, are likely to have committed abuses that may 
amount to international crimes. If, in other words, the fight against impunity “acts as the thin 
edge of the wedge meant to open up state sovereignty in the name of universal moral and legal 
	
44  Moreno Ocampo 2007c. See also Bensouda 2013a. Similarly, former ICC Prosecutor 
Moreno Ocampo stated, “The International Criminal Court…aims to confront centuries-old 
methods of behaviour – those of conflict and war, the abuse of civilians, women and children 
– and to reshape the norms of human conduct while violence is still ongoing, thus aiming, as 
stated in the Rome Statute, to contribute to the prevention of future crimes.” Moreno Ocampo 
2007d, 8   
45 Bassiouni 2013a, 649.  
46  These include Uganda (2003), Democratic Republic of Congo (2004), Central African 
Republic (2004), Darfur/Sudan (2005), Libya (2011), and Mali (2012). The decisions to open 
investigations in Kenya (2010), Côte d’Ivoire (2011), Georgia (2016), and Burundi (2017) 
came shortly after the end of the acute crises in these countries.  
47 Teitel 2014, 157.    
48 UN Doc. A/63/644 (2009) para 16; UN Doc. A/47/277 (1992). 
49 Glanville 2010.     
50 Abbott defines sovereignty cost as “the symbolic and material costs of diminished national 
autonomy.” Abbott 1999, 361. 
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principles,” 51  then the frequency with which states do adopt anti-impunity measures is 
intriguing, especially in situations of conflict. Beginning in the early 1990s, there has been a 
striking and unprecedented spike in domestic efforts worldwide to address past human rights 
abuses by focusing on individual criminal responsibility.52 Over 60% of conflicts since World 
War II have included at least one “judicial or quasi-judicial process initiated during an armed 
conflict that attempts to address wrongdoings that have taken or are taking place as part of that 
conflict.” 53  More broadly, between 1980 and 2004, 48 states launched human rights 
prosecutions at the national level.54 Also, between 1990 and 2008, there were approximately 
40 prosecutions of heads of state for human rights crimes.55  
 Moreover, if states’ ratification of the ICC Rome Statute is said to be “the most puzzling 
aspect of the Court” and “truly anomalous,” 56  even more puzzling is the number of 
governments that proactively invite the ICC to investigate crimes committed on its territory in 
the midst of armed conflict. Reflecting the wider scepticism of negotiators and non-
governmental organizations, former Prosecutor of the ICTY Louise Arbour said that she could 
not “think of a single state that will voluntarily defer to the jurisdiction of the ICC if one of 
their nationals is implicated…it seems to me absolutely clear that the first thing the Prosecutor 
is going to have to do … is get into a huge battle with the state to try to get jurisdiction in the 
ICC.”57 Yet, governments in nine states have taken measures to facilitate the opening of ICC 
investigations into crimes committed in their territory or by their nationals.58 As shown in Table 
	
51 Pensky 2016, 492. 
52 Sikkink 2011, 21. 
53 Loyle and Binningsbø 2018, 444.  
54 Kim and Sikkink 2010.  
55 Lutz and Reiger 2008. 
56 Simmons and Danner 2010, 227.  
57 Llewellyn and Raponi 1999, 97.      
58 These self-referrals and Article 12(3) declarations have occurred in three waves. The first 
three cases at the ICC were all based on self-referrals (Uganda in December 2003, Democratic 
Republic of Congo in March 2004, and the Central African Republic in December 2004). The 
second wave started six years later. In December 2010, Côte d’Ivoire confirmed an Article 
12(3) declaration that had been issued by the Gbagbo government in April 2003. In July 2012, 
the Malian transitional government issued a self-referral. In 2014, the government in Central 
African Republic issued another self-referral regarding the renewed violence. In the third wave, 
a state has requested the ICC to open an investigation into alleged crimes committed on its 
territory nearly every year since 2013: the government of Comoros in May 2013, the 
government of Ukraine in April 2014 and again in September 2015, the government of 
Palestine in January 2015 and again in May 2018, and the government of Gabon in September 
2016. 
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1, there have been eight instances of governments issuing self-referrals and four instances of 
governments lodging Article 12(3) declarations, with all governments requesting ICC 
intervention either during or shortly after armed conflict or post-electoral violence on their 
territory.60 Six of the ten current ICC investigations stem from governments requesting the 
court to investigate in their country.61 
 
Research Question  
 
If the anti-impunity norm is indeed about “radically piercing the sovereign veil,”62 then 
how to reconcile states’ engagement with the imperative to hold perpetrators of grave abuses 
criminally accountable in the midst of armed conflict, in which the government’s very 
existence and legitimacy was under threat, with the norm’s role as sovereignty-constraining 
and as “an attempt to construct a bulwark of law against politics?”63 Untangling this puzzle, 
this thesis examines cases in which governments express support for, and implement, anti-
impunity measures in contexts of internal armed conflict marked by contested governmental 
legitimacy. Two under-studied cases - the 2010-2011 post-electoral crisis in Côte d’Ivoire and 
its aftermath as well as the ongoing conflict in Mali triggered in 2012 – offer a perfect lens 
through which to study this phenomenon. Overall, this thesis asks how and why does actors’ 
usage of the anti-impunity norm influence the political dynamics of the internal conflicts in 
Côte d’Ivoire (November 2010 – July 2018) and Mali (January 2012 – July 2018).  
This thesis focuses predominantly on the decision-making and conduct of national 
government actors in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. Exploring national officials’ ‘engagement’ with 
the anti-impunity norm means analysing how and why actors take measures in relation to the 
normative imperative to hold individuals accountable for the perpetration of grave human 
rights abuses. Studying ‘engagement’ is thus broader than ‘compliance,’ as it captures 
behaviour that goes beyond actors’ legal obligations, ranging from discursive expressions of 
	
60 The frequency with which states have issued territorial state referrals has even led to new 
terminology: though the term ‘self-referral’ does not appear in the Rome Statute, it has become 
common parlance to refer to territorial state referrals as ‘self-referrals.’ 
61 These include Uganda in December 2003, Democratic Republic of Congo in March 2004, 
Central African Republic in December 2004 and again in 2014, Mali in July 2012, and Côte 
d’Ivoire in 2010. 
62 Mégret 2015b, 38.   
63  Engle, Miller, and Davis 2017, 5. 
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commitment to the norm to practical measures such as requesting ICC intervention. While it is 
not a ‘compliance’ study, studying how actors engage with the norm encompasses analysing 
how actors, discursively and practically, both support and undermine the normative imperative 
to pursue justice for these crimes. Relatedly, studying ‘engagement’ in this manner does not 
aim to analyse how actors try to adapt and reform the meaning of the norm to local 
circumstances, as done in ‘norm localization’ or ‘norm circulation’ approaches, but rather 
assumes the norm has a fixed meaning and studies how actors use the norm to shape political 
dynamics.64    
 This research question is particularly relevant in light of the current backlash against 
human rights and the evident fragility of the normative consensus underpinning this ‘justice 
cascade,’ even among states that have been supporters of the strengthening of the anti-impunity 
norm. For instance, between January 2017 and September 2018, in addition to increased 
support at the African Union for mass withdrawal from the Rome Statute, there were initiatives 
by governments in four African states to withdraw from the Rome Statute: Burundi, South 
Africa, The Gambia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.65 Shedding light on cases in 
which governments do not view the ICC’s role in upholding the normative imperative to pursue 
criminal accountability for human rights abuses as a violation of national sovereignty is a 
valuable complement to better understanding those that do presume an opposition between 
anti-impunity measures and state interests.    
 The novelty of this study can be illustrated by noting what it does not seek to do. It does 
not aim to examine the causal impact of anti-impunity measures, both national human rights 
trials and the ICC’s intervention, on the rate of violence, the rate of abuses, or peace duration, 
as various studies have done.66  Nor does it seek to measure the impact of anti-impunity 
measures on conflict resolution. The research objective here is not to explain the different 
outcomes in the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, but rather to illustrate the process of norm 
exploitation itself. The study contributes to norm implementation scholarship but its objective 
here is not to assess the robustness of the anti-impunity norm, leaving the opportunity to 
	
64 Acharya 2004 and 2013.  
65 As of September 2018, Burundi is the only state that has officially withdrawn from the Rome 
Statute. Further, the United States boldly contributed to this anti-ICC mobilisation in 
September 2018 when National Security Advisor John Bolton made an incendiary speech 
denouncing the ICC and threatening sanctions against its judges and staff. AP 2018.     
66  Wippman 1999; Kim and Sikkink 2010; Sikkink 2011; Cronin-Furman 2013; Jo and 
Simmons 2014; Broache 2016; Hillebrecht 2016; Lie, Binningsbø, and Gates 2007.     
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interpret what the study’s findings reveal about the norm’s strength or weakness to future 
research. Further, while the study discusses the legitimation strategies of the governments in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, it does not aim to assess whether the governments ‘reached’ legitimacy 
in both contexts. Rather, this thesis asks how and why does the usage of the anti-impunity norm 
by elite actors shape the political dynamics within the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire (November 
2010 – July 2018) and Mali (January 2012 – July 2018).  
 In answering this research question, this thesis contributes to an exploding field of 
research: the politics of pursuing justice in conflict-affected countries. Much has indeed 
changed since Abbott wrote in 1999 that relatively little international relations research existed 
on the atrocities regime.67 Much of this literature seeks to understand how the peace vs. justice 
dilemma – a classic yet still central debate in the judicialization of international relations – 
plays out in practice. At a basic level, debates around the inherent value of the anti-impunity 
norm echoes a broader debate between legalists and sovereigntists, between those who view 
sovereignty as the bête-noire of international criminal law and between those who view 
international criminal law as an unwelcome transcendence of sovereignty.68  This clash is 
captured by Cassese’s view that “either one supports the rule of law, or one supports state 
sovereignty. The two are not…compatible.”69 
 For the proponents of pursuing justice within conflict, the norm’s value is justified 
interchangeably according to both deontological and consequentialist rationales. For the former 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, “when it comes to peace and justice, we are living in a 
new world.”73 Invoking the deontological rationale, he stated, “Yes, it may be true: demanding 
criminal accountability, at the wrong time, can discourage warring parties from sitting down at 
the negotiating table. Yes, it may even perpetuate bloodshed. Even so, one thing is clear: the 
time has passed when we might speak of peace versus justice, or think of them as somehow 
opposed to each other.”74 In this sense, as there is a moral obligation and a legal duty to hold 
perpetrators of international crimes accountable, justice must be done irrespective of its 
consequences and should never be compromised or sacrificed.75 Invoking the consequentialist 
rationale, former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, “Peace and justice, if properly 
	
67 Abbott 1999, 364.    
68 Cryer 2005, 981.  
69 Broomhall 2003, 56; Cassese 1998.  
73 United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 2012. 
74 United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 2010b, 4. 
75 Nouwen 2012, 338. 
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pursued, promote and sustain one another. The question can never be whether to pursue justice, 
but rather when and how.” 76  Along this rationale, as Vinjamuri notes, proponents have 
increasingly emphasised the “instrumental purposes of justice, essentially recasting justice as 
a tool of peacebuilding.”77  
 For the sceptics, the anti-impunity norm inexorably clashes with state sovereignty, the 
fundamental cornerstone of international order. In a firebrand speech, US National Security 
Adviser John Bolton stated that the ICC “unacceptably threatens American sovereignty and 
US national security interests.” 78  From a much more nuanced position, others note that 
pursuing justice undermines peace in the short and long term. The paralleled increase in 
negotiated settlements and the move towards pursuing justice during conflict has created new 
dilemmas for mediators, dilemmas rendered even more difficult when the ICC, as a permanent 
independent legal institution, is involved.79  One commentator cautions that “the quest for 
justice for yesterday’s victims of atrocities should not be pursued in such a manner that it makes 
today’s living the dead of tomorrow.”80  
 To study the role of international law in politics, this thesis adopts a lens that improves 
upon the limitations of conventional approaches. Scholars tend to diverge between “those who 
see [international law] as important and those who do not,” or between liberals and realists.81 
On the one hand, liberal scholars explore how institutions can optimise international 
cooperation and help overcome conflict in the anarchic international system, by analysing 
design features such as enforcement measures, membership criteria, and transaction costs.82 
Applied to the atrocities regime, this approach predicts that a well-designed regime can hold 
perpetrators of atrocities accountable, deter future abuses, and lessen tensions.84  Yet, this 
approach does not sufficiently consider the demands of politics as liberals tend to minimise the 
role of power within politics, and instead focus on how institutions and reforms can overcome 
collective action problems.85  
	
76 UN Doc. S/2004/616 (2004).  
77 Vinjamuri 2010, 191; Nouwen 2012, 331.   
78 AP 2018. 
79 Toft 2010, 1; Zartman 2005, 2.  
80 Anonymous 1996, 258.  
81 Hurd 2016, 96. 
82 Rudolph 2001, 658; Fehl 2009, 359 – 360; De Silva 2017. See also Abbott and Snidal 1998.   
84 Rudolph 2001, 659. 
85 Jackson 2017b, 617; Hurrell 2001, 330.  
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 On the other hand, realists generally hold that international law does little to shape 
government behaviour and rather reflects, rather than constrains, state power. International law 
is thus deemed a function of serving the political purposes of powerful states and conditioned 
by the vicissitudes of diplomatic power and strategy, and the perceived weak enforcement leads 
to expectation of low state compliance if doing so counters material interests. While some 
realists acknowledge that law can influence domestic politics as well as foreign policy 
decisions, through for instance lobbying by human rights organisations, international law will 
not inherently constrain the powerful since they craft and enforce the rules.87 From a more 
normative angle, beyond deeming law to be epiphenomenal to international politics, realists 
also tend to argue that international law should not shape conduct, as it can distract and divert 
from important state matters.88 Applied to the atrocities regime, realists argue that norms and 
law do not constrain power but are rather a function of power and see the ICC, for instance, as 
a tool of powerful states that (ab)uses the language of law to discipline some states while 
protecting others.89 Yet, realists do not appreciate how norms, rules, institutions, and values 
are not simply reflections of power and material forces.91 As Koskenniemi notes, realists do 
not sufficiently consider how the concepts they study - namely interest, power, and security - 
are themselves defined and operate within a normative context of international legal 
discourse.92  
 Despite their disagreement, both liberals and realists share a similar assumption of the 
relationship between law and politics. They assume law to be a set of rules that is inherently 
constraining and regulative of state power and the behaviour of actors. While both assume this 
vision of law, liberals find evidence that the choices of governments can be, and are indeed, 
constrained by international law. On the other hand, realists generally do not.93 Rather than 
debating whether law matters or not, as it most certainly does, or whether the anti-impunity 
norm should be applied or not, this thesis adopts a different lens. Promoted by Hurd, an 
‘agnostic’ view of international law examines “how international law is used in politics and 
how politics is shaped by law.”94 Such a view has been welcomed as a useful corrective to the 
	
87 Krasner 2002, 266.  
88 Kennan 1951 cited in Simmons 2009, 10. 
89 Mégret 2002, 1267; Ainley 2011, 319.  
91 Hurrell 2001, 330. 
92 Koskenniemi 1996, 465. 
93 Hurd 2017c. 
94 Hurd 2014, 46-47. This ‘agnostic’ view of international law refers to what Hurd notes is the 
disenchanted view of international law. However, in this author’s view, the term ‘agnostic’ is 
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tendency to distinguish between law and politics, or an “overly positivist view” of international 
law that dominates the literature. 95  In contrast to the regulative model, this approach 
acknowledges the embeddedness, rather than opposition, between international law and 
international politics. It does not presume law to be an inherent constraint on state power and 
it accepts that implementing law may or may not lead to valuable goals of more order, 
accountability, and justice.96 From this agnostic lens, this thesis assumes, as do Crawford and 
Koskenniemi, that “international law is what ‘we’ make of it” 97 and explores how, why, to 
what effect, and for whose benefit?98  
 This view shares constructivists’ focus on norm diffusion and, as such, this thesis 
contributes to the scholarly literature on the relationship between norms and state behaviour. 
While classic approaches to norm diffusion view norms as shaping state behaviour through 
gradual and staged internalization of the norm’s appropriateness in large part due to the 
influence of pressure groups, this thesis joins a stream of scholarship that explores the strategic 
use of norms and thus considers the influence of power and interests in the process of norm 
diffusion. In this sense, it differs slightly from earlier scholarship’s tendency to  “counterpose 
the logic of consequences with the logic of appropriateness.”101 Indeed, viewing power as a 
significant and even sometimes prevailing force in international relations is not inconsistent 
with viewing norms as central to shaping politics.102  Assuming states are strategic actors 
operating in socially constructed contexts, this view examines the power-politics that take place 
within and through international law and explores “how legalization shapes and is shaped by 
political power.”103  
	
preferable to ‘disenchanted,’ as the latter implies a much more negative and disillusioned view 
of international law than the neutral one that Hurd presents. Rather than being disappointed or 
with international law, as the term ‘disenchanted’ implies, this view is based on agnostic, or 
neutral, presuppositions about international law. 
95 Comments by Ian Johnstone and Hilary Charlesworth on back cover of Hurd 2017a. 
96 Hurd 2017a, 3; Hurd 2016, 97. This approach reflects with Dancy and Fariss term the 
“constitutive model,” which examines the generative qualities of human rights law and assumes 
that human rights law “can become politically and socially productive, often in unpredictable 
ways.” Dancy and Fariss 2017, 12. 
97 Crawford and Koskenniemi 2012, 7. 
98 Nouwen 2013, 33.    
101 Kim and Sharman 2014, 422. 
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More specifically, this thesis contributes to a pool of studies that examines how the 
pursuit of justice for grave abuses can form part of political strategy and views transitional 
justice mechanisms as emerging from, and being shaped by, the complex and sometimes 
backdoor elite political bargaining processes.104 Studying the domestic political conditions 
within which the anti-impunity norm is implemented, or undermined, is thus crucial to 
understanding why the desirable goal of bringing justice to victims of mass atrocities can be 
fulfilled or left unfulfilled as it becomes entangled in domestic political contestation. 105 
However, rather than assume that states’ engagement with the anti-impunity norm for strategic 
purposes as inherently normatively objectionable, as some argue, this thesis adopts the original 
meaning of the term “lawfare” as a value-neutral concept, as it depends on how the norm is 
used.106 This thesis thus offers a more refined way to analyse why, how, and to what effects do 





This thesis argues that national authorities in both Côte d’Ivoire and Mali used the anti-
impunity norm as a resource in their strategies of political contestation in contexts of internal 
armed conflict marked by weakened governmental legitimacy. Deploying measures that both 
supported and undermined the imperative to investigate and prosecute grave abuses enabled 
embattled governments to influence the political dynamics of a conflict-affected country, 
influencing parties’ reputations and power relations. Doing so helped in bolstering the 
government’s legitimacy through the delegitimation of its opposition.  
	
104 Bell 2017, 102. See, for instance, Bell 2017; Clark 2019; Lake 2017; Bass 2016; Peskin and 
Boduszynski 2016; Cronin-Furman 2015; Rodman 2014; Rodman and Booth 2013; Nouwen 
and Werner 2010; Simmons and Danner 2010; Lamont 2010; Subotić 2009; Grodsky 2009; 
Peskin 2008; Branch 2007; Rowen and Rowen 2017; Leclercq 2017; Loyle and Davenport 
2016; and Mihr 2017. 
105 Subotić 2009, 6. 
106 According to some, the use of law as a weapon is undesirable as law should be divorced 
from politics. However, according to the former Prosecutor of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, law can and should “be used as a powerful weapon.” Crane 2010, 201. Rather than the 
pejorative connotation that the term has acquired, which views lawfare as the misuse and abuse 
of law for pre-determined politico-military goals, lawfare was coined as an a priori 
ideologically neutral concept. On the original meaning of lawfare, see Kittrie 2016, 6; Werner 
2010.   
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This was achieved through a process of ‘norm exploitation.’ Coined here, norm 
exploitation refers to how actors can draw benefits from the norm’s specific features and 
functions, in order to further a particular objective. First, the way in which elite actors pursue 
justice for grave abuses is arguably based on an assessment of how they should engage with 
their opposition in order to gain an advantage towards achieving their objectives in the context 
of internal conflict. In this sense, the way in which individual accountability for international 
crimes is pursued reflects a cost-benefit analysis on whether to exclude or include given 
interlocutors, depending on the interlocutor’s political value to elite objectives. Second, actors 
capitalise on the norm’s enforcement features, namely the state’s relative centrality in the 
norm’s enforcement at both the national level and within the Rome Statute system, to navigate 
the flexibility within the content of the norm itself.  
Third, the anti-impunity norm’s functions make it a particularly useful resource for 
actors to shape the political dynamics of conflict-affected contexts and further its strategy to 
boost its legitimation as the norm’s two functions overlap with two basic criteria of government 
legitimacy: actors’ claim to being members of the international community and actors’ ability 
to exercise effective control. First, the norm’s branding effect serves as a way to villainize and 
privilege political actors as (il)legitimate, thereby enabling the government to reify its claims 
that it belongs to the international community and discredit its opposition. Second, in parallel, 
the norm serves as a means of coercive leverage and neutralisation, enabling the government 
to empower and weaken certain actors in order to optimise its ability to exercise effective 
control over the territory. Capitalising on the norm’s features and functions can thus help 
discursively include and exclude, as well as empower and weaken, actors, thereby serving as a 
resource in the pursuit of broader objectives.  
In sum, this thesis thus shows how elite actors set the parameters of accountability and 
impunity in light of their objectives within the political bargaining processes, rather than simply 
as a function of having internalized the ‘oughtness’ of the anti-impunity norm through 
international and domestic pressure by pro-human rights groups. Applicable to similar contexts 
as well, the concept of norm exploitation offers a way to analyse how and why the strategic 
deployment of accountability by elites can further objectives, by exploring the aims, selectivity, 






This is the first and only two-country study of the politics of anti-impunity efforts in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. Despite the launch of national and international justice measures in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Mali in 2010 and 2012, respectively, and despite the trials of four individuals 
at the ICC, these two cases are overlooked in the voluminous literature on conflict-related 
justice and the ICC. Even recent multi-case studies on conflict-related justice processes do not, 
or only very briefly, explore these cases.108 This thesis thus bridges a linguistic-thematic divide: 
while the literature on conflict-related justice and the ICC is dominated by Anglophone 
scholars and has not fully explored the Côte d’Ivoire and Mali cases, the literature on Côte 
d’Ivoire and Mali is primarily generated by Francophone scholars and has not fully addressed 
the issue of conflict-related justice. 
This thesis is not a strictly comparative study and does not seek to systematically 
compare and contrast outcomes across these contexts. Rather, exploring these two cases 
acknowledges that “politics and law may interact simultaneously or sequentially in ways that 
take different forms and exert different relative primacy under different scope conditions.”109 
Based on a most-similar case comparison, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali were selected not to be 
representative of all potential types of conflict, but as a unique pair whose similarities as well 
as key differences allow for loosely comparative study into why, how, and to what effect did 
actors use the anti-impunity norm in contexts of internal conflict.110 
In terms of their similarities, these two cases of internal armed conflict in the same 
region over the same time period feature similar actors that officially expressed similar support 
of the anti-impunity norm and implemented similar anti-impunity measures. Indeed, national 
authorities in both countries, where the governmental legitimacy was intensely contested and 
where forces on all sides were accused of human rights abuses, including governmental forces, 
expressed support in public statements for the importance of pursuing justice for grave crimes 
and implemented anti-impunity measures at the domestic levels, including issuing arrest 
warrants, holding trials, cooperating with the ICC in transferring indicted individuals, and 
	
108 Hayner 2018; Clark 2018.  
109 Vinjamuri and Snyder 2015, 304.   
110 Bennett and Elman 2007. 
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requesting the establishment of international commissions of inquiry to investigate the 
commission of international crimes. In parallel, governments in both countries selectively 
released prisoners and issued formal and de facto amnesties. These measures were part of a 
broader set of transitional justice measures, including the establishment of truth and 
reconciliation commissions in both countries – though these non-judicial efforts fall outside 
the scope of this thesis.  
Further, the governments in both countries requested investigations by the ICC at the 
very beginning of their respective crises. The ICC investigation in Mali was based on a 
territorial state referral, or ‘self-referral.’ As one of the three mechanisms available to trigger 
the ICC’s jurisdiction, the most direct way for states to request the opening of an ICC 
investigation into crimes committed in their territory or by their nationals is through a state 
referral. According to Article 14 of the Rome Statute, States Parties can refer to the ICC 
Prosecutor a situation in the territory of another State Party or in their own territory, known as 
a territorial state referral, in which one or more crimes within the ICC’s subject-matter 
jurisdiction appear to have been committed and request the Prosecutor to investigate such 
crimes.111 The less direct way for states to request the opening of ICC investigation into crimes 
committed in their territory or by their nationals is to lodge an Article 12(3) declaration.112 
States that are not States Parties but that seek to establish grounds on which the Court can base 
its jurisdiction can issue such a declaration, in which the government accepts the exercise of 
the Court’s jurisdiction with respect to a particular time-bound situation in their country. 
Following an Article 12(3) declaration, the Court’s jurisdiction still needs to be triggered by 
one of the three trigger mechanisms. The ICC investigation in Côte d’Ivoire was not formally 
a self-referral, but rather was opened through the Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers based on 
the Article 12(3) declarations issued by the Ivorian government. The Ouattara administration 
issued two reconfirmations, in December 2010 and May 2011, of the original Article 12(3) 
declaration lodged by the Gbagbo administration in April 2003. The reason the Ouattara 
	
111 The two other mechanisms by which to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction are the Prosecutor’s 
proprio motu powers to independently initiate investigations into crimes committed by 
nationals, or in the territory, of States Parties and through the United Nations Security 
Council’s ability to refer cases to the ICC. 
112 According to Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, “If the acceptance of a State which is not a 
Party to this Statute is required under paragraph 2, that State may, by declaration lodged with 
the Registrar, accept the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court with respect to the crime in 
question. The accepting State shall cooperate with the Court without any delay or exception in 
accordance with Part 9.” 
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administration did not issue a ‘self-referral’ was because it was not possible, as Côte d’Ivoire 
had not yet ratified the Rome Statute. The Côte d’Ivoire situation is thus distinct from a formal 
self-referral but indeed comparable in terms of its political dimension. While self-referrals and 
the lodging of Article 12(3) declarations are legally distinct, both measures reflect the 
government’s similar political interest in having the ICC investigate crimes committed in their 
territory or by their nationals. More broadly, comparing cases in which governments 
proactively engage with the anti-impunity norm with cases in which governments actively 
reject the norm can obscure the internal political dynamics and cloud sharp analysis.  
Additionally, despite the highly distinctive origins and dynamics of both conflicts, Côte 
d’Ivoire and Mali is the only pair of countries that featured significant overlap between actors 
involved in responding to and managing the conflict over the same time period and in the same 
region. Experiencing moments in which its legitimacy was in serious jeopardy, the 
governments in both countries welcomed significant international political, military, and legal 
intervention by the same international organisations and institutions, namely the United 
Nations, ECOWAS, and the African Union over the same period of time. In addition, France 
played a key role in managing the crises in both countries, including through internationally-
sanctioned military intervention based on requests by respective governments. Importantly, the 
aim of the international interventions in both countries was to bolster the legitimacy of the 
government and the authority of the state more broadly. 
A key difference is the political landscape and outcome of these two conflicts. The 
politico-military conflict in Côte d’Ivoire is dualist, in light of the historic and continued 
polarization between pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara sides, and the post-electoral crisis 
ultimately ended through one-sided (electoral-)military victory. In contrast, the Malian conflict 
is pluralist in nature, as the government is confronting a variety of armed opposition groups, 
marked notably by extremely fluidity between proliferating groups. While the conflict is far 
from over and hostilities continue, the government, with support and pressure by the UN, AU, 
and ECOWAS, is broadly pursuing a negotiated settlement with some groups combined with 
a military approach towards other groups.  
While relevant to a wide variety of contexts, the dissertation’s theoretical framework is 
not assumed to be generally applicable across cases irrespective of their differences. The scope 
conditions for this study’s theoretical claims are the following. The framework is relevant to 
states affected by internal armed conflicts, and takes a broad definition of the duration of 
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conflict, studying both during-conflict and post-conflict dynamics. The framework thus does 
not directly apply to other types of politically volatile situations, such as democratic transitions 
or non-internal armed conflicts. Relatedly, this framework focuses on contexts in which anti-
impunity measures are taken during, or shortly after, the conflict, and are thus directly relevant 
to the political dynamics of the conflict. By extension, a relevant condition is the expression of 
support, both discursively and through practical measures, for the anti-impunity norm. While 
governments that express support may of course exhibit variance in the genuineness of their 
commitment to the norm, the way governments position themselves in relation to the norm 
matters, as this can range across the spectrum from antipreneurs to entrepreneurs.113 This 
framework is thus not applicable to states in which governments reject the legitimacy of the 
norm itself or the institutions that enforce it, including the International Criminal Court. 
A further relevant condition is the strength of the state’s domestic institutions, namely 
the separation of powers between the executive and judicial branches. A common characteristic 
of conflict-affected contexts is the weakening of judicial independence due to the consequences 
of hostilities on the practical capacity of judicial actors but also due to the increased interest by 
the executive and possibly legislative authorities to shape the judiciary due to heightened stakes 
during and shortly after conflict. The weakening of judicial independence in conflict-affected 
contexts may not be strictly related to the hostilities, and can be a longer-term rather than 
context-dependent feature.             
This framework is not necessarily limited to a particular type of regime. The two cases 
of Côte d’Ivoire and Mali are multi-party democracies, albeit featuring structural weaknesses 
within their democracies, but the framework is not only applicable to multi-party democracies. 
However, while this framework could theoretically apply to authoritarian states or consolidated 
democracies, the likelihood of these types of regimes fulfilling the other conditions (namely 
the expression of support for the anti-impunity norm in authoritarian states and the weak 
judicial independence in consolidated democracies) is, however, likely to be low. In terms of 
temporal scope conditions, as this thesis focuses on cases in which governments have requested 
ICC intervention, the framework is applicable to situations since the establishment of the ICC 
in 2002. More broadly, this date is also key in the evolution of the strengthening and 
crystallization of the anti-impunity norm, as the ICC enforces a ‘strong’ version of the anti-
	
113 Bloomfield 2016; Mills and Bloomfield 2018. 
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impunity norm.114 While tailored, this dissertation’s framework is more widely applicable than 




This study responds to calls made by leading scholars to empirically examine the effects 
of international law through methods of political science.115 Methodologically, the study is 
grounded in in-depth qualitative case study research strategies. The conceptual framework was 
developed by first conducting a review of literature on the anti-impunity norm’s 
implementation, norm diffusion, and government legitimation. Then, the data gathered 
empirically, namely elite interviews and documentary evidence was analysed through process-
tracing and content analysis. These are the most appropriate methods, particularly for analysis 
of norm implementation in politically-volatile contexts, as process-tracing helps inductively 
identify the strategies used by decision-makers and the relationship between certain factors and 
variables and decision processes and outcomes.116 Since decisions surrounding conflict-related 
accountability are a function of the particular power-laden dynamics of each conflict, goals of 
political leaders, and concerted advocacy by activists, such a methodology is particularly 
useful.118 Based on the collection and analysis of data, the conceptual framework was modified 
over time through an iterative process between empirical research and theory development.  
This research draws upon several sources of evidence. This includes documentary 
evidence ranging from declarations in both English and French by government officials, 
statements by governments and international organisations (both official and leaked), reports 
by national and international human rights organisations and other non-governmental 
organisations, media reports, and legal transcripts, as well as secondary source literature.120 
This evidence base also included “opportunistic” 121  data collection in the form of 
	
114 Mills and Bloomfield 2018, 2. “And the ICC is dedicated to enforcing a ‘strong’ version of 
this norm – meaning all perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes, including states’ highest officials, 
can be held accountable before competent courts.” 
115 According to André Nollkaemper, “[E]mpirical enquiry […] into what is actually going on 
is rare…Such research can rely on tools and methodologies used routinely in political science 
and economics.” Nollkaemper 2016.    
116 Mintz, Geva, Redd, and Carnes 1997, 556; Betts and Orchard 2014, 19.  
118 Sieff and Vinjamuri Wright 1999. 
120 All translations of French-language sources and interviews are the author’s own. 
121 Hartley 2005, 324.    
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autobiographical books written by key actors about the events in question.122 Though a rare 
source of insight that helps corroborate information and build a kaleidoscopic vision of the 
five-month crisis, these ‘tell-all books’ were treated, just like elite interviews, with a healthy 
degree of critical distance.   
Also, in-depth fieldwork is one of the hallmarks of “implementation research” as it 
enables the study of the micro-mechanisms of norm implementation.123 This thesis draws upon 
83 elite interviews conducted with 71 respondents.124 These interviews were gathered through 
fieldwork in Abidjan (October-December 2015, January-March 2017), Paris (February-April 
2016), The Hague (January 2016, September 2016, and September 2017), as well as by 
phone/Skype. As security concerns complicated the feasibility of conducting fieldwork in Mali, 
interviews were conducted in person, over the phone and via Skype with relevant 
individuals.125  
Interviewees were selected based on their first-hand knowledge of the political context 
and judicial processes regarding conflict-related abuses, forming a fairly small “sample 
universe.”126 Interviewees included current and former government officials and opposition 
leaders, UN officials, ambassadors and other diplomats, civil society leaders, members of 
national judiciaries, and representatives of international and national human rights 
organisations. As the interviewees did not form part of a clear and predetermined category of 
individuals, the “snowball sampling” method helped identify other relevant contacts. This 
method is particularly useful in accessing interviewees in light of the sensitivity of the research 
topic, as a chain of referrals increases rapport and trust.127  
The interviews were semi-structured, as these diverse actors all had unique positions 
and areas of expertise. Depending on their perspective, interviewees were asked to comment 
upon events they were personally involved in, explain the intentions behind their conduct, and 
	
122 These include books by the former President of Côte d’Ivoire Laurent Gbagbo, former 
Minister of Youth Charles Blé Goudé, former French Ambassador to Côte d’Ivoire Jean-Marc 
Simon, former French President François Hollande, and former UN Special Representative for 
the Secretary-General in Côte d’Ivoire Young Jin Choi.  
123 Betts and Orchard 2014, 19.  
124 Interviewees were sometimes interviewed several times in light of their in-depth knowledge 
of the subject.  
125  The Department of Politics and International Studies (POLIS) of the University of 
Cambridge refused to authorise the author’s planned trip to conduct fieldwork in Mali.  
126 Robinson 2014, 25.    
127 Clark 2006.   
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corroborate or challenge other interpretations of events.128 As ‘insiders,’ interviewees were 
also asked to help access helpful data sources, such as draft versions of peace agreements and 
policy and legal documents. The data generated through primary and secondary sources was, 
wherever possible, cross-validated and triangulated to optimise analytical accuracy and 
verifiability. Interviews were conducted in English and French by the author without 
translation. In light of the sensitivity of certain information, the conversations were tape-
recorded only when the interviewee explicitly agreed to the recording. Equally, some 
interviewees’ identities are kept anonymous as they may not have been authorised to disclose 
such information or when the publication of such information could have negative 
consequences. When including contextual details, the date, or the location of the interview 
would divulge identifying information, this information is omitted from the reference. Overall, 
this empirical approach, grounded in two in-depth qualitative case studies, can help probe and 
nuance the findings generated from the large-n quantitative cross-case comparative approach 
used by many influential studies in the literature that, in the search for generalizable 
conclusions, downplay the specificity of local contexts and the unique perspectives of actors. 
 
Conclusion and Outline 
 
 Both scholars and practitioners are increasingly realising the need to pay attention to 
the messiness of the unique political contexts within which the ‘fight against anti-impunity’ 
takes place and the complicated and often obscure elite political bargaining processes, moving 
beyond focusing exclusively on institutional design and a cookie-cutter approach to 
understanding transitional justice processes. Yet, as Bell notes, “how to understand political 
bargaining processes around justice remains under-theorized and under-researched.”129  By 
drawing on new empirical material, this thesis offers a way to analyse the political productivity 
of the anti-impunity norm and the strategic politics behind the ‘deployment’ of criminal 
accountability. By offering a way to understand what it is about norms that make them useful 
resources, it contributes to studying the relationship between international norms and state 
conduct from a pragmatic approach, one that brings in notions of power, interests, and 
bargaining. By deconstructing the norm’s features and functions, the concept of norm 
	
128 Moyser 2006, 85. When appropriate, interviewees were also invited to distinguish between 
the official accounts of their affiliated institution as well as their personal interpretation. 
129 Bell 2017, 102. 
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exploitation helps in understanding how norms, as vague and instrumentally malleable, serve 
as resources for actors involved in their implementation. It also helps to consider how the 
institutional system shapes the norm’s implementation.   
 Through this new conceptual framework, it shows specifically how the anti-impunity 
norm can serve as part of strategies to shape the political landscape of conflict-affected 
countries and in cases where governmental legitimacy is in jeopardy. Indeed, it offers a way to 
analyse how and why the anti-impunity norm’s implementation favours certain actors and 
outcomes over others, by exploring the aims, selectivity, and effects of anti-impunity measures. 
In doing so, it joins other studies that view legitimation “as a strategic move in a political game 
[that] needs to be understood as much a part of the messy world of politics as of the idealized 
world of legal and moral debate.”130 However, it improves upon the weaknesses in the literature 
on the legitimating effects of the anti-impunity norm by offering a way to understand the 
mechanics through which using the anti-impunity norm influences at least two criteria of 
government legitimacy.        
This thesis is composed of eight chapters. As the introduction, Chapter 1 sets out the 
problématique, the research question, the central argument, the methodology, and an outline of 
the thesis.  Chapter 2 presents the origins and substance of the anti-impunity norm in more 
detail. It then situates this study within the broader literature on norm diffusion, focusing on 
the value of exploring norm usage, and surveys how studies have explored the strategic use of 
the anti-impunity norm in various conflict-affected contexts as a means, among other 
objectives, to legitimate national authorities. To improve upon gaps identified in the literature, 
Chapter 3 then presents the concept of norm exploitation, a novel way to understand actors’ 
usage of the norm as a function of the interacting factors of elite strategy, the norm’s 
enforcement features, and the norm’s functions.  
Applying this framework, the case studies are then addressed sequentially, immersing 
the reader in the distinct political environment of each country, while linking the two by asking 
the same guiding questions. The case study on Côte d’Ivoire spans Chapters 4 and 5. The case 
study on Mali spans Chapters 6 and 7. The first chapter of each case study addresses the acute 
crises and the second chapter addresses the years following the crises. After first providing 
	
130 Hurrell 2007, 79. 
 31 
contextual background, each chapter analyses how actors capitalised on the anti-impunity 
norm’s features and functions to influence the conflict’s evolution.  
To conclude, Chapter 8 first presents a table that captures the relationships between 
elite strategy and accountability measures. It then recapitulates how these relationships played 
out in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, before summarising how the main findings fit within the 
literature on the strategic use of justice measures. It then analyses why the ICC’s decisions 
complemented elite interests and considers what this means for international criminal justice 
more broadly. The chapter concludes by surveying this dissertation’s findings and charts paths 
for future research.  
 
Table 1: Governments’ Issuance of Self-Referrals and Article 12(3) Declarations between 2002 
and 2018 [as of September 2018] 
Date Country  
(Head of State at 
the time) 
Article 14 Self-
Referral or  
Article 12(3) 
Declaration 
Status of conflict at 
time of request for 
ICC investigation 






Self-Referral Ongoing Active (since July 
2004) 
April 2004 Democratic 
Republic of Congo 
(Kabila) 







Self-Referral Ongoing Active (since May 
2007) 












July 2012 Mali  
(Traoré) 
Self-Referral Ongoing Active (since 
January 2013) 
May 2013 Comoros 
(Dhoinine) 
Self-Referral Not ongoing Closed – Decision 
not to proceed 
(Under Appeal) 
May 2014  Central African 
Republic II 
(Samba-Panza) 
Self-Referral Ongoing Active (since 
September 2014) 







Ongoing To be determined – 
Under Preliminary 
Examination   









Self-Referral Ongoing Closed – Decision 







Ongoing To be determined – 
Under Preliminary 
Examination   







131 On 8 September 2015, the Government of Ukraine lodged a second declaration until Article 
12(3), this time accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction in relation to alleged crimes committed on its 
territory from 20 February 2014 onwards, with no end date. 
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 This chapter first presents in more detail the subject of this thesis – the anti-impunity 
norm - by exploring the evolution and extent of a state’s duty to investigate and prosecute grave 
abuses. It then situates this study within the expanding literature on norm diffusion, 
highlighting the value of exploring norms as strategic resources. The chapter continues by 
surveying the strengths and gaps within the extant scholarship on the strategic use of justice in 
conflict-affected settings, highlighting especially the blurriness in the link between pursuing 
justice and legitimation. Finally, the chapter concludes by identifying how exploring the anti-
impunity norm’s implementation in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali not only fills gaps in literature on 
conflict-related anti-impunity measures but also furthers scholarly understanding of the 
conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali.     
 
The Anti-Impunity Norm: A Duty to Prosecute?   
 
 Since the end of World War II, through the gradual creation of new laws, political 
commitments, and institutions, a model of state accountability and a model of individual 
criminal accountability emerged as part of a historic shift away from the traditional model of 
impunity for grave abuses - with all three models coexisting today.134 The emergence of the 
anti-impunity norm, which gained significant momentum particularly since the 1990s, meant 
that states were increasingly expected to fulfil their duty to investigate and prosecute alleged 
perpetrators of international crimes. The extent of a state’s legal duty to prosecute all grave 
abuses in its jurisdiction is, however, not seen as clearly rising to customary international law, 
due in part to the patchiness of binding legal obligations and state practice.  In parallel, a 
different version of the norm has developed with the creation of international criminal courts, 
in which international courts are expected to investigate and prosecute perpetrators of 
international crimes when states are unable or unwilling and, importantly, do not require states 
to investigate and prosecute. More broadly, since international crimes are seen as violations of 
	
134 Sikkink 2011, 14-16. 
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fundamental norms of humanity and an affront to the international community as a whole, the 
international community is expected to support domestic and international prosecutions.135 In 
a sense, the creation of international courts can thus undermine the norm according to which 
states have a duty to investigate and prosecute. Within this system of international justice that 
features both domestic and international courts, the anti-impunity norm has two versions: states 
must, and also do not always have to, investigate and prosecute in domestic courts. These two 
divergent normative directions form part of a broader conception of the norm: the political 
expectation, based on extensive though not comprehensive legal obligations, that states must 
take measures to hold alleged perpetrators criminally accountable for grave abuses in domestic 
jurisdictions and, when unable or unwilling, cooperate with investigations and prosecutions in 
international criminal courts. 
  While individual criminal accountability has a history(ies) that begin(s) far earlier than 
the Nuremberg trials, these trials nevertheless mark a watershed moment as “the first genuinely 
international criminal prosecution.”136Among other legacies, Nuremberg established crimes 
against humanity as an international crime and helped develop the view that a government’s 
treatment of its citizens and others should be subject to international regulation and, relatedly, 
that certain crimes should be subject to international criminal jurisdiction.137 It also reflected a 
growing sense of responsibility of the international community to respond to these 
“unimaginable atrocities that deeply shock the conscience of humanity.”138 
 Over the next few decades, a series of new human rights treaties and legal instruments 
were adopted, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Covenants on the Civil 
and Political Rights and on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, the Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention of the 
	
135 Ratner and Abrams 1997, 295. 
136 As Schabas explains, it was “the first genuinely international criminal prosecution in that it 
was conducted by a tribunal created by treaty between states, where the accused were 
prosecuted not for ordinary crimes but for offences against international law.” Schabas 2012, 
10.  
137 For instance, the International Law Commission’s codification of the Nuremberg Principles 
in 1950 established that war crimes and crimes against humanity were subject to international 
criminal jurisdiction. 
138 Preamble of the Rome Statute.  
 35 
Rights of the Child, and the International Convention for the Prosecution of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance. 139  These legal instruments are based on a model of state 
accountability, “in which the state as a whole was held accountable for human rights violations 
and was expected to take action to remedy the situation.”140  
 Many of these instruments do not include measures to hold individual state officials 
accountable, meaning there are limited consequences for states and individuals who violate the 
rights enshrined in some these conventions. Yet, some do require states to investigate and 
prosecute individuals - reflecting the emergence of a model of individual criminal 
accountability. For instance, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol I of 
1977 established a duty on states to carry out investigations, prosecutions, or punishment.141 
These conventions “confirmed the new expectation of individual criminal responsibility for 
international law breaches” and “made such breaches subject to universal criminal jurisdiction, 
distinguishing them from those breaches that give rise only to state (civil) responsibility.”142 
However, this applies only to grave breaches, which does not cover all war crimes as such. 
Also, the 1948 Genocide Convention established that persons guilty of genocide “shall be tried 
by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed” or by an 
international tribunal if the relevant states have accepted its jurisdiction, thereby establishing 
genocide as an international crime that triggered international criminal jurisdiction.143 Also, 
while a treaty relative exclusively to crimes against humanity does not yet exist, specific 
offences that fall under crimes against humanity are addressed in other conventions, including 
the 1984 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
	
139 Ratner, Abrams, and Bischoff 2009, 7. 
140 Sikkink 2011, 14.  
141 First Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armed Forces in the Field, Art. 49; Second Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the 
Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Art. 50; Third 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Art. 129 ; Fourth Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Art. 146; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (  I).  
142 Van Schaack and Slye 2007, 39.  
143 Article 1 of the 1948 Genocide Convention provides that Contracting Parties undertake to 
“prevent and punish” genocide and Articles 4-6 provides that alleged perpetrators of genocide 
or any acts outlined in Article 3 shall be punished, that Contracting Parties shall enact necessary 
legislation to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide, and that the persons 
charged with genocide “shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of 
which the act was committed” or by an international tribunal if the relevant states have accepted 
its jurisdiction. 
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Punishment, which states that States Parties in whose jurisdiction a person is alleged to have 
committed any offence listed in the convention shall prosecute or extradite suspected persons. 
144 The Convention on Disappearances states that States Parties shall prosecute or extradite the 
individual to another State or surrender the individual to an international criminal tribunal. 
Further, a UN General Assembly Resolution 2840 adopted in 1971 urged all states to either 
prosecute or extradite and to support, through cooperation, the prosecution of perpetrators in 
other jurisdictions.145  Similarly, the General Assembly’s 1973 Principles of Co-operation, 
passed without opposition, indicated that no state expressed resistance to the declaration that 
“war crimes and crimes against humanity, wherever they are committed, shall be subject to 
investigation, and the persons against whom there is evidence that they have committed such 
crimes shall be subject to tracing, arrest, trial, and, if found guilty, to punishment.”146 While 
UN General Assembly Resolutions and declarations do not create binding obligations, these 
two can be interpreted as reflecting states’ opinion that this obligation existed. These 
conventions thus contributed to the emergence of a model of individual criminal accountability, 
which is limited to a subset of the range of rights covered in conventions adopted since World 
War II.  
 Some argue that the range of human rights treaties that require states to investigate 
grave human rights violations and take actions against those responsible suggest that a duty on 
states to investigate and take actions against alleged perpetrators, including prosecution or 
extradition, exists in customary international law.147 This view is also motivated by the fact 
that imposing duties on states to investigate, prosecute, and compensate victims for such crimes 
	
144 Under Articles 4-8, State Parties shall make all acts of torture offences under its criminal 
law and establish jurisdiction over the offences, as well as cooperate fully with the prosecuting 
jurisdiction in the gathering and preservation of evidence, and thus extradite or prosecute 
irrespective of where the crime was committed. UN Doc A/39/51 (1984), 197.  
145 “Urges all States to… ensure the punishment of all persons guilty of [war crimes and crimes 
against humanity], including the extradition to those countries where they have committed such 
crimes…Further urges ” all States to co-operate in particular in the collection and exchange of 
information which will contribute to the detection, arrest, extradition, trial and punishment of 
persons guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity… Affirms that refusal by States to 
co-operate in the arrest, extradition, trial and punishment of persons guilty of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity is contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and to generally recognized norms of international law.” UN Doc A/RES/2840 (XXVI) 
(1971), paras 1-4.  
146 UN Doc. A/RES/3074 (XXVIII). 
147 Roht-Arriaza 1990.   
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is essential to making the efforts to deter and prevent future abuses meaningful.148  However, 
scholars are not in consensus as to whether customary law imports an obligation on states to 
investigate and prosecute international crimes.149 According to Orentlicher, states that have 
signed certain human rights treaties indeed have a duty to ensure that criminal proceedings 
were instituted against those suspected of specified violations of human rights, such as 
genocide and torture, but, even if impunity for atrocious crimes is incompatible with states’ 
general obligation to ensure the enjoyment of fundamental rights, customary international law 
does not require states to prosecute every offense.150 Also questioning whether the duty to 
prosecute or extradite perpetrators of these crimes exists in customary international law, 
Freeman and Pensky argue that, while some crimes are prohibited by treaties that require states 
to hold the perpetrators accountable, these treaties also stipulate that national authorities can 
determine whether to prosecute in a similar manner as they would for ordinary offences. Since 
this discretion enables selective prosecutorial strategies, states do not necessarily violate their 
obligations if they do not prosecute all perpetrators of these crimes. 151  From a different 
perspective, some argue that this duty to prosecute arises from their jus cogens nature, which 
gives rise to obligations erga omnes, “owed to the international community as a whole and to 
each of its members.”152  As expressed by Bassiouni, for instance, “The crimes establish 
inderogable protections and the mandatory duty to prosecute or to extradite accused 
perpetrators, and to punish those found guilty.”153 However, other scholars question the idea 
that the duty to prosecute international crimes arises from their jus cogens nature.154 
 In parallel, there has been a significant normative shift unequivocally endorsed by the 
UN against amnesties for grave abuses, especially war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
	
148 Broomhall 2003, 56. For instance, even if the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) is silent about a duty to punish violations of the rights ensured by the Covenant, 
some argue that the text of Article 2, which establishes that each state party “undertakes to 
respect and to ensure to all individuals” the rights it recognises, means that “states are obliged 
to take specific steps to redress the wrong committed by each violation of a right.” Mendez 
1997, 259. 
149 Orentlicher 1991, 2537 – 2615; Nouwen 2013a, 39; Jackson 2017b, 620; Akhavan 2010, 1. 
150 Orentlicher 2007, 14. 
151 Transitional Justice Institute 2013, 10 – 11. According to Schabas, “[i]t might be safer to 
say that although state practice is evolving, and that amnesties in peace agreements are 
increasingly viewed with disfavour, a prohibitive legal rule has not crystallized.” Schabas 2012, 
177 – 188.   
152 Broomhall 2003, 56.  
153 Bassiouni 1996, 17. 
154 Jackson 2007, 123.  
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genocide.155 The UN Human Rights Committee stated blanket amnesty laws and pardons are 
inconsistent with the ICCPR as they create “a climate of impunity” and deny the victims the 
“right to a remedy” that exists in most international human rights instruments.156 This is also 
evident in the UN Secretary-General’s reports on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings and the UN’s Updated Set of Principles for the Protection 
and Promotion of Human Rights through Action to Combat Impunity.157 Another resolution 
that supports the argument that amnesty is contrary to international law appears in the “Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law,” adopted in 2005 by the UN Commission on Human Rights.158 Some, such 
as Sadat, argue “a prohibition against the grant of blanket amnesties for the commission of jus 
cogens crimes may now have crystallized as a matter of general customary international 
law.” 159  However, others note that international law “allows states some flexibility and 
discretion with respect to considering amnesties” for international crimes and gross violations 
of human rights.160 Further, rather than refusing to support negotiations that include formal 
amnesties, negotiators often exhibit “strategic silence” regarding such amnesties.161 In light of 
the many amnesties issued by states in times of crisis to perpetrators of crimes against 
	
155 Mégret 2016, 202.     
156 Mendez 1997, 259. For the former Legal Counsel to the United Nations, “This is why the 
Secretary General has consistently said that the UN can't foster, encourage, promote, or 
condone amnesties for international crimes, why the Security Council has said that these crimes 
must be excluded from any amnesty, and why international courts and tribunals have 
recognized that there is an emerging rule of international law that perpetrators of these crimes 
cannot be granted immunity from prosecution.” O’Brien 2014. 
157 UN Doc. S/2011/634 (2011), para 12 ; UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/102/Add. 1 (2005), 14. For 
instance, principle 24 states that “even when intended to establish conditions conducive to 
peace agreement or to foster national reconciliation, amnesty and other measures of clemency 
shall be kept within the following bounds: (a) The perpetrators of serious crimes under 
international law may not benefit from such measures until such time as the State has met the 
obligations to which principle 19 [notably ‘prompt, thorough, independent and impartial 
investigations of violations of human rights and international humanitarian law’] refers or the 
perpetrators have been prosecuted before a court with jurisdiction- whether international, 
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158 As discussed in Schabas 2012, 183. UN Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/35, para 4: “[i]n cases of 
gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international 
humanitarian law constituting crimes under international law, states have the duty to investigate 
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responsible for the violation and, if found guilty, the duty to punish her or him.” 
159 Sadat 2006, 1022. 
160 Transitional Justice Institute 2013, 10 – 11.   
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humanity, Jackson argues that a duty to prosecute these crimes does not exist as part of 
customary international law. 162  
 The adoption of new legal commitments did not, however, translate to significant shifts 
in state practice globally, as governments took few measures to hold individuals accountable 
for atrocities. Some important exceptions include the criminal trials of former authoritarian 
leaders, conducted mostly in Latin America and Eastern Europe, in the context of democratic 
transitions. While these trials were based in domestic law, and were accompanied by the 
establishment of truth commission and lustration laws, they were deemed to reflect increased 
acceptance by states of a need, or perhaps a duty, to hold human rights abusers accountable 
through both judicial and non-judicial mechanisms.  
 Yet, the general failure of states to uphold individual criminal accountability led to 
developments that in some ways point in a different normative direction than the emerging 
duty on states to investigate or prosecute. The parallel events of the end of the paralysis within 
the UN Security Council and the commission of mass atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda in the early 1990s led to the creation by the UN Security Council of the ICTY and the 
ICTR in 1993 and 1994, respectively. These served as key precedents for a series of subsequent 
tribunals, including the International Criminal Court in 2002, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone in 2002, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia in 2006, and the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon in 2009.  
 The creation of a series of international tribunals since 1993 is evidence of a sense of 
collective responsibility to uphold the anti-impunity norm, when states are unable or unwilling 
to do so. These tribunals are indeed “emblematic of international resolve to ensure that those 
most responsible for crimes against the basic code of humanity do not escape punishment.”163 
At the same time, these tribunals arguably undermine the normative imperative states have to 
investigate and prosecute crimes committed in their jurisdiction. More precisely, the ICTY and 
ICTR held primary jurisdiction over crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
respectively, and did not defer to national jurisdiction. These tribunals thus reflect a move in a 
	
162  Though, Jackson nuances this position by arguing that if one distinguishes between 
amnesties granted in times of stability and in times of state emergency, customary international 
law does impose a duty to prosecute crimes against humanity “from which a small public 
emergency exception allowing derogation is carved.” Jackson 2007, 120-121. 
163 Orentlicher 2007, 18. 
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different normative direction: enabling states to outsource cases to international courts while 
not necessarily undermining their duty to investigate and prosecute.  
 The ICC, as the only permanent court with much wider territorial jurisdiction than any 
other international tribunal, deserves particular attention. While there is a widespread view that 
the Rome Statute conclusively establishes a binding and universally applicable obligation for 
states to prosecute international crimes, in light of the Statute’s preamble that “recall[s] that it 
is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for 
international crimes,” it does not.164 It is important to note that the Rome Statute does impose 
a duty on States Parties: the general duty to cooperate with the ICC, as stated in Article 86-93 
of the Rome Statute and the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence.165 Yet, while the Rome 
Statute represents a major and remarkable step in the crystallization of the anti-impunity norm, 
the Rome Statute does not itself establish states’ duty to prosecute international crimes. Unlike 
the ICTY and the ICTR, the ICC holds subsidiary, or “back-up” rather than primary 
jurisdiction, meaning domestic courts have priority to address the case. This is operationalized 
through the complementarity regime, an admissibility test that states that cases are admissible 
only if national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute the same case. In order to 
successfully challenge the admissibility of a particular case, the state must show it has been, or 
is, genuinely investigating and prosecuting the same case for similar conduct. Yet, similarly to 
other tribunals, the ICC is based on an assumption that states do not investigate or prosecute 
these crimes and thus, in a sense, pushes in a similarly different normative direction: by not 
prosecuting, states can outsource their cases to international criminal courts while not 
necessarily undermining the anti-impunity norm. Seen in a different light, however, these two 
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normative directions inherent within the norm can be reconciled under the conception of the 
anti-impunity norm presented at the beginning of this section: that it encompasses the 
responsibility of states to ensure that perpetrators of grave abuses are held criminally 
accountable, in either domestic or international jurisdictions. While the ICC is not the main 
institution through which the anti-impunity norm is enforced, it serves as a backup institution 
that helps create an international model that is not solely reliant on domestic courts.  
 In sum, the anti-impunity norm is enforced through a decentralized but interconnected 
system of accountability, composed primarily of domestic courts with international courts as 
subsidiary institutions. 166  Other important developments beyond the scope of this section 
include the increase in cases of states holding individuals accountable based on universal 
jurisdiction, the creation of a series of hybrid tribunals in regions across the world, and the 
development of regional instruments such as the Malabo Protocol. These treaties, declarations, 
and institutions presented in the abbreviated history above constitute a broader normative 
context that is marked by new expectations of how states and the international community 
should uphold fundamental values. Yet, the new multi-level system of international criminal 
justice leads to two versions of the norm: states have a duty to investigate and prosecute yet 
can outsource this duty to international courts. In this sense, within the Rome Statute system, 
states can adopt different versions of the norm to further strategic interests. Since the anti-
impunity norm is marked by fragmented enforcement and features normative pulls both for and 
against the duty of states to prosecute, as mentioned above, this flexibility in the anti-impunity 
norm frames how the vagaries of politics surrounding its implementation remain a major force 
to be reckoned with.    
 
Norms in Practice: Diffusion and Usage 
 
 The rapidly expanding pool of scholarly literature on norms, to which this thesis 
contributes, owes much to the first generation of scholarship, which emerged around the same 
time as the proliferation of international human rights treaties and mechanisms in the mid-
1980s and early 1990s. Building on early research on norm socialization, scholars have since 
developed a variety of ways to understand the relationship between norms and state behaviour, 
with scholars placing different emphasis on the agents and factors that determine normative 
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change. This thesis contributes to a particular stream of scholarship that focuses on how actors 
use international human rights norms, which problematizes some of the assumptions of 
dominant ways of analysing norm diffusion.  
 The first wave of scholarship, seeking to explain how and why states were increasingly 
adopting certain international norms, focused on the agency of transnational human rights 
advocacy networks in promoting norms and shaping state behaviour. To model the 
socialization process of states, scholars offered several models, such as the “boomerang” 
model,167 the “norm life-cycle” model,168 and the norm diffusion “spiral” model.169 These 
models share a view of normative change as linear and staged, fuelled by the “bottom up” and 
“top down” pressure by groups of rights promoters. For instance, in The Power of Human 
Rights, the spiral model identified three types of processes that influence non-compliant states 
to ultimately comply with human rights norms – instrumental adaptation, argumentation, and 
habitualization – which occur over different stages: repression, denial, tactical concessions, 
prescriptive status, and rule-consistent behaviour.170 These models view norms as defining a 
“logic of appropriateness” that “play a central role in shaping the choices and actions that 
constitute a political order,” and thus emphasise that “principled ideas and arguments often 
animate” state actions.171 Through sustained mobilization by human rights activist groups and 
international actors, norm-violating states change their behaviour and over time internalize the 
norm. The model does acknowledge elite strategy, though this is limited to how norm-violating 
states make tactical concessions, such as releasing a few political prisoners, as a step on the 
longer road to norm internalization.  
    While these early models were assumed to explain norm diffusion in a wide variety 
of contexts, subsequent scholarship underscores the importance of taking into account how 
certain conditions make the pressure of pro-rights groups more or less effective, and thus shape 
states’ move from commitment to compliance. In the follow-up edited volume The Persistent 
Power of Human Rights, the same authors note that limited statehood, weak institutional 
capacity, the nature of governments, the degree of dependence on trade and aid flows, and the 
degree of popular support are all important factors in influencing domestic compliance with 
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human rights norms.172 In a similar vein, Bass highlights how the liberal or anti-liberal nature 
of the government determines support for the establishment of international tribunals to try 
grave abuses.173 Further, as surveyed by Hopgood, Snyder, and Vinjamuri, scholars have so far 
found various correlations between pressure by pro-rights groups and human rights 
outcomes.174 Key determining parameters include, among others, whether the country has 
ratified rights treaties, the degree of democracy, the strength of local human rights activists, 
and whether third parties echo calls by pro-human rights groups and simultaneously pressure 
states to comply.175 Sharing a focus on the agentic power of pro-rights groups, these studies 
expect less from simply the persuasion power of international norms to shape state behaviour 
and take into account ‘real world’ conditions and parameters.  
 The wide variety of studies that build from the aforementioned models have generated 
rich findings, yet their approach arguably leaves out crucial parts of the norm diffusion story. 
While they emphasise the importance of features of the domestic political landscape, such as 
the institutional capacity or the strength of local human rights activism, these studies do not 
give enough explanatory value to other key features of the domestic political landscape: the 
role of power, strategic elite interests, and power relations between political actors. A different 
stream of scholarship, to which this thesis contributes, analyses how local actors can 
strategically appropriate and use norms for various purposes and enables research into the use 
of international norms. The value of this perspective is that, by injecting “a healthy dose of 
domestic politics” into our understanding of norms, it can shed light on how actors engage in 
bargaining and strategic calculation around whether to change their behaviour in accordance 
with the norm. 176  These studies explore “conditional incentives, political bargaining, and 
investment in enforcement institutions as precursors to the emergence of rights.”177 Reflecting 
their cost-benefit analysis, as Schimmelfennig explains, actors “manipulate the norms 
strategically to avoid or reduce the costs of socialization, […] use and interpret international 
norms to justify their self-interested claims, and frame their preferences and actions as norm-
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consistent.”178 This approach focuses on the influence of the interests of actors and assumes 
that actors’ behaviour in the socialization process is motivated extrinsically by their political 
preferences, namely material and power-oriented benefits, rather than a function of the 
internalized ‘oughtness’ of the norm.179 Norms are thus seen as “spontaneously evolving, as 
social practice; consciously promoted, as political strategies to further specific interests; 
deliberately negotiated, as a mechanism for conflict management; or as a combination, mixing 
these three types.”180 
 This perspective also adopts a different framework to interpret how actors change their 
behaviour in response to a norm. It goes beyond focusing on whether actors take measures in 
support of the norm, such as the adoption of new institutions, laws, or changes in public 
discourse, and explores the various interests behind such changes as well as whether or not the 
change in behaviour actually supports or undermines the norm’s normative substance. This 
perspective shares the assumption with the aforementioned approaches that normative 
progress, such as increased respect for human rights, can happen through pressure and 
coercion. Yet, it is different from studies that emphasise how actors’ changed behaviour reflects 
their internalization of the norm and their newly changed views and interests, or is a function 
of reforms or changes within the domestic context. This perspective rather assumes that taking 
measures in conformance with the norm does not necessarily reflect internalization of the norm 
and can happen with or without internalization. It instead explores the strategic interests for, 
and effects of, the norm’s usage. In other words, these studies do not strictly explore whether 
actors take measures in support of the norm but rather how and why they do so.181 
 Yet, within this pool of studies that study how actors use norms in domestic political 
struggles, it is not clear what it is about norms, defined as “a standard of appropriate behaviour 
for actors of a given identity,”182 that render them capable of serving as resources. To help 
answer this question, this thesis contributes to this field by offering a new way to analyse norms 
through the concept of norm exploitation. A classic conception is that norms are composed of 
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a tripartite structure, composed of a problem, a value, and a behaviour.183 Another conception 
is that of a composite norm, or a “complex ideational structure, composed of different sub-
norms and normative elements.”184 Yet another conception, as proposed by Winston, is that of 
a norm cluster, or “a bounded collection of interrelated specific problems, values, and 
behaviours that are understood to be similar enough that their adopters form a family group.”185 
Focusing less on the substantive meaning of the norm, this study suggests a more mechanistic 
conception of norms, which sees them as characterised by their structural features of how they 
are enforced as well as the functions they play. As illustrated in the following chapters, norm 
exploitation offers a new conceptual tool for the study of norm usage that can apply beyond 
the anti-impunity norm.        
  
The Anti-Impunity Norm in Practice 
 
 The growing stream of scholarship that explores the strategic use of the anti-impunity 
norm complements the dominant approach to exploring the emergence of the anti-impunity 
norm and its domestic, regional, and international institutions. Viewing international law as a 
regulative rule, “act[ing] on international relations and upon political subjects through restraint 
and regulation,”186 studies within the mainstream approach tend to use quantitative large-n 
methods to test hypothesised causal relations between implementing anti-impunity measures 
with measurable outcomes, including the rate of abuses, the rate of hostilities, and levels of 
democratization and of the rule of law. The wide range of findings identify various relations 
between, for instance, the pursuit of justice and conflict termination: some find that it helps, 
others find that it harms, while others find it only has marginal effects.187 While shedding 
valuable light on patterned effects across space and time, these cross-national findings are 
limited in their ability to explain how anti-impunity measures led to such outcomes in detail, 
as they are based on a reasonable but presumed causal relations, and risk overestimating the 
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impact of anti-impunity measures by obscuring the role of political contextual factors in which 
such measures are implemented, such as the role of elite objectives, the particular political 
profile of the accused in national trials, the type of amnesties, and the quality of the trials.  
 To deepen and diversify these scholarly findings, this study joins others that use in-
depth qualitative case study methods that compare the presumed causal mechanisms with 
actual behaviour. These studies argue that transitional justice processes, including the 
implementation of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, should be examined not as inherently 
stabilising or destabilising but rather as sites of political contestation. By extension, rather than 
viewing the anti-impunity norm as a rule that is in opposition to political power and as a 
doctrinal whole that guides actors and practices, these studies view the norm as one of the legal 
resources that “are useful, and powerful, instruments in the process of ‘sense-making’ for 
states”188 and examine “how international law is used, what it means, and what it replaces.”189 
At the same time, this thesis does not assume that states’ engagement with the anti-impunity 
norm for strategic purposes and the alignment between judicial measures and elite interests as 
inherently normatively objectionable and evidence of the misuse of international criminal law. 
Assuming that the integration of law within political strategies should not necessarily be seen 
as abuse of law, this thesis adopts the original meaning of the term “lawfare” as a value-neutral 
concept, as whether law should be used as a weapon during conflict or not is a matter of debate 
rather than consensus. 
 Scholars have identified a variety of objectives for which actors implement anti-
impunity measures such as creating new investigatory bodies, holding human rights trials 
nationally, requesting the opening of investigations by international tribunals, cooperating with 
international tribunals…190 In contrast to the desirable aims of transitional justice, namely 
justice, truth-seeking, and reconciliation, scholars have noted how such measures can be used 
to appease international pressure in order to gain material and reputation benefits, to weaken 
internal challengers, to promote a particular narrative of the conflict, and even to prepare a 
return to war. For instance, both Lake and Cronin-Furman argue that elites in conflict-affected 
states instrumentalize postconflict accountability institutions for strategic aims by maintaining 
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an outward appearance of supporting the institutions while undermining their effectiveness and 
independence and, more broadly, the spirit of the anti-impunity norm. Lake highlights the 
pursuit of objectives internal to the country, arguing that elites manipulate the justice system 
to remove challengers who had lost the support of their superiors, surrender dissidents in 
exchange for access to illicit resources, and to rally troops for insurgency, while Cronin-
Furman places more emphasis on the elites’ establishment of ineffective institutions in order 
to avoid external costs such as the potential reduction in foreign military or development aid.191  
 Turning towards the interaction between national authorities and international courts, 
various studies argue that states can instrumentalize the ICC’s intervention to weaken their 
opposition, both militarily and reputationally, and strategically avoid scrutiny into the conduct 
of state forces.192 Others, such as Peskin and Boduszynski, argue that international actors such 
as the members of the UN Security Council instrumentalize the ICC as a potent diplomatic 
tool.193 Several scholars of transitional justice in the Balkans argue that national elites in Serbia, 
Croatia, and Bosnia, responding to international pressure to prosecute abuses, instrumentalized 
transitional justice processes in various ways to gain advantages in localized political contests 
and to secure benefits, including aid and international membership into the European Union, 
thereby changing their behaviour but for ulterior political motives.194 Exploring both judicial 
and nonjudicial transitional justice mechanisms, Leclercq, MacDonald, and Loyle and 
Davenport argue that, in light of the differences between the priorities of national and 
international actors, national authorities in Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda, respectively, 
created transitional justice mechanisms but adopted subversion techniques that led to various 
types of injustice, including temporary immunities and biased justice.195 Within this literature, 
scholars take different views on whether or not the strategic use of justice represents a highly 
problematic subversion of the norm’s normative substance itself. In other words, scholars may 
agree with Subotić’s argument that the domestic use of international norms is an inevitable part 
of norm diffusion, but not all further agree with the related argument that the use of the norm 
to achieve goals that are fundamentally different from the norm’s purpose is normatively 
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problematic and seriously damaging to the norm itself.196 Others seem to suggest that this 
divergence is inevitable but not damaging to the norm itself.197 
 
 The Anti-Impunity Norm and Legitimation  
 
 Interestingly, a common thread that links many studies on the strategic use of justice is 
the idea of legitimation, or that the pursuit of justice can build legitimacy. As addressed in 
Chapter 1, adopting anti-impunity measures is often expected to increase the legitimacy of 
governments. Indeed, integral to the aforementioned shift towards “sovereignty as 
responsibility” is the view that the legitimacy of governments is contingent on their being 
minimally just towards their citizens. The strengthening of the anti-impunity norm forms part 
of the new “legitimation environment” in which states are under increased pressure to justify 
their decisions and account for their conduct towards their citizens, including upholding the 
imperative of holding individuals accountable for grave abuses.198 This link between curbing 
impunity and government legitimation stems from two normative developments as part of the 
contra-sovereignty zeitgeist. First, it emerged from the development of transitional justice in 
the aftermath of democratic transitions from authoritarian regimes, particularly in Latin 
America. Early expressions were seen at the national level, starting in the 1970s with human 
rights trials in Greece and Portugal, as well as a series of trials in Latin America, with the most 
prominent being the 1985 trials of the junta in Argentina.199 One of the main objectives of 
transitional justice measures was to legitimise the new regime and delegitimise the old regime, 
as “[n]ational prosecutions legitimate a new government in a post-transitional situation, being 
a prime indicator of support for the rule of law”200 and as “failure to enforce the law may 
undermine the legitimacy of a new government.”201 This notion was reinforced by the report 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2001, which 
also introduced the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle, and later echoed in a report 
approved unanimously by the UN General Assembly in 2005.202 Capturing this presumed link, 
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Akhavan writes, “with effective enforcement, tribunals can contribute to the long-term 
transformation of the boundaries of power and legitimacy.”203  
 Within the expanding scholarship on why and how governments engage in the ‘fight 
against impunity,’ scholars highlight a number of ways in which the adoption of anti-impunity 
measures can contribute to the legitimation of government. Yet, by exploring the strategic 
objectives, selectivity, and effects of doing so, they problematize the presumed relationship 
between pursuing transitional justice and the legitimation of government - that establishing 
anti-impunity measures can legitimate governments through the display of its commitment to 
the rule of law and holding individuals accountable for grave abuses. However, as pointed out 
below, scholars often refer to implicit criteria for legitimacy and do not explicitly define the 
criteria of legitimacy, thereby reflecting and reinforcing the slipperiness of the concept.  
 Exploring accountability measures taken by domestic elites at the national level, several 
studies note that condemnation and prosecution boost aspects of the government’s legitimacy, 
though not necessarily by reflecting a genuine commitment to human rights. Loken, Lake, and 
Furman argue that, in Sri Lanka, domestic elites selectively condemned and prosecuted 
perpetrators of wartime rape as a “strategic legitimacy-building practice adopted for military 
ends,” as it was used to garner political legitimacy at the national level. More specifically, 
invoking human rights law helped boost two criteria of legitimacy - rightful governance and 
territorial control – as it allows them to “convey moral superiority in their commitment to 
defending women” and signals that they “are materially more capable of offering protection 
and punishing perpetrators of violence.”204 Promoting anti-impunity thus “allows them to stake 
claim on the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, while simultaneously demonstrating 
that they can follow through on a law-and-order platform capable of protecting civilian 
populations from harm.”205 In a cross-national study, Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm find that 
conducting trials of opposition groups can boost government legitimacy, premised on the 
criteria of legitimacy as law-abiding, as weakening adversaries through courts is more 
legitimate than through violence. Trials represent a “milder, more internationally legitimate 
form of leadership decapitation. Rather than killing them, governments can arrest their 
adversaries, hold trials, and enjoy the benefits of legal legitimation.”206  
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 In a similar vein, scholars have noted how domestic elites establish anti-impunity 
measures in order to maintain their legitimacy as a supporter of international human rights, 
especially in the face of international pressure to do so, but in parallel manage the scope of 
these measures to mitigate any costs of doing so. For instance, Cronin-Furman argues that 
authorities often establish “quasi-compliant” institutions in order deflect international censure 
for failure to abide by the global accountability norm while also not genuinely upholding the 
norm. 207  Similarly, MacDonald illustrates how authorities in Uganda displayed cosmetic 
endorsement of the anti-impunity norm in order to gain international validation and funds, 
while carefully managing the process to placate the pressure of delivering substantive 
transitional justice.208 This is also noted in Burundi, where authorities expressed commitment 
to the rule of law while stalling actual progress on transitional justice and thus “succeeded in 
deceiving the international community.”209 
 Going beyond bolstering the government’s legitimacy, elites can strategically engage 
with transitional justice measures to influence the status of the state itself. For instance, Subotić 
notes how both domestic and international actors in Bosnia used transitional justice to 
strengthen state institutions and weaken the Republika Srpska, in order to boost the legitimacy 
of a unitary and centralized Bosnian state. In Croatia, elites instrumentally complied with 
international transitional justice institutions “primarily to obtain international legitimacy for 
Croatia as a European state while keeping domestic norm resisters marginalized and too weak 
to successfully mobilize against adoption of transitional justice.”210   
 Further, scholars highlight various ways in which measures taken by states and the ICC 
within the Rome Statute system can serve strategic ends and shape government legitimacy. An 
influential article by Simmons and Danner argues that states strategically ratify the Rome 
Statute in a bid to bind themselves in order to credibly signal their intention to ratchet down 
violence and refrain from using criminal means in fight insurgents.211 In doing so, it entails 
domestic audience costs and raises expectations among the population that the government is 
seeking non-military solutions and thus, if the government continued to commit crimes, civil 
society mobilization against the regime. While Simmons and Danner do not explicitly mention 
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the word “legitimacy,” it is implied that failing to meet the expectations can erode the 
government’s legitimacy vis-à-vis its domestic constituency, premised on the criteria of 
refraining from committing criminal violence.212  
 Questioning the idea that states self-refer to the ICC to bind themselves and 
operationalize their genuine commitment to human rights and the rule of law as a sign of their 
legitimacy, Clark suggests that authorities in the Democratic Republic of Congo may have self-
referred to the ICC “simply to gain international legitimacy by being seen to be cooperating 
with the ICC.” This presumes a definition of legitimacy as appearing as a supporter of 
international human rights norms in the eyes of the international community, even if the 
government’s actions do not necessarily exhibit rule-consistent behaviour. Presuming a similar 
definition of legitimacy, Nouwen and Werner argue that Uganda’s self-referral to the ICC and 
the subsequent ICC arrest warrants against the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) framed the 
Ugandan government as a “legitimate government” and made Ugandan officials “feel 
legitimized by the absence of ICC proceedings” against Ugandan state actors, despite 
allegations against Ugandan forces. 213  Exhibiting cooperation with the ICC “led to an 
impression of friendship with the Court, which boosted its international legitimacy.” 214 
Accordingly, Nouwen and Werner highlight the dual usage of the ICC: to frame the 
government as a friend of the international community and to transform its enemy, in this case 
the LRA, “into an enemy of mankind.” 215  Branch notes another advantage gained from 
appearing as a supporter of international human rights norms in the eyes of the international 
community: deflecting international scrutiny and pressure regarding its human rights abuses 
and gaining international support for its military campaign against the opposition.216 This is 
similar to what Subotić notes in the Balkans, that domestic elites can “obtain an international 
shield of legitimacy for continuing justice impunity at home.”217             
  In a study on how international tribunals can influence the likelihood that quasi-state 
entities successfully gain statehood status, Dijxhoorn similarly argues that that governments 
use the narratives of war crimes and crimes against humanity to boost their legitimacy, while 
simultaneously delegitimising its opponents. Accordingly, governments issue self-referrals to 
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the ICC based on a cost-benefit analysis of whether involving the ICC could further their 
strategic goals and create critical legitimacy challenges for their opposition. In addition to a 
generic definition of legitimacy (“a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions”), Dijxhoorn focuses more specifically on one criterion of 
legitimacy: being seen to be a supporter, rather than a violator, of fundamental human rights.218   
 Other studies note how domestic elites draw upon the anti-impunity norm to shape 
broader narratives about the conflict in ways that boost their legitimacy, or the reasons leaders 
rely on to justify their political authority. For instance, in a study on Libya, Boduszynski and 
Wierda argue that former anti-Qadhafi revolutionaries selectively pursued justice as part of a 
“broader – and now violent – struggle for legitimacy and power in the new Libya.” Presuming 
a definition of legitimacy as having won “a heroic battle against a tyrant,” selective justice 
arguably served as a tool to bolster these groups’ “revolutionary legitimacy” in the “intense 
post-Qadhafi battles between different political camps and notions of legitimacy.”219 Similarly, 
Miller argues that national elites in Rwanda mobilised the discourse of the anti-impunity norm 
in part “to consolidate power, assert authority, and establish legitimacy.”220 Miller identifies 
three bases for the government’s legitimacy: having “saved the country from the scourge of 
genocide,” being “the representative of the long-oppressed Tutsi,” and having “fulfil[led] the 
requirements of the internationally-sanctioned Arusha Accords.”221 The Rwandan government, 
according to Miller, engaged in the fight against impunity “to solidify the authority and 
legitimacy of the government as not only a voice for victims but a protector of the rule of law” 
and to further a particular narrative of the conflict. Rather than having its legitimacy 
undermined as a result of instrumentalising the discourse of international justice for particular 
aims, as some warned, “the RPF’s skilful deployment of anti-impunity discourse, including at 
the national level, allowed it to win and retain that very legitimacy.”222 While valuable to the 
study of Rwanda, these tailored criteria of legitimacy are nevertheless limited in their 
applicability to other contexts.  
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 Overall, the relationship between anti-impunity and legitimation remains a 
conceptually weak link, as authors rarely explicitly theorize the criteria for legitimacy that 
upholding the anti-impunity norm is purported to shape and assume the reader understands 
exactly how and on what criteria the legitimation occurs. Scholars within the same pool of 
studies thus often use the same term to refer to different ideas. Perhaps in response to this, one 
scholar identifies as a gap in the literature on the legitimating effects of international criminal 
law and points to “the task of illuminating its precise mechanics as an avenue for future 
research.” 223  The framework presented in the next chapter offers a widely-applicable 
conceptual structure that can help build a more coherent and comprehensive understanding of 
this relationship. 
 The cases of Côte d’Ivoire and Mali are particularly well-suited to further knowledge 
in this field. The politics of conflict-related justice in both countries have not been sufficiently 
studied, neither by scholars of international justice nor by scholars of the Ivorian and Malian 
conflicts. Of the few studies that directly address Côte d’Ivoire and Mali’s conflict-related 
justice proceedings, their analysis is quite limited. Côte d’Ivoire appears as one of several cases 
examined in studies on the ICC’s prosecutorial selectivity, yet the analysis is limited to 
emphasising the rather obvious point that the cases against the Gbagbos reinforces victor’s 
justice.224 By extension, several scholars have focused on the dynamics of resistance to such 
one-sided prosecutions, contributing to broader literature on the backlash against human rights 
processes.225 Several authors dissect the ICC case against Al Mahdi, yet focus solely on the 
legal procedural aspects of this unprecedented case rather than the anti-impunity norm’s role 
in the conflict.226 Further, Dijxhoorn also addresses the ICC’s impact on the Malian conflict, 
yet Mali is addressed as one of three case studies and the analysis, based mostly on secondary 
sources, is limited to the government’s engagement with the MNLA - only one of many active 
armed groups that have been accused of committing abuses.227 This thesis also pushes forward 
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the rather narrow empirical basis for scholarly analysis on the phenomenon of self-referrals, 
which mainly draws on the self-referrals by Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo.   
 Further, while scholars of both conflicts, a pool dominated by Francophone scholars, 
highlight impunity as one of the causes of the conflict, they rarely explore the matter in detail. 
Regarding Côte d’Ivoire, Charbonneau, Banégas, and Piccolino all highlight grievances around 
impunity as a key challenge facing Ouattara’s administration, though they do not develop this 
theme in detail. 228  McGovern does explore how politicians and diplomats instrumentally 
invoked accusations of human rights abuses, this analysis is limited to the period between 2002 
and 2006.229 Regarding Mali, scholars including Sangaré, Benjaminsen and Ba, as well as 
Guichaoua and Pellerin all highlight frustration against impunity, especially for state-affiliated 
actors, as among the main fundamental grievances that foment anti-state mobilisation and spur 
involvement with jihadist groups.230 Yet, beyond mentioning its importance as a source of anti-
state mobilisation, the academic literature on the Malian conflict does not explore the issue of 
impunity for abuses in depth. 
   
Conclusion  
 
 After zeroing in on the anti-impunity norm, this chapter then reviewed scholarly 
approaches to understanding the mutual feedback between norms and state conduct and 
underlined the value of analysing norms as a resource that can become useful in the strategic 
competition not only among states, as other have explored, but also within states.231 More 
broadly, many studies on the use of norms, especially those focused on the anti-impunity norm 
surveyed above, highlight how actors’ usage of norms to pursue specific political agendas can 
undermine the substantive content and ‘spirit’ of the norm itself. Yet, as explored in the next 
chapters, the usage of norms is not inherently normatively ‘bad,’ as implementing norms is 
commonly seen as having purpose, ranging from promoting peace, truth, reconciliation, or 
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other goals. It rather depends on critically exploring how, why, and to what effects actors take 
measures in relation to the norm.          
 The conceptual framework and empirical material presented in the following chapters 
fills gaps in the literature surveyed above by offering answers to several questions: What is it 
about norms that make them useful resources? What is it about the anti-impunity norm 
specifically that makes it a resource in internal conflict? How can we more clearly understand 
the ways in which using the anti-impunity norm influences government legitimacy during 
conflict? How can studying the ways in which actors engaged in the ‘fight against impunity’ 
in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali further scholarly understanding of the new normative environment 




















Chapter 3: Norm Exploitation - A Conceptual Framework 
 
“The concepts and structures of international law…are the conditions of possibility for the 
existence of something like a sphere of the ‘international’ as one for asserting and contesting 
political power, making and challenging claims of right and legitimacy that may be analysed 
as claims about legal justice. If international law did not exist, political actors would need to 
invent it.”  




 Responding to the call to inject “a healthy dose of domestic politics”287  into our 
understanding of the anti-impunity norm, the framework presented below offers a more refined 
and widely-applicable lens through which to analyse how and why norms become a resource 
in political contestation and, more specifically, how and why the anti-impunity norm can serve 
as a resource in actors’ legitimation strategies during conflict. In shifting from a norm-as-rule 
lens to a norm-as-resource lens, it helps us better study “the way in which actors mobilize it, in 
whose interests, and with what assumptions, goals and consequences.”288 In doing so, it offers 
a way to study the co-constitution of law and politics and the “real world” conditions in which 
the anti-impunity norm operates.  
 As opposed to the dominant pool of studies that analyse the pursuit of justice for grave 
crimes as the application of the anti-impunity norm in practice, a richer way of studying this 
phenomenon is analysing the exploitation of the anti-impunity norm. Importantly, the term 
‘exploitation’ is not pejorative, as its common meaning suggests. Rather, the concept of norm 
exploitation, as coined here, is value-neutral. Exploitation refers specifically to usage. It does 
not imply that actors necessarily use the norm to further an outcome that undermines the spirit 
of the norm itself, namely holding individuals accountable for grave abuses – though it does 
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not exclude this possibility. In other words, it does not presume anything is normatively 
undesirable in the actors’ objectives nor the outcomes of using the norm.  
 It offers a sharper lens through which to analyse actors’ usage of a norm by arguing that 
it is a function of three factors: the elite strategy, the norm’s enforcement features, and the 
norm’s functions. Applied to pursuing justice in internal conflicts, it reveals how the 
implementation of the anti-impunity norm is the product of how elite actors capitalise on the 
norm’s features and functions to further a particular objective in the context of internal conflict. 
It allows for critical evaluation of how actors use the opportunities presented by the states’ 
relative centrality in the norm’s enforcement but also by how the norm’s functions overlap with 
the basic criteria for government legitimacy. This framework thus enables inquiry into the 
political power of international law, including “the use of law and legal resources in strategies 
of legitimation and delegitimation, by states and by non-state actors.” 289  More broadly, 
applicable to the study of norms in general, the concept offers a tool to observe in a more 
granular way how a norm can be strategically implemented by elite actors in the context of 
domestic political contestation and thereby explore “the use that is made of it by the actors in 
a space of strategic struggle.”290  
 This chapter proceeds in several steps. First, it shows how to conceptualise elite 
strategy. Second, it presents how the norm’s enforcement features allow state actors to play a 
relatively central, though not entirely unconstrained, role in its enforcement. Third, it outlines 
the anti-impunity norm’s functions and illustrates how they overlap with basic criteria of 
legitimacy, making it a relevant resource in strategies of legitimation and delegitimation. This 





 As mentioned in Chapter 2, a review of the literature on during-conflict accountability 
reveals that much literature overlooks how the politics at both domestic and international levels 
shape the parameters of the landscape of accountability and impunity.302 Those scholars that 
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do explore the role of politics have noted, in transitions from authoritarian and conflict-affected 
settings, that the “balance of political forces” both during and after the end of conflict is a 
fundamental factor in explaining the choice of anti-impunity measures and how actors 
implement the anti-impunity norm.303 Since holding those most responsible for international 
crimes often involves individuals with significant political and military influence, it is critical 
to analyse the political profile of those accused of bearing criminal responsibility. Indeed, in 
conflict-affected contexts, the way in which elite state actors invoke and implement “justice” 
is arguably based on an assessment of how they should engage with their opposition in order 
to gain an advantage towards achieving their objectives. Thus, this framework incorporates the 
perceived political value of the accused as a very important element in understanding how elite 
actors craft the parameters of accountability and impunity.  
 As coined here, the perceived political value of a given individual, which can be 
assessed as ‘high’ or ‘low,’ refers to the extent to which that interlocutor is deemed crucial to 
arriving at a particular political settlement that is on the government’s terms. Relatedly, an 
individual’s perceived political value takes into account their potential to spoil the peace, as 
their value is intrinsically linked to the balance of power between the government and the 
interlocutor. Borrowing Stedman’s definition, spoilers are “leaders and parties who believe that 
peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use 
violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” 304 Stedman states that spoilers “exist only when 
there is a peace process to undermine, that is, after at least two warring parties have committed 
themselves publicly to a pact or have signed a comprehensive peace agreement.”305  Yet, 
individuals can also derail, or spoil, less formal negotiations prior to public commitment or 
signing of a pact or agreement. Taking a broader lens, this thesis thus explores how an 
individual’s perceived political value influences how state actors address their alleged 
responsibility for abuses in conflictual settings even prior to a formal agreement.         
  Assessing the perceived political value of a given interlocutor thus takes into account 
whether the individual can spoil peace through their destructive capacity, based on the relative 
number of fighters or weapons they have. An individual with significant power is likely deemed 
highly valuable to achieving a particular outcome if their power enables them to spoil and derail 
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efforts to do so. Similarly, an individual with low power is likely deemed less valuable to 
achieving a particular outcome, as their weakness precludes them from spoiling efforts to do 
so. Beyond destructive capacity, it is also relevant to take into account whether excluding the 
individual from the political settlement would jeopardize it. For instance, a given interlocutor 
may not be necessarily militarily strong but can nevertheless be deemed highly valuable as they 
represent an important constituency that should be included even if they are not militarily 
dangerous, and excluding them from the political arrangement would jeopardize the settlement. 
Assessing the perceived political value of key actors is crucial across types of conflicts, as there 
is exclusion and inclusion of actors in both one-sided victories and negotiated settlements. 
Rather than static, perceived political value is fluid and can shift over time. In light of changing 
conflict dynamics within the same conflict, a given actor can shift from having high to low 
perceived political value, and vice versa, by gaining or losing leverage, constituencies, or 
armed backing. In other words, rather than assume conflict dynamics are over once a military 
victory is achieved or a peace agreement is signed, conflictual dynamics between groups – as 
well as deals, negotiations, and bargaining - span into post-crisis periods as well.306 
 This framework thus offers a concept that helps understand how the level of national 
elite support for anti-impunity measures is often linked to a calculation concerning whether 
such measures would further or block their objectives. In terms of supporting accountability, 
measures include supporting impartial and independent investigations and prosecutions, 
enforcing national arrest warrants, issuing referrals to the ICC and subsequently cooperating 
with the ICC, and otherwise supporting judicial processes. In terms of obstructing 
accountability, measures include issuing formal amnesties, lifting of arrest warrants, and 
releases of individuals accused of international crimes, refusing to enforce national arrest 
warrants, refusing to cooperate with the ICC, and otherwise weakening judicial institutions. 
Exploring cases that both do and do not go forward through the legal system reveals how 
judicial institutions in the uncertainty of conflict-affected contexts can be navigated by elites 
in pursuit of conflict-related ends.307 This view treats both the support and obstruction of 
criminal accountability as part of the anti-impunity norm’s dynamic implementation in 
practice.        
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 Investigating elite strategy thus examines both actions and policies adopted as well as 
intent. Determining the “true” intent of a government is of course challenging as it is 
“impossible to enter into an actor’s head and know conclusively its motivations.” 308 
Nevertheless, it is possible to analyse elite strategy and motivation, as well as the perceived 
political value of interlocutors, including by carefully analyse contextual factors and an array 
of sources. In addition to elite interviews, these include official statements by governments, 
regional organisations, the UN Security Council, and key states, such as France in the cases of 
the Ivorian and Malian crises, as well as from conduct that is not explicitly explained in official 
statements but rather exhibited through consistent elite behaviour. Overall, considering these 
factors responds to a call by scholars “to take political context into account in assessing the 
causes and consequences of justice efforts” since international criminal justice involves politics 
“at every step.”309 
 
The Norm’s Enforcement Features 
 
 Analysing the norm’s implementation as a process rather than a rule, embedded within 
the context of political contestation in times of internal armed conflict, requires grappling with 
the practical realities of how the norm is enforced. The anti-impunity norm developed not 
exclusively as a move against, away from, and above the state but rather built on the “volcano” 
of state sovereignty.310 As a result, the norm is anchored within the dual nature of the state 
within the international criminal justice system: the state is both a subject and agent of the anti-
impunity norm. While the norm imposes expectations and limitations on state actors, including 
potentially targeting state or state-affiliated actors for criminal accountability (state as subject), 
state actors play a central role in institutionalizing and implementing the norm (state as agent). 
The states’ relative centrality in the norm’s enforcement enables governments to maintain a 
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certain marge de manoeuvre in navigating the flexibility within the anti-impunity norm and 
determining its (in)ability and (un)willingness to prosecute grave abuses - both nationally and 
within the Rome Statute system. The norm’s enforcement can be studied as a function of 
navigating the norm’s degree of delegation to state actors, or the grant of “authority to 
implement, interpret, and apply the rules,” and degree of obligation, or the extent to which 
“states or other actors are bound by a rule or commitment.”311 The section below explores how 




 On the national level, pursuing justice for grave crimes is subject to two types of 
obstacles linked to the institutional context, both of which can be influenced to different 
degrees by state actors: practical and political obstacles. While the distinction is not clear-cut, 
both types are exacerbated in conflict-affected situations where insecurity as well as political 
stakes are higher.312 Practitioners and scholars have underlined the importance of taking the 
importance of institutions into account in both implementing and analysing transitional justice, 
as not doing so risks overstating the agency of human rights advocacy.313 By extension, not 
doing so risks understating the influence of elite agency in light of the weak capacity and 
credibility of institutions.  
 First, various practical obstacles beyond the reach of state actors can significantly 
impede effective, impartial, and independent justice processes. Arising from the instability and 
depleted public resources generated by the conflict, these practical obstacles range from the 
inability of judicial actors to investigate abuses in areas outside of the government’s control, 
the issuance of threats and intimidation by potential targets (including government and non-
state actors), as well as a lack of sufficient financial and material resources for prosecution of 
international crimes.314 Regarding the weakening of the judicial infrastructure due to the post-
electoral crisis, the UN Independent Expert on Human Rights in Côte d’Ivoire noted that 17 of 
	
311 Abbott et al 2000, 401.   
312 Nouwen 2013a, 369. 
313 Duthie 2017, 13; Waldorf 2017;  UN Docs. A/HRC/30/42 (2015).  
314 A short list of necessary resources includes training for judicial actors, expertise in forensic 
science, and victim and witness protection resources.  
 62 
34 courthouses and 22 of 33 prisons had been damaged during the crisis.315 Reflecting the 
judicial incapacity in Mali as a consequence of the armed groups’ occupation, which included 
the systematic destruction of all state presence by jihadist groups seeking to replace the judicial 
order by sharia law, the Supreme Court of Mali decided in July 2012 and January 2013 to 
transfer the jurisdiction of the northern regions to the Court of First Instance of Commune III 
in Bamako.316 As late as September 2017, only one third of public agents, including judicial 
and penitentiary personnel, had been redeployed to central and northern regions. 317  The 
widespread insecurity make it extremely challenging for judicial actors who want to act on 
criminal allegations to organise investigations and prosecutions, seen by the threats and even 
kidnappings of judicial actors.318 While significant hurdles, these practical challenges are not 
the only impediments to effective, impartial, and independent investigations and prosecutions. 
 Second, beyond these practical obstacles, political obstacles refer to those that the 
government could theoretically remove or ease if it wished. Such political obstacles emerge 
due notably to weak judicial independence that enables undue influence on judicial actors. 
Some scholars take this factor into account by including, for instance, quantitative indicators 
of judicial independence.319 However, elite manipulation of legal processes can be difficult to 
systematically analyse as it can be both explicit, through structural links between judicial 
bodies and executive power, as well as implicit, through unofficial instructions and signals 
given by political officials to members of the judiciary. Typical of conflict-affected contexts, 
executive influence over the judiciary “tends to be exercised through informal and material 
controls that” render formal legal safeguards of independence inoperative.  Indeed, “idealistic 
accounts of a duty to prosecute might miss the fact that domestic courts use a range of what 
might be understood as avoidance techniques to deal with politically difficult questions.”320 
According to human rights organisations, while Côte d’Ivoire formally guarantees the 
independence of the judiciary in its constitution, in practice, “judges that act independently are 
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the exception rather than the rule.” 321  Regarding Mali, “the classic notion of judicial 
independence is quite far from the reality in Mali.”322 While not assuming that the judiciary is 
under the control of executive powers, it is highly relevant to trace how weak judicial 
independence shapes how the norm is implemented.        
Despite lowered confidence in the judicial sector, population surveys in both Côte 
d’Ivoire and Mali highlight popular support for criminal accountability for perpetrators of 
international crimes. In a 2014 survey of 1,000 respondents in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, 55% of 
respondents said that accountability for the 2010 post-election violence was important. 
Similarly, 69% responded that obtaining justice for the violence was necessary. When asked 
what should be done with those responsible for the violence, the most frequent response was 
that perpetrators needed to face trial.323 In a 2014 survey of 2400 individuals throughout Mali, 
a majority of respondents (64%) expressed preference for retributive justice over restorative 
justice (35%). Respondents called for such prosecutions in national courts (47%) over 
international courts (25%).324 Similar findings were reached by a 2017 survey of over 2800 
individuals, which found that, despite widespread dissatisfaction with the judiciary, the 
majority of respondents favoured criminal prosecution in formal court system for conflict-
related crimes.325  
 
International Criminal Court 
 
 Beyond the national level, states retain a relatively central role in the Rome Statute 
system. Indeed, the Court’s institutional design is a product of political compromise between 
sovereignty-constraining and sovereignty-accommodating elements. It is a compromise 
between the need to ensure its effectiveness as an independent tribunal, endowed with the 
capability of investigating and prosecuting both state and non-state actors, and the demands of 
accommodating sovereignty sensitivities. This led to two key features that both impose 
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obligations on states while ultimately enabling states to play a central role in enforcing the anti-
impunity norm.  
 The first feature is the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime. According to Article 
17 (a) and (b), the Court shall determine that a case is inadmissible where the case is being, or 
has been, investigated or prosecuted by a State that has jurisdiction over it, “unless the State is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution” or unless the 
State’s decision not to prosecute the person “resulted from the unwillingness or inability of the 
State genuinely to prosecute.” Based on this principle of complementarity, the ICC is unlike 
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the International Military Tribunal for the 
Far East, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) – all of which had primary jurisdiction and 
thus the right to try matters irrespective of whether national authorities wanted to do so first. 
As outlined in Article 19, to challenge the admissibility of an ICC case, the state or the accused 
must show that the same case, in terms of suspects and conduct, is being addressed at the 
national level. As outlined in Article 20(3), the Court cannot try a person who has been tried 
by another court with respect to the same conduct unless the proceedings in the other court 
“were for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from criminal responsibility” or “were 
not conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process 
recognized by international law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, 
was inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”  
 The sovereignty-accommodating dimension of the Rome Statute’s complementarity 
regime is clear in that it allows the state with domestic jurisdiction over the crime to investigate 
and prosecute the case domestically first before the ICC can adjudicate it, as the ICC is intended 
to “supplement – not supplant – domestic criminal law prosecutions.”326  In other words, the 
ICC is conceived as a subsidiary accountability forum that gives states primary jurisdiction and 
thus accommodates states’ understandably extreme reluctance to give up one of the key 
elements of sovereign power: the state’s monopoly of force, which is epitomized in the power 
of domestic courts to try and punish perpetrators of crimes.327     
 At the same time, the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime has a sovereignty-
constraining dimension. While the complementarity regime does not impose a general legal 
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duty on states to prosecute the crimes that are under the ICC’s jurisdiction, it nevertheless does 
mean that a state is expected to be willing and able to prosecute a given case, or face “an 
exceptional decision of the ICC to intrude on national jurisdiction.”328 Depending on the case, 
and for a variety of reasons, the state may or may not wish to avoid ICC intervention. In cases 
where the state with domestic jurisdiction over the crime wants to avoid ICC investigations 
into a given individual for certain conduct, the state must genuinely investigate or prosecute 
the same individual for the same conduct in order to render the case inadmissible. It could be 
highly challenging for states to successfully render cases inadmissible before the ICC since the 
state must show evidence of investigations into the same persons and substantially the same 
conduct as the ICC’s case, and the ICC Prosecutor “can always choose different conduct or 
incidents.”329 Further, as stipulated in Article 17(1)(a), the ICC judges may determine that a 
case is admissible despite a domestic investigation or prosecution if the judges find that “the 
state is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” The idea 
that a supranational court can pressure governments to investigate and prosecute certain 
conducts for certain conduct, and interpret whether investigations and prosecutions are 
“reliable or fraudulent,” has what Hurd describes as “dramatic” implications for the model of 
sovereign statehood and adds a novel aspect of hierarchy to international politics: the ICC is 
legally authorized to supercede domestic courts.330   
 The second feature is the ICC’s dependence on state cooperation. The most significant 
constraint on the ICC Office of the Prosecutor’s ability to act outside the binds of states’ 
political will is its dependence on state cooperation for the enforcement of its mandate. Since 
the Court was not endowed with a police force and only has limited resources for investigation 
and prosecution, the Rome Statute requires such cooperation from states. States Parties are 
required to arrest and surrender a person sought by the Court (Articles 59 and 89 – 92), as well 
as to cooperate more broadly with respecting requests for assistance regarding the provision of 
evidence and testimony and the facilitation of investigation and trial. This leads to the paradox 
of the dependent-independent ICC Prosecutor.338 While the ICC Office of the Prosecutor is 
legally independent, it is also “factually, utterly dependent.” 339  Referring to another 
international tribunal, Cassese notes, “To walk and work he needs artificial limbs. The artificial 
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limbs are the state authorities; without their help the Tribunal cannot operate.”340 This feature 
means that, as it crafts a prosecutorial strategy, the Prosecutor must consider the prospects of 
state cooperation, a “function of the government’s evolving interests.”341 
 The central role played by states is most evident when states fail to cooperate. Indeed, 
states show fluctuating levels of cooperation in light of the fact that “they are both lawful 
authorities whose cooperation is valuable, and also objects of analysis and investigation.”342 
This means that states are likely to be most willing to cooperate “where prior regimes, ‘rogue’ 
or disfavoured elements of the government, scapegoats, or non-State actors are under 
investigation.”343 The Statute’s silence on the consequences of non-cooperation findings was 
also a reflection of the compromise with sovereignty, as the drafters did not want to endanger 
the adoption of the Statute “by examining it too closely.”344 At most, the ICC Prosecutor can 
apply for a finding of non-cooperation against a given State Party, which judges can then refer 
to the Assembly of States Parties or to the Security Council in cases of UN Security Council 
referrals. Overall, while the Court was “meant to operate above politics,” its actual enforcement 
structure means that “the political interests and actions of states” are both antagonists as well 
as “indispensable allies” of the ICC. 345  Analysing the anti-impunity norm’s enforcement 
features illustrates Hurrell’s observation that the “transformationist rhetoric about ‘post-
Westphalia’ substantially overstates the degree to which we have in fact moved beyond a state- 
and sovereignty-based order.”346     
 As illustrated above, the state maintains a relatively central, though not wholly 
unconstrained, role and retains decisive decision-making power over whether to prosecute 
nationally or shift the costs of accountability to The Hague. From this privileged position, state 
actors can navigate the flexibility within the anti-impunity norm and determine its (in)ability 
and (un)willingness to prosecute in both national and international courts, as well as exercise 
implicit or explicit influence over the judiciary in cases of weak judicial independence. Indeed, 
this section also reveals how, while complying with the legal requirements and political 
expectation to hold individuals accountable for crimes, states can deploy the two versions of 
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the anti-impunity norm depending on what is deemed strategically advantageous: either 
conduct prosecutions domestically or enabling prosecutions at the ICC by claiming it is unable 
and/or unwilling to pursue the case in domestic courts and effectively cooperating with the 
ICC.   
 
The Norm’s Functions 
 
 Having established in the previous section the significance of elite strategy and the 
mechanisms of the norm’s enforcement, this section demonstrates how the norm’s functions 
make it a salient resource to deploy strategically within the context of political contestation in 
times of internal armed conflict and crises of legitimacy. As demonstrated below, its salience 
stems from the overlap between two functions of the norm and two criteria of government 
legitimacy. In light of this overlap, the norm can be strategically and selectively implemented 
to help legitimate government actors via the delegitimation of their opposition in a manner that 
furthers a particular goal.  
 Drawing from the literature surveyed in Chapter 2, pursuing justice within conflict is 
expected to shape the conflict narrative through the depoliticization effect of the norm’s 
criminal lens and shape power relations through inducement and marginalization.347 These 
expected effects are based on legalist assumptions, in which the application of law is a matter 
of definite rules and procedures that can supplant and constrain politics. However, these effects 
are not as straightforward when applied in practice in politically-charged contexts. Regarding 
the first function, using the anti-impunity norm can help shape one part of the particular 
narrative of the conflict. Actors can use the norm as a frame that enables the branding of certain 
actors as innocent and others as criminal, thereby influencing actors’ claims to being legitimate 
political interlocutors and members of the international community. Regarding the second and 
third functions, rather than simply incentivizing and marginalizing actors with alleged criminal 
responsibility, the norm can be used to selectively co-opt and neutralise certain actors over 
others, thereby influencing the government’s ability to exercise effective control over the 
	
347 Another expected causal effect is deterrence. However, deterrence is highly challenging to 
robustly ‘prove’ and causally link a decline in abuses to the threats of prosecution as opposed 
to other factors. See Nouwen 2012; Koskenniemi 2002, 7-8; Schabas 2007, 57.   
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country. Thus, actors can use the norm to discursively shape the exclusion or inclusion of 
certain actors, as well as materially weaken and empower certain actors.  
 Overall, these functions can directly shape two fundamental criteria of government 
legitimacy: the narrative-shaping function can influence actors’ claims of membership within 
the international community and the power-shaping function can influence actors’ ability to 
exercise effective control over territory. The section below first presents these two basic criteria 
of government legitimacy and then explores how the norm’s functions can shape the political 
contestation by influencing these two criteria. As it shows how the norm’s functions overlap 
with two basic criteria of government legitimacy, the framework offers a way to analyse the 





 The question of government legitimacy is particularly relevant to studying internal 
armed conflicts, contexts marked by contested government legitimacy, as the value of winning 
the legitimacy contest is extremely high in internal conflicts in which non-state armed groups 
with aspirations towards statehood challenge the government on key axes of legitimacy.350 In 
both Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, national officials, with support from international conflict 
resolution actors including the UN, regional organisations, and key states, focused on 
bolstering, rather than problematizing, the legitimacy and “ontological priority” 351  of the 
governments that were facing armed opposition. 
 Government legitimacy is generally based on two broad facets: the source of power and 
the exercise of power.352 Regarding the first facet, as D’Aspremont contends, the origin of a 
government’s power is a key way that its legitimacy is evaluated.353  Indeed, it is widely 
accepted by states that the will of the people constitutes “the ultimate source of government 
legitimacy.”354 As long as it is constitutional and reflective of the will of the people, the quality 
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of the government, ranging from democratic to authoritarian, has not traditionally been a highly 
relevant factor.355 The point here is that the source of power – constitutional and ‘by the people’ 
– is one facet of government legitimacy. The second facet – the exercise of power – enables 
observers to evaluate how a government exerts its power.356 The source of power and the 
exercise of power are intrinsically linked, as “the apparatus in effective control is respected 
because, and only insofar as, it is presumed (albeit sometimes irrebuttably) to be the expression 
of ‘the will of the people.’”357 However, they are distinct, insofar as the origin of power is more 
binary (constitutional or unconstitutional) than the exercise of power, which can be bolstered 
and shaped over time and which becomes especially important in periods of internal armed 
conflict.358  
 This thesis focuses on this second facet – the exercise of power – and examines how 
governments bolster this aspect of their legitimacy. Indeed, studying the legitimation of 
governments in periods of strife is particularly illuminating because it sheds light on strategic 
attempts to justify and challenge existing power relations.359 The exercise of power is itself 
based on two key elements: international membership and domestic effectiveness. In situations 
of internal armed conflict, embattled governments take measures to bolster their legitimacy by 
reinforcing both elements, including by deploying the anti-impunity norm, as explained later. 
The first element is its reputation as law-abiding and promoter of values of the ‘international 
community,’ or its international membership. International membership is based on a 
reputation as belonging to an international community by declaring its support for, and 
adhering to, international standards of conduct and promoting fundamental principles, 
including respect for international law and human rights. In light of the evolving view that 
“recognition and protection of human rights form an essential component in evaluating the 
	
355 Some argue that a “right to democratic governance” exists, but that debate is outside the 
scope of this thesis. Franck 1992. 
356 D’Aspremont 2006, 882.  
357 Roth 2000, 2. 
358 The distinction between the ‘source of power’ and the ‘exercise of power’ vaguely mirrors 
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the authentic preferences of the members of the constituency in question, and ‘output’ 
legitimacy, i.e. the effective promotion ‘of the welfare of the constituency in question.’ Scharpf 
1999: 6-9. However, ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy are concepts more suited to the study of 
decision-making processes within governments or other institutions. (Schmidt 2012.) The 
present study focuses on how governments achieve the basic criteria that enable a government 
to effectively promote the welfare of the constituency in question.       
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legitimacy of governments in the modern international system,” it has increasingly become an 
expectation for legitimate authorities. 360  Since the legitimacy of elites is particularly 
jeopardised in times of conflict, it is reasonable to expect elites will endorse international norms 
during such periods in order to reinforce its legitimacy as a member of the international 
community. 363  While it has increasingly been linked to the “conditionality” for being a 
legitimate government and member of the international community, it is of course not a strict 
conditionality, as many governments who fail to uphold such norms maintain their status as 
legitimate. Nevertheless, states seek to avoid being deemed a rogue or pariah state by at least 
claiming support for, and justifying their actions with regards to, international law and human 
rights. Equally, in this “age of accountability” and era of “sovereignty as responsibility,” armed 
groups have increased their engagement with international law and human rights “precisely 
because of an expected gain in international legitimacy,” and criticise the government on this 
axis.366 
 The second element is its domestic effectiveness, or its ability to effectively control and 
secure a territory. In principle, the “legitimate governmental authority is determined by 
effective control over a territory.”367 In other words, having effective control of the state is a 
very important factor in how international law has traditionally viewed a legitimate 
government.368 This criterion is central though not entirely essential. Governments with little 
or no effective control over substantial parts the territory due to challenges presented by 
opposition groups, which themselves “meet the most basic criterion of statehood, which is 
physical control over territory and population,” have nevertheless in various cases continued 
to be viewed as legitimate representatives of the state.369 This does not mean the government 
swiftly becomes illegitimate, but rather becomes legitimacy-challenged. 
 This study thus examines how a government seeks to shape its legitimacy during armed 
conflict by bolstering its international membership claims and domestic effectiveness - aspects 
of its exercise of power. In doing so, it draws upon Suchman’s definition of legitimacy as: 
“[t]he generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
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definitions.”372 In this sense, these two generic criteria for government legitimacy echo basic 
expectations of a government’s legitimacy in the socially constructed systems at both the 
international and national levels. This approach is simply one of various ways of studying 
government legitimacy. This study is distinct from, for instance, studying grounded legitimacy. 
Rather than identifying the unique criteria on which the legitimacy of formal governance 
meshes with local communities’ beliefs in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, examined through an 
ethnographic and sociological lens, this study offers explanatory traction across contexts by 
examining generic and basic criteria.    
 In sum, as part of the perpetual process of legitimation during the political struggle in 
situations of internal conflict, both state and opposition actors take measures to strategically 
boost their own legitimacy and weaken the legitimacy of their opposition. Such contexts of 
contestation illustrate how legitimacy is relational. Put simply, the legitimation of one party is 
achieved through the delegitimation of its opposition. Deploying the anti-impunity norm is a 
resource upon which actors draw in this continual process of actors’ legitimation and the 
delegitimation of their opposition. The next section shows how the norm’s functions parallel 
the two elements of the government’s legitimacy and can shape them in various and 
indeterminate ways. As presented in the table below, the narrative-shaping function can 
influence actors’ claims to being a member of the international community while the norm’s 
power-shaping function can influence actors’ ability to exercise effective control.   
 
Table 2: Relationship between the Anti-Impunity Norm’s Functions and Criteria of 
Government Legitimacy 
Criteria of 
Government Legitimacy  
The Anti-Impunity Norm’s Functions 
  
International Membership Narrative-Shaping Function • Villainizing / Privileging 
Political Interlocutors 
Domestic Effectiveness Power-Shaping Function • Coercive Leverage 
• Selective Neutralisation 
 
	
372 Suchman 1995, 574. 
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Villainizing / Privileging Political Interlocutors 
 
 The pursuit of justice for past atrocities through criminal proceedings is widely 
expected to have a transformative effect by shaping historical conflict narratives, mainly 
through the establishment of a detailed and authoritative record of past events. As captured in 
the UN Secretary-General’s report entitled “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in 
Conflict and Post-conflict Societies,” trials are expected to help societies “emerge from periods 
of conflict by establishing detailed and well-substantiated records of particular incidents and 
events.”373 This is of course a subject of lively debate, often grounded in different conceptions 
of the relationship between ‘truth’ and ‘law.’ Much literature explores the variety of ways 
actors in post-conflict contexts engage with the historical narratives of mass atrocities 
generated through the retrospective measures of domestic and international criminal trials.374  
 This study contributes to a related but distinct pool of literature that focuses on how the 
increased salience of the anti-impunity norm during conflict offers actors a resource to shape 
the dynamic conflict narratives during conflict. Indeed, by serving as a particular frame that 
“shape[s] what is viewed and how what is viewed is interpreted,”375 the anti-impunity norm 
can be used to shape narratives while conflict is on-going, thereby influencing how the conflict 
is dynamically understood by both domestic and international audiences. As opposed to the 
studies that explore how actors use the historical narratives that are generated through the 
	
373 UN Doc. S/2004/616, UN Secretary-General. 2004. “The Rule of Law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies.” Paras. 38-39.   
374 Wilson 2011; Houge 2019, 288; Douglas 2016. In line with assumptions found in the 
aforementioned UN report, some argue that shedding light on what happened can deflate the 
ability of political entrepreneurs to incite violence based on ideologies that are built on 
historical revisionism, distortion, and erasure of past crimes. Yet, exploring how contested the 
“truth” generated from a criminal legal process can be, other studies highlight how political 
elites in post-conflict contexts ranging from post-Yugoslav states to Algeria use these particular 
historical narratives to entrench certain meanings and interpretations of the past for political 
aims, with the effect of overshadowing certain powerful parties’ responsibility for abuses and 
often exacerbating societal divisions. For a selection of studies on how elites interpreted the 
proceedings at the ICTY to promote clashing narratives about guilt and victimhood in post-
Yugoslav states, see Clark 2009; Subotić 2013; Bieber 2014; Klarin 2009. In a case study of 
Algeria, Mecellum shows how, following the discovery by the national investigative 
commission of state complicity in enforced disappearances and the mounting pressure to 
prosecute alleged state-aligned perpetrators, the current Algerian government strategically 
shifted the historical narrative to shape how the 1990s conflict is understood, moving from an 
interpretation of the violence as “injustice” to “misfortune caused by ambiguous forces.” 
Mecellum 2018, 254.  
375 Srinivasan 2012, 2015.  
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litigation and judgment of trials, analysing how actors use the idea that perpetrators must be 
held responsible for abuses during conflict entails also studying measures that come before 
trial, including accusations and denials of responsibility for abuses, the issuing of arrest 
warrants and amnesties, and arrests.  The framework presented below, and applied to the case 
studies, shows how interpreting political events through the frame of the anti-impunity norm 
enables actors to brand certain conflict parties as supporters, and others as violators, of 
international standards of conduct. Doing so helps actors to strategically influence a key 
criterion of legitimacy that is vitally at stake during conflict - the reputation of conflict parties 
as members of the international community and thus as legitimate political interlocutors. .  
Since, as Bell notes, questions of parties’ status and legitimacy to negotiate become paramount 
during conflict, their reputations as legitimate or illegitimate political interlocutors are also a 
central aspect of the conflict narrative.376  Using the anti-impunity norm can indeed reinforce 
a distinction between parties - between the innocent and the guilty, the political and the 
criminal, the friend and enemy of the international community, and thus the legitimate and the 
illegitimate.  
 Before explaining how the anti-impunity norm can be a particularly powerful 
interpretative resource in shaping narratives by influencing this legitimacy criterion, it is 
important to explain how the concepts of ‘frames’ and ‘conflict narratives’ are related yet, as 
used in this thesis, distinct. The conflict narrative can be understood as “how a story is told, 
which events are selected, how they are presented and connected to other events or myths, or 
placed in a historical or cultural context.”377 Drawing on Autesserre’s approach, frames, on the 
other hand, consist of ideologies (“assumptions and definitions taken as given”) and paradigms 
(the liberal peace). Frames can thus shape conflict narratives, as they “shape one’s 
understanding of objectives or processes and how one acts toward or within them.”378 In this 
case, the frame of the anti-impunity norm highlights the imperative of holding perpetrators of 
abuses criminally accountable for serious abuses, what some scholars has described as having 
“become almost unquestionable common sense that criminal punishment is a legal, political, 
and pragmatic imperative for addressing human rights violations.”379 This frame can influence 
the conflict narrative because it shapes the understanding of the causes of the conflict, who 
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should be held responsible for the conflict, what should be done to manage the conflict, and 
who should be involved in doing so.  
 The anti-impunity norm, through the focus on individualization within international 
criminal law, focuses responsibility on individuals rather than on collectives. Judging a person, 
rather than a whole group or nation, is intended to avoid collective stigmatization and 
recrimination. It also focuses on judging actors through their conduct, rather than their 
grievances, according to legal standards that delimit non-criminal from criminal behaviour. 
This legalization thus helps frame certain conduct, and by extension the actors, through a binary 
between ‘non-criminal’ and political vs. ‘criminal’ and no longer political, as those 
criminalized are “considered to have put themselves outside the pale of politics, and even 
humanity, through their inhuman acts.”380 In doing so, it decontextualizes the conflict and 
narrows the understanding for how the conflict evolved, since the “meaning of historical events 
often exceeds the intentions or actions of particular individuals” and stems from structural 
causes. 381  In light of these interpretive features, applying this frame in such inextricably 
political contexts as armed conflicts can thus help actors shape a conflict narrative in ways that 
benefit certain actors by painting a particular narrative that highlights some aspects while 
obscuring others. To be clear, this is of course not argue that, in light of these effects, the anti-
impunity norm should not be used. Perpetrators of crimes should obviously be denounced for 
such conduct. Rather, it is to problematize the binary between law and politics that is assumed 
by the view that the anti-impunity norm only depoliticizes conflict. 
 In terms of the criteria for legitimacy, applying the anti-impunity norm can thus shape 
the politics of reputation and influence the claims made by state and opposition actors to be 
political interlocutors that support international law and a members of the international 
community. Using the anti-impunity norm can shape the conflict’s dynamics through its 
branding effect - villainizing certain actors as illegitimate and, by extension, privileging certain 
actors as legitimate. As Autesserre notes, frames can “reify and perpetuate arbitrary and often 
dichotomous categories such as man/woman, war/peace, or barbarian/civilized.”382 In this case, 
international criminal law has a particularly power branding effect as it “draw[s] bright lines 
between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour,”383 and thus draws bright lines between who 
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is acceptable and who is not. Its branding effect stems from its implicit reference to humanity 
and its implicit definition of the boundaries of the international community – making it “a 
spectacular form of global regulation.”384 As Kinsella explains, this regulation has productive 
effects, including the production of the subject.385 In this sense, international criminal law 
defines and highlights those acts that put the agent outside the community. Offenses are 
perpetrated “not only against the victim but also – and primarily – against the community 
whose law is violated” and the perpetrator has harmed “international order, and mankind in its 
entirety.” 386  Appealing to humanity and thus highlighting a particular vision of the 
“international community” can, somewhat paradoxically, reinforce the exclusion of particular 
actors. 
 The act of identifying the opposition as ‘criminal' simultaneously produces the subject 
of the identifier, as it makes the identifiers come into existence as non-criminal and legitimate. 
The one denouncing such harm is portrayed, at least to a certain degree, as a defender of this 
community. Even before any arrest warrant, trial, judgment, or sentence, a group mentioned as 
allegedly responsible for abuses, and especially by the ICC, is to some extent criminalised and 
branded as enemies of mankind, “whereas those who can side with the enforcement of 
international criminal law can rebrand themselves as friends of humanity.” 387  This can 
reinforce an actor’s “attempt to undermine the legitimacy of their adversary’s purpose and aims 
while elevating the legitimacy of their own.”388  
 Since the norm’s framing effect allows actors to signal the villains, the virtuous, and 
the victims, the norm can be used by states and other actors as they promote an “intentional” 
causal story, or a particular understanding of the conflict that shapes certain actors as the cause 
of the conflict. According to Walling, “intentional stories identify and name perpetrators who 
are responsible for deliberate harm to their victims. These are stories about aggression, ethnic 
cleansing, genocide, or systematic human rights and international humanitarian law violations, 
which are frequently classified as crimes against humanity or war crimes.”389 Yet, while the 
norm can be used to shape the dynamic contemporary narrative, it can narrow the story by also 
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strategically overshadowing both past abuses committed by the identifier and the group they 
represent as well as, more broadly, that party’s responsibility in the broader structural causes 
for the conflict. In other words, by tracing how the discourse of international criminality is 
used, it becomes clear how it can help overshadow other parts of a more holistic understanding 
of the conflict.    
 If discourses can exclude, they can also include. While the anti-impunity norm is 
generally viewed through its exclusionary effects vis-à-vis those targeted, the branding effect 
can also be used to ‘repoliticise’ actors. Through selective branding, the anti-impunity norm 
can be used to rhetorically “adjudicate[e] over the merit and demerit of various groups in 
international society.”390 Yet, the definition of the ‘enemy’ is not fixed but rather fluid and can 
evolve over time in line with evolving dynamics of the conflict. This process of ‘re-
politicization’ entails no longer viewing the actor in light of their conduct and potential 
responsibility for abuses, but rather treated as an actor with grievances. More concretely, anti-
impunity measures against certain parties can be suspended in order to politically rehabilitate 
their status as legitimate interlocutors and place belligerent parties on a more equal moral 
standing by avoiding any villainization.391 In practice, in cases where the opposition is not 
unified, strands of the opposition may wish to present themselves as potential partners rather 
than enemies of the peace and seek to distinguish themselves from other members of the 
opposition. This is particularly relevant as conflicts can be ignited when parties feel excluded 
or resolved when their political demands were recognised, instead of being treated as demands 
by purely criminal actors.392  
 To be clear, this does not mean that the anti-impunity norm is used to shape how the 
conflict is understood internationally rather than nationally. Rather, as one aspect of the 
conflict narrative, the portrayal of government or opposition actors as legitimate members of 
the international community is relevant for influencing the perceptions of both national and 
international audiences. Expressing support for the anti-impunity norm can help actors boost 
their reputation by signalling their membership to ‘the global village,’ which can improve their 
image not only in the eyes of the ‘international community’ but also among domestic audiences 
as a supportive partner in the cosmopolitan collective ‘struggle against impunity,’ while 
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gaining benefits by delegitimating one’s opposition in so doing.393 For governments, showing 
domestic audiences that the government is deemed acceptable to international actors can indeed 
be part of the government’s efforts to boost the its authority in its national constituency, as it 
can send a message of the government’s viability in conducting international relations. This is 
especially beneficial in states “where sovereignty and its representation in practice heavily 
dependent on external recognition.”394 Similarly, opposition parties that seek to challenge the 
government’s legitimacy also seek to shape their reputation as legitimate and law-abiding 
political interlocutors both in the eyes of the international community but also among domestic 
audiences, in order to defend their aspirations of being a viable governing entity. As Jo 
explains, legitimacy-seeking rebels are more likely to comply with international law “with the 
expectation of political benefits of domestic or international legitimacy that can aid their 
military struggle,” as they seek recognition, legitimacy, and reputation.395 
 In sum, using the anti-impunity norm serves as a frame is often expected to de-escalate 
conflict based on the premise that it helps view the conflict through a depoliticized approach, 
in part through its focus on individuals, their conduct, and legal rules of (il)legal conduct. In 
other words, if a political approach to the etiology of conflict focuses on the contestable 
meaning of individuals’ adversarial actions operating within a collective context shaped by 
larger (economic, political, legal, cultural, organisational…) structures, then a depoliticized 
approach focuses on analysing the actions of specific individuals in comparison to widely-
known rules of (il)legal conduct that, if violated, require certain consequences. Yet, and 
importantly, depoliticization can have political effects on the conflict landscape. In other 
words, in a Schmittian view, the essence of politics is the differentiation between friends and 
enemies. This differentiation can be constructed through the norm’s purported aim of 
depoliticizing conflict by focusing on individual actors’ conduct according to legal standards 
rather than collective grievances and a systemic analysis. In a spin-off of Schmitt’s views, and 
building off of Nouwen and Werner’s analysis, by interpreting individual actors’ through a 
criminal lens and a narrow contextual analysis, the anti-impunity norm enables actors to brand 
the enemy ‘other’ as criminal and no longer ‘political,’ thereby contributing to this 
differentiation that represents, for Schmitt, the essence of politics. 396 Tracing how the norm’s 
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discursive function is used by actors reveals how control over the framing can “translat[e] into 
the power to define threats to international peace and security, to assign responsibility for 
conflicts and to shape interpretation of relevant norms, including human rights.”397 This power 
to define is directly related to how using the norm can also influence the more material power 
of relevant actors.      
  
Coercive Leverage and Selective Neutralisation  
 
 Whereas the norm’s narrative-shaping function can help brand actors’s international 
membership claims and reputations as legitimate political interlocutors, the norm’s power-
shaping function can be used empower and disempower certain actors, thereby influencing the 
ability of the government and its opposition to exercise effective control. “With inclusion and 
exclusion, come empowerment and disempowerment.”398 More specifically, pursuing justice 
is expected to contribute to resolving conflict by having two effects on actors’ power: 
inducement and marginalization. However, as explained below, the way in which actors used 
conflict-related justice measures in practice is better understood from a political bargaining 
perspective that highlights how actors strategically implement these measures to shape the 
balance of power in conflicts.     
 First, anti-impunity measures are expected to increase the likelihood that conflict can 
be settled through inducement, as anti-impunity measures in theory “complement that basket 
of liberal norms that seeks to reconcile warring parties and promote peace through negotiated 
settlements and power-sharing arrangements.” 399  More specifically, “retributive criminal 
justice may induce an increased desire on the part of a potential target to partake in a peace 
process.”400 Threats of prosecutions and arrest warrants are expected to shift the cost-benefit 
analysis of belligerent parties and can exert pressure upon warring sides, convincing 
combatants that further combat is not likely to be successful. However, a richer way to 
understand how the parameters of justice can induce actors is by analysing it as a means of 
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coercive leverage. In other words, rather than simply inducing the opposition to join 
negotiations, the norm can arguably serve as a means of coercive leverage, or a bargaining 
chip, with individuals deemed necessary for peace. This leverage can be used by governments 
and negotiators as incentive for potentially targeted parties to participate in peace talks or cede 
power.   
 Most obviously, the threat of trial can be used to pressure parties to lay down their arms 
and cede power, incentivising certain groups or commanders to defect by removing the 
prospect that even a military victory would result in nothing but continued condemnation or 
even a trial. Equally, the threat of trial, amplified by a self-referral and/or the opening of ICC 
investigations, can incentivise parties to join the negotiating table, as it can encourage leaders 
to join talks as a way of regaining status by becoming official interlocutors in a peace 
process.401 Indeed, fears of prosecution both nationally and by the ICC may convince parties 
that “diplomacy may produce better outcomes than what they can expect to experience on the 
battlefield” and may even encourage them to offer concessions at the bargaining table. Also, 
leaders may see engaging in a peace process “as a means of short-circuiting ICC action” and 
“may even seek to encourage the belief among outside powers that, while they are interested 
in pursuing peace talks, further ICC action risks replacing the existing leadership of the warring 
side with hardliners more opposed to mediation.”402 In another sense, Simmons and Danner 
argue that states invite ICC intervention to signal to its opposition its commitment to non-
violent means and to political negotiations.403  
 Also, offers of amnesty can be used strategically to incentivise parties to join 
negotiations or to cede power to step down without fear of criminal accountability.404 De facto 
or formal amnesties can be offered to marginalize strong spoilers and facilitate the adoption of 
peace negotiations. Other measures include the request for the Security Council to temporarily 
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suspend ICC investigations for a renewable one-year period, which could be used by mediators 
as a potential incentive in efforts to bring parties to the negotiating table or to pressure parties 
to cede power. Overall, this form of clemency, by formally suspending accountability for grave 
crimes or by deliberately not implementing such measures, serves as a type of “safety valve” 
which may in fact “operate as disconcertingly as political justice itself.”406  
 However, the success of these measures of coercive leverage is of course entirely 
uncertain. If the opposition fears being held accountable, through national or international 
justice, they may bolster their resolve to continue fighting, fearing arrest once they lay down 
their weapons. Also, fears of possible prosecution can incentivise parties to dig in their heels 
and avoid direct contact with their opponents or external actors who may see to enforce judicial 
measures. Further, the normative shift away from impunity means that the flexibility of 
mediators has been reduced as offers of amnesty and the lifting of arrest warrants are 
increasingly subject to scrutiny, closing off the possibility to offer potential spoilers a deal that 
will leave them weak and secure.407 Mediators may feel pressure not to offer incentives such 
as amnesty and exile. Even if they do, parties may also reject offers of exile and “honourable 
exits” from the country since doing so would imply their guilt or the wrongfulness of their 
actions and would damage their political status and struggle. Even after joining negotiations, 
leaders can walk out or refuse to sign deals, possibly rallying their forces against the prospect 
of peace. This is further complicated by the ICC’s independence since, “[I]f the Rome Statute’s 
‘no impunity’ directive cannot be compromised in an ongoing war and is seen as binding on 
governments and mediators, it makes negotiated settlements highly improbable and biases 
conflict resolution toward military solutions.”408 
 Second, anti-impunity measures are expected to increase the likelihood that conflict is 
settled through marginalization of alleged criminals, as a “primary mechanism through which 
justice can help deliver peace” is by excluding belligerent parties.409 Accordingly, targeting 
leaders is expected to “trigger a loss of power” and thereby weaken their base of support.410 
For instance, according to the ICC Prosecutor, “Arresting and removing Harun today will 
contribute to breaking the criminal system established in Darfur [and] will help peace, the 
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political process and the deployment of peacekeepers.”411 However, a more enlightening way 
to understand how marginalization can influence outcomes is by analysing its use as selective 
neutralisation. In other words, taking into account the impact of prosecutorial discretion and 
the inherent selectivity of the enforcement of international criminal law, governments can use 
judicial measures to selectively neutralise certain parties and perceived spoilers to shape a 
balance of power in ways that favour the government’s intended outcome. The target’s 
willingness and ability to continue fighting may be hampered due to a loss of support and/or 
due to their incarceration.413 As Wegner explains, “a leader sought by arrest warrant will find 
it more difficult to mobilise his followers since the potential gains of an armed struggle are 
nullified through his international ‘pariah’ status.”414 Neutralisation can isolate “those leaders 
and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, 
worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it.” 415 
Additionally, judicial measures can selectively marginalise spoilers within a party who “might 
have their own reasons for prolonging or renewing the conflict,”416 thereby making way for 
more moderate leadership. In sum, arrest warrants and criminal trials can “identify, stigmatize, 
and even physically remove certain individuals from a region of conflict. Indictment and arrest 
of potential ‘spoilers’ can ensure that they do not partake in the peace processes or continue 
unduly to influence a fragile transitional society.”417        
 Drawing upon the anti-impunity norm for selective neutralisation can also extend to 
shaping - to a limited extent - international justice. While the ICC is formally independent, 
governments can take certain actions in anticipation of ‘burden-sharing’ with the ICC and to 
encourage ICC investigations against particular targets. Most clearly, by issuing self-referrals, 
governments can shift the political costs of prosecution towards The Hague. Also, governments 
can interpret complementarity based on a cost-benefit analysis of whether transferring 
individuals or trying them domestically and thereby challenging the admissibility of the ICC’s 
case, is most advantageous. Equally, though this would violate their obligations under the 
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Rome Statute, governments can selectively enforce international arrest warrants, as a means of 
incentivising their opposition to join the negotiations.  
  Also, actors can invoke the need to respond to and prevent further human rights abuses 
to justify its use of force and to bolster calls for international intervention, which would help 
neutralise the opposition. Since invoking international criminal law internationalizes the scale 
and gravity of the conflict, it can help portray the conflict as a threat to regional and 
international stability and thus a matter for international engagement and partnership. As 
Nouwen and Werner explain, by framing the political conflict through the lens of international 
criminal law, “some issues are elevated to a level beyond the local, the national, and even the 
international, thus paving the way for outside interventions in the name of a more 
encompassing global community.” 418  Measures by international tribunals can bolster this 
strategy. By implicitly labelling a “good” side and marginalizing an “evil” side, the ICC has 
been accused of “legitimis[ing] the humanitarian claims of intervening forces” 419  and 
providing “moral clarity for policy makers seeking to negotiate the surrender of the 
aggressor.”420  
 However, these expected effects are of course risky. Most clearly, the issuance of arrest 
warrants either nationally or by the ICC, can dissuade both targeted and non-targeted leaders 
from ending hostilities and push them to continue the conflict. Targeted leaders may see 
redoubling their efforts on the battlefields “as a means of deterring a continuing ICC 
investigation and improving their bargaining position in the conflict”421 and “as a way to avoid 
capture, extradition, and trial.”422 Also, the marginalisation effect assumes that the targeted 
party is replaced by a more moderate leader, one that is more amenable to resolving the conflict 
by peaceful means, which is entirely uncertain.423 Further, it can also complicate or even block 
diplomatic efforts at engaging with the targeted party and limit the means available to 
mediators. The ICC has called on states to “eliminate non-essential contacts with individuals 
subject to an arrest warrant issued by the Court” and to “contribute to the marginalizing of 
fugitives.”424 Moreover, the measures taken by the independent ICC Prosecutor may thwart and 
	
418 Nouwen and Werner 2015, 162.  
419 Roach 2005, 440-443. 
420 Triponel and Williams 2013, 818.  
421 Greig and Meernik 2014, 269. 
422 Prorok 2017, 215. 
423 Vinjamuri 2010, 195. 
424 Office of the Prosecutor 2010, 12-14. 
 83 
derail other actors’ strategy, by targeting government officials or government-affiliated armed 
groups or individuals who are crucial to peace talks.  
 Overall, while the idea of criminal accountability is often viewed as shaping the conflict 
landscape through inducement and marginalisation of parties, the effects of both national and 
ICC anti-impunity measures are not determinative and are rather highly contingent. From a 
political bargaining perspective, a sharper way to analyse how actors’ deployment of the anti-
impunity norm shapes political dynamics within conflict is by considering how it is used as a 
source of coercive leverage and selective neutralisation, to exclude and include certain actors 
into political arrangements, as both can theoretically favour the government’s ability to 
exercise effective domestic control over the territory. This view takes into account the agency 
held by government actors in enforcing judicial measures as well as the need, in both negotiated 
settlements and one-sided victories, to include and exclude actors who are allegedly criminally 
responsible for grave abuses.  
 More broadly, it is important to note that the nature of these crimes - as atrocity crimes 
- plays a role in the use of the anti-impunity norm as a resource. As atrocity crimes have been 
identified as affronts to humanity as a whole, in light of their gravity and scale, the application 
of considerations of international criminal law raises the stakes in various ways. Their nature 
of atrocity crimes increases the imperative to pursue justice for victims of the crimes and the 
scrutiny on governments with regards to how they address accountability of perpetrators. In 
doing so, it amplifies the branding effect against alleged perpetrators, as these crimes are 
deemed grave affronts against universal values and codes of conduct. In parallel, it raises the 
ability to use threats of prosecution as coercive leverage. Relatedly, it increases the desire of 
alleged perpetrators to benefit from amnesty and thus increases the leverage of offers of 
impunity for such crimes to incentivise actors to change their conduct. Put differently, the use 
of law as apolitical resource would not be the same, but rather weaker, if used to address crimes 
that were of lesser gravity. While it is beyond the scope of this thesis, it would be interesting 
to consider how pursuing criminal accountability for other crimes that are not deemed atrocity 
crimes, such as terrorism or environmental degradation, would be used as a resource to shape 
the political landscape during conflict. 






 Much scholarly literature argues that the anti-impunity norm offers “language and 
processes by which to deal with conflict”425 and the pursuit of justice for grave abuses helps 
legitimate governments, but the literature lacks a framework through which to analyse these 
claims more clearly and systematically. There is indeed a need, as flagged by Bell, to recognise 
“the distinctness of conflicts, their particular conflict resolution imperatives, and the ways in 
which transitional justice language and mechanisms are strategically deployed by parties.”426  
 Focusing on one part of transitional justice, that of individual criminal accountability, 
this thesis offers a way to do so. First, it improves on existing frameworks by taking seriously 
how elite political strategy influences the norm’s implementation. Second, it considers how the 
norm’s institutional enforcement framework shapes actors’ ability to support or undermine 
anti-impunity measures. Third, it illustrates how the anti-impunity norm’s functions overlap 
with basic criteria of government legitimacy, meaning implementing the norm can further the 
government’s strategy of bolstering its legitimation through the delegitimation of its 
opposition.  
 Examining norm exploitation thus reveals how norms are used as a strategic resource 
to shape the political landscape of a country affected by internal conflict in their interests, a 
resource that stems from the structure of the norm’s enforcement, its functions, and elite 
objectives. Norm exploitation is different from related concepts proposed by other scholars. It 
is different because it does not necessarily imply, as “norm hijacking” does, that actors take 
measures that appear to support justice but in fact undermine or ignore the norm’s substance 
and thus the norm’s strengthening does not actually “produce justice.”430  This remains a 
possibility, but not an inherent part of the concept. In other words, exploiting the norm does 
not have a negative normative connotation, as it were. It depends, rather, on how it is exploited 
and to what aims. Over the next four chapters, the politics of accountability and impunity in 
Côte d’Ivoire and Mali are analysed through this framework. 
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 The 2010 presidential election in Côte d’Ivoire was expected to close the chapter on 
what had been nearly a decade of precarious “neither war nor peace” instability. 431  The 
remarkably high turnout rate of 82% reflected such hopes. Instead, the dispute over the election 
results between incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo and long-time rival Alassane Ouattara 
sparked a crisis that would last five months and kill over 3,000 people. Knowing Laurent 
Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo, and political youth movement leader Charles Blé Goudé were later 
charged with crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court, and that Alassane 
Ouattara went from being beleaguered in a hotel room to “truly the president of Côte 
d’Ivoire,”432 it is crucial to analyse how actors’ usage, or deployment, of the anti-impunity 
norm shaped the political dynamics during the crisis.  
 This chapter first provides background regarding the post-electoral crisis and presents 
the chapter’s central argument. It then analyses how actors used the anti-impunity norm’s 
functions in furthering short-term objectives and traces how the state’s relative centrality within 
the enforcement of justice shaped how the norm was implemented. The chapter focuses on the 
measures taken by the Ouattara administration, but also highlights measures taken by the UN, 
France, ECOWAS, and the AU, as these actors were deeply involved in the negotiations. By 
tracing the norm’s exploitation, this chapter shows how the anti-impunity norm was not a rule 
that supplanted and constrained politics but rather a flexible resource that contributed to 
shaping the political dynamics of the conflict on terms favoured by the Ouattara government, 
supported by key international actors. This chapter then leads to Chapter 5, which explores 
how the anti-impunity norm was used by actors in the years following the post-electoral crisis 
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 Following the second round of the presidential election, held on 29 November 2010, 
Côte d’Ivoire found itself in an extraordinary electoral-political deadlock marked by a severe 
crisis of governmental legitimacy. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) declared 
Ouattara the victor, having received 54.1% versus 45.9 % of the vote. Endorsing the results 
announced by the IEC and certified by the United Nations Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General (SRSG) Young Jin Choi, the vast majority of states as well as the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), and the UN Security 
Council recognised Ouattara as the president-elect. However, on 3 December 2010, the 
Constitutional Council of Côte d’Ivoire invalidated results in seven regions, which represented 
approximately 10% of the vote, and declared Gbagbo the winner with 51.45% versus 48.55% 
of the vote.433 Ivorians suddenly found themselves with two presidents, two governments, and 
“two legitimacies.”434   
 Exacerbating the chaotic political situation, multiple official and unofficial armed 
forces operated in Côte d’Ivoire. On the pro-Gbagbo side were the state security forces, 
(including the Defense and Security Forces, police, and gendarmerie), armed militia groups 
(including the youth group known as the Jeunes Patriotes), and mercenaries. Fighting on the 
pro-Ouattara side was, primarily, the armed branch of the Forces Nouvelles rebels known as 
the Armed Forces of the Forces Nouvelles (Forces Armées des Forces Nouvelles, FAFN).. Pro-
Ouattara forces also included the Invisible Commando armed group, self-defence fighters 
known as ‘dozos,’ and mercenaries. International forces on the ground included the United 
Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the French Operation Licorne.  
  Both pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara forces were allegedly responsible for serious 
abuses, with abuses most often committed on the basis of actual or perceived political and 
ethnic affiliation. The official death toll is often referred to as 3,000. This figure is a low 
estimate in light of the challenges of reporting abuses during the crisis.435 In terms of the 
proportion of responsibility for abuses between pro-Gbagbo and pro-Ouattara sides, the 
National Commission of Inquiry appointed by Ouattara found pro-Gbagbo forces were 
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responsible for 1,452 deaths and the FRCI were responsible for 727 deaths.436  From the 
beginning of the crisis in November 2010, most of the urban violence in Abidjan was 
committed by pro-Gbagbo forces, often intended to repress political opposition. Emblematic 
episodes of abuses allegedly committed by pro-Gbagbo forces, which later became grounds for 
charges of crimes against humanity, include the killing of over 150 civilians over six days in 
mid-December 2010, the attacks on women’s marches in early March 2011, and the bombing 
of a market on 17 March 2011. Abuses by pro-Ouattara forces were increasingly reported 
starting in early March 2011 as they gained a foothold in Abidjan. For instance, pro-Ouattara 
forces were accused of abuses in Anonkoua-Kouté village in Abidjan, where mostly pro-
Gbagbo communities lived.  
 While most of the focus was on the criminal conduct of pro-Gbagbo forces in Abidjan, 
pro-Ouattara forces were accused by UNOCI, the UN Human Rights Council’s International 
Commission of Inquiry, and human rights organisations of perpetrating grave abuses, often 
targeting people based on ethnicity, particularly over the course of several weeks as they 
advanced southwards towards Abidjan in March 2011.437  Specifically, the incident in the 
western town of Duékoué was “particularly shocking in its size and brutality,” according to the 
head of the ICRC delegation, with several hundred people killed over two days between 29 and 
30 March 2011.438 More broadly, in western Côte d’Ivoire, both sides committed retaliatory 
“tit-for-tat” violence, often a continuation of long-standing tension surrounding control over 
land between indigenous communities, which tend to favour Gbagbo, and non-indigenous, or 
‘allogène,’ communities from northern and central Côte d’Ivoire and West African states, 
which tend to favour Ouattara.    
 The post-electoral crisis, or what one scholar describes as a “slow-motion train 
wreck,”439 was particularly complicated as neither side fulfilled all criteria of government 
legitimacy. The struggle was described as being “between an elected president without 
legitimate force and an illegitimate president that stayed in power because of the military forces 
under his command.”440 However, the crisis was even more than a clash between Ouattara as 
de jure vs. Gbagbo as de facto president. The deadlock stemmed from discord within 
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fundamental axes of governmental legitimacy. One basic axis of governmental legitimacy is 
formal international recognition, which stems from the origin of a government and whether the 
control of the means of governance was acquired through the established legal constitutional 
process.441 In Côte d’Ivoire, the situation was complicated as there was a clash between two 
aspects of the government’s “legitimacy of origin:” between strictly electoral and constitutional 
legitimacy.  
 On the one hand, Ouattara had international recognition, which was based on his 
electoral legitimacy, or “the claim that one has won the majority of the people’s votes through 
an electoral process deemed free and fair by the international community.”442  Ouattara’s 
legality was grounded in the UN SRSG’s unprecedented mandate of certifying the presidential 
elections, as agreed in the UN Security Council Resolution 1765 (2007), which came in 
response to a request made by signatories of the 2005 Pretoria Accord. Thus, states swiftly and 
nearly unanimously recognised Ouattara as the president-elect, enabling him to participate in 
international relations in spite of his actual inability to control the territory through the 
constitutional means of governance.  
 On the other hand, Gbagbo had constitutional legitimacy, at least on a formal and 
procedural basis, as the Constitutional Council fulfilled its mandate to validate and announce 
the results more broadly443 and “had not been constitutionally challenged in due process in 
domestic legal parlance.”444 His legality was thus grounded in the internal legal framework of 
Côte d’Ivoire.445 Unlike Ouattara, who did not hold constitutional legitimacy as he had not 
officially been sworn in according to constitutional protocol, Gbagbo consistently referred to 
his constitutional legitimacy throughout the crisis, stating, “political crises in Africa are caused 
by people who do not respect the law…No country can be strong without respecting laws and 
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procedures.”446 The decision to not recognise Gbagbo based on the Constitutional Council’s 
results was nevertheless unusual, as the UN General Assembly usually refers to the criterion 
of constitutionality in previous controversies around accreditations of government 
representatives.447  
 Crucially, Gbagbo’s constitutional legitimacy enabled him to have the advantage on the 
second basic axis of government legitimacy, the exercise of power.448 Gbagbo’s legal authority 
in terms of national law enabled him to maintain administrative power, giving him control over 
political, military, and financial resources. Most importantly, Gbagbo could still rely on the 
security forces, particularly the Republican Guard, an elite unit of the gendarmerie known as 
the Center for the Command of Security Operations (Centre de commandement des operations 
de securité, CECOS), the navy, and mercenaries.449 In contrast, Ouattara had no control over 
the army, limited finances to pay and retain the loyalty of his supporters, and limited ability to 
communicate with Ivorians.450 His administration of just over a dozen ministers relied on 
phones and Internet to rule from the Golf Hotel, which was blockaded by pro-Gbagbo forces. 
The FAFN, estimated at around 10,000 elements, was armed mostly with light infantry 
weapons, including AK-47, machine guns, and rocket-propelled grenades, as well as limited 
number of heavy machine guns and armoured vehicles.451 French authorities were reportedly 
shocked to realise that the FAFN, armed with “insignificant and obsolete” weapons, were in 
fact “not operational.”452  In the words of SRSG Choi, Ouattara led the “world’s smallest 
republic” from a blockaded hotel while Gbagbo remained the “Master of Abidjan.”453 The 
balance of power was also, and crucially, perceived to be in Gbagbo’s favour. Ouattara-
appointed Prime Minister Guillaume Soro stated, “These generals and heavy weaponry have 
the respect of the immense majority of the army. Clearly, we can hold off this army for two 
days, three days, three weeks, but not indefinitely.” 454  Also of crucial importance was 
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Gbagbo’s control over the media, namely the Radiodiffusion Télévision Ivoirienne, which was 
a redoubtable “tool for legitimation” during times of crisis, in the words of a former Minister 
for Information.455 As French Ambassador Simon realised shortly after the election, Gbagbo 
was “buoyed and maintained in power by the street” and “would only leave if constrained and 
forced out.”456 
Summarizing the ambiguity of this duality of government, Rim notes:  
the situation presented the extraordinary precedent of a state’s having two competing 
entities claiming governmental authority, with one only partially de facto in his actual 
control of the administration but nationally de jure based on the constitutionality 
granted by the Constitutional Council, while the other was internationally de facto 
through the acceptance of his representation in the international community without 
having internal effectiveness, while remaining only potentially de jure via the 
theoretical democratic entitlement endowed by election victory.457 
 Over the next few months, a phalanx of international diplomats mobilised to resolve 
this unprecedented political deadlock. At the beginning of the crisis, key actors were broadly 
in agreement on the main objective: enabling Ouattara to reach the presidency by convincing 
Gbagbo to step down and excluding Gbagbo from future political arrangement. ECOWAS and 
the AU recognised Ouattara as President-elect and suspended Côte d’Ivoire on 7 and 9 
December 2010, respectively.458  On 20 December 2010, the UN Security Council passed 
Resolution 1962, recognising Ouattara as the president-elect.459 Over the course of the crisis, 
the series of envoys sent by ECOWAS and the AU to mediate included the heads of state or 
Prime Ministers from nine countries.460 Yet, while the conflict’s management is generally 
remembered as straight-forward – simply convincing Gbagbo to step down in order to enable 
Ouattara to accede to power - the continued power imbalance in Gbagbo’s favour and the 
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weakening diplomatic consensus over time meant that efforts to resolve the crisis were of 
particularly high stakes and their success was by no means predetermined.        
 Within the deadlock, each president grounded their claim to the presidency in clashing 
legal claims. As a result, the idea of ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ was a matter of contestation in political 
discourse, meaning both Gbagbo and Ouattara treated each other as outlaws. Gbagbo’s words 
during his inauguration speech could just as easily have been expressed by Ouattara: “They 
want to scare us, but they cannot expect that the legalists will surrender to those who have taken 
the road of illegality.”461  Since there was no clear way to arbitrate their rival legal claims to 
electoral legitimacy, Ouattara and other actors who sought to enforce Ouattara’s victory 
invoked another legal vocabulary through which to view the conflict: international criminal 
law. Indeed, as envisioned by the UN’s approach to peace-making in this “age of 
accountability,” various actors invoked the importance of the anti-impunity norm since the very 
first days of the crisis.  
 Overall, this chapter shows how the anti-impunity norm was a salient resource used by 
actors to shape the political contestation, but also how the fluctuations in power and strategies 
shaped the way accountability for abuses was pursued.463 As the goal shared by the Ouattara 
administration and the UN, AU, ECOWAS, and France was to enable Ouattara’s particularly 
hamstrung government to reach ‘full’ legitimacy, the use of measures that both supported and 
obstructed the normative imperative to hold individuals accountable for grave abuses was 
deployed as one of several means to enforce Ouattara’s electoral victory. Indeed, the anti-
impunity norm was used to in parallel reinforce the reputation of either side as (il)legitimate 
members of the international community as well as shape their relative ability to exercise 
control over the territory. These effects were achieved by exploiting the state’s centrality in the 
national and international administration of criminal justice, which enabled actors to take a 
combination of measures that both upheld and undermined the pursuit of justice for serious 
crimes. As a result, the way in which the anti-impunity norm was implemented did not derail 
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Villainizing / Privileging Political Interlocutors 
  
 As Gbagbo’s constitutional legitimacy enabled him to maintain control over political, 
military, and financial resources, he retained high perceived political value - making it essential 
to negotiate with him and convince him to cede power. However, Ouattara opposed Gbagbo’s 
repeated calls for directly negotiating a political solution to the deadlock, either through a vote 
recount or through a power-sharing arrangement. Invoking the anti-impunity norm helped craft 
the ideational aspect of the legalistic strategy adopted by Ouattara, which involved isolating 
Gbagbo internationally, asphyxiating him financially, 464  and progressively reconquering 
administrative power.465 Invoking the norm was indeed one of the limited means available to 
Ouattara to isolate Gbagbo internationally and chip away at Gbagbo’s high political value to 
resolving the conflict.  
 As international criminal law is arguably the most potent legal vocabulary to identify 
those that are ‘outlaws’ of the international community, Ouattara invoked international 
criminal law as a discursive lifeline to shift the terms of the debate and focus on judging the 
legitimacy of parties based on the way in which they exercised their power, and more 
specifically on their respect of international law and human rights. Seeking to delegitimate 
Gbagbo both domestically and in the eyes of the international community, Ouattara thus used 
the norm’s narrative-shaping function as an interpretive resource in influencing one part of the 
struggle for government legitimacy: the reputation of being a member of the international 
community. Also continuing the established practice in Ivorian politics of using accusations of 
human rights abuses as currency in the “politics of disqualification,” Gbagbo equally used the 
vocabulary of international criminal law as a discursive tactic.466 Yet, as explained below, 
while both leaders used the anti-impunity norm to discredit each other, both ways ultimately 
helped in framing Ouattara’s administration from being an armed rebel group to members of 
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the international community, while framing Gbagbo from being a member to a dictator and 
rebel of the international community. At the same time, this did not have a determinative effect 
on his political reputation, as it did not fully discredit him as a political interlocutor until the 
very end of the crisis in mid-March 2011, when the increase in abuses ultimately delegitimised 
him.   
 
Ouattara vs. Gbagbo 
 
 The anti-impunity norm was a particularly salient interpretive resource as it has 
significant emotive resonance in the Ivorian context. As McGovern explains, political 
legitimacy in Côte d’Ivoire “continued to be linked to keeping up the appearances of 
sophisticated ‘civilized’ behaviour,” making accusations of human rights abuses “an ideal 
vehicle for eliminating one’s political opponents from competition.” Compared to other 
contexts, “Ivorians seem to care quite a lot about what the rest of the world thinks of 
them…Ivorian political actors may change their actions in response to the threat of prosecution 
for war crimes because they do not like to think of themselves as war criminals, and don’t want 
others to think of them that way either.”467 This cultural traction matters since, as Nouwen 
notes, the likelihood of successful norm promotion increases “the more the frame within which 
a norm is promoted resonates with cultural traditions and narratives of the local context.”468  
 Within this context of “this national-level concern with civility,”469 in the first two 
weeks of the crisis on 14 December 2010, Ouattara decided to issue a re-confirmation of the 
Article 12(3) declaration issued by President Gbagbo in April 2003 in a bid to request ICC 
attention and re-establish grounds for the ICC to open an investigation. This decision was not 
taken in response to any particularly shocking abuse that had been committed within those first 
few weeks. Rather, it was aimed to swiftly change Gbagbo’s reputation from ‘contested 
president’ by branding him as a ‘potentially accused criminal.’ A government official explained 
that Ouattara’s decision was a means to “manage the crisis” and show the contrast between 
Gbagbo and Ouattara. “It was Gbagbo himself who issued [the] Article 12(3) [declaration]. 
The ICC tried to visit Côte d’Ivoire several times. They were not able to work because there 
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were many skeletons in the closet. But Ouattara said, ‘I do not have any skeletons in my closet. 
So, all those who wish to come are welcomed.’” 470  According to a researcher for an 
international human rights organization, the Ouattara administration’s de facto self-referral was 
part of efforts of “trying to show respect with human rights,” as he sought to remain “in line 
with the good graces of the international community” since, in many respects, “that was their 
legitimacy.”471 Ouattara’s decision to re-confirm the Article 12(3) declaration mirrored exactly 
how then-President Gbagbo had issued the initial Article 12(3) declaration in April 2003 in the 
context of the civil war for the same purpose, “recruiting international allies in his attempt to 
do away with a bothersome set of opponents who would be exposed as illegitimate.”472  
 Gbagbo’s request to the ICC in April 2003 had also been made in the context of an 
internal armed conflict. 473  After their failed coup d’état in September 2002, the Forces 
Nouvelles rebels, led by none other than Guillaume Soro who later became Ouattara’s Prime 
Minister, eventually took control of the northern half of the country. During this time, Gbagbo’s 
government, namely the Presidency, was accused of running a ‘death squad’ to eliminate 
perceived enemies, which allegedly was most active in the months following the attempted 
coup d’état. In early 2003, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights publicly stated that 
the ICC could try those responsible for the killings. Also, the French press reported on a memo 
written by the French Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE), which contended that 
there was an 80% probability that the ‘death squads’ operated under the instructions of 
President Gbagbo and/or First Lady Simone Gbagbo. Further, President of France Jacques 
Chirac implicitly threatened the presidential couple by saying that those supporting the ‘death 
squads’ could be brought before the ICC. In response to these allegations, Gbagbo requested 
the UN Security Council to refer the case of Côte d’Ivoire to the ICC so “it could send 
‘competent’ investigators to the country, who would, he insisted, clear him. Then they could 
pursue the true war criminals – the rebels.”474 In the communiqué, the government notes its 
request “was motivated by the profound attachment of the legitimate authorities of Côte 
d’Ivoire to human rights and the strict observance of international human rights.”475 Realising 
	
470 Interview with senior official in the Ministry of Justice, Abidjan, 1 December 2015.  
471 Confidential interview with researcher for a human rights organisation, December 2016.  
472 McGovern 2010, 73. 
473 Côte d’Ivoire Article 12(3) Declaration – 2003. 
474 McGovern 2010, 72. In addition, Gbagbo also filed a libel case against two newspapers that 
had reproduced these accusations, ultimately winning 3,000 euros and the retraction of three 
articles. 
475 Communiqué, Gouvernement de la Côte d’Ivoire, March 13, 2003. McGovern 2010, 72. 
 95 
there was no traction for a Security Council referral, in April 2003, President Gbagbo lodged 
an Article 12(3) declaration, accepting the ICC’s jurisdiction beginning on 19 September 2002 
– the day of the coup d’état. Thus, in a strange twist of fate, while Gbagbo’s request to the ICC 
intended to target the rebels, who were now Ouattara’s military force, Gbagbo became the 
target of Ouattara’s request to the ICC seven years later.476 
 Through a focus on criminality, Ouattara’s invocation of international criminal law also 
helped create a direct normative clash that undermines Gbagbo’s fundamental political 
narrative, thereby reinforcing Gbagbo’s villainization. This narrative is grounded in 
sovereigntism, or souverainisme, which exalts the national constitution as representing the 
sovereign will of the people, giving it superiority over international decisions.477 Since the UN 
certified Ouattara’s electoral victory, and Gbagbo rejected it on constitutional grounds, 
Gbagbo’s sovereigntist rhetoric during the crisis drew upon the well-worn perception that 
international actors, namely France, always weaken Gbagbo’s position through undue 
legitimation of Gbagbo’s opposition.478 This resentment against French neo-colonial influence 
was indeed an engrained “master trope” of Gbagbo’s Ivorian Popular Front (Front Populaire 
Ivoirien, FPI).479 For Gbagbo, another reason why France sought to weaken his position was 
due to his activism for multi-party democracy, since this posed a direct challenge to long-time 
President Félix Houphouët-Boigny – who was a very close ally of France and a key player in 
anchoring French influence in West Africa.480 In 1992, Gbagbo was even arrested during a 
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march against Houphouët-Boigny’s government and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. 
The Prime Minister at the time was none other than Alassane Ouattara.481  
 As a fundamental objective of the anti-impunity norm is to limit leaders’ ability to abuse 
civilians behind the cloak of sovereignty, invoking the ‘sovereignty-piercing’ considerations 
of international criminal law helps opponents reinterpret Gbagbo’s sovereigntism as a pretext 
to violate both democracy and human rights. Such instrumentalization of sovereignty is exactly 
what the anti-impunity norm, stemming from the “age of accountability” and “sovereignty as 
responsibility,” aims to confront and reveal as an unacceptable pretext for criminal behaviour. 
Viewing the crisis through the criminal lens thus depoliticizes Gbagbo’s sovereigntist claims 
by portraying his narrative not as a political stance but rather as as a pretext for criminality. 
Reinterpreting his discourse as simply instrumentalising political grievances to justify criminal 
conduct builds the image of the dictator, ready to stay in power by all means based on spurious 
claims. This criminal lens, by reframing Gbagbo’s sovereigntist narrative as a rejection of both 
democracy and “humanity’s law,”482 helps, in a sense, bring together the classic and newer 
visions of the anti-impunity norm in practice. As mentioned previously, transitional justice as 
a concept emerged during the democratic transitions from authoritarianism, particularly in 
Latin America, and gradually became part of responses to armed conflict. Since the beginning 
of the crisis, the Ouattara administration appealed to international criminal law to frame 
Gbagbo as an authoritarian dictator, aiming to delegitimate him as a political interlocutor.  
 The use of international criminal law to frame Gbagbo as anti-democratic is clear in the 
content of the Article 12(3) declaration confirmation, in which Ouattara’s government 
committed to fully cooperating with the Court “regarding all crimes and abuses committed 
since March 2004.” This date is symbolic. On 25 March 2004, an opposition protest organised 
by the Forces Nouvelles against President Gbagbo was violently repressed. According to the 
UN Commission of Inquiry, at least 120 civilians were killed over three days. The march 
“became a pretext for what turned out to be a carefully planned and executed operation by the 
security forces…and the so-called parallel forces under the direction and responsibility of the 
highest authorities of the State.”483 Reifying this historical parallel, an official from the ICC 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) explicitly recalled the March 2004 protest in a statement issued 
shortly before the scheduled march. Highlighting the possibility of international criminal 
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investigations into Gbagbo-affiliated officials, the OTP official stated, “it is imperative to not 
let that happen again.”484 Ouattara’s de facto self-referral was thus both retrospective and 
prospective: by referring to the crimes committed since March 2004, Ouattara signalled to the 
international community the importance of supporting Ouattara’s weak yet law-abiding 
administration in the face of a leader who had proven to not shy from using force against his 
own people in an effort to quash pro-democracy movements.  
 In public statements, the Ouattara administration continued to link international 
criminal law and democracy to frame its flailing ‘hotel-government’ as a victim of both anti-
democracy and criminal forces, capitalized on the norm’s branding and villainizing effect to 
further the contrast between the rival leaders’ (il)legitimacy. Ouattara’s Prime Minister 
Guillaume Soro drew upon this as he painted a contrasting portrayal of Ouattara as an 
enlightened human-rights respecting – and legitimate - leader, comparable to figures of 
resistance in French cultural imaginary, versus Gbagbo as an obstinate criminal - and 
illegitimate - leader, comparable to the most notorious dictators, surely an exaggerated portrait. 
“Victor Hugo used to say ‘in the face of dictatorship, revolt is allowed…In Côte d’Ivoire, as 
long as we face a dictator whom we now call Idi Amin Dada, I’ll call on Ivorians to protest by 
any means in their cities, in villages, in the countryside, abroad, to resist dictatorship…We 
know all the murders Ceaucescu committed in Romania and the same exact thing is happening 
in Côte d’Ivoire.” 485  Soro declared on 23 December 2010, “We strongly hope that the 
international community does not take too much time to realise that Gbagbo does not belong 
in the presidential palace, but rather at the International Criminal Court in The Hague…We are 
waiting for the ICC to send a mission to Côte d’Ivoire, to establish the responsibility of those 
involved and for those who are implicated to be transferred to The Hague.”486 Overall, the 
appeal to international criminal law within the context of state-sponsored repression gave “a 
new important advantage to the Ouattara camp” as they “succeeded in turning a bit more 
international public opinion against Gbagbo.”487    
Gbagbo vs. International Community 
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 Rather than deny its importance, Gbagbo similarly appealed to the anti-impunity norm 
to simultaneously express his commitment to human rights and to discredit Ouattara on the 
basis of abuses allegedly committed by his supporters, reflecting “the commitment of Ivorians 
on both sides of the civil conflict to see themselves and be seen as legitimate political actors.”488 
For instance, in late December 2010, Gbagbo recruited two French lawyers to defend his 
legalist claim to the presidency: Roland Dumas, former Minister of Foreign Affairs under 
President François Mittérand, and Jacques Vergès, a lawyer with extensive experience 
representing controversial high-profile defendants. One week later, on 7 January 2011, Gbagbo 
issued Presidential Decree No. 2011-06, establishing an “International Commission of 
Inquiry.” Composed of four Ivorians and three foreigners, the Commission was mandated to 
investigate human rights violations related to the post-election crisis, identify perpetrators, and 
submit a report within one month.489 On 31 March 2011, in a “Memorandum on alleged crimes 
against humanity committed in Côte d’Ivoire,” Gbagbo’s administration submitted allegations 
of abuses by pro-Ouattara forces to the ICC Prosecutor.490 Indeed, the Gbagbo administration’s 
contempt for the ICC’s alleged bias did not stop them from requesting the court to intervene, 
using it as a resource to call attention to abuses by pro-Ouattara forces. Further, in May 2011, 
representing families of victims of the Duékoué violence, Gbagbo’s lawyers filed a lawsuit in 
Paris against pro-Ouattara forces for alleged crimes against humanity.491  
 While these measures showing support for the imperative to hold individuals criminally 
accountable for grave abuses aimed to shape Gbagbo’s reputation in the eyes of his 
constituency as a supporter of international law and member of the international community, 
the way in which Gbagbo engaged with the anti-impunity norm to discredit Ouattara and 
legitimate himself at the same time worsened his reputation “in the eyes of the world” as a 
political interlocutor and member of the international community. This is because Gbagbo 
pandered to his national audience rather than the international community by denouncing how 
the law was being applied.492 Reflecting how being branding a war criminal was so damaging 
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in the Ivorian political imaginary, Gbagbo simultaneously denied all allegations against his 
side and instead accused Ouattara and the UN of using international law as a weapon to smear 
his reputation and undermine Ivorian sovereignty. This approach thereby furthered the growing 
chasm between Gbagbo and the international community and delegitimated him further.  
 One particularly tense exchange between the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights Navi Pillay and General Bruno Dogbo Blé, Gbagbo’s Commander of the Republican 
Guard, illustrates this contestation around the threat of ICC prosecution. In late December 
2010, Pillay sent letters to Gbagbo and three top security advisers, reminding them of “their 
personal accountability for human rights abuses and infringements of international 
humanitarian law committed by elements of the security forces under their command and 
control.”493 Dogbo Blé answered swiftly by affirming his respect for international law as 
evidence of his legitimacy. “I am a professional of the army, instructor in international 
humanitarian law. I cannot allow myself to permit my men to violate human rights.” Invoking 
the selectivity of the accusations for human rights abuses, he answered, “You can transfer me 
to the International Criminal Court on the basis of false and biased reports by your 
representative in Abidjan. But you cannot take my dignity, my sense of honour and 
determination to defend my country from the criminals that are portrayed by your 
representative as angels.”494 Dogbo Blé expressed frustration that victims of abuses by pro-
Ouattara forces had lost the “game of comparative victomology.”495 Instead, he threatened to 
try the UN’s representative “for defamation and false accusations.”496 Beyond illustrating the 
antagonism between Gbagbo’s camp and the UN, Dogbo Blé’s response highlights the concern 
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amongst Ivorian elites to be deemed law-abiding and thus the salience of international criminal 
law in Ivorian discourse.  
 Further episodes of abuses highlight how the Gbagbo camp did not wish to be seen as 
denying the importance of international criminal law, but rather played to his base by arguing 
that international criminal law was being abused to tarnish the reputation of Gbagbo’s forces. 
For instance, on 20 December 2010, Gbagbo’s Minister of the Interior refuted allegedly biased 
reports of serious human rights violations, arguing that the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights failed to mention that 14 members of the state security forces had been killed by 
Ouattara’s supporters.497 Also, in response to the attacks on women’s marches in March 2011, 
the Gbagbo administration denied the responsibility of their forces, arguing the allegations lack 
factual basis. “Despite our sincere respect towards the memory of these women, victims of an 
acts from another era, the DFS purely and simply reject the accusation, truly fallacious and 
baseless. The Chief of the General Staff of the Armies further requests the accusers to find the 
alleged perpetrators of these killings, as the FDS [DSF] were not operational in Abobo on that 
day.”498 Again, on 8 March 2011, Gbagbo’s Council of Ministers dismissed the accusation that 
the DSF had killed seven women as “without foundation” and a “pure montage.”499 This 
counter-narrative claimed the video footage had been fabricated, the witnesses were “pseudo-
witnesses,” and the victims were actresses covered in fake blood.500 Another key event, which 
would also form part of the ICC case against Gbagbo and Blé Goudé, was the bombing of a 
market in Abidjan by pro-Gbagbo forces on 17 March 2011, killing at least 40 people. 
Gbagbo’s spokesperson claimed it was “a true conspiracy” as the “regular security forces” were 
not in that neighbourhood on that day. “It is clear that there is a synergy between the UN, 
France, and the rebels against Côte d’Ivoire.” 501  Moreover, though it showed Gbagbo’s 
legalistic approach, hiring Vergès to defend Gbagbo against claims of international crimes 
worsened the optics of his illegitimacy, as Vergès had defended or advised notorious political 
leaders, including Klaus Barbie (“The Butcher of Lyon”), Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam 
Hussein, Khieu Samphan, Moussa Traoré, and Idriss Déby. Gbagbo’s lawyers’ decision to visit 
a hospital and meet with victims of an alleged attack by UN peacekeepers further illustrates 
how they appealed to international criminal law not to enhance Gbagbo’s reputation in the eyes 
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of the international community but rather, to display his support for the anti-impunity norm 
and cast a spotlight on alleged hypocrisy of how the norm is applied and thereby boost 
Gbagbo’s narrative as the legitimate leader within his own domestic constituency.  
 While Gbagbo portrayed himself as criticising the way in which accusations of human 
rights abuses were being used, rather than criticising the value of law and the anti-impunity 
norm itself, the way in which he did so was deemed disingenuous and thereby devastating for 
his international reputation as a legitimate political interlocutor. For instance, key diplomats 
increasingly compared Gbagbo’s and Ouattara’s approaches to accountability as they assessed 
the leaders’ legitimacy comparatively, or relationally. Comparing their reactions to the 16 
December 2010 march, Ambassador Simon writes in his book, “[t]he presidential clan…was 
determined to keep power by all means, including through force.” Several paragraphs later, 
Simon notes he “was struck to observe that, in this terrifying escalation of violence, the 
supporters of Alassane Ouattara maintained their calm, in the image of their leader who wanted 
at all costs to avoid shedding the blood of his fellow citizens.”502 Highlighting Gbagbo’s 
international reputation, Simon writes that Gbagbo probably “didn’t imagine he would end up 
as the bad guy.”503 In mid-January 2011, President Sarkozy reportedly stated that Ouattara “is 
not a warrior, he’s a nice guy. We cannot expect any brutal actions from him.”504 For Colonel 
Héry, defense attaché at the French embassy in Abidjan, “Gbagbo had chosen the path of the 
dictators.”505 Yet, the way in which Gbagbo’s denialist attitude delegitimated him in the eyes 
of the international community and caused him to lose status as a political interlocutor was not 
entirely straightforward. In light of his high political value for most of the crisis, he maintained 
his status as a political interlocutor and the UN, France, the AU, and ECOWAS continued to 
negotiate with him over the next few months.  
Further, rather than completely weaken support for him internationally, cracks in the 
international consensus around the need for Gbagbo to cede power started to appear even after 
this villainization. Though the AU and ECOWAS had initially agreed to demand that Gbagbo 
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fully cede power, these bodies began to diverge around January 2011. While ECOWAS was 
“growing increasingly impatient with Gbagbo’s prevaricating and brinkmanship,” the AU 
“became more circumspect of international intervention and focused on a negotiated 
settlement.”506 In a “coup de théâtre” on 21 January 2011, President of South Africa Jacob 
Zuma questioned the validity of the electoral results and instead supported a power-sharing 
solution.507 Fissures also emerged within ECOWAS in January 2011.508 Overall, detractors 
included the presidents of Ghana, Gabon, Uganda, The Gambia, Mauritania, Zimbabwe, and 
Libya.509 These intra-African schisms provided Gbagbo “some sort of mitigated legitimacy.”510 
Promoted by South Africa, a power-sharing arrangement, which involved rotating power with 
a 24-month period for each of the ‘two presidents,’ became an increasingly viable option.511        
While Gbagbo retained his high political value and a limited but not insignificant 
amount of support among several African states, the series of highly-mediatised human rights 
abuses in mid-March 2011 by pro-Gbagbo forces, exacerbated by his refusal to hold the 
perpetrators accountable, concretized his delegitimation as a political interlocutor and caused 
him to finally lose support the diplomatic support of key allies. This was evident in diplomats’ 
personal accounts. In his account of the March 2011 events, Choi compares Gbagbo and 
Ouattara’s approaches to urban guerrilla warfare. Choi asked Ouattara whether his party would 
arm its youth, to which the Ouattara camp responded “they would not.” Choi then writes, “On 
the other side, the survival strategy of Gbagbo loyalists was clear: first, pay the civil servants 
and military by any means possible, then, dislodge Ouattarist elements from Abidjan by 
organising demonstrations by the Jeunes Patriotes and by mobilising their forces.”512 For Choi, 
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“it was clear that Ouattara was gaining the upper hand. The only thing left was to gain the 
hearts of the Ivorian people. For the Gbagbo camp, who had perpetrated many abuses against 
the civilian populations, this was no longer possible.”513 According to Ambassador Simon, 
with the two attacks on the women’s marches in March 2011, “Gbagbo had passed a threshold. 
We could no longer negotiate with him.”514 After the 17 March 2011 attack on the Abobo 
market, Simon further noted that Gbagbo chose “savage repression over wise renunciation,” 
meaning he no longer had any excuses and “nobody could defend him.”515 Simon continued, 
“It was too much… France and the UN denounced crimes against humanity.” He specifically 
pointed out that “the spokespeople for Gbagbo tried to exonerate themselves, pretending, 
unscrupulously and in contempt of victims and their families, that the visual evidence had been 
fabricated.” 516  Rejecting the doubts raised by Gbagbo’s administration as to who was 
responsible for the killings, a French presidential advisor on Africa “had no doubt as to who 
fired the shot.”517  For the commander of the Licorne forces, the Abidjan attacks were a 
“flagrant sign of the moral bankruptcy” of the Gbagbo camp.518 
 Concern over Gbagbo’s role in the deteriorating human rights situation contributed to 
the AU’s decision on 10 March 2011 to finally recognise Ouattara (again) as the president-
elect, ending the offers to negotiate a power-sharing arrangement. Several days prior to the 
AU’s communiqué, AU envoy Jean Ping was in Abidjan on the day of the attack against the 
women protesters on 5 March 2011. According to Simon, the “inexcusable events in Abobo 
weighed heavily in their condemnation of Gbagbo’s downward spiral.”519 In its communiqué, 
besides the generic condemnation of “all atrocities and other violations of human rights, threats, 
and acts of intimidation,” the AU also particularly noted “acts of obstruction directed at the 
operations of the UNOCI” – an implicit yet clear reference to acts by pro-Gbagbo forces.520  
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Overshadowing Abuses by Pro-Ouattara Forces 
 
 While Ouattara drew upon accusations of human rights abuses to frame the illegitimacy 
of Gbagbo as a political interlocutor since the very beginning of the crisis, he also benefitted 
from the growing need towards the end of the crisis to be viewed as legitimate, helping 
overshadow abuses committed by his own forces. As pro-Ouattara forces gained strength and 
moved southwards towards Abidjan, they were increasingly accused of grave abuses beginning 
in March 2011. As mentioned earlier, the most lethal episode of the conflict happened in 
Duékoué where, on 29-30 March 2011, Forces Nouvelles fighters, who had recently been 
renamed the Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), and other pro-Ouattara fighters 
allegedly killed several hundred people. 521  According to a report conducted by ONUCI, 
“certain victims were clearly executed while fleeing…. Bodies were [also] discovered laying 
on their stomach, likely indicating that they had been killed from behind. Others had had their 
throats slit or been burned alive. Women, children, and the elderly also figured among the 
victims.” 522  The Duékoué massacre was troublesome for Prime Minister and Minister of 
Defense Guillaume Soro, who was a long-time leader of these rebel-turned-army forces and 
was present in the area when the offensive took place.523 However, the alleged responsibility 
of pro-Ouattara forces did not receive much attention at the time, reflecting the selectivity in 
the use of the anti-impunity norm to villainize alleged offenders. For instance, in the UNSC 
Resolution 1975, passed on 30 March 2011, beyond generic condemnation against all 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, no direct reference was made 
to abuses by pro-Ouattara forces, even in the wake of the Duékoué massacre that took place 
two days earlier. According to a researcher for an international human rights organisation, 
“publically, there was very little reaction” to the Duékoué events.524 There was indeed strong 
desire to avoid bad press during the crucial final days of the crisis in late March 2011, when 
preparations were being made for UNOCI and France to help the FRCI remove Gbagbo 
through forceful means. Diplomats were reportedly livid and “went ballistic” at the timing of 
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reports on abuses by pro-Ouattara forces, as it jeopardised their strategy that was already 
controversial due to its undertones of regime change.525  
When these crimes were mentioned later, the alleged criminal responsibility by pro-
Ouattara forces was obscured and the violence was simplistically attributed to long-standing 
community-based and seemingly uncontrollable rivalry. For instance, the report of the AU 
Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, published on 21 April 2011, 
does not highlight alleged perpetrators but rather states that “[S]ome localities, notably 
Duékoué, were first the scene of inter-tribal confrontations, before being subjected to the 
horrors of war during the offensive launched by the FRCI.”526 Further, despite reported abuses 
committed by the Invisible Commando in Abidjan, the AU report only portrayed them as 
saviours. “Subsequently, an armed group, known as “commando invisible” (invisible 
commando), came to the rescue of populations of Abobo by attacking pro-Gbagbo forces, 
which did not hesitate to use heavy weapons against the civilian population.”527 Also, in his 
book, then French Ambassador Simon dismissed the allegations of abuses as reprisals linked 
to historic, deeply embedded, and intractable inter-ethnic rivalry. “After the FRCI’s victory 
following difficult hostilities in the west of the country, horrifying communitarian score-
settling occurred after the FRCI’s passage, between ‘autochtone’ pro-Gbagbo militias and 
‘allogène’ populations... We are confronted with one of the dramas that reveal the root causes 
that regularly plunge these regions of Côte d’Ivoire into mourning.”528 The violence was indeed 
partly based on competition between “frustrated landowners and foreign tenants who claimed 
ownership of land to which they had added value,” and was fuelled by accumulated resentment 
at unpunished violence in that area for nearly a decade.529 However, Simon wrote in 2015 that 
”serious investigations should allow us to know exactly what happened and who is 
responsible.”530 This overlooks reports by the UNOCI,531 the International Commission of 
Inquiry,532 and human rights organisations533 that all point to some degree of responsibility by 
the pro-Ouattara forces. In this sense, blurring the criminal lens helped frame the Forces 
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Nouvelles not as a rebel group who had been frequently accused of abuses throughout the eight 
years of its control of the north, but as a national army.  
 Overall, while both sides used accusations of human rights abuses “as ammunition in 
the political struggle against their adversaries,”534 invoking international criminal law helped 
the Ouattara administration translate a complex crisis into a narrative of one man’s dual 
political and criminal responsibility for the crisis. This narrowing of the narrative through a 
criminal lens helped overshadow other underlying factors that contributed to the recurring 
outbreak of political violence. The two arguably most significant of these underlying factors 
include reforms to the Constitution, especially around key rules of eligibility for presidency 
and voting rights which perpetuated the perennial debate of what constitutes Ivorian-ness,535 
and the use of militias to capture power including through persecution based on perceptions of 
who is ‘truly’ Ivorian. While expedient for creating a particular narrative, this narrowing of the 
narrative should nevertheless be viewed with caution, as the spotlights and shadows it creates 
can exacerbate challenges of overcoming the fundamental drivers of the conflict in the long 




 Beyond shaping the reputations of political interlocutors as supporters of international 
law and thus legitimate members of the international community, the anti-impunity norm was 
used as a means of coercive leverage to pressure and incentivise Gbagbo to cede power and 
help the Ouattara government overcome its main weakness - lack of effective control over the 
entire territory. More specifically, even before serious human rights abuses were committed, 
the norm served to draw a ‘red line’ in order to illustrate a threshold between illegality and 
criminality, impressing upon Gbagbo that crossing this threshold would trigger Gbagbo’s 
transition from contested legality to criminality. Recognising Gbagbo’s high political value in 
reaching a political settlement throughout most of the crisis, international mediators actively 
applied the norm coercively through threats of prosecution while also extending the promise 
of amnesty and ‘golden exits.’ Indeed, despite the steady increase in abuses, the Ouattara 
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administration and international mediators exploited the state’s centrality in the national and 
international administration of criminal justice to navigate the flexibility of the normative 
prohibition against amnesty for grave abuses in order to threaten Gbagbo based on a shifting 
and fluid red line.  
 
‘Carrot and Stick’ Approach 
 
 Since the very first days of the crisis, the threat of prosecution and the promise of 
impunity were used as a mediation tool, in parallel with political and economic sanctions 
imposed on Gbagbo’s administration, to regulate the power relations between both parties and 
break the deadlock. Even before Ouattara lodged an Article 12(3) declaration on 14 December 
2010, and before the UN certified the results issued on 2 December 2010 by the Independent 
Electoral Commission, UN SRSG Choi invoked the threat of prosecutions at the ICC to 
pressure Gbagbo and the Constitutional Council to not announce any rival results. On 1 and 2 
December 2010, SRSG Choi met with Gbagbo, the Minister of Interior Désiré Tagro, 
diplomatic advisor and future Minister of Foreign Affairs in Gbagbo’s government Alcide 
Djédjé, and President of the Constitutional Council Paul Yao N’Dré. SRSG Choi reportedly 
warned them of the threat of an ICC investigation if the Constitutional Council were to 
invalidate the UN-certified results. Drawing a parallel with the situation in neighbouring 
Guinea, Choi warned, “The proclamation of results by the Constitutional Council will most 
likely trigger mass street protests that will represent a challenge for the security forces. This 
may cause numerous victims…The dramatic events in Guinea triggered regime change and 
ICC intervention.” 536  In a meeting the following day, highlighting the red line between 
contested legality and criminality, Choi again warned of an ICC intervention “if the number of 
deaths was unacceptable” and that repression of opposition demonstrations “would trigger 
individual sanctions and, if need be, would open the door to an ICC intervention.” Tagro then 
reportedly retorted, “Let’s go together to the ICC, you and I!” Choi responded, “Yes, you as 
the accused, myself as a witness.”537 Following the Constitutional Council’s announcement of 
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its results on 3 December 2010, Choi again asked Gbagbo’s close associates, “Will you kill as 
many people as possible before you are killed yourselves or dragged before the ICC? Will it 
be, ‘après moi le déluge’?” His interlocutors reportedly told him that Gbagbo “did not envisage 
perpetrating a bloodbath” but “the security forces would never let Ouattara seize power.”538 
Similarly, when a high-level Ivorian military official explained to the Commander of Operation 
Licorne, General Palasset, that he was bound by the constitution to follow Gbagbo’s orders, 
Palasset reportedly responded, “[B]e careful, there was already Rwanda; the international 
community will not remain passive, you all run the risk of appearing before the ICC.”539 The 
ICC rendered this threat more credible by issuing a series of early statements that reminded the 
government that the ICC was monitoring the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. Viewing Gbagbo’s 
decision to stay in power as “announcing the possible commission of future crimes,” the ICC’s 
statements were issued pursuant to the Court’s objective to deter the Gbagbo administration 
from committing abuses and to pressure the government to take measures to prevent the 
commission of abuses, including by ceding power.540 The potential for an ICC investigation 
was rendered even more credible when, on 14 December 2010, Ouattara reconfirmed the 
Article 12(3) declaration, recognising the ICC’s jurisdiction over Côte d’Ivoire since March 
2004.        
 The cautionary threats, however, were unsuccessful in both dissuading the 
Constitutional Council from announcing rival results and in deterring security forces from 
repressing an opposition march. During the march on 16 December 2010, state security forces 
allegedly killed 45 persons, raped at least 16 women and girls, and wounded at least 54 
persons.541 The march became a key episode in the crisis and would later be the subject of 
charges of crimes against humanity at the ICC.542 On 17 December 2010, President of France 
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Sarkozy explicitly threatened ICC prosecution, drawing on Gbagbo’s background as a historian 
and his concern for his own political legacy.543 Invoking the red line, Sarkozy declared, “If, 
before the end of the week, Laurent Gbagbo does not leave the post he occupies in violation of 
the will of the Ivorian people, he will be placed under sanction…It is up to him to decide what 
image he wants to leave in the history books. If he wants to leave the image of a man of peace, 
he still has time – but time is of the essence and he must leave. Or does he want to leave the 
image of someone who fired at perfectly innocent civilians? And, in this case, there are 
international jurisdictions and an [international] criminal court. The Prosecutor [of the ICC] 
himself indicated that he was closely following the situation and that those who were 
responsible for firing would be held responsible.” 544  This echoed how SRSG Choi also 
appealed to Gbagbo’s background as a historian to discourage him from requesting the 
Constitutional Council to issue different results, reportedly stating “Mr. President, if you take 
this fatal decision, what will be your place in history?...If your decision provokes hundreds of 
killings, destruction, and suffering for the Ivorian people, what will be your place in 
history?”545 Gbagbo reportedly responded, “A bloodbath is not an option for me. But, at the 
same time, I will not abdicate for fear of a possible bloodbath.”546  
 In parallel to threats of prosecution, offers of protection from prosecution were made 
to Gbagbo throughout the crisis. Illustrating the exploitation of the norm’s enforcement 
features, these offers were premised on the idea that the state’s centrality in the national and 
international administration of justice could guarantee such impunity arrangements, as the state 
could suspend national prosecutions and block the enforcement of any eventual ICC arrest 
warrant through non-cooperation. Some offers were made implicitly in the form of a ‘golden 
exit.’ For instance, in two letters sent in December 2010, President of the United States Barack 
Obama reportedly invited Gbagbo to the White House to discuss “how to advance democracy 
in the region, laying out a role he could play” should he cede power and suggested that Gbagbo 
could “move to the US or receive a position in an international or regional institution if he left 
peacefully.” 547  The Obama administration also reportedly offered Gbagbo a university 
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position, in light of his academic past.548  Simultaneously, the administration noted it “would 
support efforts to isolate Gbagbo and hold him to account if he refused to step down.”549 
According to Gbagbo’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, France offered its support to arrange for 
Gbagbo to be president of the International Organisation of la Francophonie.550 Similarly, 
France also assured Gbagbo that peaceful relinquishing of power would be rewarded by the 
international community. According to presidential advisor Jean-David Levitte, President 
Sarkozy reportedly explained to Gbagbo, “If you leave without making any problems, I am 
sure that the international community will ensure that you have a privileged status, with 
sufficient resources and guaranteed security. It is exactly what we will offer to Qaddhafi.”551 
These offers were not tantamount, according to Ambassador Simon, to explicitly offering to 
protect Gbagbo from prosecution.552 
 Other offers were made more explicitly, even in the wake of highly-mediatised increase 
in abuses. In early December 2010, AU envoy Thabo Mbeki extended the offer of amnesty as 
an incentive for Gbagbo to cede power. On 22 December 2010, a few days after the opposition 
march, Choi offered the “Kérékou Option,” named after the proposal made in 1991 to former 
president of Benin, Mathieu Kérékou. Accordingly, Gbagbo could accept amnesty and step 
down in anticipation of running again in the 2015 presidential elections, capitalising on his 
legacy of having avoided further bloodshed by ceding power despite his disagreement with the 
UN-certified results. Former President Kérékou himself reportedly told Gbgabo to “leave 
power, before power leaves you.”553 On 28 December 2010, ECOWAS sent the heads of state 
of Sierra Leone, Benin, and Cape Verde to Côte d’Ivoire. Explaining that amnesty was still on 
the table, President of Benin Boni Yayi stated, “The goal of our mission is to have president 
Gbagbo understand that it is in his interest to leave power with honour. He can benefit from 
amnesty, with the possibility of coming back in five years, as Kérékou did in 1996. This option 
is the only one available for Laurent Gbagbo.”554 In early January 2011, the AU envoy Prime 
Minister of Kenya Raila Odinga also noted that Gbagbo “wants amnesty, he wants to know 
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he’s safe if he chooses to stay.”555 Ouattara said he would not force Gbagbo to leave the country 
and would issue him an amnesty and the status of a former head of state.556 In January 2011, 
the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Johnnie Carson stated that they held 
Gbagbo fully responsible for the crisis and the violence, reiterated its opposition to any power-
sharing agreement, and insisted instead that the US and other countries have offered Gbagbo a 
‘dignified exit,’ implying amnesty. Referring to the shifting red line, “the longer the crisis goes 
on, the more likely this option will disappear.”557 Further, on 9 January 2011, ECOWAS envoy 
Obasanjo used the threat of international criminal prosecution as a means to pressure Gbagbo 
to accept the incentives of amnesty, exile abroad, and a monthly stipend if he chooses to step 
down.558 According to SRSG Choi, Obasanjo warned Gbagbo to not cross the red line into 
criminality. “Let’s be serious, here is my counter-proposition: you need to leave, and amnesty 
is the only discussible issue, on the condition that you do not commit any crimes against 
humanity. However, I was told that you are not far from doing so. Be prudent, think of what 
happened to Charles Taylor and his associates. If you cross the red line, you will be chased as 
long as you live and wherever you are.”559 
 This practice of threatening prosecutions while extending amnesties, despite the 
commission of abuses that would eventually be confirmed as charges of crimes against 
humanity, continued at the AU meeting in March 2011. The AU recognised Ouattara as 
president and, endorsing the conclusions of the AU High Level Panel, called on Ouattara to 
negotiate a power-sharing arrangement with the opposition – though without Gbagbo. The 
difference between the draft and final version of the AU communiqué shows how the weight 
of the consensus against amnesties for international crimes made actors change the offer of 
amnesty from being explicit to implicit and still retain the inducement of amnesty. Indeed, the 
AU High Level Panel recommended the adoption of an amnesty covering “all acts and offences 
committed in relation with the post-electoral crisis” and providing “full immunity for all those 
who held the office of President of the Republic or that of Prime Minister, as well as senior 
officers of the Armed Forces and Security Services.”560 This amnesty was included explicitly 
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in a draft version of the AU communiqué proposal.561 However, indicative of how explicit 
amnesties are no longer acceptable, the final version made the offer implicitly by referring to 
the need to ensure “all the necessary guarantees for all concerned actors, in particular for the 
outgoing President, His Excellency Laurent Gbagbo.”562 Asked whether this covered crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, Gbagbo’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who 
attended the AU meeting, noted, “The African Union did not specify the parameters. Except 
for economic crimes, the authors would not be pursued.”563 Ouattara later confirmed this offer, 
by stating “Gbagbo will have an honourable exit.”564  Asked whether France would have 
supported such a general amnesty, despite the human rights abuses carried out over the past 
few months, Ambassador Simon noted, “Of course – you have to encourage leaders to accept 
peace.” Asked whether this strategy of offering amnesty as well as requesting ICC intervention 
was contradictory, Simon referred to its use as a line between illegality and criminality. “It was 
to express that, if you do not accept amnesty now, there would no longer be an option later.”565 
While other agreements sometimes include perfunctory clauses regarding the need to prosecute 
crimes under international law, even amidst a general understanding that the target would not 
be prosecuted, this communiqué did not include such a clause, thereby signalling to Gbagbo 
that he would not be prosecuted and reflecting Gbagbo’s continued perceived high political 
value to resolving the conflict peacefully. The use of “all the necessary guarantees” as a 
euphemism for general amnesty shows how ambiguous language in the text of political 
agreement can simultaneously acknowledge the consensus against explicit offers of general 
amnesties while signalling the duty to prosecute will not be enforced. In sum, the threats of 
prosecution combined with the series of offers of de facto amnesty and the ambiguous language 
in the African Union’s 10 March 2011 communiqué reflect how both international mediators 
and the Ouattara administration capitalised on the state’s centrality in the national and 
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Mobilisation for Neutralisation  
   
There is an Ivorian saying: “when two men are having a fistfight, you must first wait 
until it is clear which one is going to win, and then you must step in before someone gets really 
hurt.”583 This moment arrived in mid-March 2011. In light of the failure of the successive 
diplomatic offers to convince Gbagbo to step down, and in light of the heightened abuses 
carried out by his security services in March 2011, Gbagbo’s previously high political value as 
an interlocutor in finding a solution to the crisis weakened drastically. According to the French 
army Chief of Staff, “I think it was the day that Gbagbo bombed the Abobo market that the 
President of the Republic [Sarkozy] realised there was no longer a political exit strategy, no 
escape route for Gbagbo, and that an armed intervention was, from then on, inevitable.”584 In 
the same vein, the SRSG Choi noted that the March attacks “scandalised international public 
opinion and contributed to our decision to launch aerial strikes against these heavy 
weapons.”585 Attacks by pro-Gbagbo forces on the Golf Hotel and UNOCI’s headquarters thus 
“provided the international community the ideal pretext to silence [Gbagbo] definitely.”586 
In light of Gbagbo’s lowered political value to ending the conflict by diplomatic means, 
key actors adopted a more robust approach towards excluding Gbagbo. In this shifted context, 
the issue of justice was increasingly high on the agenda, as it revolved mainly around Gbagbo’s 
fate.587 Exploiting the anti-impunity norm ultimately helped actors neutralise the Gbagbo-
affiliated opposition through a legalist exit strategy. More precisely, invoking the duty to 
respond and prosecute international crimes was used to both encourage the adoption of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1975 (2011), which set the stage to neutralize Gbagbo by force, 
as well as to prepare plans to transfer Gbagbo to the ICC. In this sense, though no indictments 
were issued before the end of the post-electoral crisis, Ouattara, in coordination with France, 
drew upon the normative imperative that Gbagbo should be held accountable for his alleged 
crimes to neutralise him by force and by law, ultimately enabling the Ouattara administration 
to finally gain effective control over the country.      
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 Invoking the imperative to respond to and prevent further human rights abuses helped 
overcome resistance among UN Security Council members to a resolution that would authorise 
military intervention against a contested ‘legal’ president, tantamount to regime change in some 
actors’ views. To mobilise the adoption of Resolution 1975 on 30 March 2011, French lobbying 
directly invoked the normative expectation of “sovereignty as responsibility” and, by 
extension, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. According to General Puga, President 
Sarkozy pressured his interlocutors to accept the Security Council resolution, telling them, 
“How long will you stay seated, arms folded, without reacting? Do you want to be accused 
later of having not assisted a population at risk?”588 French actors thus invoked the anti-
impunity norm to make the distinction between a ‘legal’ and ‘responsible’ government 
particularly salient, and to convince others that even a ‘legal’ government is not legitimate if it 
uses heavy weaponry against its own people. According to presidential diplomatic advisor 
Jean-David Levitte, there had indeed been some debate in the Council regarding Gbagbo’s 
legitimacy. Explaining his lobbying strategy, Levitte stated, “If the Gbagbo government is 
legal, it is not abnormal that it [the government] acts to restore order. However, no government 
can be legitimate if it uses heavy weapons against its population.”589 Reflecting this imperative 
to curtail Gbagbo’s ability to harm civilians, the resolution added a key clause to UNOCI’s 
existing authorisation under Chapter VII to “use all necessary means to carry out its mandate 
to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.” The resolution added, 
“including to prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian populations.” Though the 
resolution was portrayed as simply authorization to use military force to curtail Gbagbo’s 
ability to use heavy weaponry and protect civilians, it was understood as authorization to finally 
neutralise and arrest Gbagbo through legal means, due to his responsibility for the continuation 
of the crisis and the commission of crimes against civilians. As France’s Permanent 
Representative to the UN Security Council Gérard Araud explained, Resolution 1975 was “the 
only way to avoid a fully-fledged civil war and, perhaps, a bloodbath in the streets of Abidjan” 
and had one “very simple” message: “Gbagbo must go.”590  
 But, go where? While the Responsibility to Protect doctrine helped undermine 
Gbagbo’s contested legitimacy and convinced UN Security Council members to approve the 
resolution unanimously, the related responsibility to prosecute provided a way to end the crisis 
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by neutralising Gbagbo. Capitalizing on the state’s relatively central position within the ICC 
system, the Ouattara administration, supported by France, took various steps from the first days 
of the crisis to lay the groundwork for the opening of ICC investigations thereby anticipating 
a legalist exit strategy for his rival by transferring him to the ICC. Indeed, by proactively 
waiving the sovereignty-accommodating elements of the Rome Statute, namely the primacy of 
national jurisdictions, the Ouattara administration showed how it interpreted complementarity 
not as a simple admissibility test but rather as a burden-sharing strategy to gain advantage in 
exercise effective control over the territory.  
 Since the beginning of the crisis, the Ouattara administration sought to overcome 
obstacles in opening an ICC investigation. As it had not yet ratified the Rome Statute and 
officially become a State Party, Côte d’Ivoire could not formally issue a territorial state referral, 
or self-referral.591 For investigations to be opened, this would either have to be done via the 
Prosecutor’s proprio motu powers, a third-party state referral, or a UN Security Council 
referral. Capitalising on the state’s centrality in the Rome Statute system, the embattled 
Ouattara administration, with France’s support, encouraged the ICC to open an investigation 
proprio motu by making clear that it would provide full cooperation and would not contest the 
admissibility of its cases. Within two weeks of the elections, and before the events could 
reasonably meet the gravity threshold for ICC’s jurisdiction, Ouattara lodged an Article 12(3) 
declaration in desperation regarding his utter weakness rather than in response to any grave 
human rights abuses that had been committed by either side. According to Prosecutor Moreno 
Ocampo, in a conversation three days earlier, Ouattara called him and “explained the drama of 
this situation, how Gbagbo’s soldiers were surrounding his hotel.”592  In the Article 12(3) 
declaration issued on 14 December 2010, Ouattara committed to providing full cooperation 
with the ICC and indicated his administration’s intention to become a State Party at the earliest 
opportunity.593  While then Ambassador of France explained that France “did not see any 
problem” with Ouattara’s decision,594 a former official of the Quai d’Orsay stated that France 
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rather “strongly encouraged” Ouattara’s administration to request ICC intervention.595 France 
declared its readiness to cooperate with the ICC as early as January 2011.596  
 Further, on 9 March 2011, Ouattara’s lawyers submitted a 40-page memorandum to the 
ICC that sought to encourage the opening of ICC investigations. Indicating that the Ouattara 
administration would not contest the admissibility of cases, the memorandum highlighted the 
inability of the Ivorian judicial system to conduct proceedings. 597  Declaring the Ivorian 
judiciary’s weakness and inability to prosecute such crimes was itself a means of bolstering its 
capacity to effectively control the territory by neutralising Gbagbo and, in the longer term, 
prosecute such crimes domestically. Reflecting his desperation and perception that an ICC 
investigation could neutralise his rival, Ouattara reportedly called his lawyer, stating “If 
nothing is done, Gbagbo will kill us! He won’t hesitate!”598 Further, on 7 April 2011, Ouattara 
declared that all measures will be taken to allow for “exemplary collaboration with 
international jurisdictions and human rights organisations, in order to investigate, prosecute, 
and severely punish” perpetrators of “indescribable” acts.599 Again on 3 May 2011, in his 
second Article 12(3) declaration, Ouattara reiterated his country’s commitment to full 
cooperation with the OTP, this time narrowing the suggested time period of the ICC’s 
investigation to begin in November 2010, likely seeking to speed up investigations and arrest 
warrants through a narrower temporal scope.600 
  In parallel, the Prosecutor also took measures to facilitate the opening of ICC 
investigations. According to leaked e-mail communications, between December 2010 to April 
2011, internal ICC documents discussed ways to trigger the ICC’s jurisdiction.601 For several 
reasons, the ICC Prosecutor sought a state referral as this would the most feasible and 
advantageous trigger mechanism. First, as opposed to cases of state referrals, opening 
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investigations based on proprio motu requires authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber.602 
Beyond judicial thresholds, state referrals also indicate likely cooperation by the referring 
government, meaning the anticipated success rate of investigations and prosecutions is 
reasonably higher. State referrals also placate fears that the ICC tramples on state sovereignty 
and allows the ICC to portray itself as a useful partner in the broader struggle against enemies 
of the ‘international community.’ Moreover, a third-party state referral or a UN Security 
Council referral would avoid the potential legal hurdles stemming from Ouattara’s contested 
legal status at the time of his first Article 12(3) declaration. More specifically, had the ICC 
Prosecutor requested the opening of investigations via his proprio motu powers, this would be 
based on Côte d’Ivoire’s Article 12(3) declaration issued in December 2010.603 However, 
Ouattara’s status as head of state could be questioned as he had not been constitutionally 
recognised.604     
 As a result, the ICC Prosecutor sought to open investigations via third-party state 
referrals, likely a State Party from West Africa. On 21 December 2010, the Prosecutor 
explained, “I think African states play a critical role in this, to find a solution to the problem. 
But if no solution can be found and crimes are committed, African states could be willing to 
refer the case to my Office and also provide forces to arrest those individuals who commit the 
crimes in Côte d’Ivoire.”605 On 5 April 2011, he stated his office was “discussing with some 
(ICC) state parties, particularly within the region, if they wish to refer the case. That would 
help to expedite the activities of the court.”606 On 11 April 2011, in a leaked email, the ICC 
Prosecutor’s advisor also expressed the Prosecutor’s hope that a state from the region would 
refer the situation in Côte d’Ivoire to the ICC as soon as possible.607 These states likely included 
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Senegal, Burkina Faso, or Nigeria, all ICC States Parties and sympathetic to Ouattara. In doing 
so, the Prosecutor followed the rationale for state referrals that drafters of the Rome Statute 
expected would be higher than self-referrals, namely that a State Party would bring a complaint 
against another State Party. This would have been the first such referral in the ICC’s history.608 
However, no state decided to issue such a referral. 
 Third, even though an investigation had not yet materialised by early April 2011, the 
measures taken by Ouattara, France, and the ICC Prosecutor indicate that the plan was to end 
the crisis by arresting Gbagbo and transferring him to the ICC. Indeed, the convergence of 
political interests between the Ouattara administration, France, and the ICC Prosecutor around 
potential investigations against Gbagbo and his entourage was particularly evident at the end 
of the crisis. On 11 April 2011, Laurent Gbagbo and approximately 100 members of his 
entourage were arrested by the FRCI with assistance from French troops. While Ouattara stated 
that day that he would ask the Minister of Justice to initiate a judicial procedure against Laurent 
Gbagbo, his wife, and his collaborators, the Ouattara administration expected the Gbagbo 
couple would be tried at the ICC, while other members of his entourage would be tried 
nationally.609 For instance, in the lead-up to the arrest, a leading member of the pro-Ouattara 
forces indicated that they had no intention of killing Gbagbo, “but rather wanted him to stand 
trial at the ICC, following the example of former president Charles Taylor of Liberia.”610 Also, 
on the day of Gbagbo’s arrest, speaking to the UN Security Council, the Ivorian representative 
to the UN stated that, after a swift and professional arrest, Gbagbo was “in good health” and 
would be tried.611 On the same day, the Ivorian Ambassador to France alluded to international 
prosecution and the advantages of such a legalistic strategy. “We must not in any way make a 
royal gift to Laurent Gbagbo in making him a martyr. He must be alive and he must answer for 
the crimes against humanity that he committed.”612 The reference to crimes against humanity, 
which did not appear in the Ivorian criminal code prior to the implementation of the Rome 
Statute in January 2015, indicates the hope that Gbagbo would be tried at the ICC. Moreover, 
one week after Gbagbo’s arrest, Côte d’Ivoire’s Ambassador to the UN highlighted the 
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expectation that Gbagbo would be tried at the ICC. “[Gbagbo] has too much crime on his hands. 
He will definitely face the International Criminal Court.”613  
 In parallel, the ICC Prosecutor indicated a particular interest in investigating Laurent 
Gbagbo. According to leaked email communications, on the same day as Gbagbo’s arrest, an 
advisor to the ICC Prosecutor called the Africa director at the French Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and indicated the Prosecutor’s hope that Ouattara would not release Gbagbo from 
detention. The advisor also stated, “Ocampo will try to contact Ouattara or one of his 
advisors.”614 The Prosecutor’s request for Ouattara to maintain Gbagbo in detention, despite 
investigators having not yet travelled to Côte d’Ivoire, the absence of an official investigation, 
and the absence of any sealed or unsealed arrest warrant against him highlight at the very least 
a strong degree of anticipation that the ICC would focus on Gbagbo in some significant 
capacity, likely as an accused. 
 Finally, while some argue that coordination between Ouattara, France, and the ICC 
Prosecutor amounted to a plot against Gbagbo,615  the anticipation of a trial as a way to 
neutralise Gbagbo actually served, to some extent, to help keep Gbagbo and his entourage alive. 
While scholars find varying strength of the ICC’s deterrent effect,616 a question that is beyond 
this study’s scope, the plan to try Gbagbo had deterrent effects on the pro-Ouattara forces at 
the time of his arrest. Indeed, in order to ensure the success of this legalist decapitation of his 
rival, Ouattara ordered his forces to capture Gbagbo and his entourage unharmed. This was 
also a requirement set by the French officials. According to Admiral Edouard Guillaud, in 
exchange for facilitating the FRCI’s access to the presidential residence by securing the aptly-
named Boulevard de France, France required the FRCI to promise “that it would not end in a 
bloodbath”617 as Sarkozy did not “want any trouble for France if this situation ends up at the 
International Criminal Court.”618 According to French Ambassador Simon, Ouattara promised 
the FRCI would not commit “any reprisal, any abuses” and ordered his troops that “Gbagbo 
and his entourage must not be harmed.”619 Ouattara personally called the commanders who led 
the final operation, “even those with the most unclean hands,” to communicate these 
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instructions personally.620  According to a French diplomat at the time, there were strong 
reasons to fear abusive conduct by the pro-Ouattara forces. “There was real hatred between the 
two camps.” He recalled how a high-level official in Ouattara’s government claimed he would 
have killed his rivals, if it had been up to him. “That was their state of mind.”621 According to 
an FRCI soldier, “some of us wanted to finish him off immediately.”622 According to one FRCI 
commander, Gbagbo surrendered and pleaded for them not to kill him.623 Other members of 
his entourage, including Simone Gbagbo, his son Michel Gbagbo, and Secretary-General 
Désiré Tagro, who ultimately succumbed to his injuries, were reportedly mistreated, “only 
narrowly avoiding being lynched.”624 As one observer put it, even if defeat is never beautiful, 




 After nearly six months of hostilities and abuses, President Ouattara’s constitutional 
inauguration ceremony took place on 6 May 2011, and “finally gave him the legitimacy that 
had been refused to him during the post-electoral crisis.” 626  In this context of contested 
government legitimacy and high uncertainty, the anti-impunity norm was deployed 
strategically by the Ouattara administration and key international actors to bolster his 
legitimacy vis-à-vis Gbagbo, using it to reinforce Ouattara’s reputation as a supporter of the 
norms of the international community as well as to bolster his ability to gain effective control 
over the territory. Reflecting the pragmatism in the norm’s deployment, while Ouattara invoked 
the anti-impunity norm to favour a particular narrative that villainized and delegitimated 
Gbagbo based on past, present, and future human rights abuses committed by his forces, 
Gbagbo’s high political value and strong spoiler power meant that this villainization did not 
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block extensive diplomatic negotiations with him. Also in light of Gbagbo’s high political 
value and strong spoiler power, despite the ICC’s jurisdiction over Côte d’Ivoire and the 
consensus against amnesties for grave crimes, the threats of prosecution were combined with 
offers of general amnesty - even after the commission of acts that became charges of crimes 
against humanity against Gbagbo and Blé Goudé at the ICC. Finally, once Gbagbo’s perceived 
political value decreased, supporting accountability measures, including through close 
coordination between the government and the ICC, helped justify the motive and means of 























 Following the dramatic culmination of the post-electoral crisis, a UN official captured 
the uncertainty that reigned. “It’s difficult to know exactly what the plan of the government is. 
Was it just that they wanted Gbagbo taken away? If they stop at Gbagbo, they will have no 
credibility, and it will be a failure.”627 Yet, over the next few years, Côte d’Ivoire became hailed 
as a rare success story in post-conflict transition, evidenced by the impressive average GDP 
growth rate of 7-8%628  and the country’s first-ever peaceful presidential elections held in 
2015. 629  According to Ambassador Simon, speaking in 2016, “reconciliation has largely 
succeeded.”630 However, many Ivorians claim the stability is an illusion and that the country is 
instead sitting on a volcano. As the spokesperson for the truth commission noted, the calm does 
not mean there is peace.631 
 This chapter explores how the Ouattara administration’s use of the anti-impunity norm 
contributed to this ‘peace-ish’ condition. More specifically, the way in which the crisis ended, 
through the arrest of the former president by former rebel commanders and his later transfer to 
The Hague, set the foundations for the challenges of stabilising Côte d’Ivoire. Indeed, the 
Ouattara administration faced the classic challenges of ‘victor’s peace’: it sought to 
simultaneously manage relations between the government and the ‘coalition of losers’ as well 
as within the ‘coalition of victors.’ In other words, it sought to promote political reconciliation 
with supporters of the former regime as well as consolidate control over the entire country by 
relying on the former rebel-turned-military commanders.  
   As is common for post-crisis governments that gained power through military means, 
“chief among the issues that confronted President Ouattara was the question of legitimacy.”632 
According to Straus, success in restoring the government’s legitimacy depended in part on how 
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the state managed the justice and reconciliation process.633 Indeed, in light of abuses committed 
by all sides, Ouattara’s reputation as a highly contested leader was based, and judged, in part 
on his commitment to the pursuit of impartial justice. In the wake of the crisis, it was already 
clear that the tension between Ouattara’s commitment to upholding impartial justice and his 
debt towards the pro-Ouattara forces, who carried him to power yet left in their path many 
allegations of abuse, would be one of the most sensitive issues moving forward. Also, in light 
of continued insecurity, Ouattara faced various challenges in establishing effective control over 
the country.   
 As argued below, capitalising on the anti-impunity norm’s enforcement features and 
functions was used as a resource by the Ouattara administration to further certain short-term 
political objectives, in a broader effort to boost the legitimation of its administration. The 
normative imperative that all perpetrators of grave abuses be held accountable served as a 
discursive axis around which Ouattara administration and its opposition expressed their 
reputation as thus legitimate political interlocutors as supporters of the norms of the 
international community. In parallel, pursuing accountability highly selectively helped the 
administration regain effective control over the country. By exploiting the state’s centrality in 
the enforcement of criminal justice nationally and by the ICC, the Ouattara administration 
implemented a combination of measures that both supported and undermined the government’s 
responsibility to hold perpetrators accountable. Doing so served as means of coercive leverage 
and selective neutralisation, thereby helping the government regulate relations with the losers’ 
coalition and within the victors’ coalition. Overall, the chapter illustrates how national 
authorities pursued justice for grave abuses strategically with the aim of boosting its reputation 
and its ability to exercise effective control over the territory, thereby shaping the balance of 
power in order to further its stabilisation objectives.  
 
Villainizing / Privileging Political Interlocutors 
 
 Following the crisis, even though cases of victor’s peace make it even more problematic 
and challenging, reconciliation became a central part of the Ouattara administration’s 
rhetoric.636 In light of the abuses committed by all forces, and in light of his political proximity 
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with the former rebel commanders who were allegedly responsible for grave abuses, Ouattara’s 
commitment to the impartial pursuit of justice became a discursive axis around which both 
Ouattara and the Gbagbo-affiliated opposition crafted their reputations as legitimate political 
interlocutors. Ouattara indeed had an interest in reinforcing his legitimacy in the eyes of the 
international community and in the eyes of the Ivorian population in light of the reputational 
damage caused by the FRCI’s abuses. According to Clark, “Ouattara will have to answer as 
why he could not rein his forces in much more heavily.”637 The revelation of the “carnage” at 
the massacre in Duékoué “considerably tainted the image of the FRCI, underlining that the 
Gbagbo camp does not hold the monopoly over human rights abuses.”638 For one UN official, 
the abuses “risk[ed] delegitimizing him.”639  
 Furthering his previous commitment to the anti-impunity norm during the crisis, and as 
evidence of his legitimacy as president, Ouattara consistently reiterated his commitment that 
his government would ensure that all perpetrators of abuses be held criminally accountable 
through impartial justice. As a researcher for Human Rights Watch notes, “Ouattara has said 
the right things. He is not shying away from the need for accountability, for reconciliation and 
investigations.”640 Similarly, according to a diplomat, the Ivorian authorities “are very aware 
of the perception of Côte d’Ivoire internationally. They are self-motivated to appear that they 
are making progress.”641 For instance, on 12 May 2011, in a speech for the Day of the Martyrs 
of the crisis, Ouattara declared that no crime would go unpunished. 642  Among the first 
decisions taken as President, Ouattara established an impressive array of anti-impunity 
measures. In May 2011, Ouattara invited an International Commission of Inquiry, established 
by Resolution 16/25 of the Human Rights Council, to investigate wrongdoings by all conflict 
parties.643 In July 2011, a National Commission of Inquiry was established. In its final report, 
the Commission concluded that grave abuses were carried out by forces loyal to both sides, 
finding that pro-Gbagbo forces were responsible for 1,452 deaths and the FRCI were 
responsible for 727 deaths.644  In June 2011, a Special Investigative Cell was established, 
mandated to lead investigations and prosecutions of crimes committed since 4 December 2010, 
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and was renewed for an indefinite period in 2013.645 Regarding the ICC, on 3 May 2011, the 
Ouattara administration issued a second re-confirmation of Article 12(3) declaration, 
requesting the ICC to conduct impartial and independent investigations throughout the country. 
In February 2013, Côte d’Ivoire ratified the Rome Statute. After the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
authorised the Prosecutor to open an investigation proprio motu in September 2011, Côte 
d’Ivoire cooperated with enforcing the ICC arrest warrants for Laurent Gbagbo and Charles 
Blé Goudé. Though Côte d’Ivoire  declined to transfer Simone Gbagbo, she was prosecuted in 
national courts for similar charges.  
 Nevertheless, the targets of such accountability remain entirely lopsided after more than 
seven years since the crisis. While many members of the pro-Gbagbo opposition have been 
charged and tried for various crimes, no member of the pro-Ouattara side has officially been 
tried. While the leniency of Ouattara’s administration towards the former rebels and the pursuit 
of one-sided justice “risked alienating another group of actors whose support had been key in 
2010-2011 – the international community,”646 international diplomatic pressure on Ouattara 
regarding equitable accountability was rather limited.647 This is supported by interviews with 
the diplomatic community in Abidjan. According to one diplomat, the majority of diplomatic 
representatives have since 2014 claimed that the crisis was over and that energy should be 
focused on economic development. Lobbying around justice issues is “less visible, less 
pressing.” 648  As an Ambassador put it, “Victor’s justice does not mean that it is not 
justice…Who are we to tell the Ivorians to speed up their judicial proceedings?”649 According 
to another diplomat, “We don’t take positions on how domestic mechanisms should work. The 
[country] does not have a policy of how transitional justice should be done – no ‘one size fits 
all’ approach.”650 
 At the same time, the reputational liability of the victor’s justice was much more salient 
in the eyes of many Ivorians, as an axis around which to challenge Ouattara’s legitimacy as a 
supporter of international human rights norms. In light of Ouattara’s expressed commitment to 
impartial justice, the way in which criminal accountability was pursued became a platform for 
the significant proportion of Ivorians who rejected Ouattara’s electoral victory, and especially 
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the hard-line opposition, to challenge Ouattara’s legitimacy and justify their refusal to 
participate as political interlocutors in the normalisation of relations between both sides. 
Indeed, by setting “a common standard for assessing the behaviour of all involved” and thereby 
generating increased scrutiny of how justice is pursued, the anti-impunity norm’s invocation 
amplified the opposition’s contestation of the Ouattara administration’s legitimacy.651 More 
specifically, the Gbagbo-affiliated opposition promoted a discourse of resistance and used 
accusations of victor’s justice as a salient discursive tactic, focusing on Gbagbo’s arrest and 
transfer to The Hague as the means by which an illegitimate ruler gained power. In other words, 
Ouattara’s decision to arrest Gbagbo prompted criticism of his illegitimacy as a political actor, 
as they argue that it served to enforce his illegitimate electoral victory. According to the 
spokesperson of the hard-line faction of the FPI, “Ouattara is illegitimate - he does not have 
the consent of the citizens!”652 In this sense, calls by pro-Gbagbo supporters for Gbagbo’s 
release from the ICC are grounded in a principle of democracy. As one pro-Gbagbo supporter 
explains, “the combat for the liberation of Laurent Gbagbo is a combat for the return of 
democracy.”653 Denouncing the two-tiered justice, the FPI refused to participate in legislative 
elections of December 2011 as well as the municipal and regional elections in April 2013 as 
long as Gbagbo and the FPI cadres were in detention.    
 Beyond serving as an axis around which the opposition criticised Ouattara’s legitimacy, 
the issue of justice became an axis around which the opposition itself splintered. While the 
cleavage between the hard-line and moderate factions of the FPI had long been simmering, it 
was exacerbated by their differing views in how to respond to the detention of Laurent Gbagbo: 
either accepting or refusing to become a political interlocutor. The hard-line faction, led to 
Aboudramane Sangaré, refused to participate in politics until Gbagbo was released and instead 
confirmed Gbagbo as their candidate for the 2015 presidential elections. In contrast to their 
‘empty chair politics,’ Pascal Affi N’Guessan called for engaging in politics as a means by 
which to lobby the government for Gbagbo’s release. This decision prompted the hard-line 
faction to brand Affi N’Guessan a traitor to Gbagbo and rejected the legitimacy of the Affi 
N’Guessan-led FPI. According to Laurent Akoun, representative and spokesperson of the hard-
line faction, “Careful! There are not two FPI’s. The FPI is not in Affi’s hands. Affi is an ally 
	
651 Hurrell 2001, 332. 
652 Interview with Laurent Akoun, Abidjan, 9 December 2015. 
653 Jones 2017, 44.  
 127 
of Ouattara.”654 Along similar lines, a government official in charge of the political dialogue 
between the administration and the opposition, explained that the FPI was fully represented by 
Affi N’Guessan, who participated in official dialogue with the government, and deemed the 
hard-line faction as spoilers to the political dialogue. “If we wanted to listen to them, we’d be 
at a deadlock.”655    
 The domestic audience costs generated by Ouattara’s commitment to the anti-impunity 
norm was particularly salient during the 2015 presidential campaign, as all opposition 
candidates demanded the release of Gbagbo from the ICC, a clearly unrealistic and maximalist 
demand that nevertheless served as a particularly powerful anti-Ouattara platform. Most of the 
opposition candidates disingenuously promised that they can ensure the return of their leader, 
repeating this commitment on a daily basis during the campaign. For instance, independent 
candidate Kouadio Konan Bertin stated, “As soon as I am elected, the next day, I will jump in 
a plane to free Gbagbo.” Pascal Affi N’Guessan, the FPI candidate, stated that freeing Gbagbo 
is the “only thing at stake in the elections…As Côte d'Ivoire’s Head of State, I will have the 
political, diplomatic and institutional means to ensure that president Laurent Gbagbo and 
Charles Blé Goudé are freed.”  
 Exploring how the idea of justice served as an axis around which actors shaped their 
reputations as political interlocutors shows how the idea of justice can be a discursive resource 
of resistance against the rulers, who may use it as an instrument of power.656 While Ouattara 
expressed commitment to the anti-impunity norm rhetorically and through the creation of anti-
impunity measures as a means to craft his reputation, the way in which Ouattara administration 
implemented justice served as an axis around which the opposition criticised his legitimacy as 
a human-rights supporting leader and justified their decision to become, or refuse to become, 
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Towards the Opposition  
  
 While Gbagbo’s arrest and transfer to the ICC neutralised him as a spoiler, this 
simultaneously complicated political stabilisation efforts as it prompted the opposition to 
boycott politics and left the Ouattara administration without a political opposition. In light of 
this missing crucial element, the Ouattara administration arguably exploited state centrality in 
the national administration of justice to favour the emergence of a moderate opposition. A 
government official leading the political dialogue with the opposition explained the high 
political value of the moderate opposition in the administration’s eyes. “One cannot be one’s 
own mirror. The opponent is there to tell you if you’re walking straight or not.” The official 
continued, “Absolute power absolutely corrupts.”657 Following the FPI’s boycott of the 2012 
and 2013 legislative elections, the need for an opposition grew steadily with the run-up to the 
presidential elections scheduled in October 2015. As such, the way in which individuals were 
held accountable was used as a means of coercive leverage for Ouattara’s government in order 
to help regulate inter-party relations, between the government and the political opposition. 
 This was particularly evident in the mass trial of the Gbagbo-affiliated opposition. 
Following the arrest of Gbagbo and 100 members of his entourage in April 2011, the detained 
were individually charged for various crimes, ranging from crimes against the state, economic 
crimes, and ‘blood crimes’ including genocide. The first trial for any of these charges was held 
in early 2015, in which 81 members of the pro-Gbagbo opposition were tried for crimes against 
the state. The initial charges against all accused were threatening national security, plotting 
against the state, creating armed militias, directing or participating in an insurrectional 
movement, public disorder, tribalism and xenophobia, coalition of functionaries, rebellion, and 
usurpation of public function.658 The defendants included former First Lady Simone Gbagbo, 
First Vice-President of the FPI and leader of the FPI’s ‘hard-line’ faction Aboudramane 
Sangaré, and the leader of the FPI’s ‘moderate’ faction Pascal Affi N’Guessan. On 10 March 
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2015, 18 defendants were acquitted while the rest were convicted of a selection of the initial 
charges and handed down sentences ranging from 18 months suspended sentence to 20 years’ 
imprisonment.  
 For the government, this trial showed its commitment to ensuring justice for victims. 
For instance, the ruling party’s spokesperson stated, “this verdict confirms that Côte d’Ivoire 
is resolutely on the road of the struggle against impunity.”659 Also, the state prosecutor declared 
that the verdict is “fair” and shows that “the reign of impunity is finished.”660 However, the 
range in sentences arguably reflected the government’s strategy of generating a moderate 
political opposition, by exploiting existing divisions within the FPI between the moderate and 
hard-line factions. Most clearly, the sentences handed down on 10 March 2015 were shorter 
for the more moderate members and longer for the more hard-line members of the opposition, 
mirroring the division within the FPI between those who called for engaging in politics to lobby 
for Gbagbo’s release and those who called for boycotting politics until Gbagbo was released 
from the ICC.  
 Most notably, on the ‘hard-line’ side, Simone Gbagbo was convicted for conspiracy 
against the state, participation in an insurrectional movement, and disturbing public order, and 
sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment.661 Unusually, this was twice as long as the sentence 
requested by the prosecution. Equally, Commander of the Republic Guard General Dogbo Blé 
and Commander of the National Marine Vice-Admiral Faussignau Vagba were sentenced to 
20 years’ imprisonment. Also, Laurent Gbagbo’s son Michel Gbagbo, a university professor 
of Criminology who played no official political role in the FPI, was sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment. Aboudramane Sangaré received five years’ imprisonment, though the 
prosecutor had requested only fourteen months.  
 In contrast, key leaders representing the moderate opposition received more lenient 
sentences. Most notably, Pascal Affi N’Guessan was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, 
which he had already served in pre-trial detention. By the time of the trial, Affi N’Guessan, 
who had already been conditionally released in August 2013, had already taken back the reins 
of the FPI since his release. Having won the legal right to represent the FPI, he had started 
participating in a direct dialogue with the government. This short sentence enabled him to 
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continue leading the FPI. Also, Gbagbo’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Alcide Djédjé 
and Gbagbo’s former Prime Minister Gilbert Marie Aké N’Gbo received suspended sentences 
of two years. As close allies of Affi N’Guessan, both rejoined the FPI and engaged in political 
dialogue with the government. Djédjé later rejoined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a high-
level position.662 The comparatively lenient sentences swiftly enabled the moderate opposition 
to reintegrate political landscape of Côte d’Ivoire as an opposition party – a necessary part of 
Côte d’Ivoire’s political stabilisation – while also exacerbating the split in the FPI’s ranks. 
 The range in sentences is not inherently problematic, as different members of the 
opposition played distinct roles during the crisis and may have been responsible for different 
types of criminal conduct. Indeed, the government argued the trial displayed its commitment 
to justice. Yet, the way in which the Minister of Justice Gnénéma Coulibaly defended the trial 
further raised concerns regarding fair trial standards. The Minister presented two curious lines 
of reasoning. First, he noted that proving these specific charges is not difficult since it is clear 
that the accused were guilty of participating in insurrection against the state. “For those who 
remember what happened in Côte d’Ivoire, it is not necessary to search everywhere for 
evidence or illustrative elements for the charges.”663 Second, he oddly recalled that the Ivorian 
justice system had not tried these crimes since 1963, implying that the magistrates did not have 
the experience expected of them. He used the French expression for “practice makes 
perfect.”664  
 However, the disparity in treatment and the range in sentences strongly appears 
strategic in light of the trial’s serious shortcomings and due process concerns, suggesting the 
exploitation of the executive’s privileged influence over the judiciary. Indeed, widespread 
criticism of the trial focused on various weaknesses. Most importantly, the judges handed down 
longer sentences than requested by the prosecution. In addition, the prosecution dropped 
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2015.  
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charges against the defendants, witnesses testified on the basis of hearsay, and the prosecution 
did not present solid evidence. Both the UN and human rights groups criticised the proceedings 
as little more than a sham trial. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al 
Hussein noted the trial “laid bare structural deficiencies in the judicial system in Côte d’Ivoire 
that need to be urgently addressed.”665 According to a leader of a human rights group, “It is as 
if there was pressure on the judges to proceed swiftly. It is unfortunate – we should have put 
all the efforts towards the ‘blood crimes’ investigations to satisfy the victims of both sides, 
since only the State is concerned here.”666 Human rights groups claimed the trial was “riddled 
with fair trial concerns”667 and should be seen as a counter-example for any future trial.668 
According to an unnamed source with privileged knowledge of the case, “We had a lot of 
evidence but it was not included in the file and very few witnesses were heard during the 
investigation.”669 According to a diplomat, “the Simone Gbagbo trial bothers everyone.”670 
Even Affi N’Guessan, who benefitted from the disparity in sentences, criticised the political 
nature of the sentences. “The sentences were distributed based on the person, not based on facts 
but based on their attitude vis-à-vis the ruling power.”671 In light of these shortcomings in the 
quality of the proceedings, it is highly like that political interference played a role in the trial’s 
outcome.     
 At the same time, the exploitation of the executive power’s centrality in the norm’s 
enforcement at the national level in order to regulate power relations helped further the 
administration’s goals of promoting a policy of détente with the moderate opposition, crucial 
for democratic governance and the presidential election scheduled seven months later. This 
moderate opposition did not become a political threat to the Ouattara administration during the 
elections. The election results show how the vast majority of the FPI electorate abstained from 
voting, displaying support for the FPI’s Sangaré faction. Indeed, the turn-out for the 2015 
presidential elections was 52% (down from 81.12% in 2010), with only 9% of the electorate 
voting from Affi N’Guessan. In this sense, the Ouattara administration’s approach succeeded: 
setting the parameters of accountability to exacerbate existing cleavages further divided and 
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weakened the Gbagbo camp while nevertheless maintaining some form of moderate and benign 
political opposition.    
  
Towards the Former ComZones 
  
 In parallel, the combined threat of justice and the promise of impunity also served as 
coercive leverage to help regulate intra-party power relations, between the government and the 
security services, in order to optimise the government’s ability to exercise effective control 
over the territory, especially in light of continuing security threats. The mounting pressure on 
the Ouattara administration to pursue even-handed justice zeroed in on potential criminal 
responsibility of several key players, namely the all-powerful former zone commanders of the 
Forces Nouvelles rebellion, known as the ‘ComZones,’ who became the pillars of Ouattara’s 
state security apparatus.672 Based on the national and international commissions of inquiry, as 
well as the Special Investigative Cell, the government held much information regarding their 
alleged criminal responsibility.673 The pursuit of criminal accountability was thus one means 
by which Ouattara could reduce their influence, making these FRCI leaders fear “that the 
Ouattara government may try to purge them from the army, or that they may end up in front of 
the ICC for crimes committed during the armed struggle against the Gbagbo regime.”674 At the 
same time, in a potential source of instability for Ouattara, many of these individuals felt they 
had not been compensated enough and demanded ‘their due’ from the government. As the 
relationship between Ouattara and these commanders was one of mutual dependence and 
wariness, the central question for Ouattara was how far he would “be capable (or not) of freeing 
himself from the soldiers ‘who made him king.’”675 According to the spokesperson of the 
	
672 The ComZones who controlled the ten zones in rebel-held northern Côte d’Ivoire are Morou 
Ouattara, Hervé Touré, Chérif Ousmane, Zoumana Ouattara, Koné Zacharia, Issiaka Ouattara 
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Commission on Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation, Ouattara faced the challenge of sawing 
off the branch he was sitting on.676 Similarly, a senior UN official stated, “the government 
initially wanted to cut the branches of the ComZones…but these branches go deep, and the 
question is how to reduce their influence without threatening the security of the state.”677  
 In light of the ComZones’ extremely high perceived political value to the Ouattara 
administration’s ability to exercise control over the territory and their high potential to spoil 
the relative stability, Ouattara arguably used the promise of impunity as a chip, and the threat 
of accountability as pressure, within the domestic processes of bargaining with them. Offering 
protections from criminal accountability in exchange for their loyalty, while nevertheless 
maintaining the Damocles’ sword of justice over them, helped regulate the particularly delicate 
relationship between the Presidency and the security forces – though ultimately to the detriment 
of the impartial and independent pursuit of justice.678 This was achieved by exploiting the 
executive’s influence over the judiciary to set limits on the pursuit of justice nationally, while 
nevertheless leaving prosecution as a possibility.        
 Before analysing how the scope of criminal accountability was strategically set, it is 
important to underline the ComZones’ high political value and high spoiler power, or how the 
ComZones are both a crucial pillar and a serious threat to national security. Rather than a clear 
break from the dynamics prior to 2010, during which time the ComZones controlled the 
economic and military structures of the northern half of Côte d’Ivoire, the post-crisis dynamics 
were marked by the ComZones’ continued influence not only over the territory each 
commander used to control but also over the “broad array of informal tax and revenue-
generating networks, as well as local dispute resolution and service provision roles” despite 
their integration into the army. This helped them maintain the loyalty of hundreds of armed 
elements, control over large quantities of unaccounted weapons and ammunition, and the 
support of northern communities, enabling them to “resist unwanted military reforms by 
threatening to turn that power against the government.”679 For instance, in 2015, one former 
ComZone was found to possess an arsenal of weapons and ammunition that could outmatch 
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the firepower of the entire army.680 The mutinies in January 2017 also illustrate the military’s 
continuing leverage and the limits of the efforts to weaken these links through the integration 
of former Forces Nouvelles combatants.681 As one French officer explained, “Whether we like 
it or not, without these guys, it would be anarchy in the country.”682 Further, and importantly, 
some of the ComZones are loyal to their former leader, Prime Minister Guillaume Soro, rather 
than to President Ouattara. This creates the possibility that Soro may leverage his support with 
the ComZones and their former soldiers to challenge Ouattara.683 Their military influence, 
combined with their general loyalty to Soro rather than Ouattara, thus makes them a political 
wildcard for the Presidency.     
   Created in June 2011, the Special Investigative Cell is the main judicial unit in charge 
of investigating and prosecuting crisis-related crimes. Its creation was welcomed by human 
rights organisations as a “first step to fight impunity” as it responded to the need to address 
these inherently complex investigations through a special unit completely devoted to fact-
finding and establishing responsibility.684 As of August 2018, the Cell has issued charges 
against 150 individuals for ‘blood crimes,’ including crimes against humanity and genocide, 
against military and civilian officials from both sides. However, none of these officials have 
faced trial nationally. While the Cell had high potential for pursuing impartial justice, the Cell’s 
margin of manoeuvre was arguably crafted through explicit and implicit influence of the 
executive branch in a way that ensured it would not prosecute politically valuable commanders 
and derail the government’s efforts to control the country, while nevertheless enabling it to 
continue investigations - thereby formally upholding the President’s professed commitment to 
the anti-impunity norm and in parallel maintaining it as a means of leverage over key power-
holders.  
 This can be seen first by exploring the parameters of the independence of the Special 
Cell. The independence of magistrates and investigating judges is in theory protected from the 
vagaries of political will in several ways. The formal separation of powers, and the 
independence of the judiciary, is officially enshrined in the Ivorian constitution of 23 July 
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2000.685 Also, while the magistrates are under the authority of the Minister of Justice, who 
reports to the President, the independence of their decision-making is enshrined in the code of 
penal procedure and the constitution.686  To be clear, while the Minister of Justice gives 
instructions to the Procureur de la République, who then transfers the casefile to the examining 
magistrates, the magistrates are formally independent and can conduct the investigative 
procedures and make recommendations for prosecution based on their independent assessment 
of the case. Nevertheless, the hierarchical link to the executive power can clearly be a factor in 
their decision-making regarding politically sensitive cases.687 Also, magistrates are in principle 
immovable and their assignments should not be subject to political considerations.688 This is 
somewhat limited, however, by the President’s role as head of the Superior Council of the 
Magistrature (Conseil Superieur de la Magistrature), which makes decisions regarding the 
appointment, reassignment, and promotion of members of the judiciary.    
 In light of the political sensitivity of these particular cases, these formal protections of 
judicial independence do not fully thwart obstacles to the independence of members of the 
Special Cell. One obstacle stems the Cell’s proximity to the Ministry of Justice. According to 
a former member of the Cell, “The Special Cell was created by a decree from the Minister of 
Justice. In theory, the Minister does not manage the investigating judges. That is in theory. 
Between theory and practice, that is where it happens.”689 Tellingly, Gnénéma Coulibaly was 
appointed Minister of Justice in 2012, a post he held until early 2016. He is a close ally of the 
highly influential and former rebellion leader Guillaume Soro, who was Prime Minister and 
Minister of Defence, and later President of the National Assembly. According to a human rights 
researcher, “He was Soro’s last Minister. His unofficial mandate was to do everything to avoid 
any accountability for the former ComZones.”690  In this sense, while the members of the 
Special Cell are independent, the political proximity between the Minister of Justice and Soro, 
and by extension the former ComZones, is a disincentive for judges who seek to investigate 
the ComZones. 
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 More concretely, while the immovability of judges is constitutionally protected, the 
threat of being transferred is a means by which members of the Cell were indirectly 
disincentivised from pursuing politically sensitive cases.691 Commenting on the independence 
of the judiciary in Côte d’Ivoire, one former member of the Cell noted, “It is official, but it is 
not totally effective. There are many obstacles to overcome. We need to have the courage to 
say it: when you are too independent, you bother. You are transferred. The transfers are a way 
for the government to sanction investigating judges who bothered.” So, “for those who do not 
want to be transferred, they are inclined to work in a manner that pleases those who are in 
charge of transfers. At the end of each judicial year, they ask themselves, will I be 
transferred?”692 An example of how this practical limit on the independence of judicial actors 
can serve as a clear disincentive was the case of investigating judge Losséni Cissé, who issued 
the first indictment of a member of the pro-Ouattara forces, Amadé Ouérémi. After being 
charged with crimes ranging from murder to endangering state security, Ouérémi was arrested 
in May 2013. His arrest was politically problematic, as Ouérémi had fought alongside 
influential individuals, including two former ComZones, Losséni Fofana and Ousmane 
Coulibaly, during the southern offensive in March 2011. His testimony is thus politically 
inconvenient and a liability for these politically valuable individuals, as Ouérémi explained 
how he received weapons and instructions from Coulibaly and Fofana during the hostilities in 
Duékoué, during which several hundred people were killed.693 This may explain his continued 
detention without trial five years after his arrest.694 Cissé, the judge who signed the indictment, 
was transferred several months later from Abidjan to Bouaké, located over 300 km away. This 
type of decision around human resources negatively impacted the Cell’s work more broadly, 
as the majority of the Cell’s staff were reassigned and replaced a few months later.          
 A more implicit, though also entirely clear, way in which judicial actors were 
disincentivised from prosecuting high-value individuals was through the appointment of 
former ComZones to key leadership roles, despite their alleged responsibility for human rights 
abuses. As then Minister of Defense commented, in light of their crucial role in enforcing 
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stability, “[t]he solution was to make them leaders.”695 For instance, former ComZone Chérif 
Ousmane was accused of abuses committed as he took control of key neighbourhoods in 
Abidjan, including ordering the summary executions of 29 prisoners in early May 2011.696 In 
August 2011, he was promoted to second-in-command of the presidential security guard 
(Groupe de sécurite de la présidence de la République, GSPR). Also, former ComZone Losséni 
Fofana led the western offensive around Duékoué, where the massacre took place in March 
2011.697 In August 2011, Fofana was first promoted to vice-commander of the army’s newly-
created Special Forces and later became the FRCI commander for the volatile western region. 
Former ComZone Ousmane Coulibaly was in charge of securing the pro-Gbagbo 
neighbourhood of Yopougon, during which time soldiers under his command allegedly 
“committed dozens of summary executions and frequent acts of torture during the final battle 
for Abidjan.” 698  In September 2012, Coulibaly was appointed prefect for San Pedro, 
strategically located for the exportation of cocoa (the country’s top export) and the scene of 
frequent insecurity. 699  Moreover, following the munities in 2017, eight ComZones were 
promoted to lead military units.700 
 Their appointments are a clear signal to disincentivise judicial actors from investigating 
them, as their omnipotence renders the pursuit of accountability incredibly challenging. 
According to an official of an international organisation who is very familiar with the dynamics 
within the military apparatus, “some FRCI leaders are not able to sanction” the former 
ComZones. For example, former ComZone Koné Zacharia has been accused of detaining 
civilians extra-judicially, but “he does what he wants. He is above the law.” In this sense, it is 
contradictory to mandate a judge to lead investigations against these individuals while 
simultaneously promoting the potential accused. “It is a bit hypocritical.” 701  Diplomatic 
sources expressed concern that even prosecuting rank-and-file soldiers or low-level 
commanders from the FRCI could threaten security due to the “precarious control President 
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Ouattara still exerts over the military.”702 As one government cabinet member acknowledged 
in 2016, “I am not sure that the government trusts the ex-comzones…but we can’t reject them,” 
much less prosecute them.703  According to an ambassador in Côte d’Ivoire, “the famous 
question of the ComZones, who certainly committed crimes against humanity… [Ouattara] 
cannot prosecute them – it would be the end of his presidency.”704  
 While their appointments to key posts reveal the limits of Ouattara’s professed 
commitment to the pursuit of impartial justice, the existence of the Special Investigative Cell 
as well as Ouattara’s commitment to cooperate with the ICC simultaneously created leverage 
for the Ouattara administration over the military. This was evident in the political wrangling 
over the existence of the Special Investigative Cell. As previously mentioned, the Cell was 
originally created by ministerial order on 24 June 2011 for a one-year renewable mandate, 
making its renewal dependent on political support. This became an issue at the end of its second 
term, as its renewal revealed the tension between the President and the Minister of Justice. 
Arguing that Côte d’Ivoire’s judicial system had recovered and could handle the crisis-era 
crimes, the newly appointed Minister of Justice Gnénéma Coulibaly intended to close the cell 
- before any trial had taken place. According to a civil servant in the justice sector with first-
hand knowledge of these developments, “At the end of 2012, with the appointment of the new 
Minister of Justice, his preoccupation was to close the Special Cell. That was his objective.”705 
The Cell had started working on pro-Ouattara cases, meaning “clearly the political will 
decreased. The question became how to close the Cell and transfer the cases to ordinary 
jurisdictions.”706  
 After intense lobbying by civil society, the UN, and the diplomatic community, the Cell 
was renewed – this time by presidential rather than ministerial decree.707 Not only was it 
renewed, it was strengthened in several ways. 708  The presidential decree made the Cell 
permanent, rather than dependent on political will for renewal, and tied its budget to the general 
governmental budget rather than to the Ministry of Justice’s budget, thereby allowing for 
greater financial flexibility. Further, its jurisdiction was expanded to include all crimes related 
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to the post-electoral crisis of 2010 as well as any infractions connected to these crimes.709 
Human rights groups welcomed the renewal as “an excellent signal of political will for the 
struggle against impunity.”710 According to a human rights researcher who partook in the 
lobbying, “Ultimately, Ouattara’s willingness to do justice is rather clear. He always repeats it 
to interlocutors. He says it in private, he says it in public. His engagement for justice is not in 
doubt, it’s the agenda and timing that is subject to negotiation.”711 This renewal also reflects 
how the President pursued several objectives at once: maintaining its existence as a sign of his 
commitment to the pursuit of justice and maintaining it as a means of leverage over the 
potentially accused power-holders within the military.  
 While the vast majority of indictments have targeted individuals aligned with the pro-
Gbagbo opposition, the continued existence of the Cell nevertheless maintains the Damocles’ 
sword of justice over the heads of influential actors. Most clearly, leaked information revealed 
in July 2015 that indictments had already been issued against eight pro-Ouattara members of 
the FRCI, two of whom are high-ranking former ComZones, Chérif Ousmane and Losséni 
Fofana, for war crimes committed in Abidjan and Duékoué, respectively. Two soldiers under 
Fofana were equally indicted. While the individuals remain free, indicating a level of protection 
from prosecution, the indictments were welcomed by human rights groups as a “decisive step 
in legal procedures” of crisis-related crimes712 and marked the first time these ComZones were 
questioned by Ivorian judicial authorities. According to a source close to the investigation, 
“They are sensitive cases. It is difficult to investigate individuals who are in power.”713 
According to a human rights researcher, the investigating judges “are certainly courageous 
people.”714 In light of the confidentiality of the proceedings, it is difficult to fully debunk 
suggestions that the leaked indictments were purely perfunctory, though individuals with 
knowledge of the proceedings indicate the indictments were the result of extensive 
investigations by the members of the Cell.715  While these individuals remain free and in 
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influential posts, the political ramifications of these indictments benefit the Ouattara 
administration. Not only does it defuse criticisms of victor’s justice in advance of the 
presidential elections later that year, the indictments maintain the threat of accountability over 
the former ComZones. Overall, while the Special Cell’s one-sided prosecution record so far 
reflects a strong degree of political pressure to protect certain individuals and to avoid 
destabilising Côte d’Ivoire, it nevertheless serves a function of maintaining bargaining leverage 
over key strongmen who serve as a pillar and a threat to the Presidency.  
    
Selective Neutralisation 
  
 While the previous section examined how the exploitation of state centrality within the 
national administration of justice helped shape power relations in a way that favoured the 
government’s objectives of maintaining stability, this does not mean that charges for grave 
crimes have not been issued and that trials for human rights abuses have not taken place. The 
Special Investigative and Examination Cell has charged over 150 people from both Gbagbo 
and Ouattara sides for ‘blood crimes,’ including crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
genocide. Twenty individuals have been charged for the March 2011 attack on Duékoué, 
twenty people have been charged for the suppression of protests in Abidjan by Gbagbo’s 
security forces, dozens of individuals from both sides have been charged for attacks in the 
Abidjan neighbourhood of Yopougon for alleged crimes during the crisis, and eighty 
individuals have been charged for an attack on a refugee camp in Nahibly in 2012, including 
self-defence militias and members of the FRCI.716  However, despite these wide array of 
charged individuals, the only individuals who have been tried for crimes under international 
law are those who were targeted by an ICC arrest warrant: Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé, 
and Simone Gbagbo. 
 Tracing the inconsistencies within Côte d’Ivoire’s decision-making regarding 
transferring Ivorians to The Hague shows how the state’s centrality within the ICC system 
enables governments to, in full compliance with their duties under the Rome Statute, exploit 
their margin for manoeuvre to pursue strategic political objectives. Indeed, the primacy of 
domestic jurisdiction and the ability of states within the ICC’s complementarity regime to 
indicate their (un)willingness to genuinely investigate and prosecute given cases domestically 
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enabled authorities to selectively transfer indicted individuals to The Hague based on a cost-
benefit analysis of whether trying them nationally or at the ICC would bolster the government’s 
ability to control Côte d’Ivoire in the wake of the crisis. Rather than simply an admissibility 
test, complementarity was interpreted through the lens of stabilisation and allowed authorities 
to pursue selective neutralisation of individuals as a function of post-crisis political exigencies. 
Indeed, the Ivorian government’s decision to transfer only two out of three individuals wanted 
by the ICC is unique in situations before the ICC so far.  
 Though this preference evolved over time, the Ouattara administration had envisioned 
a division of labour between Côte d’Ivoire and the ICC since the crisis, proactively keeping 
open the possibility of transferring Gbagbo and his close associates to The Hague by not 
launching investigations for Rome Statute crimes. On 1 May 2011, after President Ouattara 
announced the launch of criminal investigation against Laurent Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo, and 
other members of his entourage, the Minister of Justice clarified that these judicial 
investigations would exclude crimes that may fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction.717 Further, in 
his letter to the ICC Prosecutor on 3 May 2011, President Ouattara noted that “the Ivorian 
judiciary is not at this stage in the best position to address the most serious of the crimes” 
committed since 28 November 2010 and “any attempt at trying the most responsible individuals 
may face multiple obstacles.”718 The ICC Prosecutor referred to these two latter points in his 
request for authorisation to open investigations.719 Within four months, the ICC issued arrest 
warrants against Laurent Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo, and Charles Blé Goudé for crimes 
committed during the post-electoral period between December 2010 and April 2011.  
 Though Laurent Gbagbo’s transfer to the ICC did not raise admissibility issues, since 
the Ivorian government displayed its unwillingness to prosecute by transferring him, the 
justifications provided by Ivorian authorities and diplomats highlight how his transfer was not 
simply deontologically-driven but rather viewed as a means to reduce instability caused by his 
presence in the country and thereby increase the government’s ability to exercise full control 
over the territory. Indeed, Laurent Gbagbo was deemed of very low political value to the 
government’s strategy of stabilising the country and, maintaining high spoiler power, 
represented a continued threat to stability, though lower than during the crisis. Aware of the 
political volatility of his transfer, Ivorian authorities and the ICC kept plans for his arrest and 
	
717 Abidjan Net 2011b.  
718 Letter to the Prosecutor dated 3 May 2011 
719 OTP Request for Authorisation 2011, 18,19 
 142 
transfer secret until the last minute. The ICC arrest warrant was issued under seal on 23 
November 2011 and unsealed, to the surprise of his lawyers, on 30 November 2011 - the day 
of his transfer to The Hague. Government officials highlighted several reasons for his transfer. 
The government spokesperson explained that Gbagbo’s transfer was “salutary” because it 
would ensure there is no impunity (deontological) and it would placate criticisms of bias had 
Gbagbo been tried nationally and enable the government “to definitively dedicate itself to its 
purpose: improve the living conditions of Ivorians” (consequentialist). 720  Invoking the 
consequentialist ‘reconciliation through justice’ rationale, Minister of Justice Coulibaly stated, 
“it is difficult to go into a reconciliation process when people who have committed crimes do 
not accept responsibility.”721 In clear terms, one government official explained, “It makes 
everyone uncomfortable, but we had no choice at the time. Gbagbo has weight…political 
force…he has followers. He lost 46% to 53% - the margin is not wide. 7 points.”722    
 More interesting is the Ivorian government’s contrasting treatment of Charles Blé 
Goudé and Simone Gbagbo, which highlights inconsistencies in the government’s approach to 
complementarity. The ICC arrest warrant for Blé Goudé was issued under seal on 21 December 
2011. After being extradited to Côte d’Ivoire from his hiding in Ghana, Blé Goudé was charged 
nationally on 21 January 2013 with war crimes as well as murder, kidnapping, and economic 
crimes committed during the country’s post-election crisis. The ICC arrest warrant was 
unsealed on 20 September 2013. Six months later, on 22 March 2014, Côte d’Ivoire 
surrendered Blé Goudé to the ICC, where he is currently in the Court’s custody, on trial for his 
alleged role as an indirect co-perpetrator of four counts of crimes against humanity. On parallel 
tracks, the ICC arrest warrant for Simone Gbagbo was issued under seal on 29 February 2012 
and unsealed on 22 November 2012. Côte d’Ivoire then filed an admissibility challenge on 30 
September 2013 on the grounds that Simone Gbagbo was being investigated and prosecuted in 
national courts, referring to the three sets of charges issued against her: economic crimes, 
crimes against the state, and ‘blood crimes’ or crimes against individuals that are “of the same 
nature as those alleged in the case before the Court.”723 Indeed, Simone Gbagbo had been 
	
720 Asked if the government needed to distance Gbagbo, Koné replied, “Our goal was not to 
distance Laurent Gbagbo. Our ambition was to make Côte d’Ivoire a state of law and to ensure 
that there is no impunity. There is no better answer than this transfer.” RFI 2011. 
721 AFP 2011. 
722 Interview with a Chief of Staff to a Minister of State, Abidjan, 27 November 2015. 
723 Côte d’Ivoire Challenge to Admissibility of Simone Gbagbo 
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charged with human rights violations, including genocide, by national courts. 724  On 11 
December 2014, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I rejected the admissibility challenge.725 After Côte 
d’Ivoire appealed the decision, the Appeals Chamber rejected the challenge and confirmed the 
case’s admissibility on 27 May 2015, stating that the investigative steps in Côte d’Ivoire were 
“scarce in quantity and lacking in progression.”726 On 10 March 2015, Simone Gbagbo was 
convicted in Ivorian courts for crimes against state security. Simone Gbagbo was later tried for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes and was acquitted on 28 March 2017.  
 The timing and the arguments put forward in the admissibility challenges highlight a 
degree of inconsistency in Côte d’Ivoire’s position. In the admissibility challenge filed on 30 
September 2013, Côte d’Ivoire argued that it had opened investigations at the national level for 
similar charges and substantially the same conduct. Regarding the “inability” criterion, Côte 
d’Ivoire argued that it was able to try the case nationally as the judicial infrastructure had 
substantially improved since the crisis, national courts had reopened throughout the country, 
and a National Commission of Inquiry and a special investigative unit were created.727 Yet, 
Côte d’Ivoire did not contest the admissibility of the case against Blé Goudé and surrendered 
Blé Goudé to the court six months later in March 2014. This distinction highlights how the 
complementarity regime enables a government to claim it is simultaneously willing and able 
to prosecute certain accused while unwilling and unable to prosecute others, even though the 
defendants are accused of similar charges. By extension, it shows how governments can 
interpret complementarity based on a cost-benefit analysis of whether national prosecutions 
would help or harm stabilisation objectives. The contrast in treatment is due to the perception 
that, for reasons explained below, trying Blé Goudé nationally was a costly risk to stability 
while trying Simone Gbagbo was less costly and presented advantages for the government’s 
objectives.  
	
724 The International Commission of Inquiry stated that conduct during the crisis may amount 
to crimes against humanity but did not mention genocide. Simone Gbagbo was charged with 
genocide in February 2012. 
725 Simone Gbagbo Admissibility Decision. 
726 Judgment on Appeal against Admissibility of Simone Gbagbo. 
727 In addition, with regards to the “(un)willingness” criterion, Côte d’Ivoire argued that the 
domestic proceedings were not undertaken with the purpose of shielding Simone Gbagbo from 
her criminal responsibility. Côte d’Ivoire Challenge to Admissibility of Simone Gbagbo, paras. 
35-38, 43-44, and 52-54. 
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 Regarding Blé Goudé, Ivorian authorities intended at first to try him nationally, in line 
with Ouattara’s commitment that only Laurent Gbagbo would be transferred to the ICC.728 Yet, 
the perception that Blé Goudé was a security threat and maintained high spoiler power, evident 
from interviews with governmental, UN, and diplomatic sources, eventually convinced the 
Ouattara administration to agree to transfer him to The Hague. According to the UN Group of 
Experts, Blé Goudé had reportedly “been involved in financing the military and political 
network that planned and carried out several important attacks” in 2012 and “attempts by those 
individuals to destabilise the new administration of Côte d’Ivoire cannot be ruled out.”729 
Explaining why Blé Goudé was kept in an undisclosed location, Minister of the Interior Hamed 
Bakayoko noted, “Given the context and the personality [of the accused], we cannot take any 
risk and maintain the greatest degree of secrecy.” 730  Referring to his ability to mobilise 
supporters, a senior official within an international organisation noted, “When he went to court 
hearings in Abidjan, there were large crowds at the tribunal.” 731  Explaining why the 
government transferred both Gbagbo and his right-hand man, French Ambassador Simon 
explained, “the ICC was a relief for the government. It would have been too complicated to 
manage the trials in Côte d’Ivoire.”732 More broadly, a senior official in the Ministry of Justice 
explained, “There was really a political dimension. One has to consider the consequentialist 
and deontological rationales. Should you apply the law because it is the law and it should be 
applied or in relation to the consequences? My mission, and the mission of the government is: 
the greatest good for society [corps social] is peace. If justice could create trouble….” He 
continued, “In 2012 and 2013, when the ICC requested the transfer of Blé Goudé, we had the 
human resources (our magistrates are among the best trained)” but complications could arise 
because Blé Goudé “is not an anonymous person. He is known, even very well-known. If Blé 
Goudé were to be tried here, would it guarantee social peace? During the period preceding his 
transfer, anti-riot security teams had to be sent to the Court. For peace, and quietude, we 
transferred him.”733 
	
728 Ben Yahmed 2013. 
729 UN Doc. S/2012/766 2012, para 30 ; UN Doc. S/2012/196 2012, para 20. 
730 Ben Yahmed 2013. 
731 Interview with a senior official with an international organisation, Abidjan, 11 December 
2015. 
732 Interview with former Ambassador Jean-Marc Simon, Paris, 25 May 2016. 
733 Interview with senior official in the Ministry of Justice, Abidjan, 1 December 2015. 
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 In contrast, trying Simone Gbagbo domestically was deemed less costly and even 
advantageous in regulating both intra- and inter-party relations. In terms of a cost-benefit 
analysis, some officials highlight that transferring a woman to the ICC would negatively impact 
the government’s reputation, in light of a cultural view regarding the treatment of women. 
According to an official from the Ministry of Justice, “It’s immoral to deport a woman. There 
is always a grain of sympathy for a woman, even if we portray her as a murderer.”734 However 
true this may be, there is also a more strategic angle to the government’s decision. Importantly, 
Simone Gbagbo had much lower spoiler power as she had a relatively weaker ability to 
mobilise supporters than the other two accused. “Simone Gbagbo is not Laurent Gbagbo. Even 
if she is an Iron Lady, she was never a great mobiliser, because the society is strongly 
patriarchal. She doesn’t mobilise many people, like a man would.”735 Her appearances at her 
trials in Abidjan drew many people, but the crowds were entirely manageable and did not 
provoke security incidents.  
 Yet, she was deemed politically value for several reasons. For instance, refusing to 
transfer her sets a precedent for refusing to transfer any future indictees. This helps signal to 
key power-holders within the military, namely former ComZones, that the Ouattara 
administration will not send them to The Hague. Indeed, the Ivorian government’s attitude 
towards the ICC changed around the time Prosecutor Bensouda stated on 31 March 2015 that 
the ICC investigations into the pro-Ouattara side would intensify.736 Just two weeks later, in 
April 2015, President Ouattara declared that he would not send any more Ivorians to The 
Hague, possibly anticipating further arrest warrants following the OTP’s investigations into the 
pro-Ouattara side.737 Ouattara’s refusal to transfer Simone Gbagbo increases the credibility of 
this promise. This shows how the government can exploit the state’s centrality within the Rome 
Statute system, namely the ICC’s dependence on state cooperation and states’ jurisdictional 
primacy, to quell the apprehension of those who rightly fear the Damocles’ sword of the ICC 
but who are also valuable to Côte d’Ivoire’s stability.   
 Equally, by maintaining Simone Gbagbo in Côte d’Ivoire and trying her in national 
courts, the government retained the possibility of using her as a pawn in the political chess 
	
734 “C’est malsain de déporter une femme. Il y a toujours un brin de sympathie pour la femme, 
même si on la présente comme meurtrière.” 
735 “Elle ne mobilise pas plus que quelqu’un d’autres, comme un homme.” Interview with 
senior official in the Ministry of Justice, Abidjan, 1 December 2015. 
736 France24 2015. 
737 JeuneAfrique 2015a. 
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game of reconciliation with the Gbagbo opposition. Maintaining her in the country kept open 
the potential for granting pardons and clemency as a source of leverage, measures that the 
government frequently mentions as available options which grew increasingly attractive in 
light of the 2020 presidential elections. As explained by Michel Gbagbo, point-person for 
issues of political prisoners for the Sangaré-affiliated opposition, as well as a government 
official leading the political dialogue with the Affi N’Guessan-affiliated opposition, the issue 
of political prisoners (though the government rejects this term) is a central bone of contention 
in the political dialogue between the government and the FPI. 738  According to Simone 
Gbagbo’s lawyer, Ouattara regularly mentioned he would consider issuing a clemency or a 
pardon. Ouattara eventually did so over three years later in August 2018, granting amnesty to 
approximately 800 people, including Simone Gbagbo.739 This continued Ouattara’s practice 
since 2011 of offering clemency to thousands of prisoners, including to those whom opposition 
groups note are ‘political prisoners,’ amidst efforts towards national reconciliation.740   
 At the same time, national proceedings against Simone Gbagbo were opened in direct 
response to the ICC’s case against her. As part of efforts to challenge the case’s admissibility 
at the ICC, Simone Gbagbo was tried individually for war crimes and crimes against humanity 
in national courts and acquitted in March 2017. In this sense, the trial appears to fulfil the goal 
of the complementarity regime: encouraging national prosecutions for international crimes. 
However, serious concerns with regards to fair trial standards prompted the civil parties to 
reluctantly pull out of the trial. Ivorian and international human rights organisations, including 
those who had participated as civil parties throughout the investigation, described the trial as a 
“judicial fiasco”741 that “did little to advance the cause of justice.”742 The concerns regarding 
the “genuineness” of the proceedings may become an issue in future admissibility proceedings 
in line with Article 17(2). However, this is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 Overall, this shows how the state’s centrality in the Rome Statute system enables a 
government to pursue full compliance with its duties under the Rome Statute while also 
	
738 Interview with Michel Gbagbo, Abidjan, 5 November 2015; Interview with Chief of Staff 
to a Minister of State, Abidjan, 27 November 2015. 
739 Interview with Simone Gbagbo’s lawyer Rodrigue Ange Dadjé, Abidjan, 13 November 
2015. 
740 For instance, in January 2016, Ouattara offered clemency to 3,100 prisoners held since the 
post-electoral crisis as part of his call for “all my fellow citizens to seize this new opportunity 
towards a national gathering and the consolidation of peace.” France24 2016. 
741 Konan 2018. 
742 HRW 2017. 
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accommodating the political exigencies of post-crisis stabilisation. The practice of states’ 
outsourcing of cases of politically problematic individuals to the ICC simultaneously 
undermines one version of the anti-impunity norm, that states must hold individuals 
accountable for abuses domestically, while fulfilling another version of the norm, that states 
must cooperate with legal proceedings in international courts but do not need to hold 
individuals accountable in domestic courts. Tracing the decision-making of Ivorian authorities 
reveals how the vagueness within the norm itself enables states to strategically deploy one of 




  By adopting measures that both supported and undermined the imperative for states to 
hold individuals accountable for grave abuses, Ivorian authorities furthered its short-term 
objectives by neutralising some threats while maintaining alliances with others. The way in 
which accountability was pursued served as coercive leverage to encourage the emergence of 
a moderate opposition to replace the hard-line opposition. In parallel, selectively neutralising 
some alleged perpetrators that were no longer politically valuable, and were indeed a threat to 
the government’s objectives, by transferring them to the ICC, while sheltering high-value 
individuals from prosecution helped the government reach its objective of increasing its 
effective control over the country and preserve stability. This was achieved through the 
exploitation of the norm’s enforcement features and functions to favour short-term 
entrenchment of government power. Yet, it did so by undermining the Ouattara 
administration’s commitment to fully uphold the anti-impunity norm. By exacerbating deeply-
held grievances within Gbagbo’s constituencies over perceived injustices and lack of 
representation, this pragmatism prevented the Ouattara administration from pursuing justice as 










 Sparked in January 2012, a conflagration of crises violently debunked the widespread 
view that Mali was a stable democracy in a turbulent region. Within several months, Mali 
simultaneously experienced a constitutional crisis, a separatist rebellion, and an occupation by 
various terrorist groups of nearly two-thirds of the country. The Malian state was described as 
facing an unprecedented “near-death experience” and being at the brink of “sheer dissolution,” 
in which its very existence and secular nature were at stake.743 In the midst of this maelstrom, 
Malian authorities issued a self-referral to the ICC in July 2012 and repeatedly insisted on the 
importance of pursuing criminal accountability for crimes under international law. As two 
members of a Malian armed group known as Ansar Dine were later charged with war crimes 
and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court, it is crucial to analyse how 
actors’ usage, or deployment, of the anti-impunity norm shaped the political dynamics during 
the crisis.       
 This chapter first provides background information on the crisis and presents the 
chapter’s central argument. It then analyses how actors used the anti-impunity norm’s functions 
in furthering short-term objectives and traces how the state’s relative centrality within the 
enforcement of justice shaped how the norm was implemented. The chapter focuses primarily 
on the measures taken by the Malian authorities, but also highlights measures taken by the 
Algeria, France, the AU, and the UN - as these actors were deply involved in the negotiations. 
Similarly to the Côte d’Ivoire situation, tracing the norm’s exploitation shows how the anti-
impunity norm was not a rule that supplanted and constrained politics but rather a flexible 
resource that contributed to shaping the political dynamics of the conflict on terms favoured by 
the Malian transitional authorities, supported by key international actors. This chapter then 
leads to Chapter 7, which explores the usage of the anti-impunity norm over the five subsequent 








 Many years in the making, a multidimensional crisis was triggered in early 2012 and 
set off what became Mali’s annus horribilis. Following the fall of the Qaddafi regime in Libya, 
approximately 1,000 Malian-born Tuaregs who had been fighting in Libya returned to northern 
Mali with weapons, supplies, and training and gave new momentum to a secessionist feeling 
among some Tuaregs. In October 2011, they formed the Movement for the National Liberation 
of Azawad (Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad, MNLA) and launched an armed 
rebellion, claiming the state of “Azawad” which broadly encompassed the three northern 
regions (Timbuktu, Gao, and Kidal). During hostilities in January 2012 between the MNLA 
and the Malian army at Aguelhok, around 100 soldiers were killed after surrendering, with their 
hands tied behind the back and their throats slit. This prompted fury against President Amadou 
Toumani Touré’s government in Bamako as it revealed the government’s inadequate provision 
of equipment and support to the army’s operations in the north.  
 Amidst this anger, a few dozen soldiers led by Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, led a 
coup d’état against President Touré on 22 March 2012, just a few weeks before scheduled 
presidential elections. The coup was condemned internationally. The African Union and 
ECOWAS suspended Mali, neighbouring states imposed sanctions, and other states declared 
their refusal to formally cooperate Sanogo’s unconstitutional government. Under intense 
pressure, Sanogo agreed to hand power to a civilian transitional government on 6 April 2012. 
However, highlighting friction within the army, a particularly emblematic case of human rights 
abuses occurred on 31 March – 1 April 2012, when an attempted counter-coup by an elite army 
unit that had remained loyal to former President Touré commonly called the “Red Berets,” was 
violently put down by Sanogo’s coup leaders, who allegedly disappeared, tortured, and killed 
21 Red Berets soldiers. 
 Within three weeks of the coup, Bamako lost control of northern Mali to armed groups. 
The MNLA, a pro-independence and secular Tuareg group, was joined by other groups, 
including Ansar Dine, a Tuareg Salafist movement with links to al-Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb (AQIM).744 Ansar Dine was established in 2012 by Iyad ag Ghaly, a Malian Tuareg 
leader who has been a key figure in the Malian politico-military landscape for decades and 
	
744 This group has many transliterations, including Ancar Dine, Ansar al-Din, Ansar Eddine, 
and Ansar ul-Din. Ansar Dine will be used in this thesis.  
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recently took a “jihadist turn,” perhaps from newfound convictions but also for political 
expediency.745 On 26 May 2012 the MNLA and Ansar Dine announced their merger in the 
“Transitional Council of the Islamic State of Azawad,” which was to “apply Islamic legislation 
in all facets of life, based on the Koran and the Sunna” as well as build a unified army.746 
Unable to conceal growing rifts between the MNLA and Ansar Dine, the merger was short-
lived as the MNLA quickly renounced its commitment to the agreement one week later.  
 In addition, AQIM and its offshoot Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa 
(MUJAO), a Salafist splinter group made up of Saharan fighters, also took advantage of the 
insecurity triggered by the MNLA’s rebellion and gradually fanned out across northern Mali, 
adding a radical dimension to the armed conflict. Ansar Dine, working in alliance with AQIM 
and MUJAO outgunned and side-lined the MNLA. Starting in June 2012, they began exercising 
nearly exclusive control over two-thirds of Mali, a territory roughly equivalent to the size of 
France, with no local adversaries to contend with, making it “one of the world’s better-
established terrorist safe havens.”747 During this “jihadist occupation,” a harsh version of sharia 
law was implemented, banning drinking, smoking, television, music, football…, which was 
enforced by lashings, amputations, and other forms of corporal punishment. In what became 
emblematic of this occupation, militants destroyed mosques and mausoleums in Timbuktu.      
 This crisis was marked by contestation over the legitimacy of the Malian authorities as 
members of the international community as well as contestation over who were the ‘legitimate’ 
opposition groups. Regarding the government, the interim civilian government led by President 
Dioncounda Traoré and Prime Minister Cheikh Modibo Diarra was formally legitimate and 
recognised as such by the UN, ECOWAS, and the AU, as former President of the National 
Assembly Traoré had been sworn in as Interim President, as required by the 1992 Constitution, 
following the Sanogo-led coup against former President Amadou Toumani Touré. Yet, this 
transitional government was weak and in need of bolstering and strengthening, not only in 
terms of its reputation but also in terms of its capacity to effectively control its territory.748 In 
parallel, there was contestation over who were the ‘legitimate’ armed groups with whom the 
	
745 Chivvis 2016, 63. 
746 Mandraud 2012.  
747 Chivvis 2016, 160. 
748 The two goals of restoring constitutional order and restoring control over the north were 
repeatedly stated in 29 statements and resolutions by the UN, ECOWAS, and the AU during 
this period, as well as the 6 April 2012 agreement between civilian leaders and the coup leader 
Sanogo as well as the government’s transitional roadmap published in July 2012. 
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government should negotiate and who were the ‘illegitimate’ armed groups who should be 
militarily neutralised. An associational strategy was adopted towards groups that renounced 
terrorism while preparations for an African-led military operation against Islamist-terrorist 
groups developed. More precisely, international actors called for the Malian authorities to 
negotiate with the ‘legitimate’ groups, namely MNLA and Ansar Dine, while preparations were 
hammered out for an African-led armed operation against the ‘illegitimate’ groups, namely 
MUJAO and AQIM. This dual pronged-approach appeared in all UN Security Council 
resolutions adopted in 2012.749  
 While this strategy appeared to be based on broad consensus, seen by how the UN 
Security Council resolutions on Mali between January 2012 and February 2013 were passed 
unanimously,750 unlike other resolutions being discussed at the time concerning Syria and 
Libya, there was in fact a wide range of views about how to manage the crisis and how to 
engage with the kaleidoscope of armed groups.751 Most importantly, the Malian authorities 
expressed their readiness to negotiate with these groups but displayed little enthusiasm and did 
not officially participate in any formal negotiations with any group during this period, 
preferring instead military operations against all groups.752 Preparations for a military approach 
were quickly sped up after the groups started a surprising southward advance in early January 
2013, crossing of the Rubicon of the Niger River and prompting Malian transitional authorities 
to request French military intervention. France swiftly launched Operation Serval on 11 
January 2013, which successfully yet only temporarily thwarted the groups’ advance. 
 This chapter argues that Malian executive authorities selectively supported and 
undermined accountability measures in ways that shaped the reputation of actors as members 
of the international community as well as the power relations between the government and the 
opposition in order to further short-term political objectives. As Mali was portrayed as a new 
front in the ‘global war on terror,’ the idea of the ‘the terrorist as international criminal’ was 
	
749  For instance, as stated in Resolution 2071 (2012), the Security Council “urges the 
transitional authorities of Mali, the Malian rebel groups and legitimate representatives of the 
local population in the north of Mali, to engage, as soon as possible, in a credible negotiation 
process in order to seek a sustainable political solution, mindful of the sovereignty, unity, and 
territorial integrity of Mali.” UN Doc. S/RES/2071 (2012), para 4. 
750 These include UN SC Resolution 2056 (2012), Resolution 2071 (2012), Resolution 2085 
(2012).  
751 ICG 2012a, 28.   
752 The government sent two letters to the UN Security Council, on 18 September 2012 and 18 
October 2012, requesting the authorization of an international force.   
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an axis around which the political reputations of various actors were produced, either 
privileging them as legitimate political interlocutors or villainizing them as enemies of 
mankind in the ‘war on terror’ and thus rejects of the international community. Also, as in Côte 
d’Ivoire, actors invoked the threat of accountability as means of coercive leverage to shape 
both inter- and intra-party dynamics and as a guiding thread in justifying the neutralisation of 
other actors via force and law. Overall, the chapter shows how the anti-impunity norm was 
used as a salient resource in contributing to boosting the ability for the Malian state to re-
establish its international reputation and at least temporary control over the north. Its 
application formed a productive dimension of the political dynamics of the crisis, by helping 
actors justify the motive and means of legitimising, rather than problematizing, the Malian 
state. 
 
Villainizing / Privileging Political Interlocutors 
   
 While there was general consensus among Malian authorities and international actors 
over the threat represented by the consolidation of northern armed groups as a new front in the 
‘global war on terror,’ they disagreed on whether to favour negotiations or military action. As 
Charbonneau puts it, “central in this is the problematic distinction between parties with whom 
one can make peace, and parties with whom one ‘can only’ make war.”753 In other words, who 
are the groups with whom the government can build peace and who are the groups who must 
be neutralised? In Mali, the anti-impunity norm’s deployment provided a strategic interpretive 
resource to brand terrorist groups as international criminals - double hostis humani generis.  
Indeed, one of the justifications for international criminal justice is the protection of human 
diversity and plurality, 754  which was being attacked by groups seeking to impose 
fundamentalist rule in northern Mali. Thus, the application of the anti-impunity as an 
interpretive frame in the Malian context contributed to drawing a dichotomy between non-
criminal non-terrorist groups as a foil to criminal terrorist groups, the former to be associated 
with negotiations and the latter to be excluded.  
 Yet, as this section illustrates, this villainizing effect was not necessarily deployed 
based simply on alleged criminal conduct of the labelled subject, but rather on their perceived 
	
753 Charbonneau 2017, 13. 
754 Nouwen and Werner 2015, 159. 
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political value to resolving the conflict through negotiations. In other words, as Malian and 
international actors viewed the conflict through different lenses, anti-impunity considerations 
indeed shaped the reputation of parties as legitimate political interlocutors, but not in a 
determinative manner. Indeed, key international players, including Burkina Faso, Algeria, 
France as well as the UN Security Council more generally, drew a distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate groups based not on their commission of crimes but rather on the 
group’s expressed support of terrorism. To resist this pressure to negotiate, the Malian 
authorities capitalised on the anti-impunity norm as a strategic resource to undermine this rival 
narrative and brand its opposition writ large as threats to human diversity by virtue of their 
responsibility for grave human rights abuses. In helping build the “architecture of enmity 
relevant to decision- and policy-making in Mali,” the norm was thus used differently by various 
actors in the politics of identifying terrorists and left “room for manoeuvre afforded to the 
Malian state and actors to accept, resist, or adapt this conceptualisation of the ‘enemy.’”755 
Further, focusing on the ‘terrorist as international criminal’ helps overshadow a more holistic 
picture of the crisis which would problematize the Malian state’s own responsibility in 
fomenting the emergence of this instability. Overall, rather than suggesting the threat posed by 
the various opposition groups was not serious, as it most definitely was, it is nevertheless 
revealing to show how the norm was used strategically to privilege and villainize political 
interlocutors and help actors favour a certain narrative over an alternative one. 
 
Government vs. Separatists vs. Terrorists  
 
 It is first helpful to note how the different lens adopted by international actors and 
Malian authorities shaped their approach to who is a legitimate interlocutor. The efforts to 
respond to the turmoil in Mali over the course of 2012 raise an interesting parallel between 
counter-terrorism strategies and the use of international criminal law. Both are justified as 
responding to threats to human diversity – the former through force, the latter through law. 
Counter-terrorism strategies frame the enemy’s fundamentalist ideology as a threat to political, 
cultural, social, and religious diversity, on both a local and global scale. As Nouwen and 
Werner explain, crimes against humanity “threaten the very conditions for politics and human 
action by corrupting the idea that the world is a place to be shared by peoples living in a 
	
755 Charbonneau 2017, 14. 
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multitude of cultures, habits, identities…”756Drawing on Arendt, they argue that international 
criminal law thus also aims to protect diversity because it responds to conduct that amounts to 
“an attack on human diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic of the ‘human status’ 
without which the very words ‘mankind’ or ‘humanity’ would be devoid of meaning.”757   
 The labelling of certain actors as terrorists and as criminals has similar branding effects, 
through the depoliticization of the actor. The label ‘terrorism’ depoliticizes the actor, as “the 
insurgent is assumed to be rational and political, while the terrorist’s rationality and 
relationship with politics are in perpetual doubt.”758 Equally, no matter the political objectives 
being pursued or the causes of conflict, the “problematisation of certain acts as international 
crimes…introduces in parallel a spurious de-politicization process.” 759  Thus, applying 
international criminal law within the ‘global war on terror’ framing creates a powerful image 
of the ‘terrorist as international criminal,’ branding ‘terrorist’ groups who commit international 
crimes as enemies of mankind - twice over.  
 In Mali, while both Malian authorities and key international actors similarly sought to 
address the threats posed by opposition groups, they diverged in their interpretation of who is 
a threat to human diversity and thus who is an (il)legitimate interlocutor. For those promoting 
a counter-terrorism strategy, groups’ illegitimacy stems from their aim to destroy the political, 
cultural, social, and religious diversity in Mali and more globally through fundamentalist 
Islamist ideology imposed through violent means. As such, ‘hard-core’ terrorists presented the 
main threat against diversity, through both their ideology and their criminal acts. Concrete 
efforts were thus made throughout 2012, led by Algeria and Burkina Faso, to generate a 
political dialogue between Bamako, the MNLA, who declared its rejection of terrorism and 
Islamist ideology, and Ansar Dine, who varyingly expressed support for Islamist ideology as 
well as openness to negotiating with the Malian state. This strategy was aimed at prising these 
groups away from the more ‘hard-core’ terrorist groups AQIM and MUJAO, who fully 
supported Islamist ideology and rejected the authority of the Malian state. This focus deems 
‘non-terrorists’ legitimate interlocutors while overlooking grave abuses that these groups may 
have committed. Indeed, despite the MNLA and Ansar Dine’s clear involvement in alleged 
	
756 Nouwen and Werner 2015, 159; Luban 2011. 
757 Arendt 1964, 268-269 as cited in Nouwen and Werner 2014, 158. 
758 Charbonneau 2017, 5; Stampnitzky 2013, 49-82. 
759 Turan 2015, 29. 
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war crimes in northern Mali since January 2012, international actors called for political 
dialogue with them throughout the year.  
 This flexibility with regards to the normative prohibition against negotiating with 
groups accused of international crimes was most clear in the responses to the destruction of 
Timbuktu mausoleums, which prompted global outrage, including a declaration by the ICC 
Prosecutor that the acts amounted to war crimes.760 These measures, taken by Ansar Dine and 
AQIM, intended to eradicate the religious diversity in Mali, eliminating Sufi shrines and 
imposing one interpretation of Islam. In the same week as the African Commission on Human 
and People’s Rights condemned the acts “in the strongest possible terms” and declared “such 
barbaric and unspeakable acts” as “war crimes and crimes against humanity,”761 the AU stated 
Ansar Dine can be part of a negotiated political solution if it breaks with AQIM and its allies. 
The AU Peace and Security Commissioner Ramtane Lamamra explained that the AU ruled out 
negotiations with “terrorist group” AQIM but regional mediators maintained contacts with the 
MNLA and Ansar Dine. “We have not yet exhausted all the possibilities to reach a peaceful 
solution to this situation.”762 Also, UN Security Council Resolution 2056, adopted on 5 July 
2012, simultaneously condemned “the desecration, damage and destruction of holy, historic 
and cultural significance” committed in part by Ansar Dine and threatened sanctions against 
the group, stating that “any acts of terrorism are criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their 
motivations, whenever and by whomsoever committed” while also calling “on all groups, 
including the MNLA, Ansar Dine, and foreign combatants on Malian soil, to renounce all 
affiliations” from terrorist groups to participate in national dialogue.763 As late as November 
2012, even though French officials were privately unconvinced that the negotiations would 
succeed, President Hollande called upon President Traoré to “intensify the dialogue” with 
groups that rejected terrorism, namely MNLA and Ansar Dine.764 Speaking after the adoption 
of UN SC Resolution 2085 (2012), the Representative of France to the UN explained on 20 
December 2012 that “our hope is that the authorities in Bamako and the northern armed groups 
that dissociate themselves from terrorism hold a political dialogue that allows for elections to 
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take place across the entire country and the peaceful return of the Malian army to its 
garrisons.” 765  As late as 21 December 2012, both MNLA and Ansar Dine stated their 
commitment to finding a negotiated solution.766   
 This flexibility with which actors apply the anti-impunity norm arguably depends on 
the target’s perceived political value to the negotiations. Despite its alliance with AQIM and 
its alleged responsibility for international crimes, Ansar Dine, especially its leader Iyad Ag 
Ghaly who is “by far one of the most experienced figures in Mali’s political quagmire,”767 was 
deemed a particularly valuable player in negotiations. In light of its Malian and Tuareg origins, 
as opposed to the international profile of AQIM, as well as Ag Ghaly’s only recent turn towards 
Islamist ideology, Ansar Dine was viewed as more likely to come back into the fold of secular 
Mali. At various points in 2012, Ag Ghaly declared he would not contest the Malian state, that 
he was open to negotiating with the government, and even sought to reconcile with MNLA. To 
this end, since the early days of 2012, “Algeria and other countries continued to downplay his 
jihadist credentials and portray [Iyad Ag Ghaly] as a potentially useful interlocutor in the 
conflict. Indeed, given his secular past, not a few outside observers questioned the strength of 
Ghal[y]’s allegiance to jihadism – and the durability of his ties to AQIM.”768 In August and 
November 2012, Ansar Dine met with Burkina Faso’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, while in 
parallel having consultations in Algeria, who sought to reconcile the MNLA, Ansar Dine and 
Malian authorities.769 As late as 21 December 2012, Ansar Dine stated its commitment to 
finding a negotiated solution.770 At the same time, occupying a median position “between the 
jihadis and the West,” Ag Ghaly also called for sharia law and maintained collaborative 
relations with AQIM.771 Throughout 2012, Ansar Dine maintained a somewhat ambiguous 
posture vis-à-vis the MNLA, AQIM, Bamako and the international community – pursuing a 
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“kind of ambiguity to place himself in the centre of every possible outcome of the conflict.”772 
He has entertained relations with the Malian government – even working at the Malian 
Presidency and serving as a diplomat to Saudi Arabia – as well as entertaining relations with 
AQIM after reinventing himself as an Islamist. Later becoming closer to AQIM, he was 
identified in 2013 as a terrorist leader and placed on the US sanctions list – though he 
maintained his shadowy links to various terrorist and ‘non-terrorist’ groups. To illustrate his 
political value, Walther and Christopoulos use social network analysis to show that Ag Ghaly 
is a top-scorer in terms of “between-ness centrality,” meaning he occupies a central place 
within the networks of influential figures of various armed groups and thus “incredibly higher 
brokerage benefits than would be expected by chance.”773 
 Overall, various international actors used the anti-impunity norm to both condemn acts 
perpetrated by groups as war crimes while also painting some of them as nevertheless 
legitimate interlocutors, as long as they were not the ‘hard-line’ AQIM or MUJAO. In other 
words, the political exigencies imposed by the ‘global war on terror’ frame set the parameters 
of legitimacy in a particular way: rather than being deemed illegitimate interlocutor based on 
the perpetration of international crimes, even crimes condemned as shocking and abhorrent, 
one is deemed illegitimate based on one’s expressed support for Islamist terrorism.   
 
Government vs. Separatists and Terrorists  
  
 In contrast, contesting this portrait of (il)legitimate political interlocutors, Malian 
authorities used the anti-impunity norm as an interpretive frame to identify the threat to human 
diversity as stemming from the perpetration of international crimes, overlooking whether the 
alleged perpetrators officially support or renounce terrorism. This approach reflected how “the 
government in Bamako hardly acknowledges a difference between jihadists and Tuareg rebels, 
arguing that they are more or less the same people.”774 As mentioned above, while Bamako 
expressed its openness to these negotiations, it did not formally participate in any talks. For 
Bamako, the only real solution would be military, as it saw a promising opportunity to eliminate 
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not only the hard-core ‘terrorist’ groups but also the ‘non-terrorist’ separatist Tuaregs, deeming 
both enemies. 775  In this sense, Malian authorities used the anti-impunity norm to 
simultaneously transcend the discursive distinction between legitimate and illegitimate groups 
and conflate all groups as criminal and illegitimate interlocutors, as well as to project the 
legitimacy of its own embattled government. 
 This can be seen from the Malian government’s decision to self-refer to the ICC. 
Capitalising on the state’s privileged position in the system of international criminal justice, 
the Malian transitional authorities surprisingly decided to issue a self-referral as one of its first 
measures taken in the chaos of the coup d’état’s aftermath. On 18 July 2012, Minister of Justice 
Malick Coulibaly signed and delivered the self-referral letter to the ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor. The intention to project its own legitimacy as a government, while lumping the 
MNLA, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM as perpetrators of crimes under international law and 
into an undifferentiated criminal enemy, is evident from the government’s justifications for this 
decision as well as the timing of the self-referral. 
 Explaining why the government took the decision to self-refer in the midst of conflict, 
Minister Coulibaly highlighted the appropriateness of doing so, in light of the government’s 
commitment to the importance of upholding the international norm of holding individuals 
accountable for grave crimes and its inability to provide justice due to its displacement from 
the north. “Given that the north of Mali is not under the control of the legitimate authorities, 
we think it is right to submit the case to the court in order to avoid impunity.”776 Also, Prime 
Minister Diarra’s speech to the UN General Assembly in September 2012 shows how he 
highlighted his government’s decision to self-refer to display, at the highest diplomatic pulpit, 
its membership in the international community as a law-abiding and human rights-promoting 
government while branding and villainizing its opposition as “lawless” and criminal. Diarra 
began his speech by saying:   
[C]onflict resolution by peaceful means has taken on a distinctive dimension for 
my country, Mali, firmly committed to ideals of peace and stability, which, 
nevertheless, faces today one of the most difficult times in its history. Its territory 
is occupied by armed groups composed of fundamentalist terrorists, drug 
traffickers, and other criminals of all types. The most basic human rights are 
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constantly being violated by a hoard of faithless and lawless vandals. In light of 
this, the Malian government recently appealed to the International Criminal Court 
to investigate these odious acts that are no less than war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.777 
 Another reason Diarra’s government self-referred, knowing full well the extent of the 
ICC Prosecutor’s independence and jurisdiction over the country, was to legitimise his 
government vis-a-vis past and successive governments. Indeed, following the killing of 
soldiers in Aguelhok by Tuareg rebels, hundreds of women and children of the soldiers who 
had been killed vehemently protested the government’s secrecy shrouding the attack.778 This 
public outrage contributed to grievances against then President Touré’s government, ousted in 
March 2012. Diarra, appointed the month after the coup, sought to legitimate his new 
government by responding to these demands. For instance, in an interview in July 2012 in front 
of a large televised audience of Malian political elite, and amidst rumours that he would be 
removed from his position as Prime Minister, Diarra was asked what the government would do 
in response to the Aguelhok massacre and sexual violence committed by various groups in 
Kidal. Diarra answered, “We immediately undertook the formation of the government, the 
documentation of crimes committed, with help from human rights organisations. And our 
Minister of Justice, along with a delegation, has just returned from the ICC at the beginning of 
this week, where we submitted a complaint against all these people who committed these 
crimes.” 779  Asked again in an interview five years later, Diarra also insisted that his 
government self-referred to the ICC due to his anticipation that future governments would 
undermine his government’s commitment to anti-impunity. This self-referral would, in a sense, 
lock in his government’s commitment to justice. While the following governments did indeed 
exchange impunity during negotiations with armed groups, as analysed in the following 
chapter, Diarra’s response with the benefit of hindsight shows another way the government 
used its self-referral to illustrate its commitment to the values of the international community, 
namely human rights and anti-impunity, and thus boost its reputation as a legitimate 
government despite its inherent weakness.780  
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 The timing of the self-referral is also important. While it is commonly assumed that 
justice in Mali solely targets ‘terrorist’ crimes, particularly as the two defendants at the ICC 
are accused of signature ‘terrorist’ crimes of destroying mausoleums and handing down illegal 
sentences as part of their role in enforcing harsh version of sharia law, the timing of the self-
referral indicates that it was in direct response to crimes attributed to all groups, not just 
MUJAO and AQIM. While the government officially requested ICC involvement on 18 July 
2012, the initial decision to self-refer was taken two months earlier. On 30 May 2012, Prime 
Minister Cheikh Modibo Diarra’s government publically declared its intention to refer crimes 
committed by the MNLA, AQIM, Ansar Dine and other armed groups in the region of Kidal, 
Gao, and Timbuktu since the month of January 2012.781 This announcement came after the 
Aguelhok massacre in January 2012 and before the highly-mediatized destruction of the 
emblematic Timbuktu mausoleums by Ansar Dine and AQIM, which took place particularly 
in June and July 2012, and before the full consolidation of Islamist groups’ takeover of all 
northern regions.   
 This is also evident in the text of the self-referral letter, which reads: “Grave and 
massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law were committed namely 
in the northern part of the territory: summary executions of soldiers of the Malian army, rapes 
of women and girls, massacres of civilian populations, child recruitment, torture, widespread 
pillaging of state and private goods, forced disappearances, destruction of state symbols, 
buildings, hospitals, tribunals, city halls, schools, the offices of NGO and international aid 
organisations, the destruction of churches, mausoleums, and mosques.”782 Though it did not 
identify any of the armed groups, its specific reference to summary executions likely refers to 
the Aguelhok events (blamed in large part on the MNLA with support from AQIM and Ansar 
Dine783), and its reference to the other crimes refers to MNLA, Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and 
AQIM. Further, in January 2013, Minister of Justice Malick Coulibaly explained “I personally 
went to The Hague and formally requested the ICC's involvement. We are already aware of 
acts that we believe constitute crimes within the court's jurisdiction, such as the attack at 
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Aguelhok, the mass rapes at Gao and Timbuktu, and the destruction of our cultural heritage.”784 
Illustrating the salience of Aguelhok abuses in Malian political discourse, impunity for the 
events was again mentioned in 2017, when the Minister of Justice explained during a visit by 
ICC Prosecutor Bensouda to Bamako that the crimes of Aguelhok would be investigated and 
prosecuted, either nationally or at the ICC.785   
 The government’s strategic conflation of the MNLA with ‘terrorist’ groups reflected 
popular resentment against the MNLA, sometimes seen as more problematic than ‘terrorist’ 
groups. As Branch has observed with respect to the Lord’s Resistance Army in Uganda, in light 
of the MNLA’s rebellion, the Aguelhok massacre, and the looting, killings, and sexual violence 
it was accused of perpetrating, painting the MNLA as criminal sought to deny them “the 
possibility of relevance or of becoming a political force.”786 In addition to holding the MNLA 
responsible for abuses, many Malians hold the MNLA responsible for triggering the crisis more 
broadly.787 While the MNLA’s rebellion in January 2012 indeed weakened the already frail 
Malian army and ushered in the takeover by Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM, many Malians 
perceive the army’s collapse in the north was not due to the strength of the armed groups but 
rather due to the betrayal of Tuareg officers who held significant positions in the army and then 
joined the MNLA “without having raised their grievances through formal channels.”788 Even 
later in the crisis, Bamako elites “continued to harbour deep scepticism and even downright 
hostility towards the Tuaregs, many still conflating the jihadist and secular groups.”789 As 
Chivvis explains, “even as Al Qaida expanded its influence across the north, however, southern 
political elites, including [former President] ATT, would still see the Tuaregs as the real 
villains. More often than not, these southern elites regarded Al Qaida’s grip on the north as 
either a secondary or the same issue as the Tuareg revolt.”790 In contrast to the MNLA’s 
intention to gain a Tuareg-controlled independent Azawad, the “mujahideen’s claims to be 
engaged in the establishment of an Islamic state in Mali that enforces shari’a law is not 
premised on the exclusion of any ethnic or racial group from the north.”  In some instances, this 
led to “a benign vision of the Salafi tenets of the mujahideen,” though of course “that vision 
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proved hard to reconcile with the violent huddud punishments and petty harassment they 
inflicted on ordinary citizens.”791 According to Dijxhoorn, accusations of war crimes against 
the MNLA was one factor that “diminished the chances of the MNLA’s reaching its objective 
of an independent Azawad state.”792 As Marchal notes, support for French intervention would 
later wane “when it [became] clear that the former colonial power is avoiding punishing the 
Tuaregs from the crimes that it is widely felt they committed.”793 
 To counter its branding and villainization by the Malian authorities, the MNLA also 
used the language of international criminal law to portray itself as law-abiding and legitimate 
and denied responsibility for what it called the unfortunate Aguelhok events in January 2012. 
For example, on 10 October 2012, Dutch lawyers for the MNLA submitted an ‘Action Plan: 
Respecting the Laws of War’ to the UN Security Council stating: “the MNLA is deeply 
concerned that innocent civilians may have been subjected to attacks and protected monuments 
may have been destroyed in the course of the current armed conflict in Mali.” Furthermore, it 
affirmed that the “MNLA was determined to ensure that its members respected international 
humanitarian law and that it would investigate any credible allegation of mass human rights 
abuses committed by MNLA troops.” Also, it expressed the desire for a more expansive ICC 
investigation, calling for investigations into events that took place since July 2002, rather than 
since 1 January 2012 – the temporal parameters of the ICC investigation suggested by Malian 
authorities. The MNLA also stated it would cooperate with the ICC in its preliminary 
examination and announced it would engage with Geneva Call, an organisation which seeks to 
boost armed groups’ compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law.794 In a 
letter dated 12 October 2012, the MNLA’s lawyers expressed similar commitments to the ICC 
Prosecutor, welcoming its preliminary examination, stating that the group will submit evidence 
to the ICC, and reiterating their concern regarding the destruction of religious or historic 
monuments – crimes that are attributed only to ‘terrorist’ groups, namely Ansar Dine and 
AQIM.795 In February 2013, the MNLA published another declaration in which it expressed 
support for the ICC and requested investigations into crimes it alleged were committed by 
Malian state actors.796  
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 Beyond requesting ICC intervention to investigate alleged crimes by all armed groups, 
the Malian government further projected itself as a defender of the diversity of humanity’s 
heritage and as a victim of an international criminal enemy by casting a particular spotlight on 
the signature jihadist crime of the destruction of the Timbuktu mausoleums. In late May 2012, 
the same month as its decision to self-refer to the ICC, another one of the first steps taken by 
Prime Minister Diarra’s government was to appeal to UNESCO - hardly a typical response to 
an invasion and occupation by armed groups. The Malian government and UNESCO agreed 
upon a range of measures, including finalising Mali’s accession to the 1999 Second Protocol 
to The Hague Convention of 1954 for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict and requesting the inscription of the two World Heritage sites of Timbuktu and the 
Tomb of Askia on the List of World Heritage in Danger. In Diarra’s words, “In parallel [to the 
ICC self-referral], when we witnessed, powerless, the destruction of our heritage, both material 
and immaterial in Timbuktu, there also we swiftly signed and finalised accords that we had 
with UNESCO, in order for these crimes to be considered as war crimes and will, how would 
I say, be subject of prosecutions at the international level.”797 Further, he explained that, “this 
would generate cooperation and the support of the international community for these imperilled 
sites.”798  
 Appealing to the ICC and UNESCO simultaneously helped deterritorialize the conflict 
and bridge the geographical space between Mali and Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq, where the 
international community was powerless in responding to the destruction of other UNESCO 
World Heritage sites, ranging from the Taliban’s destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and 
ISIS’s destruction of Palmyra. In doing so, it branded Ansar Dine, whose members worked 
with AQIM in destroying the mausoleums, as a double threat to the diversity of humanity, not 
only through its destruction of religious and cultural diversity in pursuit of fundamentalist 
ideology but also through the commission of war crimes. Diarra’s reasoning reflects Hannah 
Arendt’s conception of crimes against humanity as “being international crimes because they 
transcend domestic boundaries; and they transcend domestic boundaries because they are an 
attack on human diversity as such.”799 The commission of ‘signature’ terrorist crimes, similarly 
to amputations and stonings, was used as justification to not negotiate with Ansar Dine as it 
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reflected their illegitimacy as interlocutors. For Prime Minister Diarra, "Ansar Dine? One of 
their groups just amputated people in Timbuktu. I call that extremists, not separatists. It’s not 
the same.”800 The anti-impunity norm helped frame Ansar Dine as on par with the Taliban and 
ISIS, and thus an illegitimate interlocutor. In sum, the government and armed groups were 
reified as legitimate or illegitimate interlocutors through actors’ strategic application of 
considerations of international criminal law.  
 
Overshadowing the Malian State’s Role 
 
 If invoking the importance of upholding the anti-impunity norm helps shape the 
narrative by branding interlocutors as (il)legitimate, what does it simultaneously overlook and 
who benefits from this? In line with Shapiro’s comment that “representations of alterity 
(dangerous Others) reproduce the identities and spaces that give nation-states and nations in 
general their coherence,” this section explores how the government’s deployment of the anti-
impunity norm obscures a more complex picture.801   
Some observers argue that the self-referral to the ICC was intended to overshadow 
abuses committed by Malian soldiers. For De Wilt, the alleged crimes highlighted in Mali’s 
self-referral letter “suggests that the enemy had targeted assets of the state including human 
resources, property, and state symbols, yet the letter is silent on any atrocities that may have 
been committed by the governmental forces.”802 This echoes concerns raised by other self-
referrals, where the government’s centrality in drafting the letter and in highlighting certain 
crimes overshadows crimes committed by government forces within the same conflict.803 
However, this effect was much less flagrant in the Malian case. By the time of the self-referral 
in July 2012, the Malian army had not been accused of such widespread abuses within this 
particular crisis. Further, the first alleged crime cited in the Malian self-referral, namely 
summary executions of soldiers of the Malian army, likely refers to the Aguelhok massacre, 
yet it may also apply to the Red Berets case, in which Captain Sanogo’s supporters in the 
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military were accused of killing fellow Malian soldiers. Thus, the letter remains ambiguous as 
to the intended scope of the referral regarding crimes allegedly committed by the Malian 
military.  
 More importantly, highlighting the government’s commitment to combating impunity 
and the ‘terrorist-criminal’ arguably helps overshadow how impunity for Malian officials is a 
strong source of grievance that contributes to the mobilisation against the state – either in 
insurgent or ‘terrorist’ groups. Memories of state-sponsored repression and abuses by the 
Malian military against Tuaregs since Mali’s independence is a key element in the Tuareg 
political imaginary, dating as far back as the first rebellion in 1962.804 Indeed, the presence of 
the state “is often a negative one” in that the army “not only cannot defeat militants but also 
antagonizes the very people who might benefit from its protection.”805  Impunity of state 
officials and repression by the Malian army against certain ethnic groups was thus one of the 
factors that ultimately helped open “the door for various groups to flourish in the north, gaining 
territory and, in some instances, popular legitimacy.”806 
 In Mali as in other countries, Islamist groups Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM grafted 
onto local conflicts against the state and exploited these feelings of exclusion and neglect “of 
poor, isolated groups with grievances that are eking out an existence on the margins.”807 The 
framing of these armed groups as purely ‘criminal’ helps the Malian elite and its supporters 
depoliticize what was to many a project that responded to legitimate grievances of being 
politically and economically marginalised by Bamako elite. Dubuy notes that their objective 
was “essentially political” as “these groups aim to undermine the Malian state and to create a 
terrorist State in order to establish sanctuaries like in Afghanistan.” 808  By setting up 
administrative and judicial structures, these groups provided state-replacement services and 
were in some ways more likely to respond to the populations demands than the rebel groups 
and the state.809 For instance, in Gao, after reportedly being invited by influential members of 
the local Arab communities, MUJAO distributed millions of West African CFA Francs for 
Ramadan and maintained the town generator by spending thousands of dollars for fuel.810 
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Similarly, in Timbuktu, AQIM set up a toll-free telephone number for individuals to call to 
report harassment by MNLA members or “ordinary bandits.”811 A memo written by Al Qaeda 
emir Abdelmalek Droukdel to his commanders in the region reveals that AQIM was well aware 
of its dependence on populations’ support, as it cautioned them against alienating the 
population through overly harsh sharia law.812 As such, “the AQIM strategy was a careful and 
gradual one of integration and penetration into local communities based on a combination of 
military, political, religious, economic, and humanitarian means.”813  
 In terms of justice, the portrayal of these groups’ rule as simply the “unilateral whim of 
blood-thirsty sociopaths”814 obscures how these groups replaced the provision of law and order 
by the state, which was deemed absent and “often perceived as illegitimate,”815 and provided 
at least a certain kind of order, despite the radical forms of social mores and punishment.816 
Many inhabitants of Gao and Timbuktu during the jihadist occupation in 2012 even opined that 
“the justice administered by the qadis on behalf of AQIM was fair and effective.”817 This view 
chafes with how the trials, sentences, and punishments administered by these groups would 
likely be considered war crimes under international criminal law.818 As Notin notes, Prime 
Minister Diarra’s references to the “mutilations, amputations, rapes, and barbarous acts” 
showed he “knew the words to use to keep France’s support,” but “said nothing on the other 
hand of the money distributed by jihadists and the order, albeit very authoritarian, that they re-
established and that some of the population welcomed.”819 Indeed, facing the impunity of state 
officials and the lack of access to justice, “the reinstatement of fair justice” is one essential way 
for the state to “rebuild trust with the populations and thus nibble away at the legitimacy 
enjoyed by the jihadist groups.”820 
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 This is not to minimise the grave and criminal abuses carried out by these Islamist 
groups in the name of fundamentalism. Rather, it helps explain how branding the armed groups 
as criminal helps depoliticize them and thereby render the Malian political elite ontologically 
unproblematic by obscuring how the Malian state’s predation and absence in northern regions 
prompted them to seek alternatives and contributed to the conflict. The use of terms such as 
‘criminal’, ‘barbaric’, as well as ‘Islamist’, ‘jihadist’, ‘Salafist’, and ‘terrorist’ to illustrate the 
risk of conflict diffusion by tapping into the broader ‘war on terror’ contributes to making “the 
authority of Malian political elites unproblematic.”821 In other words, focusing on the ‘terrorist 
as international criminal’ helps the government deny that the existence of these groups “is a 
symptom of a deeper national problem that would require a political solution” involving the 
groups that have adhered to these terrorist groups.822 The focus on the criminality of armed 
groups, while crucial, obscures how the sources of criminality and beneficiaries of rampant 




Towards Armed Groups 
 
 Beyond shaping the ideational framing of the (il)legitimacy of various interlocutors in 
the context of peace negotiations, authorities used the imperative of pursuing justice for grave 
abuses to boost its ability to establish effective control over the territory. The situation in 2012 
was dire. Speaking in July 2012, Prime Minister Diarra stated, “I sleep in fear because, with 
all these groups in the north, we will become another Somalia if the south becomes weak.”823 
Rather than epiphenomenal, a combination of threats of prosecution, the ICC self-referral, and 
measures to obstruct accountability was used as a means of coercive leverage to regulate both 
inter- and intra-party power relations, both between the government and the armed groups as 
well as between civilian and military authorities within the Malian government. 
 First, as mentioned above, the Malian authorities decided to self-refer to the ICC in 
May 2012 and issued an official request for the ICC to open an investigation in July 2012. 
	
821 Charbonneau and Sears 2014, 200.  
822 Branch 2007, 191. 
823 Diarra 2012. 
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According to Prime Minister Diarra, this was intended to incentivise groups to leave the 
battlefield and join the negotiating table – in line with the expectations of proponents of 
pursuing justice within conflict. A few days after the self-referral, Prime Minister Diarra 
explained to a crowd of Malian political elite in a televised interview that the appeal to the ICC 
would encourage defections among members of armed groups who wanted to dissociate 
themselves from ‘terrorist’ groups, thereby weakening the groups’ power and increasing the 
likelihood that they accept to join the negotiations. “When you have to negotiate with groups, 
it is evident that every time one of these groups is weakened, your negotiating position is 
strengthened.” Prime Minister Diarra then explained that the MNLA had been chased out by 
Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM, and “is now going everywhere where negotiations could 
potentially take place, and says it is ready for negotiation.” He continued, “the Keeper of the 
Seals and Minister of Justice self-referred to the ICC for certain acts and, through this, I am 
sure you will soon see other groups that will want to dissociate from all that, and little by little 
brings us to an optimal position where negotiations could begin.” Since the army would 
meanwhile be gaining strength “and gaining the spirit of battle,” such defections would 
“certainly put us in better conditions than three months ago.”824 In this sense, the self-referral 
was intended to boost the likelihood of generating a ripe moment for negotiations.   
 At the same time, as explored in the previous section, the government’s genuine ability 
and willingness to officially engage in such negotiations with the MNLA during this time is 
questionable. In terms of inability, the civilian governmental authorities “did not have the 
political backing needed to make concessions” due to its transitional interim nature.825 Also, it 
faced strong resistance to negotiations from a political minority in Bamako who were allied 
with the military.826 In terms of unwillingness, the government did not formally negotiate with 
the MNLA and Ansar Dine, who were already engaged in negotiations organised by Burkina 
Faso and Algeria. Explaining why the government was not negotiating with any groups, the 
Prime Minister stated, “there is no one currently on the ground with whom we can be advised 
to negotiate…those with whom we are ready to negotiate [the MNLA] are spread around 
Nouakchott, Niamey, and Ouagadougou.”827 The reasoning that negotiations with the MNLA 
	
824 Diarra 2012. 
825 Bergamaschi 2013, 5. 
826 Lecocq et al 2013, 354. 
827 Chatelot 2012. 
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are not possible as they are outside of Mali is relatively weak, as the government could have 
engaged in negotiations organised by Burkina Faso and Algeria. 
 Rather, the government did not wish to formally negotiate with armed groups as it 
perceived the conditions were not ripe, due to the continued threat posed by the armed groups. 
Diarra explained, “a good negotiation, in good faith, cannot be done with a knife under the 
throat.”828 Further illustrating his scepticism towards negotiations, Diarra noted in September 
2012, “The crisis has lasted eight months and I have not seen any non-military solution emerge. 
On the other hand, the situation is worsening every day with amputations, flagellations, rapes, 
and destruction of our sites in the north.”829 In sum, while the government stated its hope that 
the self-referral would convince members of armed groups to defect and join negotiations, a 
likely ulterior motive was also to weaken all groups and boost its own position, which would 




 Second, Bamako’s ability to exercise effective control over the north hinged upon 
international military assistance from African states and other countries, namely France and 
the US. However, the unconstitutional nature of the Sanogo’s junta-led government prompted 
the suspension of Mali by the AU and ECOWAS, the application of sanctions by neighbouring 
ECOWAS states, and the suspension of military partnerships with other countries. Re-
establishing civilian control over the government was thus a necessary step towards re-
establishing governmental control over the territory. However, in light of the reality of 
Sanogo’s continued power over the military and his strong spoiler power, he was perceived as 
highly politically valuable to the maintenance of some semblance of order and the 
reestablishment of governmental control over the territory, meaning his demands had to be 
placated.830 The challenge was to manage the tug-of-war between Sanogo and civilian leaders 
as well as the need to respond to outrage against Sanogo and his supporters in light of their 
alleged involvement in the deaths of fellow soldiers.   
	
828 Diarra 2012. 
829 Chatelot 2012. 
830 For more, see Lecocq 2013. 
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 Reflecting this complexity, civilian leaders adopted somewhat contradictory justice-
related measures to regulate intra-party relations. In order to incentivise Sanogo to cede power 
to a transitional civilian government and thereby eliminate a key obstacle to obtaining 
international military assistance to help re-establish the government’s control over its territory, 
the Malian government first offered a limited amnesty for Sanogo and the “putchists” which 
formally respected the normative prohibition against amnesty for serious abuses, but which 
nevertheless signalled to Sanogo that he would benefit from impunity. This was evident in the 
phrasing of the Framework Agreement on the Implementation of the Solemn Commitment deal 
brokered with him on 6 April 2012. The agreement included a commitment that the National 
Assembly would pass a general amnesty for Sanogo and his associates.831 As Melly explains, 
“the vast bulk of Malian political parties [had] united against the coup and indicated they could 
use their control of the national assembly to pass an amnesty for the putchists if civilian rule is 
soon restored.”832  However, before the National Assembly passed this act, the attempted 
counter-coup by the elite Red Berets squad took place on 30 April – 1 May 2012. According 
to a human rights researcher who investigated the disappearances at the time, there was ample 
evidence pointing to the responsibility of Sanogo and his supporters for the disappearances of 
twenty Red Berets members.833 The amnesty act that was passed unanimously by the National 
Assembly several weeks later on 18 May 2012 respected the prohibition for amnesty for 
international crimes as it did not technically cover the alleged killings, as the events took place 
on 30 April – 1 May 2012, outside the temporal limits of the amnesty law which only applies 
to various acts conducted in relation to the mutiny between 21 March – 12 April 2012.834 The 
amnesty indeed did not arise as an issue in Sanogo’s later trial for these abuses.  
	
831 Chapter 3 “Framework Agreement on the Implementation of the Solemn Commitment,” 
also known as the “Accord Cadre de Ouagadougou”, Ouagadougou, 6 April 2012. [on file with 
author] 
832 Melly 2012. 
833 Phone interview with a researcher from an international human rights organisation, 5 April 
2018. Interview with member of the Ministry of Defense, Paris, 25 November 2016.  
834 According to the ‘Amnesty Law for Coup d’Etat leaders’ (Loi No2012-020 du 18 mai 2012, 
portant amnistie des faits survenus lors de la mutinerie ayant abouti à la démission du 
président de la République), "les infractions ci-après citées, ainsi que leurs tentatives ou 
complicités, prévues et punies par les textes en vigueur, commises sur le territoire national du 
21 mars au 12 avril 2012 en lien avec la mutinerie ayant abouti à la démission du Président de 
la République sont amnistiées : mutinerie, atteinte à la sureté intérieure de l’état, atteinte à la 
sureté extérieure, destruction d’édifices, opposition à l’autorité légitime, violences et voies de 
fait, embarras sur la voie publique, homicide volontaire, homicide involontaire, coups et 
blessures volontaires, blessures involontaires, enlèvement de personnes, arrestations illégales, 
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 While the amnesty act did not formally provide amnesty for grave abuses, the way in 
which Malian authorities justified the amnesty act as a means for the recovery of territorial 
integrity highlights how the amnesty was nevertheless conceived and interpreted as a means to 
signal to Sanogo that he should not feel vulnerable to prosecution, since he was crucial to re-
establishing control over the north. According to the president of the National Assembly’s 
Legal Commission, “The amnesty law, it is not an impunity award. It is an essential element to 
resolve the crisis. It will allow us to focus on the essential, which is the recovery of territorial 
integrity and peace in the north. We have voted the law for our country, for the stability of the 
country, to enable partners to come to Mali’s assistance.”835 Despite their clearly difficult 
relationship, the interim President Dioncounda Traoré said he believed the ex-putschists would 
play an important role in the liberation of the north.836 According to a UN official, “Politically, 
providing amnesty to the soldiers aimed to facilitate a return to constitutional order. It was also 
a means to reassure the putchists, to assure them that there would be no vengeance against 
them.”837 Put simply, while the amnesty does not cover grave abuses, thereby respecting the 
prohibition against amnesties for grave abuses and acknowledging the anti-impunity demands 
expressed by many in Bamako, Sanogo would not have ceded power if he feared he would be 
prosecuted for the Red Berets case. 
 This reflects how the parameters of accountability are often drawn according to the 
political value of those potentially accused. Indeed, accommodating Sanogo was crucial as his 
considerable influence within the military made him a particularly valuable player in 
transitioning to a civilian government and mobilising the army – both essential to the 
government’s quest to restore its effective control over the territory. According to International 
Crisis Group, Sanogo “still represents the army factions that are in control of the security 
apparatus, thus having the capacity for repression,” and still has influence over the garrison 
town of Kati, “an undeniable centre of power that continues to escape the civilian transitional 
authorities’ control.”838 Sanogo thus “held the upper hand in a divided military that neither 
Traoré nor Diarra could control. This triangulated form of authority was inherently unstable, 
	
séquestrations de personnes, dommage volontaire à la propriété mobilière et immobilière 
d’autrui, incendie volontaire, pillage, extorsion et dépossession frauduleuse, vol qualifié, vol, 
atteinte à la liberté du travail, atteintes aux biens publics". 
835 RFI 2012.   
836 RFI 2012b.   
837 Phone Interview with a MINUSMA official, 22 September 2017.    
838 ICG 2012b, 2. 
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and real power lay in the garrison town of Kati.”839 This need to engage with Sanogo was clear 
in an agreement reached on 20 May 2012 between the interim President Traoré, Prime Minister 
Diarra, and Sanogo, in which it was agreed that these leaders must uphold the best possible 
relations through regular meetings.840 Sanogo’s power within the ruling triumvirate in Bamako 
continued even after he stepped down, thereby limiting the transitional government’s authority 
in addressing the country’s complex problems.841 For instance, just a few weeks after the 
amnesty act in late May 2012, Sanogo supporters beat interim President Traoré nearly to death 
in the Presidency building. Further, on 11 December 2012, Prime Minister Diarra resigned after 
being arrested by Sanogo’s supporters within the army, which “merely confirmed that the army 
junta continued to hold power, despite the window-dressing of the civilian government, whose 
presence it resented.”842   
 In parallel, and reflecting the difficult relations within the ruling triumvirate, the Malian 
government used the self-referral of the situation in Mali to the ICC, placing all Malians under 
ICC jurisdiction, as an implicit source of pressure over Sanogo. As Lecocq notes, “to their 
credit, both Traoré and Diarra tried to curb the power of putsch leader Captain Amadou Sanogo 
behind the scenes, mainly by lobbying for international intervention.” 843  The Council of 
Ministers, led by Prime Minister Diarra, decided to self-refer to the ICC on 30 May 2012, just 
two weeks after the amnesty deal. This decision ushered in the possibility that the ICC, by 
virtue of its independence, could undermine the tacit protection from accountability afforded 
to Sanogo and jeopardize the delicate balance of power within the triumvirate government. 
Asked whether his government pursued a contradictory policy towards Sanogo, Diarra first 
vehemently denied that Sanogo had received such general amnesty from prosecution, insisting 
heavily on his government’s respect for such normative prohibition. He was also clearly very 
aware of the implications of the ICC’s independence. Insisting that justice for all crimes must 
be pursued, irrespective of the target’s political profile, Diarra stated he would not contest 
potential investigations of Sanogo and others responsible for the Berets Rouges case if such 
prosecutions developed. Asked whether Sanogo objected to the government’s decision to self-
refer to the ICC, Diarra noted that nothing was said as the decision received relatively little 
	
839 Lecocq et al 2013, 348. 
840 20 May Agreement [on file with author].  
841 Bergamaschi 2013, 4. 
842 Nossiter 2012.    
843 Lecocq 2013, 61.  
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attention at the time.844 Reading between the lines and in light of the tension between Diarra 
and Sanogo, Diarra’s decision to self-refer to the ICC, among other effects, served as a source 
of pressure by placing a Damocles’ sword above Sanogo’s head by opening the door for 
international prosecution.  
 In sum, in light of his strong spoiler power and his high politico-military influence,, 
accommodating Sanogo’s concerns for impunity was deemed crucial to the government’s 
objectives to recover the north and stabilise Mali. As such, the amnesty act was arguably a 
measure that, while formally limited to certain crimes, was nevertheless a tacit general amnesty 
to incentivise Sanogo to cede power. This amnesty thus both enabled government actors to 
display its respect for the prohibition against amnesty for such grave abuses, thereby upholding 
its commitment to human rights and responding to public outrage, while also signalling to 
Sanogo that he would not be prosecuted. At the same time, the door was kept open to 
prosecutions at both national and international levels. Diarra’s self-referral decision indeed 
illustrates how self-referrals can be used to regulate power relations within a country but also 
within a government. More broadly, this illustrates how the government’s strategic approach 
of the anti-impunity norm can serve as a means of coercive leverage, through both incentives 
and pressure. It also shows how enforcing accountability can not only shape the power of 
interlocutors, but is also shaped by the power of interlocutors and thus the anticipated cost-
benefit analysis of holding them accountable for crimes. 
 
Mobilisation for Neutralisation   
 
 While the reestablishment of civilian rule was a crucial step in gaining support for an 
African-led military operation against northern groups, such operations did not swiftly 
materialise. Preparations for military operations were slowed by a lack of international 
attention to the Mali crisis as well as low confidence in the feasibility of organising a robust 
African-led operation. Appealing to the anti-impunity norm was one of the resources drawn 
upon to overcome the lack of momentum for the military option. Indeed, actors in support of 
this plan deployed considerations of international criminal law and the duty to respond to 
	
844 Interview with former Prime Minister Cheikh Modibo Diarra, Paris, 11 September 2017.   
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abuses in shifting ways to build political support and justify military neutralisation of an 
“enemy of mankind.”  
 Resistance to military operations came from various sources. Domestically, while 
President Traoré and Prime Minister Diarra strongly requested external (preferably French) 
intervention, Sanogo opposed such plans. Internationally, views were split. Since Hollande’s 
presidency began in May 2012, France officially supported plans for an African-led operation 
envisioned by ECOWAS and sought to play a facilitating role, consistently declaring France 
would not have any troops on the ground.845  However, the regional heavyweight Algeria 
pushed for a political solution to the crisis through talks with MNLA and Ansar Dine, opposing 
external intervention until early 2013. The United States was also very reluctant to support a 
military intervention, pushing instead for elections to take place prior to any military 
operation.846 After ECOWAS passed a plan to deploy 3,300 West African troops to expel the 
terrorist groups from northern Mali, the US Ambassador to the UN referred to the plan as 
“crap” 847  and the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, more diplomatically, expressed 
reservations against an immediate military intervention.848 Nevertheless, the UN SC adopted 
Resolution 2085 on 20 December 2012, which approved the deployment of the African-led 
International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). Yet, on 11 January 2013, French-led 
Operation Serval was swiftly launched to respond to the surprise southward advance by armed 
groups. 
 As seen through content analysis of 24 declarations by the French President François 
Hollande, Minister of Foreign Affairs Laurent Fabius, Minister of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian, 
and Ambassador of France to the UN Gérard Araud between June 2012 and February 2013, 
French leaders deployed anti-impunity considerations in shifting ways as a resource to build 
political momentum for intervention and to overcome the lack of interest and the scepticism 
throughout 2012 regarding the viability and desirability of international intervention. At first, 
French officials drew upon the cultural symbolism of war crimes in Timbuktu to highlight the 
	
845 French officials nevertheless had reservations as to the plan’s viability and widely thought 
some type of French intervention would be inevitable. For instance, France had doubts because 
the ECOWAS meetings “were inconclusive and the feeling in Paris was that many African 
players wanted to benefit from the Malian crisis, but were not interested in solving it.” Marchal 
2013a, 488. 
846 According to one US official, “It was troubling to hear heads of state talk about a West 
African Force that didn’t exist.” Chivvis 2016, 82-86. 
847 Lynch 2012.    
848 UN News 2012. 
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need to respond forcefully to the destruction of humanity’s heritage. This served as a guiding 
thread in building the conflict diffusion thesis, thereby justifying the need for military 
intervention in this new front in the ‘global war on terror.’ In early July 2012, just before the 
UN Security Council planned to discuss the possibility of an African-led military operation, 
Minister Fabius specifically highlighted the destruction of mausoleums in Timbuktu as 
“abominable gestures” that reflect “a totally fundamentalist conception of human beings and 
religion.” He stated, “We had Afghanistan, there must not be a Sahelistan…it threatens not 
only Mali, which needs to re-establish its [territorial] integrity, but also the region.” Fabius 
called for the resolution to be adopted as it would provide the legal framework for a series of 
measures taken by “our African friends.”849 The ICC Prosecutor’s statement on 2 July 2012, 
that the deliberate attacks against historical monuments and destruction of buildings dedicated 
to religion is a war crime, reinforced this call. The next day, on 5 July 2012, the UN Security 
Council unanimously adopted the non-committal Resolution 2056 (2012), which noted the 
request of ECOWAS and the AU for a UN mandate authorizing a stabilisation force. Shortly 
after the resolution was passed, Araud again invoked humanity’s heritage to underscore the 
resolution’s importance.850  As Charbonneau and Sears note, “only in July 2012, after the 
destruction of the Timbuktu mausoleums, was French Ambassador to the UN, Gérard Araud, 
successful in passing” this resolution.851 
 Both ECOWAS and the AU also called for prosecutions for the destruction of Timbuktu 
mausoleums and other international crimes in its advocacy for military operations. In a 
statement on 7 July 2012, ECOWAS called upon Mali “to request a UN-backed military 
intervention in order to win back the country’s north” and called upon the ICC “to proceed 
with necessary investigations to identify those responsible for war crimes and to take the 
necessary action against them.” 852  Similarly, in expressing its support for ECOWAS 
preparations for military arrangements, the AU called for prosecution of the perpetrators of the 
“senseless and unacceptable destruction of the cultural, spiritual, and historical heritage of this 
region, notably in Timbuktu” and “urges that the perpetrators be brought to justice before the 
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relevant international jurisdictions.”853 Interestingly, both statements of regional support for 
Mali’s decision to self-refer to the ICC were issued prior to Mali’s official self-referral.   
 Returning to French discourse, French officials shifted discursive tracks and instead 
minimised questions of human rights abuses as it sought to ‘sell’ the 11 January 2013 launch 
of Operation Serval. While the intervention was legally justified based on the Malian 
government’s consent and request for the intervention, France sought to generate political 
support for the intervention. In doing so, French leaders framed the intervention as a short-term 
necessary intervention to defend Malian territorial integrity against “terrorist aggression,” 
rather than on a sense of protection of civilians against abuses. According to the director of 
communications for the Minister of Defense, it was decided that focusing on the terrorism 
angle would best rally support for the intervention.854 Over fourteen speeches between 11 and 
28 January 2013, President Hollande, Minister Fabius, Minister Le Drian, and Ambassador 
Araud referred to “aggression” nine times and “terrorists” seventy-three times. They did not 
refer to “criminals” after the first day of the intervention on 11 January 2013 and there was no 
specific reference to an international responsibility to protect the Malian population against 
human rights abuses.855 The three-pronged objective of the intervention was outlined as: halt 
the terrorist aggression that sought to control the entire country, securitise Bamako, and enable 
Mali to regain its territorial integrity.856 The team also introduced the term “jihadist terrorist 
groups” (“groupes djihadistes terroristes”), going one step beyond the common reference to 
“jihadist groups.”857 Framing the intervention as a fight to defend a state’s sovereignty against 
aggression of terrorist groups was indeed more convincing for other UN Security Council 
members than justifications based on the protection of human rights. 
 In another discursive shift, the vocabulary of international criminal law, and imperative 
to respond to the war crime of destroying cultural heritage in Timbuktu, resurfaced as central 
in the ex post facto justification for the intervention. Hollande had previously anticipated the 
resonance of responding to this war crime. On 21 January 2013, in a meeting with the Ministry 
of Defence during Operation Serval, Hollande insisted for the army to recapture Timbuktu prior 
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to his scheduled visit on 1 February 2013. According to one of Hollande’s advisors, “The 
operation had to have strong media impact. The town of Gao? This was not known to people. 
Unlike mythical Timbuktu.” 858  In his now famous visit to Mali in early February 2013, 
Hollande justified the intervention as an illustration of France’s historic tradition of defending 
universal human rights and the importance of curtailing the jihadists’ ability to commit crimes 
with impunity. For instance, raising the issue of human rights for the first time as a justification 
for intervention, Hollande referred to human rights three times as he explained why France 
decided to intervene. 859  To visually illustrate what the intervention protected, Hollande 
specifically went to Timbuktu, visited a destroyed mausoleum and the Ahmed Baba library for 
ancient manuscripts accompanied by UNESCO’s Secretary-General, and committed French 
support for the reconstruction of Malian cultural sites. “[W]e cannot accept what happened in 
Timbuktu… as it is the heritage of Mali but also because it is the heritage of all of humanity 
that you are in charge of.”860 Hollande later explained, “what I wanted to signify by my 
presence in Timbuktu with the imam [of the Grand Mosque of Timbuktu] was that what we 
did was intended to liberate and to enable that religious sites as well as elements of cultural 
heritage, namely manuscripts, could be preserved and safeguarded.”861 A few weeks later, at 
an event for International Women’s Day, Hollande explained that France intervened in Mali 
“because there were women who were forced to wear the veil without their consent, there were 
women who no longer dared leave their homes, there were women who were beaten because 
they wanted to be free…We want to fight against terrorism, against barbarism, against 
fundamentalism.”862 A few months later in September 2013, Hollande stated, “We set an 
example for the world: when law is violated, when women and children are massacred, it is at 
that moment that the international community must rise. That is the lesson of Mali, that is the 
message of Bamako.”863 
 In his speech in Bamako, Hollande also explicitly insisted on the Malian government’s 
responsibility to prosecute the crime of destruction of cultural heritage, as well as other human 
rights abuses. President Hollande declared, “there must be no impunity for these acts. But it is 
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up to the Malian justice, international justice, the International Criminal Court to ensure that 
there is just punishment for these crimes.” Further, commenting on the quality of that justice, 
he insisted that justice must be fair and explicitly linked the Malians’ responsibility to prosecute 
and the quality of the justice meted out as a sign of its legitimacy in the eyes of the international 
community: “You must be exemplary. The international community is watching you. Yes, we 
must punish the criminals, the terrorists, but we must do so, you must do so, in respect of human 
rights – those very rights that were violated, cheated by the terrorists.”864 Spotlighting the 
Malian government’s responsibility to render full and fair justice for these crimes further 
justified the French intervention, as it reifies the narrative that France forcefully defended a 
responsible and law-abiding government from terrorist-criminal opposition. Thus, after being 
first drawn upon to generate support for an African-led operation, and then minimised during 
efforts to “sell” Operation Serval in January 2013, the need to respond to the war crime of 
destroying cultural heritage sites and other abuses was used to bolster ex post facto justification 
for the intervention. This is not to argue that the way France justified the intervention did not 
genuinely represent its intentions. Rather, the uneven invocation of the anti-impunity norm 
highlights how it was used selectively as a discursive resource to further evolving strategies to 
bolster the government’s ability to exercise control over its territory. 
 Reinforcing this discourse, the ICC Prosecutor decided to open an official investigation 
in Mali on 16 January 2013, just five days after the launch of Operation Serval. The Prosecutor 
portrayed this decision as part of its role as a constructive actor rather than a liability. “Justice 
can play its part in supporting the joint efforts of the ECOWAS, the AU, and the entire 
international community to stop the violence and restore peace to the region. Key regional and 
international organisations have acknowledged the need for justice as part of the resolution of 
the crisis in Mali.”865 Dijxhoorn suggests that “for Western governments, besides the UN 
Security Council resolutions, an ICC investigation into war crimes probably made it easier to 
‘sell’ sending troops to Mali to their home constituencies, and, initially, more governments 
signed up to provide troops than were needed.”866 While perhaps true, the link between the ICC 
investigations and domestic audience support for troop commitments is unclear. In any case, 
despite concerns regarding whether the ICC should be “following the flag” of intervention, 
there is no clear evidence to suggest that this announcement was timed in order to further 
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legitimise the intervention.867 French officials who worked at the Ministries of Defense and 
Foreign Affairs at the time were not aware of any coordination between the ICC and France.868 
According to ICC officials, the Prosecutor had been gathering and assessing evidence since the 
Malian self-referral in July 2012 and the announcement of the decision to open an investigation 
was not taken in relation to the French intervention.869 In contrast to the OTP’s previous 
practice, the ICC Prosecutor published an extensive report on Mali when it announced its 
investigations, meaning the decision to launch an investigation was not made hastily.870  
 As if responding to the call President Hollande made during his speech in Timbuktu for 
Mali to prosecute crimes committed during the crisis, Malian Prosecutor General Daniel 
Tessougué issued arrest warrants several days after Hollande’s speech against 28 armed group 
leaders. Those subject to arrest warrants included key players from all types of armed groups, 
including prominent actors such as MNLA’s Bilal Ag Cherif and Ansar Dine’s Iyad Ag 
Ghaly.871 The seventeen charges included crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide as 
well as terrorism, sedition, crimes against integrity of the state, pillaging, crimes of racial and 
ethnic character.872 The Prosecutor General’s strategy of charging leaders of all types of armed 
opposition groups, conflating their criminality rather than distinguishing between ‘legitimate’ 
non-terrorist and ‘illegitimate’ terrorist groups, is another illustration of how Malian actors 
used the anti-impunity norm to diverge slightly from the strategy adopted by the UN SC and 
key international mediators. As addressed in Chapter 7, the arrest warrants later complicated 
the political dialogue between Bamako and ‘non-terrorist’ groups.   
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Hamma Ag Mossa, Deity Ag Sidimou, Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, Iglas Ag Oufen, Baye 
Ag Dicknane, Moussa Ag Assarid, Abdallah Ag Albakaye, Mahdi Ag Mohada); Ansar Dine 
(Iyad Ag Ghaly, Algabass Ag Intallah, Ahmada Ag Bibi, Cheick Ag Aoussa, Sidi Mohamed 
Ould Boumana); MUJAO (Cherif Oul Attaher, Abderhamane Ould El Emr alias Ahmed El 
Tlemsi; Aliou Mahamane Touré); AQIM (Oumar Ould Hamaha; Amada Ag Hama; Soultane 
ould Baby; Drug traffickers (Mohamed Ould Ahmed Deya; Dina Ould Daya; Mohamed Ould 
Sidati; Baba Ould Cheick; Mohamed Ould Awainat; Abinadji Aga Abdallah). 




 Over the course of Mali’s annus horribilis, strategically deploying anti-impunity 
measures played a role in furthering the government’s objectives. Indeed, Malian actors 
exploited the norm’s villainizing/privileging function to frame the government’s legitimacy as 
a member of the international community through the delegitimation of its opposition writ 
large, thereby resisting international pressure to negotiate with MNLA and Ansar Dine, despite 
their alleged responsibility for international crimes. Malian authorities also capitalised on the 
norm’s power-shaping functions by using it as coercive leverage against certain actors and as 
a rallying call to overcome resistance to using force to neutralise groups.   
 The anti-impunity norm thus provided interpretive and justificatory resources to further 
the government’s preferred implementation of the two-pronged strategy to boost Mali’s 
authority over the north: by resisting negotiations with ‘non-terrorist’ groups and by mobilising 
for the neutralisation of all groups through force and through law. Drawing on the anti-impunity 
norm was indeed one way in which “interim authorities clearly capitalised on a widespread 
perception of an Islamist threat, and it effectively garnered international support for the Malian 
government at a time when its domestic standing was doubtful.”873 Invoking the anti-impunity 
norm overall helped boost the government’s claims of being a legitimate member of the 
international community and its plans to re-establish effective control over its territory – and 
thus boost the government’s legitimacy vis-à-vis its opposition. The following chapter 
considers how actors’ implementation of anti-impunity measures served to influence the 
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 While Operation Serval was hailed as having brought Mali back from the brink of 
dissolution, it ushered in a phase during which decisions taken would “either make or break 
Mali.”874 During this phase, which can certainly not be called ‘post-conflict’ though perhaps 
‘post-acute crisis,’ the broad aim was to bolster “the state’s omnipresence, extending the 
influence of the government across the territory,”875 namely through negotiating with rebel 
groups while militarily neutralising terrorist groups - though on an even more complicated 
landscape than before. 
 Notwithstanding the profound impunity in Mali for crimes committed during the 
conflict by all sides, the period since 2012 has ushered in anti-impunity ‘firsts’ in Mali. As 
mentioned previously, the government issued a self-referral to the ICC in July 2012, which led 
to the opening of an ICC investigation in January 2013. The Malian Prosecutor General’s 
decision to issue arrest warrants, including for charges of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity, against 28 leaders of all armed groups in February 2013 was welcomed as “a 
remarkable and hopeful shift in the government’s role.”876 While the vast majority of crimes 
committed in Mali have gone unaddressed, the trials of four individuals stand out as landmark 
moments in the struggle against impunity in Mali. One of the two trials held nationally even 
marked the first time the charges of war crime and torture were confirmed in judicial 
proceedings in Mali concerning conflict-related crimes. The trials at the ICC marked the first 
time the charge of destroying religious buildings was the sole charge in a case before an 
international tribunal. In addition, in the roadmap adopted in January 2013, one of the 
preconditions under which talks with armed groups would be held was that “crimes against 
humanity and war crimes committed during the period of belligerence should not go 
unpunished.” Truth commissions were created, which are mandated to, inter alia, record cases 
of human rights violations. Human rights groups welcomed these measures that showed the 
government is “establishing a national framework conducive to the exercise of justice, 
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beginning with international crimes.”877 These measures appear to respond to popular calls for 
accountability. According to a survey conducted in late 2013 and early 2014, “Malians are 
determined to hold executors of political violence to account,” with a large majority of 
respondents (74%) preferring legal prosecution to other options, including amnesties and truth-
seeking.878 
 This chapter thus traces the interaction between the “political” and “justice” tracks in 
Mali, starting in the wake of Operation Serval in February 2013, spanning through continued 
insecurity and formal peace negotiations, and ending with the presidential elections held in July 
2018. During this period, the Malian authorities pragmatically implemented the anti-impunity 
as a resource to favour the reification of the government as legitimate, both in reputation and 
in its ability to effectively control its territory. Indeed, similarly to the dynamics explored in 
the previous chapter, implementing the anti-impunity norm strategically served as a resource 
to brand, coerce, and neutralise the opposition - though in different ways in light of the 
governent’s broader strategy to further formal peace negotiations with groups labelled as non-
terrorist groups. This was achieved by capitalising on the norm’s enforcement feature, the 
state’s relative centrality in navigating the flexibility around the normative prohibition against 
amnesties for international crimes as well as in determining its (in)ability and (un)willingness 




 The temporary dispersal of northern armed groups following Operation Serval 
prompted a significant reconfiguration both on the battlefield and in the political landscape of 
northern Mali, with the proliferation of both ‘terrorist’ and ‘non-terrorist’ armed groups. On 
the battlefield, international troops remained as Operation Serval gave way to Operation 
Barkhane and was later joined by the G5 Sahel Anti-Terror Task Force, a counter-terrorism 
partnership composed of five regional states and backed by France. Alongside these anti-terror 
operations, a UN peacekeeping force named MINUSMA was established in 2014, taking over 
from AFISMA. Despite the significant resources spent on fighting the “war on terror,” terrorist 
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groups have proliferated and gained prominence. AQIM, Ansar Dine, and MUJAO maintained 
influence and new threats emerged from the creation of the Macina Liberation Front, the return 
of Al-Mourabitoune, and the merger of several groups into the Group for the Support of Islam 
and Muslims (Jama’ah Nusrah al-islam wal-muslimin, JNIM).    
 On the political front, in light of the weakness of the government to exercise control 
over the north, regional and international mediators facilitated extensive negotiations with 
groups that renounced their separatist aims and denounced terrorism. As declared in the 
roadmap adopted unanimously by the Malian parliament on 29 January 2013, “the government 
continues to prioritise dialogue with groups that do not question the territorial integrity and 
constitution of Mali.” In the first few months of 2013, the Malian government began to engage 
proactively in a process of political dialogue and “signalled a recognition that something 
needed to be done about the nation’s division.”879 Within this associational strategy towards 
non-terrorist groups, the first major turning point was the signing on 18 June 2013 of the 
Ouagadougou Accord, or the Preliminary Agreement to the Presidential Election and the 
Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali, between the MNLA and the High Council for the Unity of 
Azawad (Haut conseil pour l’unite de l’Azawad, HCUA). This agreement led to the Algiers 
process, a protracted peace process spearheaded by Algeria with the participation of the AU, 
ECOWAS, EU, France, and various other countries. Talks began in January 2014 and 
culminated in June 2015 with the Algiers Accord, or the Agreement for Peace and 
Reconciliation in Mali, signed between the Malian government and two alliances: the pro-
government Platform Coalition and the anti-government Coordination of Azawad Movements 
(CMA).  
 While these accords were watershed moments in the normalisation between the 
government and ‘legitimate’ groups and the stabilisation of Mali, they by no means halted the 
rate of hostilities and abuses. Between 2013 and 2018, widespread abuses were committed by 
all parties, including the execution by Islamist armed groups of dozens of government officials, 
suspected government collaborators, and members of armed groups signatory to the 2015 peace 
accord, as well as frequent attacks against peacekeepers. The Malian army was also accused of 
committing atrocities against civilians in the context of counterterrorism operations, namely 
extra-judicial killings, forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, torture and ill-treatment, 
including against Tuaregs, likely as vengeance, and against Peuls, due to conflation between 
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Peuls and members of terrorist groups.880 Insecurity also increased and spread to central Mali, 
mainly due to sporadic hostilities between parties involved in negotiations, the proliferation of 
both terrorist and non-terrorist armed groups, and the emergence of pro-governmental militias. 
 
Villainizing / Privileging Political Interlocutors 
 
 As explained in Chapter 6, invoking international criminal law in a counter-terrorism 
context creates a double enemy of mankind - a threat to human diversity both through its 
application of fundamentalist ideology as well as through the commission of international 
crimes. As such, the integration of the anti-impunity norm in conflict settings helps “designate 
the enemy by denouncing the criminal character of the adversary’s activities, the enemy of 
human kind” 881  and thus “immediately authorises the state’s use of violence against 
‘terrorists.’”882 In this second phase, the vocabulary of international criminal law continued to 
serve as an interpretive resource in the strategic branding of the government’s opposition– 
though in a different way than previously.  
  
Signatory Groups vs. Terrorist Groups 
 
  Following Operation Serval, and the identification of Ansar Dine as a terrorist group 
by the United States in February 2013, armed groups splintered, emerged, and reconfigured 
themselves in order to gain the most optimal position at the negotiating table.  This was clear 
in President Keita’s speech at the UN General Assembly in September 2015, as he called on 
signatory groups to expel from Mali and the Sahel “a common enemy, namely the terrorist 
groups and narco-jihadists who only seek to satisfy their criminal appetites through fear and 
terror.”883 In light of the emphasis on negotiations with separatist ‘non-terrorist’ groups, in 
which the Malian authorities engaged more genuinely than previously, the concept of the 
‘terrorist as international criminal’ served as a discursive axis around which the government 
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distinguished between groups and around which groups branded themselves, as explicit 
supporters of norms of the international community, namely human rights. In other words, it 
helped serve as a distinction around which the (il)legitimacy of parties was shaped and helped 
create an opposition with whom the government could negotiate. In turn, characterising the 
enemy by its rejection of norms of the international community and its criminality helped 
further a useful one-dimensional narrative: that negotiations can be held with the non-terrorist 
and non-criminal groups and that the ‘terrorist-criminal’ groups must be excluded and 
neutralised through force. In doing so, it helped draw a contrived distinction between signatory 
and non-signatory parties and overshadowed complexities, narrowing the narrative. 
 This was evident in the negotiations that led to the June 2013 Ouagadougou Agreement, 
signed between Bamako, the MNLA, and the HCUA. Two other groups were also able to 
adhere to the negotiations without signing the agreement: the Arab movement of Azawad 
(Mouvement arabe de l’Azawad, or MAA) and the self-defense militia the Cooperation of 
Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance (Coordination des mouvements et forces 
patriotiques de resistance, or CMFPR). The main overlapping characteristic of the diverse 
signatory groups was their declared renunciation of terrorism and their expressed support of 
the values of the Malian state, including human rights. Indeed, the vocabulary of human rights 
is one of the vocabularies upon which “all Malian actors ‘buy legitimacy’ by appealing to the 
ideologies and interests of national or international patrons.”884  This helped them portray 
themselves as foils to the more unsavoury groups: Ansar Dine, MUJAO, AQIM, Al 
Mourabitoune, Macina Liberation Front, JNIM… Repoliticising former foes as non-criminal 
negotiating partners simultaneously obscures their past, continuing, and shifting links to 
‘terrorist’ groups. For instance, the HCUA was a mix of former MNLA and Ansar Dine 
members, who sought to distance themselves from those increasingly unpopular groups, 
especially as Iyad Ag Ghaly had become a persona non grata following the UN sanctions placed 
on him in February 2013.885 Similarly, in 2012, the MAA had helped AQIM enter Timbuktu, 
preferring AQIM to the Tuareg MNLA. It later distanced itself from the terrorist groups and 
joined the negotiations, considered to be close to the government.886 The MAA later split into 
two branches: the MAA-Ould Sidatti branch, which allied with the MNLA and HCUA, and the 
MAA-Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed branch. 
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 Further, over the course of the subsequent Algiers peace process, groups continued to 
fragment and (re)form, leading to two large coalitions. The Coordination of Azawad 
movements, described as anti-government, was made up of the MNLA, the HCUA, the MAA-
Sidatti branch, a faction of the Coalition du Peuple de l’Azawad (CPA), and a splinter group 
of the Cooperation of Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance (CMFPR-2). The 
Platform coalition, described as pro-government, was composed of the CMFPR-1, the MAA-
Ahmed branch, the Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (Groupe d’Autodéfense 
Touareg Imghad et Alliés, or GATIA), and a splinter group of the CPA. Amidst the fluidity, 
the prism of ‘terrorist as international criminal’ helped reify a distinction between signatory 
groups and terrorist groups that overshadowed the extreme porosity between armed groups, 
marked by “a dynamic of fusion, scissions, alliance and betrayal.”887 It thus helped obscure the 
connections between different groups and actors and “how they can navigate the opportunities 
presented by the new boundaries and binaries enabled by global terrorism discursive 
framework.”888 
 This extreme fluidity is evident in the political trajectories of key leaders. Most clearly, 
Alghabass Ag Intalla, a prominent Tuareg leader, was an elected representative in the National 
Assembly prior to the crisis. He worked to create the MNLA, then joined Ansar Dine’s 
leadership as political representative during the 2012 occupation. After splitting from Ansar 
Dine and creating the Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA), which then joined the HCUA in 
May 2013, prior to the Ouagadougou negotiations, which is allied with the MNLA. As Wing 
points out, his shifting allegiances were opportunistic. “He had come full circle, presumably in 
order to have the best strategic position in terms of peace negotiations,” including by distancing 
himself from ‘terrorists’ at the opportune moment. Indeed, following the French intervention, 
he acted strategically by officially breaking away from Ansar Dine, since Ansar Dine was no 
longer welcome at the negotiation table after the international community declared it a terrorist 
movement.889 However, while Ansar Dine was not officially part of the negotiations, it was 
widely believed that Alghabass Ag Intalla, as well as several others, represented the interests 
of Ansar Dine’s leader Iyad Ag Ghaly.  He later won a seat at the National Assembly and 
joined none other than President IBK’s party.  
	
887 Lecocq et al 2013, 346. 
888 Charbonneau 2017, 12. 
889 Wing 2016, 62. 
 187 
 This fluidity also extends to ethnic groups. For instance, the Lamhar Arabs are in Mali’s 
“peace camp” as they are in the pro-government Platform coalition. However, they initially 
supported the MNLA, then allied with MUJAO, before returning to the Malian state’s camp.890 
This also translates to the battlefield, as a French military source noted “We observe strong 
collusion between terrorist groups and certain signatory groups.” 891  This porosity even 
prompted the commander of Operation Barkhane to call for biometric identification of 
opposition forces in order to identify them, since “the strength of the enemy is mutability 
[desilhouettage]: a jihadist combatant in the morning can be a trafficker at night, a shepherd 
the next day, and a member of a signatory group (of the Algiers peace accord) the following 
day.”892 The politics of identifying ‘terrorists’ and ‘separatists’ is indeed “multileveled and 
expresses a variety of contested, uncertain and unstable boundaries and practices.”893  
 
Overshadowing the Malian State’s Role 
 
 Overall, the strategies adopted by national and international actors to resolve the Malian 
conflict are conceived primarily through an anti-terrorism prism, focused on the militarization 
of the fight against radical Islamist groups. As Charbonneau explains, “Whatever forms the 
newest political and moral economies might ultimately settle into – what one might call 
‘durable peace’ – is now determined in relation to the perceived necessities of the global war 
on terrorism.”894 Yet, the anti-terrorism prism obscures factors that encourage radicalism895 
and diverts attention from the underlying governance problems, including weak rule of law, 
corruption, poor state services, weak decentralisation...896 Among these underlying problems 
is widespread impunity for abuses by state security forces, government-affiliated armed groups, 
and opposition armed groups. While the ‘terrorist as international criminal’ label duly reflects 
terrorist groups’ rampant commission of abuses against civilians, portraying the Islamists’ 
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presence and influence as unequivocally oppressive and criminal is also helpful for the 
government. It overshadows how the way in which the government pursued negotiations and 
counter-terrorism operations contributed to the emergence of jihadist groups and the violence 
it sought to curtail. Put differently, this villainization obscures how “an increasing number of 
Sahelians, especially among the youth, are ready to support and sometimes join these groups 
in a context where official authorities are performing appallingly.”897 Indeed, abuses by state 
forces during counter-terrorism operations serves as a potent recruitment tool for jihadist 
groups, reflecting how “Islamist violence emerges from local conditions and specific 
experiences of exclusion and marginalisation.”898  
 This was a clear contributing factor to the spread of violence from northern to central 
Mali, especially starting in 2015, where the Ansar Dine-linked group named Macina Liberation 
Front emerged, drawing from the Peul ethnic group. Human rights organisations have 
documented many cases in which Peul males suffer mistreatment and torture by the army, 
which allegedly often accuses Peul men of collaboration with terrorists.899 These abuses create 
a “particularly fertile terrain” for these extremist groups in central Mali, who “respond to strong 
local demands for justice, security and, more broadly, moral standard in politics.”900 According 
to a researcher for Human Rights Watch, the Peul “insist that their young men are not being 
wooed over the Internet or joining out of religious conviction, but rather, as one imam told me, 
‘because the jihadists provide a better alternate to the state.’” When asked how to prevent 
jihadist recruitment, Peul elders and villagers explained to the researcher that “they want a 
government whose security forces protect instead of abuse them; whose civil servants serve 
instead of exploit them; and whose justice system ensures their right to redress.”901 Thus, rather 
than being driven by Islamist ideology, young recruits were driven by the search for better 
provision of protection and justice, as the security forces had lost “credibility in the eyes of the 
population.”902 Feeling victimised by the state exacerbated feelings of political marginalisation 
among these groups, as they were excluded from the official negotiations, which focused 
mainly on grievances of northern groups. Similarly to the issues raised in Chapter 6, the abuses 
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by governmental forces and the impunity afforded to them continued to contribute to the spread 




  The issue of criminal accountability for grave abuses was a significant stumbling block 
during the peace negotiations, as the national and international arrest warrants issued in 
February 2013 by the Malian Prosecutor General Daniel Tessougué targeted representatives of 
armed groups with whom the government needed to negotiate in order to re-establish control 
over the territory – a key criterion of government legitimacy. However, rather than a constraint, 
the threat of criminal accountability represented by the arrest warrants was used as a bargaining 
chip during the Ouagadougou and Algiers peace processes. The section below first traces how 
the government, encouraged by international mediators, not only built ambiguity regarding 
justice into the text of the agreements but also lifted the arrest warrants against key interlocutors 
who were viewed as politically valuable to the negotiations, determined by their status and 
leverage within a group participating in the negotiations and thus the cost-benefit of 
maintaining or lifting the threat of prosecution. This was achieved in part by capitalising on the 
state’s centrality in navigating the flexibility in the normative prohibition against amnesties for 
international crimes. It was also achieved by capitalising on the executive’s ability to exert 
influence over judicial actors in the national administration of justice, facilitated by the 
“executive dominance, elite patronage, and managed political ‘consensus’” that mark Malian 
governance. 903 Indeed, while Malian governance may be based on “consensus-building,” the 
tendency is deemed both helpful and harmful to stability as the concepts of inclusion and 
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Ouagadougou Peace Process 
 
 As mentioned earlier, the Ouagadougou Accord was a key turning point in the 
government’s objective of boosting its legitimacy by reestablishing control over its territory, 
as parties agreed to the cantonment of armed groups, a ceasefire, the phased deployment of the 
Maliam army, and the return of Malian state authority in the north. However, several 
representatives of the participating MNLA and HCUA were under arrest warrants. According 
to the former Special Advisor to the African Union High Representative to Mali and the Sahel, 
who participated in the Ouagadougou negotiations, “I remember being in a room and one of 
the armed group representatives said, ‘I am sitting at the table, but there is an arrest warrant 
against me.’”905 To balance the new normative environment of the “age of accountability” with 
the need to reach an agreement, government representatives and mediators built ambiguity 
regarding accountability into the agreement.  
 This is clear in how its content changed over time. A draft version of the accord 
explicitly called for the lifting of arrest warrants against members of the rebel groups who were 
signatories to the agreement. Displaying respect for the normative prohibition against 
amnesties for international crimes, the suspension of these warrants would not apply to “war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of genocide, sexual violence and other grave 
violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.”906 Nevertheless, this caveat 
was deemed perfunctory. When it was circulated five days before the official signing, the draft 
prompted strong opposition among the Malian media and politicians, including around the 
question “how and when will rebels be prosecuted for alleged war crimes?”907 For instance, 
Mali’s Prosecutor General cautioned, “If the politicians sign this agreement, they will have to 
answer to History one day. Mali should not humiliate itself again for the billions of euros 
promised by our international supporters.”908 In light of the public pressure, the final text of 
the Ouagadougou accord deleted the controversial clause regarding the suspension of arrest 
warrants against signatory groups - to the disappointment of the armed groups.  
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 However, rather than clarify the parameters of accountability and reassure critics, the 
final Ouagadougou Accord featured vague phrasing regarding justice. The final accord did not 
explicitly include a commitment to lift the arrest warrant, but rather, in Article 18, parties 
committed to “confidence-building measures” to facilitate the implementation of the 
Accord.909  The scope of these “confidence-building measures” was highly unclear. These 
measures would appear to be more than simply releases of detained belligerents, which was 
covered in paragraph 3 of Article 18.910 Also, unlike the draft version, the final accord did not 
mention that the “confidence-building measures” would not undermine the pursuit of criminal 
accountability for grave crimes.  
 This euphemistic reference to “confidence-building measures” did not explicitly 
include the lifting of arrest warrants, but it was clear to everyone that the arrest warrants would 
not be enforced. A representative of an international organisation, who participated in the 
negotiations noted, “There was an implicit understanding that it will be just left inactivated 
because the government was very sensitive about putting that on paper. That is why it didn’t 
appear in the final agreement…The Ouagadougou process was about the armed groups 
accepting that presidential elections be held throughout the country, including in Kidal, that 
was under their control. Whatever would facilitate that, the government would do it. But the 
government was, on the other hand, under immense popular pressure not to appear lenient vis-
à-vis armed groups…It was a gentleman’s agreement.”911 In light of reported pressure on the 
Malian government not to enforce those arrest warrants, observers during the negotiations said 
the warrants “look likely to be dropped.”912 Regarding the tacit agreement that was reportedly 
reached, one of the Tuareg delegation’s leaders noted, “We will find out if Mali is operating in 
good faith.”913  
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 Denouncing this ambiguity, the most prominent critic was the Prosecutor General who 
had issued the arrest warrants, Daniel Tessougué. Shortly after the signing of the agreement, 
Tessougué stated, “Today, we are speaking of war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, 
which are by definition imprescriptible crimes. We want, through negotiations, to let them pass. 
Be very careful. We are planting the seeds of impunity. If we plant the seeds of impunity in 
Ouagadougou, we will collect the flowers of impunity in Bamako.” He continued, “Fine, we 
can walk on cadavers to go to peace, that’s the formula. I say now that other groups will conduct 
themselves the same way and we have impunity…For peace to exist, we also need justice.”914 
In contrast, arguing that this ambiguity does not undermine the government’s commitment to 
the anti-impunity norm, the ECOWAS mediator explained that the plan to establish an 
international commission of inquiry fulfilled the imperative to provide accountability for grave 
crimes. “It is clearly stated that all those who perpetrated crimes against humanity would be 
held accountable because they will establish an international commission of inquiry. And no 
one will be amnestied.”915 Indeed, Article 18 included a commitment to the swift establishment 
of an independent commission of inquiry for “war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes of 
genocide, crimes of sexual violence, drug trafficking and other grave violations of international 
human rights and humanitarian law.” However, a commission of inquiry is not equivalent to a 
commitment to prosecuting alleged perpetrators of international crimes. It would take five 
years for an international commission of inquiry to be established.916 This strategic phrasing 
thus enabled mediators and government officials to deny having formally consecrated impunity 
while also facilitating an agreement. 
 Confirming suspicions of the implied agreement, Malian authorities lifted the arrest 
warrants in October 2013 for several representatives of the signatory groups, namely Alghabass 
Ag Intalla (HCUA), Mohamed Ag Intallah (HCUA), Ahmada Ag Bibi (HCUA), and Ibrahim 
Ag Mohamed Assaleh (MNLA). This was a key demand by the armed group representatives, 
who even pulled out of the follow-up talks in September 2013 until the government committed 
to releasing 23 of their members and lifting the warrants. Most clearly, it enabled Alghabass 
Ag Intallah, Ahmada Ag Bibi, and Mohamed Ag Intallah to run as candidates in the legislative 
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elections scheduled for November 2013. 917  Welcoming the releases and the lifted arrest 
warrants, Mohamed Ag Intallah stated, “I think it is helpful to bring back trust between the 
south and the north. It is a good step but much is left to be done. I am waiting for the government 
to release those whom we do not see – we already gave them the list. We know where they 
are.”918 Also, Ahmada Ag Bibi stated, “It is a good sign of willingness to dialogue…We also 
share this willingness to dialogue.”919 
 Lifting the threat of justice for these highly valuable political interlocutors was reached 
by exploiting the executive power’s centrality in the national administration of justice. Indeed, 
while the executive and legislative authorities have legal means to lift the threat of prosecution, 
including through presidential pardons and through amnesties voted through the legislature, 
the lifting of the arrest warrants in October 2013 by judicial actors was outside such formalised 
means. In other words, capitalising on the executive power’s ability to pressure judicial actors, 
“the government imposed this decision on senior judges, who were extremely hostile to the 
idea.”920 The judicial authorities had not been consulted prior to the decisions to lift the arrest 
warrants, prompting the Prosecutor General to consider resigning.921 Regarding the releases 
and the lifting of arrest warrants, one diplomat explained, “The government just sort of did it. 
The Ministry of Justice was not kept in the loop.”922    
 Yet, wary of criticism for undermining the pursuit of justice and infringing upon the 
independence of the justice system, the Minister of Justice Ali Bathily tread an interpretive 
tight-rope and relied on several justifications to argue that the lifting of arrest warrants did not 
amount to transactional impunity and to express the government’s support of the normative 
prohibition against amnesties for grave crimes. Minister Bathily noted, “Lifting the warrant is 
to re-establish their freedom of movement, but it is not to exonerate or clear the person of the 
charges that they may be facing. So, the investigations continue.”923 He also noted that, since 
a guilty verdict had not been reached, lifting arrest warrants did not amount to granting 
impunity. “There is no impunity. An arrest warrant is not a guilty verdict. By lifting the warrant, 
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we are not putting an end to the investigation.”924 While formally true, such measures clearly 
strongly disincentivise judicial actors from prosecuting the case. 
 Moving away from legal rationales, the minister also explicitly linked the lifting of 
arrest warrants to the political requirements of the negotiations. Asked about the Prosecutor 
General’s complaint that judicial authorities had not been consulted prior to the prisoner 
releases and the lifting of arrest warrants, Minister Bathily noted, “Regarding what was agreed 
in the Ouagadougou accords, it is not like the government said, ‘I’m innovating and I will 
inconveniently interfere with the judicial sector.’ No, the reason for these measures is that the 
government must at all time live up to its engagements, including when this involves the 
judicial sector.”925 The minister explicitly noted how the political value of specific interlocutors 
was a salient factor. “Since [the arrest warrants], things have evolved on the ground and 
politically. We have entered into a negotiation cycle under the aegis of the international 
community… If they are the ones representing the political elements that are likely to take 
measures to build the restoration of peace, conditions should be created for them to assume the 
role of negotiators and that would allow the international community to make sure that the 
negotiations are conducted in the right conditions.” He continued, “everything is negotiable, 
except for territorial integrity.”926 The Minister also noted that the suspension of accountability 
could lead to more accountability. “And we won’t investigate without peace. Lifting the arrest 
would be a step to move towards more justice.”927 More broadly, other government officials 
noted the need to offer impunity in order to further the negotiations. Acknowledging the 
criticism of leniency towards the armed groups, an aide to President Traoré noted, “It was that 
or nothing, but we were heading for disaster if we hadn't been able to get an agreement on 
presidential elections in the Kidal region.”928 Further, an official of the Malian Ministry of 
Justice noted that the arrest warrants against Ibrahim Ag Mohamed Assaleh, Mohamed Ag 
Intalla, Ahmada Ag Bibi, and Alghabass Ag Intalla were lifted “to facilitate the conduct of the 
national reconciliation process.”929 
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Algiers Peace Process 
 
 Similar transactional impunity was offered as part of the negotiations during the 
subsequent Algiers peace process. As mentioned above, negotiations between the Malian 
government and two alliances, the loyalist Platform coalition and the anti-government 
Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA), led to the signing of the Algiers Accord in 
June 2015 after protracted talks under heavy international pressure. As during the 
Ouagadougou process, the Malian executive capitalised on its ability to influence the judicial 
actors in order to empower certain key actors in the peace process and generate an agreement 
that would enable it to extend its territorial control. Since the beginning of the Algiers process 
in 2014, the practice of releasing alleged perpetrators of human rights abuses, who have high 
political value in the eyes of participants in the peace negotiations, was instrumental in ensuring 
parties reached an agreement. For example, in July and August 2014, as part of a prisoner 
exchange before the signing of a road map for the Algiers peace process, the government 
released over forty armed group members, including many alleged perpetrators of grave abuses 
who were already charged by the Malian justice system.930  
 Further, while the government and the Platform coalition signed the Algiers agreement 
on 15 May 2015, the CMA refused to sign. Four days later, Malian authorities cancelled arrest 
warrants against 15 CMA leaders, including the Secretary-General and founder of the MNLA 
Bilal Ag Cherif and Mohamed Ag Najim, respectively. The charges reportedly included 
“crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes” among other crimes such as “undermining 
state security, crimes of a racial, regional or religious nature, murder, international drug 
trafficking, and terrorism.” 931  According to a governmental source, “The arrest warrants 
against the leaders of the CMA were lifted at the request of the Malian government. The 
measure can be considered as a sign of appeasement, a few days between the signing of the 
accord by the rebels.” According to rebel leader Almou Ag Mohamed, it was to “create a 
conducive climate around the negotiations.”932 Since a High Court judge signed the order 
lifting the arrest warrants on 15 June 2015, this was not in explicit violation of judicial 
independence, but rather the result of intense political pressure on judicial actors. While the 
CMA had delayed signing the peace agreement for other reasons as well, including gaining 
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concession on the return of refugees, security arrangements, and development plans, the lifting 
of the arrest warrants was a key factor in incentivizing the CMA to sign the agreement as it 
“helped assuage the concern expressed by CMA leadership over their possible arrest when 
travelling to Bamako for the signing of the peace agreement.”933  Overall, according to a 
coalition of human rights groups in Mali, at least 50 alleged perpetrators of crimes against 
humanity or war crimes who had been arrested were released for political reasons or within the 
framework of negotiations with armed groups.934  Most of them had been charged and/or 
arrested “in connection with crimes under international law and human rights abuses carried 
out by armed groups in the northern regions in 2012 and 2013.”935 
 The practice of building ambiguity regarding justice into the text of agreements was 
also evident in the long-awaited law on national reconciliation, approved by the Malian 
National Assembly in June 2018.  As part of the increased focus on reconciliation and easing 
tensions in the country ahead of the presidential elections in July 2018, President Ibrahim 
Boubacar Keita and Prime Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga promoted a law that includes 
the “exoneration of criminal investigations already initiated or planned against individuals who 
committed or were complicit…in crimes or delicts occurring in the events linked to the crisis 
started in 2012.” Article 15 of the bill expands the exoneration of cases to all persons who 
disarm within six months of the law’s activation. Acknowledging the normative prohibition 
against amnesties for grave crimes, the text excludes war crimes, crimes against humanity, rape 
and “all other crime deemed imprescriptible.” Wary of criticism that this undermines the 
government’s expressed commitment to accountability, President IBK stated that no one with 
“blood on their hands” will be amnestied and that the bill “does not constitute an award of 
impunity, nor does it signal weakness. Even less a denial of victims’ rights.”936 This reflects 
the government’s interpretation of the duty to prosecute international crimes as fulfilled by 
including the perfunctory exclusion of war crimes, crimes against humanity, rape and “all other 
crimes deemed imprescriptible.” Yet, the law is vague by design and leaves ample space for 
investigations into human rights abuses to be suspended. Most explicitly, the link to the events 
of the crisis triggered in 2012 is left unspecified. Perhaps more importantly, the scope of this 
amnesty depends on the criminal charges. Since no charge of war crime or crime against 
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humanity has yet been successfully tried in a Malian national court, it is clear that the 
reconciliation law could cover many killings and abuses, and “could exacerbate the sense of 
impunity around the crimes of Mali’s security forces and armed groups.”937 This shows how 
strategic phrasing can display a government’s formal respect for the normative prohibition 
against amnesties for grave crimes, while effectively amounting to undermining the anti-
impunity norm and serving as a resource to further an associational strategy towards opposition 
groups.    
 Reflecting how the flexibility with regards to the normative prohibition against 
amnesties for international crimes can be exploited to reach an agreement, international actors 
did not express concern with sacrificing justice in the name of peace, sometimes even 
pressuring Malian government officials to do so. Commenting on this “sensitive question” 
during the Ouagadougou negotiations, the Burkina Faso Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
ECOWAS mediator Djibril Bassolé explained, “the government of Mali clearly made us 
understand that it did not wish to interfere in questions of justice. We understand that but we 
nevertheless requested everything to be done to appease the tensions and especially for the 
actors that are the subject of judicial investigations.” Asked whether there was an unwritten 
agreement that stipulated the arrest warrants would not be enforced, Bassolé simply noted, “In 
any case, we strongly requested the personal intervention of the President of the Republic 
within this context.”938 During the lead-up to the Ouagadougou negotiations, President of 
France Hollande and President of Côte d’Ivoire Ouattara personally pressured interim President 
of Mali Traoré to sign the agreement.939  Commending the mediation of Burkina Faso, among 
others, the UN Security Council welcomed the Ouagadougou Accord as a landmark moment 
and “an important step towards lasting peace and stability in Mali” in the stabilisation of 
Mali. 940  To be sure, MINUSMA made the inclusion of a prohibition of amnesties for 
international crimes a condition for the UN’s signing of the Algiers agreement.941 Asked 
whether the lifting of arrest warrants prompted concern among diplomats, one diplomat who 
observed in peace negotiations explained, “there wasn’t going to be a peace deal if they didn’t 
lift the arrest warrants” and so “the notion of transitional justice was treated lightly. It was more 
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of an afterthought.”942  Despite the clear endorsement of impunity, the Ouagadougou and 
Algiers agreements were “met with applause from European and other capitals.” 943  
Interestingly, while the ICC’s investigation was active during the Ouagadougou and Algiers 
peace processes, no party raised the threat of ICC prosecution as a serious point of concern.944 
Rather than using the threat of ICC prosecution to pressure armed groups to change their 
behaviour, the ICC was not even mentioned.   
 
Emblematic Cases of Transactional Impunity 
 
 Used as a bargaining chip to help the government in its protracted struggle to boost its 
legitimacy by re-establishing control over its territory, the way in which the threat of criminal 
accountability was lifted highlights at least two paradoxical aspects of the Malian peace 
negotiations. First, and as seen in many other cases, the path to reaching the Algiers Accord, 
which included a commitment to upholding accountability and a prohibition against amnesty 
for international crimes, passed through impunity.945 Second, and more interestingly, the path 
to reaching an agreement with parties that “commit to rejecting all forms of extremism and 
terrorism and to not providing any form of material or moral support to terrorist or criminal 
groups” required providing transactional impunity for individuals who worked closely with 
such ‘terrorist’ groups. In other words, tracing the political trajectories of individuals who 
benefitted from transactional impunity reveals that these individuals had varying degrees of 
proximity to ‘terrorist’ groups and Islamist ideology. As previously mentioned, in light of the 
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fluidity of shifting allegiances, the more influential factor in determining the parameters of 
criminal accountability was not simply their political identity as (non-)terrorist but rather their 
political value and spoiler power.  
 The aforementioned cases of Alghabass Ag Intalla and Ahmada Ag Bibi, influential 
Tuareg leaders whose arrest warrants were lifted in October 2013 as part of the Ouagadougou 
peace process, are emblematic. Ag Intalla is a prominent Tuareg politician, as well as the son 
of Intalla Ag Attaher, the highly influential hereditary traditional chief of the Tuareg Kel Adagh 
confederation, and “as such has a certain amount of social standing.” 946  As previously 
mentioned, between 2011 and 2014, Ag Intalla shifted from being an elected representative as 
a member of the National Assembly, to belonging to the MNLA (a non-Islamist separatist 
group), to becoming political representative of Ansar Dine (an Islamist group with close 
connections with AQIM), to creating a dissident group named MIA (the Islamic Movement for 
Azawad), to joining the HCUA (a new and purportedly separatist and non-Islamist group 
composed of elements of both MNLA and Ansar Dine), and back to an elected representative.    
 Similarly, Ahmada Ag Bibi joined Ansar Dine in early 2012, reportedly serving as Iyad 
Ag Ghaly’s deputy and “undoubtedly his most loyal lieutenant,”947 and later joined the HCUA 
in 2013. While officially a member of HCUA and a participant in the Ouagadougou 
negotiations, the intermediary role he played in October 2013 during the negotiations to release 
several French hostages taken by AQIM demonstrates his continued proximity to terrorist 
groups. The timing of these hostage negotiations may also be linked to the timing of the lifting 
of the arrest warrants against Ag Bibi and others involved in the Ouagadougou peace talks. 
While implicitly agreed to in the Ouagadougou Accord signed in June 2013, the arrest warrants 
were lifted four months later in October 2013, just a few days before four French hostages held 
by AQIM were released on 30 October 2013. While unconfirmed, due to the highly sensitive 
nature of hostage negotiations, media reports suggest that Iyad Ag Ghaly likely used his 
decades-long experience as an intermediary to AQIM as leverage to negotiate impunity for 
himself and his associates. Indeed, Ag Ghaly has links to Abdelkrim le Targui, a Tuareg leader 
of a katiba of AQIM, who held the hostages, as well as HCUA leaders Ahmada Ag Bibi and 
Alghabass Ag Intalla, both of whom benefited from the lifting of the arrest warrants. However, 
irrespective of his proximity to terrorist groups like AQIM and Ansar Dine, who were not 
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allowed to participate in the peace negotiations, Ag Bibi was provided impunity as he was 
deemed politically valuable. As a presidential advisor noted, “He can play a role to bring his 
tribe back on the negotiation track.”948 Following the lifting of the arrest warrants against them, 
both Ahmada Ag Bibi and Alghabass Ag Intalla were elected to the Malian legislature under 
none other than the Rassemblement pour le Mali (RPM), the party of President Ibrahim 
Boubacar Keita.       
 Further, the case of Cheikh Ag Aoussa highlights how other individuals who had been 
explicitly named in criminal complaints submitted by human rights groups to the Criminal 
Court of Bamako and had ties to terrorist groups also benefitted from transactional impunity. 
As mentioned earlier, Ag Aoussa was first part of Ansar Dine in 2012 and later served as 
military chief of HCUA in 2013. In addition to being reportedly suspected of involvement in 
the execution of Malian military members in Aguelhok in January 2012, Ag Aoussa was named 
as one of 15 individuals accused of grave abuses against victims in Timbuktu. Yet, he also 
served as one of the principal interlocutors with the UN and French forces during their 
operations in Kidal. Commenting on his political value, one UN official noted, “Despite his 
toxic aspects, he is too vital to do without him.”949 His arrest warrant was lifted on 15 June 
2015, in a prelude to the signing of the Algiers Accord. Expressing frustration at this 
phenomenon, and referring to Ag Aoussa, Prosecutor General Daniel Tessougué stated, 
“HCUA, MNLA, Ansar Dine, for us it’s the same. The No. 2 of the HCUA was the No. 2 of 
Ansar Dine before the hostilities. So, try to understand the mutations that can take place, like 
a gangrene, like a cancer.”950  
 Demonstrating the paradoxes of the peace processes in Mali, their trajectories highlight 
how “many of the actors of peace, who used to be actors of war, are not nice guys. They are 
even real bad guys capable of supporting terrorist attacks.”951 Yet, despite their affiliations with 
terrorist groups and their alleged responsibility for human rights abuses, being deemed 
politically valuable to the restoration of state authority comes with a share of the scarce 
resources to which the state has unique access, including impunity.952 This reflects broader 
clientelist practices, in which valuable leaders who support the government are “brought back” 
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through offers of money and other rewards.”953 Needless to say, this “policy of rewarding 
obstreperous actors in order to push the moment of reckoning forward a little,” comes at the 




 Despite the ambiguity within the agreements and the strategic offers of transactional 
impunity made to increase the chances that actors reach a peace agreement, this did not rule 
out the occurrence of four trials that were welcomed as landmark moments in the pursuit of 
justice in Mali as well as in the evolution of international criminal jurisprudence. Four 
opposition figures were tried for grave abuses: two trials were held in Mali and two were held 
at the ICC. Human rights groups welcomed these cases as “a victory for victims” and 
“considerable advances for the fight against impunity,” 955  yet they also deplored their 
selectivity, noting these cases “are just the tip of the iceberg.”956 The defendants were among 
dozens accused of responsibility for grave abuses in criminal complaints submitted by human 
rights groups and only represented an extremely small portion of all crimes committed by 
armed groups and government forces since 2012.957 
 By analysing these cases as exceptions within the landscape of impunity, it is clear that 
the Malian authorities implemented the anti-impunity norm in such a way as to avoid clashing 
with the political exigencies of the negotiations. As explained below, these individuals were 
deemed of low political value to the government’s legitimation strategy to re-establish control 
over the territory and thus, their prosecution was deemed not costly and even beneficial. 
Regarding the peace processes with ‘non-terrorist’ groups, three of the four trials were of 
members of Ansar Dine and MUJAO - groups that did not participate in the negotiations. The 
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defendants were all Malian Tuaregs who were recruited from the local population by the 
leaders of Ansar Dine, MUJAO, and AQIM to administer institutions to impose their harsh 
views on the population. Yet, reflecting the fluidity between ‘non-terrorist’ and ‘terrorist’ 
groups, their superiors and counterparts in these ‘terrorist’ groups were spared prosecution, as 
they had positioned themselves as valuable to the political process. As illustrated below, this 
selective neutralisation through law, to weaken some while empowering others, was achieved 
by exploiting the centrality of executive power in the national administration of justice as well 
as the state’s primacy in the ICC system, by adopting an interpretation of complementarity that 
favoured transferring cases to the ICC rather than trying them domestically.    
 
Aliou Mahamane Touré 
 
 The trial of Aliou Mahamane Touré, known as the “hand chopper of Gao,” marked not 
only the first national trial regarding abuses against civilian population committed during the 
occupation by terrorist groups but also the first time Malian courts grappled with the charge of 
war crimes. As MUJAO’s Chief of Islamic Police, he was responsible for carrying out the 
sentences of the Islamic court “by inflicting heinous abuses ranging from whipping, illegal 
arrest and detention, assault, inhumane treatment, and amputating limbs of convicted 
persons.”958 He was arrested by Malian forces on 23 December 2013 and, after three years of 
investigations, was found guilty on 18 August 2017 and was handed a ten-year sentence. The 
trial and verdict were welcomed as “an undeniable breakthrough that sent a powerful message 
to the victims of the serious violations that he orchestrated,” especially in light of the “zeal” 
with which he carried out his crimes.959 
 While Touré was prosecuted, his superior in the Islamic Police during the occupation 
in Gao was not. Yoro Ould Dah, a member of MUJAO who belongs to the Arab community 
and who was well known for his alleged criminality and also named in the same criminal 
complaint for abuses committed in Gao, was arrested on 30 July 2014 by French forces who 
suspected him of involvement in an attack against a French soldier. After being transferred to 
Bamako, Ould Dah was released several days later in August 2014 by Malian authorities as 
part of the peace process. Crucially, four months prior to his release, Ould Dah had joined the 
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MAA, an armed group participating in the Algiers peace process.960 He then served as a “key 
player in the military structure” of the MAA and later led the Platform forces, the pro-
governmental coalition of armed groups, through which he worked with MINUSMA and other 
foreign forces.961 Alluding to his newfound political identity, Ould Dah stated, “Everyone 
makes mistakes. Me too. Now, I’ve joined the MAA four months ago. I am not a terrorist.”962 
Despite his previous role as leader of the Islamic Police for which his subordinates and 
counterparts have been prosecuted, Yoro Ould Dah’s transfer to a leadership position in a 
government-aligned coalition of armed groups that participated in the peace negotiations 
increased his political value. Thus, while the costs of trying Ould Dah were deemed too high, 
the cost of trying Touré were deemed ‘affordable.’ Touré raised this during his trial, accusing 
the judicial system of bias as he was the only person prosecuted for crimes committed in Gao.963 
While Touré had indeed been one of nearly 30 individuals targeted by arrest warrants in 
February 2013, he was not a political heavy-weight. This is evidenced as well by the lack of 
contestation regarding Touré’s arrest and trial. Asked whether any groups participating in the 
peace negotiations requested, either officially or unofficially, Touré’s release, several 
participants and observers confirmed this was not an issue.964   
 The trial of Mahamane Touré was nevertheless a milestone in the domestic treatment 
of international crimes. Indeed, a fascinating back-and-forth occurred between the 
investigating judge, lawyers for the civil parties, the Office of the Public Prosecutor, and the 
judges of the Criminal Court of Bamako (Tribunal de Grande Instance of Bamako) regarding 
the charge of war crime – defined in Article 8 of the Rome Statute and in Article 31 of the 
Malian Criminal Code. The investigating judge found the charges of war crimes and torture, 
as well as attacks on the internal and external security of the state, criminal conspiracy, 
aggravated assault, terrorism, and illegal possession of military weapons and ammunition, to 
be sufficiently established and referred the case to the Public Prosecutor. This marked the first 
time that charges of war crimes and torture had been accepted by an investigating judge. 
However, the charges of war crimes and torture were dismissed by the Pre-Trial Chamber upon 
	
960 Thienot 2014. 
961 Boutellis and Zahar 2017, 20; RFI 2015.  
962 Okello 2018. 
963 FIDH MIDH, and LIDHO  2017b, 16. 
964 Phone interview with a Professor of Political Science and a former member of the UN 
Standby Team as a senior expert on mediation, 7 May 2018; Phone interview with member of 
the UN mediation team within MINUSMA, 30 August 2018; Phone interview with former 
Special Advisor to the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, 25 May 2018.  
 204 
the request of the Public Prosecutor who argued that “since Mali never declared war, it might 
seem a bit superfluous to contemplate war crimes.”965 At the trial, lawyers for the civil parties 
asked for the charges of “aggravated assault” to be reclassified as “war crimes”, arguing that 
such a reclassification better reflects the reality of the serious abuses committed against 
civilians and that a declaration of war does not need to have been issued as long as the crimes 
took place during an armed conflict. The Public Prosecutor then changed position and 
supported the civil parties’ request for reclassification, explaining that it “had not correctly 
grasped the concept of war crimes and the importance of accepting this charge in this case.”966 
Ultimately, the judges found Touré guilty of various crimes (attacks on the internal security of 
the State, criminal conspiracy, possession of military weapons, and aggravated assault with 
mitigating circumstances) but rejected the classification of war crimes, finding it 
“inapplicable.”967 Though no reason was given, the lawyers for civil parties suggest it may be 
due to “poor understanding by the Malian judges of international crimes, even though 
international crimes were added to the criminal code in 2001.”968  
 
Al Mahdi and Al Hassan  
 
The two other emblematic cases were of Touré’s counterparts in Timbuktu. Ahmad Al 
Faqi Al Mahdi was a member of Ansar Dine and served as the head of the morality brigade, 
known as the Hesbah. Al Mahdi was arrested in October 2014 by Operation Barkhane and 
detained in Niger. With Mali’s cooperation, Niger transferred him to the ICC on 26 September 
2015 following an arrest warrant issued for him on 18 September 2015. After pleading guilty, 
he was convicted as a co-perpetrator for the war crime of intentionally directing attacks against 
historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion, including nine mausoleums and one 
mosque in Timbuktu, carried out between June and July 2012.969 His conviction marked the 
first time the ICC tried the war crime of destroying historical and religious monuments and 
was widely welcomed as a major step for international criminal legal jurisprudence.  
	
965 FIDH MIDH, and LIDHO 2017b, 18. 
966 FIDH MIDH, and LIDHO 2017b, 18. 
967 FIDH MIDH, and LIDHO 2017b, 19. 
968 FIDH MIDH, and LIDHO 2017b, 19. 
969 Judgment Al Mahdi. 
 205 
Al Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud, henceforth ‘Al Hassan,’ was 
also a member of Ansar Dine and served as de facto chief of the Islamic Police. Al Hassan was 
arrested by Operation Barkhane and transferred on 31 March 2018 to the ICC, following an 
arrest warrant issued on 27 March 2018. He was accused of participating in the destruction of 
mausoleums in Timbuktu and in the policy of forced marriages “which victimized the female 
inhabitants of Timbuktu and led to repeated rapes and sexual enslavement of women and 
girls.”970 As of August 2018, the charges for the five charges of war crimes and four charges 
of crimes against humanity were yet to be confirmed. Like Touré, both Al Mahdi and Al Hassan 
were named in a criminal complaint lodged by human rights group in Malian courts. An 
investigation had been opened by an investigating judge, though the proceedings had stalled.971  
By examining the context surrounding their transfers to The Hague, this section shows 
how complying with the Rome Statute’s legal requirements can complement, rather than 
obstruct, the government’s legitimation strategy. The Malian government’s decision to transfer 
them to The Hague not only fulfilled the government’s requirement to cooperate with the ICC 
but also satisfied the admissibility test, set by the Rome Statute’s complementarity regime. As 
a reminder, a case may been deemed admissible if the State that has jurisdiction over the case 
is unable or unwilling genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution of the case 
domestically. Mali demonstrated its unwillingness to prosecute them domestically and 
established the cases’ admissibility. Exploring this compliance in more detail illustrates how 
the government capitalised on the state’s primacy in the ICC system to implement the anti-
impunity norm to its advantage, and thus in line with its cost-benefit analysis, by only 
prosecuting individuals with low perceived political value whose trial would not jeopardize 
peace negotiations. Simultaneously, it externalised to The Hague any cost that would come 
from trying them domestically.  
 Mali arguably cleared the barriers to their trials in The Hague not because it was unable 
to try them domestically due to the insecurity or unwilling because their political status would 
complicate an already volatile political situation, but rather because their trial would not 
endanger the broader peace process and the government’s goal of re-establishing control over 
its territory.  First, the Malian government was arguably not necessarily unable to try Al Mahdi 
and Al Hassan. According to Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute, “in order to determine inability 
	
970 Al Hassan - Case Information Sheet. 
971 FIDH and AMDH 2018. 
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in a particular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the 
necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.” It should 
of course be acknowledged that the context of insecurity presents huge challenges to the Malian 
judiciary. For instance, as of September 2017, “only 30% of all agents of the State in the 
septentrional and Mopti regions were on the job.”972 The impact of the occupation on the 
administration of justice in northern Mali prompted the Supreme Court, on 16 July 2012973 and 
21 January 2013,974 to transfer the jurisdiction of courts in the north to the Criminal Court of 
Commune III of the District of Bamako.  
 However, as evidenced by the successful trial of Aliou Mahamane Touré, conducted in 
a manner that was deemed to uphold fair trial standards, these challenges are not categorically 
insurmountable. According to human rights organisations, “the Malian political and judicial 
system thereby showed that they were now willing and able to prosecute the perpetrators of the 
most serious crimes committed during the conflict.”975  First, in terms of jurisdiction, the 
jurisdiction of courts in the north was re-transferred on 16 February 2015, as the Supreme Court 
argued “the areas formerly occupied have been liberated and the sovereign functions of the 
State can once again be carried out more or less normally, with the gradual return of the agents 
of the State.”976 Also, importantly, both Al Mahdi and Al Hassan had already been detained, 
making their apprehension for trial feasible. Moreover, as explained further in Chapter 8, the 
strength of the publicly available evidence against Al Mahdi, including video and audio 
recordings as well as satellite imagery, made a national trial increased the feasibility of holding 
his trial in Mali.977 According to a lawyer for civil parties, “It was the easiest one. The images 
were streaming. He harangued the crowds. His speeches were translated. There was no way 
	
972  UN Doc. S/2017/811 (2017). According to human rights groups, “The courts of the 
Timbuktu and Gao regions that were rehabilitated after the occupation are barely functional 
and cannot, due to the security situation and threats faced by the administrators of justice, 
handle cases that investigate individuals who are or have been affiliated with armed groups and 
terrorist groups, some of whom have benefited from the confidence-building measures 
provided for in the peace agreement.” FIDH MIDH, and LIDHO 2017b, 9. 
973 Supreme Court Decision N°46 of 16 July 2012. 
974 Supreme Court Decision N°04 of 21 January 2013. 
975 FIDH MIDH, and LIDHO 2017b, 16. It should be noted that the justice sector provided no 
budget for victims to participate in the trial. To compensate, human rights groups facilitated 
victims’ participation, including organising their travel by plane from Gao to Bamako, 
explaining the proceedings and preparing them for their testimony on the stand. 
976 Supreme Court Decision N°11 of 16 February 2015. 
977 Rosenberg 2016b. 
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out.”978 Asked whether the Al Mahdi and Al Hassan trials could have been conducted in Mali, 
from a practical perspective, a Malian scholar-practitioner with extensive experience in human 
rights protection explained, “There are no major obstacles – it would be possible.” 979 
Moreover, according to the timeline of the proceedings, a trial of Al Hassan could have been 
held domestically, as Touré’s trial was held on 18 August 2017 - before Al Hassan’s transfer 
to the ICC.  
Rather, the Malian government was unwilling - or more precisely uninterested - in 
prosecuting Al Mahdi and Al Hassan. As illustrated below, Al Mahdi and Al Hassan were 
arguably transferred to the ICC because they were not politically valuable to the peace 
negotiations. Put differently, other individuals who were accused of similar criminal conduct 
committed in Timbuktu were nevertheless released, as they were deemed valuable to political 
reconciliation in light of their spoiler power. In contrast, the costs of transferring Al Mahdi and 
Al Hassan to the ICC were low. Equally, the benefits of trying them domestically were not 
high enough.      
The most controversial case is that of Ag Alfousseyni Houka Houka. A member of 
Ansar Dine, Houka Houka served as the judge of the Islamic Tribunal in Timbuktu during the 
ten-month jihadist occupation, issuing sentences for amputations, stonings, floggings, and 
arbitrary arrests, among other punishments. A proceeding was opened by the Public Prosecutor 
against Houka Houka, who was later arrested by the Malian army in January 2014 in light of 
these allegations. According to the colonel who led the operation, “there are youths here whose 
arms Houka Houka amputated; he issued forced divorces. He also possessed weapons of war.” 
According to a resident of Timbuktu, “the arrest of Houka Houka is a big day. In the streets, 
everyone is expressing their joy.”980  
However, capitalising on the executive authorities’ ability to undermine ongoing 
judicial proceedings, Malian authorities released Houka Houka on 15 August 2014, prompting 
outrage among civil society and UN human rights monitors. According to the UN Independent 
Expert on Human Rights in Mali, his release “occurred at the same time as the competent 
investigating judges were holding the first round of hearings for a group of victims of 
international crimes” committed in northern Mali, accompanied by human rights 
	
978 Phone interview with Malian human rights lawyer, 2 February 2017. 
979 Phone interview with Professor of Law, former Chargé de Mission at the Ministry of Justice 
of Mali, and former Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister Modibo Keita, 28 June 2018. 
980 Studio Tamani 2014. 
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organisations. 981  The Malian authorities’ parallel decisions to release Houka Houka and 
transfer Al Mahdi and Al Hassan to the ICC are noteworthy, as Houka Houka worked closely 
with both Al Mahdi and Al Hassan. As leaders of the morality brigade and Islamic Police, both 
Al Mahdi and Al Hassan implemented the decisions taken by Houka Houka, the judge of the 
Islamic tribunal. The ICC Prosecutor highlighted this collaboration during the Al Mahdi trial’s 
opening hearing.  
Al Mahdi went to the meeting in question in the company of Houka Houka, the future 
judge of the Islamic tribunal… In addition to Hisbah, Mr Al Mahdi was also involved 
in the work of the Islamic tribunal in Timbuktu as demonstrated in his statements and 
the documentary evidence and videos. On one of the videos Mr Al Mahdi is sitting to 
the right of Judge Houka Houka and has a discussion with him during the hearing. 
Furthermore, Al Mahdi actively participated in the execution of the decisions of the 
tribunal. When it came to public flagellation, for example, he explained the sentence 
using a loudspeaker before hundreds of people gathered and mentioned the importance 
of the armed groups. And you can see that on the excerpt from France 2, which I 
mentioned a short while ago where you can see Mr Al Mahdi using a loudspeaker to 
speak to the crowd and explain what the sentence of the Islamic tribunal of Timbuktu 
had been.982  
Though he was not an official representative of any armed group that officially 
participated in the Ouagadougou or Algiers peace processes, his status within the patronage 
bazaar of the Malian politico-military context evidently affords him political leverage. He now 
lives freely around Timbuktu and reportedly serves as an intermediary between the government 
and certain armed groups.984 According to a lawyer working on behalf of the civil parties, 
frustrated with the lack of political will, “Houka Houka is even asking for his reintegration into 
the civil service. Requesting his salary in arrears. The state is doing absolutely nothing…There 
is no will.”985 Commenting on Houka Houka’s release, the UN Independent Expert on Human 
Rights declared that the “confidence-building measures set out in article 18 of the 
Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement are no justification for the politically-motivated release 
of alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations. Such action is contrary to the 
	
981 Human Rights Council 2015, 10; FIDH and AMDH 2014a. 
982 Transcript of Al Mahdi Hearing, 32 -33. 
984 RFI 2018. 
985 Phone interview with Malian human rights lawyer, 2 February 2017.  
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international obligations of Mali and undermines the principle of the separation of powers 
enshrined in article 81 of the Malian Constitution of 25 February 1992.”986 Responding to 
protests, the Minister of Justice Bathily did not even seek to portray the release as compliant 
with anti-impunity, as in other cases. More candidly, he explained, “Today, [Houka Houka] is 
revealing things that we are interested in knowing.”987   
In contrast, Al Mahdi and Al Hassan had lower political value to the Malian 
government’s strategy. Though Al Mahdi was named in a criminal complaint for human rights 
abuses submitted to the Court of First Instance of Commune III, Mali did not issue any 
extradition request for Al Mahdi following his arrest in October 2014 in Niger, where he was 
charged in an unrelated case for arms trafficking with the intent of committing acts of terror. 
Similarly, while Al Hassan was named in the same criminal complaint in Mali, the proceedings 
had stagnated. After he was detained by Operation Barkhane, no action was taken to prosecute 
him domestically. According to an international advisor to the peace negotiations, participants 
in the peace process did not raise concerns regarding Al Mahdi’s transfer and trial. 988 
According to the former Special Advisor to the AU High Representative for Mali and the Sahel, 
“I can’t remember any official reaction by an armed group because he was not considered an 
official member of those who were negotiating.”989 Indeed, despite the fluid links between 
AQIM and signatory groups, Al Mahdi’s trial was not a point of contention.  
In sum, the Mali situation continues the trend seen in other self-referral cases, in which 
the government interprets complementarity in a way that is advantageous to its broader political 
objectives. However, unlike in other cases, in which governments agreed to transfer cases to 
the ICC that were deemed too politically difficult to handle on the national level in light of the 
clout of the defendants, Al Mahdi and Al Hassan were transferred not because their 
prosecutions would be costly because they represented a political obstacle for the Malian 
	
986 Human Rights Council 2015. 
987 Dicko 2014. 
988 Phone interview with a Professor of Political Science and a former member of the UN 
Standby Team as a senior expert on mediation, 7 May 2018. Exceptionally, in January 2016, 
the Sahara Emirate, an offshoot of AQIM, released a video calling for the release of Al Mahdi 
and other individuals detained in Mali, in exchange for a Swiss hostage held by AQIM. The 
video notes “a Muslim is the brother of another Muslim, he does not oppress him and does not 
denounce him.” The message could be read as either a sign of solidarity or a cautionary threat 
to Al Mahdi. Maupas 2016. 
989 Phone Interview with former Special Advisor to the African Union High Representative to 
Mali and the Sahel, 25 May 2018. 
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government’s strategy during the crisis, but precisely because they were politically 
insignificant to the peace talks. In this sense, the authorities’ outsourcing of the ‘easy’ cases 
simultaneously undermines one version the anti-impunity norm, the imperative for states to 
hold individuals accountable for abuses domestically, while fulfilling another version of the 
norm, that states do not need to hold individuals accountable in domestic courts but cooperate 
in legal proceedings in international courts. This illustrates how the inherent vagueness of the 
norm enables actors to advance their strategic objectives by deploying different versions of the 
norm. Assessing whether this proximity between the ICC’s prosecutorial strategies and state’s 
political interests in pursuing selective justice is normatively desirable or objectionable, 
however, is discussed further in Chapter 8. 
 
Amadou Haya Sanogo 
  
 The fourth case of human rights abuses that has been tried since 2012 concerns the 
crisis within Bamako. The domestic trial of Amadou Haya Sanogo, the leader of the March 
2012 coup against then President Amadou Toumani Touré, for the disappearance and execution 
of Red Berets soldiers marked the first time such a politically important figure was held 
accountable for human rights abuses. After investigations and the discovery of a mass grave, 
judge Yaya Karembé charged Sanogo in late November 2013 for “killings, murders, and 
complicity in killings and murders.”  
 The political context at the time of the discovery of the grave is, of course, also relevant 
in understanding the arrest of such a powerful figure. At the time of his arrest, Sanogo’s value 
to the government had significantly weakened, as the transitional government had been 
replaced by an elected president, Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) in August 2013. This is not to 
argue that the government would not have allowed for Sanogo’s arrest had robust evidence 
against him emerged at an earlier date. However, it is important to note that Sanogo’s 
prosecution fit with two objectives of IBK’s new government. First, Sanogo’s arrest allowed 
IBK to display his commitment to the anti-impunity norm and to the rule of law more broadly. 
In December 2013, he stated, “There will be no impunity. Impunity – zero tolerance. Everyone 
will have to answer to the law. You have followed a recent case of a certain officer who 
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believed he was above the law. He is now in prison, meditating on his miscalculation.”990 
Second, Sanogo’s neutralisation fit within IBK’s objective of reducing the influence of the 
former junta and consolidating his authority over the military hierarchy.991 In October 2013, 
due to rival groups clashing within the military, Operation Saniya resulted in the arrest of 
several members of the former junta. Additionally, in November 2013, the Council of Ministers 
dissolved the military committee for the monitoring of defence and security forces reform, led 
by Sanogo.992  
Over the next five years, however, the political will to prosecute Sanogo became more 
ambivalent. For instance, in August 2016, the Malian cabinet transferred judge Karembé, who 
was leading the case against Sanogo, to a diplomatic post at the Malian embassy in Khartoum, 
Sudan. This was interpreted by many observers as a move to neutralise him by way of 
promotion.993 Also, while human rights organisations welcomed the quality and independence 
of the investigation, which “attests to the genuine political will on their part” despite the 
sensitivity of the case, “owing to the position of power that Sanogo and his accomplices held,” 
the opening of the trial was only held at the very end of the statutory three-year pre-trial 
detention limit. According to an observer who met with judicial officials prior to the opening 
of the trial, the officials did not seem aware of the impending deadline.994 To comply with the 
statutory limits, the trial’s opening was rapidly organised within two weeks of this meeting and 
was hailed as a crucial step in the fight against impunity in Mali.  
However, successive procedural delays have significantly slowed its progress. Several 
observers noted that the government’s political will to prosecute Sanogo has waned, in light of 
the need to placate his supporters within the military ahead of the 2018 presidential elections 
as well as concerns around potential revelations regarding the collaboration between Sanogo 
and President IBK.995 According to a diplomat familiar with the case, “there is no interest from 
the government. The government did not tell us this directly, but Sanogo has a lot of supporters 
in the military ranks. It would be costly for the government to do anything against him, 
	
990 Keita 2013. Displaying the government’s political will to prosecute Sanogo, the Minister of 
Justice himself accompanied judge Karembé to the site of the mass grave. 
991 ICG 2014a, 6. 
992 Communiqué of the Council of Ministers of Mali, 8 November 2013. 
993 Phone interview with researcher from a human rights organisation, 5 April 2018. 
994 Confidential interview, February 2017. 
995 Confidential interview, November 2016. 
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especially with the presidential elections coming up.”996 For instance, in February 2018, one 
of the accused, Ibrahim Dahirou Dembélé, who was former Commander in Chief of the Armed 
Forces at the time of the Red Berets case, was promoted to the prominent position of Inspector 
General of the army. To comply with this decision, the judges of the trial chamber granted 
interim release. Dembélé was later appointed as Minister of Defense, prompting strong 
criticism from the victims’ groups.997 This situation illustrates the importance of taking into 
account the authorities’ central role in enforcing the anti-impunity norm at a domestic level, as 
elite political will is crucial in enabling the holding of such a politically-sensitive trial, which 
would require, for instance, the need to authorise a budget and to arrange for security measures 
during the trial. While the trial is ongoing, an analysis of the evolution of the case suggests that 
political will existed for the detention of Sanogo, in order to neutralise his kinetic influence, 
though later likely waned with regards to his actual prosecution, likely in part due to Sanogo’s 




 In similar ways as in the first phase of the Malian conflict explored in the previous 
chapter, using the norm’s functions helped the authorities shape parties’ reputations as well as 
the relative power of the government and its opposition, thereby including and empowering 
certain actors while excluding and neutralising others. Drawing upon the norm’s narrative-
shaping function and branding effect helped privilege some interlocutors as legitimate and 
villainise others as illegitimate, by creating a contrived difference between ‘non-criminal non-
terrorist groups’ and ‘criminal terrorist groups.’ In terms of optimising the government’s ability 
to exercise control over the territory, criminal accountability was selectively enforced and 
suspended as a means of coercive leverage and selective neutralisation to increase the prospects 
of reaching a political settlement that would enable the government to enhance its effective 
control throughout Mali. In light of the extremely sparse landscape of accountability for the 
widespread abuses committed in Mali, it is clear that being held accountable was not simply a 
function of having committed abuses. Rather, it was also shaped by the perceived political 
value and spoiler power held by key interlocutors, and thus the government’s cost-benefit 
analysis of whether supporting prosecutions would jeopardise its strategy to extend its power 
	
996 Interview with a diplomat based in Bamako 2014-2017, 4 January 2018. 
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throughout the territory. In light of the fungibility of individuals, this paradoxically entailed 
suspending the threat of justice against individuals linked to ‘terrorist’ groups. This was 
achieved by in part capitalising on the executive power’s influence over the national 
administration of justice, leading to measures that undermined the government’s commitment 
to the anti-impunity norm. Indeed, despite the active ICC investigation and the consensus 
against amnesties for grave abuses, Malian authorities, with the tacit support of international 
mediators, still used the promise of impunity as a bargaining chip in order to incentivise certain 
groups to sign peace agreements. It was also achieved by complying with Mali’s duty to 
cooperate with the ICC’s investigations against individuals who were deemed not politically 
valuable to the negotiations.  
 As in Côte d’Ivoire, the particular way justice was pursued undermines the 
government’s full commitment to anti-impunity more generally. The parameters of 
accountability and impunity were drawn in a way that responded to the political exigencies of 
the conflict, prompting Malians on all sides of the conflict to “complain of impunity, of no 
accountability for the crimes of individuals, groups, or the state, especially because armed 
group leaders, rather than being punished, have essentially been rewarded.”998 Feelings of 
injustice have contributed to grievances and mobilisation against the state, including through 
terrorist groups. As Holder explains, justice, “which has been sorely lacking, will be the 
fundamental issue in not only national reconciliation, but also the reconstruction of the 
State.”999 From this longer-term perspective, actors adopted an approach that prioritised the 
restoration of stability in the face of transnational terrorism, but that does not aim to “meet a 
desire for genuine change that runs deep” among Malians nor to lay the foundations for more 
sustainable state.1000  This has caused some Malians to interpret political reconciliation as 
impunity.  





998 Pezard and Shurkin 2015, xv. 
999 Ploquin 2016; Lebovich 2018; Yabi 2018. 
1000 ICG 2015; Bratton, Coulibaly and Dulani 2013.  
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Chapter 8: The Anti-Impunity Norm in Conflict   
 
  The rise of the anti-impunity norm represents a remarkable change in the international 
constitutional order, one that has indeed changed the way elite political actors act within this 
new normative environment of the “age of accountability.” The role of scholarship in this field 
is to understand how and why politics have changed in response to this new norm. The concept 
of norm exploitation helps explain how and why actors can use the norm to pursue certain 
objectives. It shows how elites capitalised on the norm’s inherent ambiguity regarding whether 
states have a duty to prosecute grave abuses, the centrality of the state within the norm’s 
enforcement and the limits of judicial independence nationally, and the overlap between the 
norm’s functions and criteria of government legitimacy. It shows how elite actors set the 
parameters of accountability and impunity in light of their objectives within the political 
bargaining processes, and in order to boost their legitimation by shaping parties’ reputations 
and ability to exercise effective control over territory, rather than simply as a function of having 
internalized the ‘oughtness’ of the anti-impunity norm through international and domestic 
pressure by pro-human rights groups. In this sense, the normative commitment to the 
imperative to hold individuals accountable for grave abuses expressed by elites and displayed 
through certain measures was not strong enough to convince actors to pay the high costs of 
doing so when it would complicate strategic interests.  
 In terms of overall findings, this thesis thus joins others in demonstrating how the 
priority placed on domestic security imperatives means pressure for impunity supersedes the 
pursuit of justice for grave abuses and that the patterns of justice “follow the logic of political 
coalitions and interests more than it leads them.”1001 It echoes the findings of studies that 
examine the use of the anti-impunity norm not simply in terms of accountability but rather from 
a political bargaining perspective and reveal how, through domestic accountability measures 
that are not wholly effective and independent as well as by complying with their obligations 
towards international courts, the selective pursuit of justice can become part of actors’ 
strategies to shape the balance of power in conflicts.1002 
	
1001 Bass 2016; Snyder and Vinjamuri 2004, 43.  
1002 Bell 2017; Lake 2017; Cronin-Furman 2015; Loken, Lake, and Cronin-Furman 2018; 
Subotić 2009. 
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  This chapter first presents a table that shows the cross-cutting relationships between 
elite strategy and accountability measures and then, recapitulating the four previous chapters, 
it then shows how these relationships played out in practice in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. It then 
summarises the main findings drawn from these cases, highlighting the limits of the 
internalization of the anti-impunity norm in light of the bargaining around accountability, and 
situates these findings within the pool of studies on the strategic use of anti-impunity measures. 
Further, it explains more specifically why the ICC’s prosecutorial decisions ultimately 
complemented elite strategy and considers what this means normatively for international 
criminal justice. Finally, the chapter concludes by drawing together this dissertation’s original 
contributions and suggests paths for future research.  
 
Relationships between Elite Strategy and Accountability 
 
 The table below captures the relationships that explain how actors use the anti-impunity 
norm to shape the political landscape in ways that reflect, but also determine, the balance of 
power within the country. It helps untangle the puzzle of why elites discursively embrace the 
anti-impunity norm despite the risks in doing so and highlights the need to scrutinize the 
underlying dynamics that motivate elites’ approach toward anti-impunity measures. While the 
case studies delved more fully into how actors exploited the norm’s features and functions, this 
table recapitulates the findings by zeroing in on how actors supported or obstructed 
accountability measures in order to shape one key criteria of legitimacy: its ability to exercise 
effective control. The table below shows how elite actors did so to pursue at least five aims: to 
incentivise individuals to cede power, to incentivise individuals to join negotiations and accept 
a political settlement, to ensure the loyalty of individuals, to neutralise opponents, and to dispel 
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 The first column, the target individual’s perceived political value, reflects the 
importance of taking into account the perception of elite actors regarding the role the target 
individual plays within the conflict-affected context. This applies to individual targets who are 
not only in the opposition but also within the state’s political and military ranks. As explained 
in Chapter 3, an individual can be deemed of high political value, meaning they are deemed to 
play a crucial role in the present or future political arrangement. This can be due to their strong 
spoiler power since, as Hayner notes, “those who control the levers of war have to be included, 
or any peace effort will fail.”1003 At the same time, having high political value is not inherently 
a reflection of strong spoiler power in terms of the individual’s potential to cause violence. 
Rather, an individual may have high perceived political value despite having very little ability 
to inflict harm. This can be the case, for instance, in post-conflict democracies where opposition 
parties are encouraged to emerge in order to hold legitimate elections. An individual can also 
have low perceived political value, meaning elite actors do not see them as having a crucial 
role in the present or future political arrangement. These individuals can have strong spoiler 
power or low spoiler power. In other words, as illustrated in the case studies below, an 
individual’s perceived political value (high/low) is not necessarily strictly linked to their power 
to spoil and disrupt the political context (strong/weak). Considering the political profile of the 
individuals that are accused of grave abuses is rare and adds a valuable angle to the approach 
adopted by most cross-case studies, which tend to focus not on who is targeted but instead on 
other factors, such as the type of conflict outcome (one-sided victory vs. negotiated settlement), 
the type of trial (national security trial, national human rights trial, international human rights 
trial), or the status of Rome Statute ratification.1004  
 The second column describes the elite actors’ posture towards accountability measures: 
block or implement. In supporting accountability mechanisms, elite actors capitalised on the 
state’s centrality of the norm’s enforcement and the inherent ambiguity within the norm itself 
regarding states’ duty to prosecute grave abuses or outsourcing to the ICC. In obstructing 
accountability mechanisms, elite actors capitalised on the state’s centrality of the norm’s 
enforcement and the limits of judicial independence within the domestic institutional 
framework. The third and fourth columns reflect the importance of taking into account elite’s 
approach towards given individuals. An exclusionary approach refers to cases in which elite 
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1004 Dancy and Wiebelhaus-Brahm 2018; Meernik, Nichols, and King 2010; Simmons and 
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actors want to exclude the individual from future political arrangements. An associational 
approach refers to cases in which elite actors want to include the individual from future political 
arrangements. Importantly, an exclusionary approach does not necessarily refer to a situation 
of one-sided victory and the associational approach does not necessarily refer to a situation of 
negotiated settlement. Rather, in both types of conflict, elite actors seek to include and exclude 
various interlocutors for different reasons. Indeed, it depends on the opportunities to further 
the government’s strategic interests that are generated by excluding or including a particular 
interlocutor that is allegedly responsible for grave abuses. Supporting and obstructing 
accountability measures can further both exclusionary and associational approaches in different 
ways.   
 The cross-cutting relationships illustrated in the chart leads one to expect the following 
situations. In an exclusionary approach, if elite actors wish to exclude a given challenger who 
has high perceived political value, they will likely block accountability measures, such as by 
offering amnesties, releasing detainees, blocking judicial processes, and refusing to cooperate 
with the ICC. The aim is likely to incentivise the challenger to cede power. If elite actors wish 
to exclude a given challenger who has low perceived political value, they will like cooperate 
and support accountability measures, such as issuing arrest warrants conducting national trials, 
and cooperating with ICC arrest warrants. In an associational approach, if elite actors wish to 
include a given challenger who has high perceived political value, they will likely block 
accountability measures, such as by offering amnesties, releasing detainees, blocking judicial 
processes, and refusing to cooperate with the ICC. This could be done for several aims, 
including incentivising challengers to join the negotiation table, incentivising challengers to 
accept a political settlement, incentivise challengers to join a given political arrangement, and 
to protect the loyalties of a given individual. The lower-right hand case is slightly distinct. If 
elite actors wish to include a given challenger, they will likely cooperate with, or at least not 
block, accountability measures against individuals with low perceived political value. The aim 
may be to deflect attention from other, more politically valuable, targets. The section below 
recapitulates the findings from the previous chapters and illustrates how these dynamics play 






 Since the beginning of the post-electoral crisis in November 2010, the Ouattara 
government approached the idea of accountability as a source of coercive leverage and a means 
of selective neutralisation. Elite actors adopted an exclusionary approach towards Gbagbo, as 
they viewed Ouattara’s ability to exercise effective control over the territory as dependent on 
excluding Gbagbo from present and future political arrangement. Yet, throughout most of the 
crisis, Gbagbo was deemed to have high perceived political value to the peaceful resolution to 
the crisis, mostly due to his strong spoiler power. As explained in Chapter 4, Gbagbo 
maintained control over the administrative and military apparatus and held the upper hand in 
the balance of power against Ouattara’s ‘hotel government.’ Accordingly, while the threat of 
prosecution was made regularly, elite actors consistently made broad amnesty and ‘golden exit’ 
offers to Gbagbo. Even in mid-March 2011, after three of the four events that would form the 
basis for charges of crimes against humanity at the ICC, Gbagbo was offered general amnesty 
to incentivise him to step down.  
 By the end of March 2011, Gbagbo’s perceived political value to the peaceful resolution 
of the conflict diminished, due to his intransigence despite successive mediation attempts as 
well as the increase in abuses allegedly carried out by his security services. While he still 
maintained strong spoiler power in light of the continued allegiance of key parts of the security 
services, Gbagbo’s perceived political value lowered. As a result, invoking the duty to respond 
and prosecute helped convince UN Security Council members that even Gbagbo’s semi-legal 
government should no longer be considered legitimate if it uses heavy weaponry against its 
own people.1005 The imperative to respond and prevent further abuses was used as a resource 
to mobilise support for neutralising Gbagbo through military means, as the documentation of 
particularly egregious abuses “provoke[d] the actual use of military force” and generated 
support within the UN Security Council to respond to grave abuses through forceful 
intervention. 1006  In parallel, the Ouattara administration increased efforts to facilitate the 
opening of an ICC investigation. Shortly after the military operations that led to Gbagbo’s 
	
1005 For instance, Ambassador of France Simon noted that the reference to the ‘Responsibility 
to Protect’ doctrine used in UN SC Resolution 1973 adopted on 17 March 2011 to mobilise 
support for intervention in Libya could serve a similar function in Côte d’Ivoire. “We 
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jurisprudence.” Simon 2016, 312. 
1006 Walling 2013, 252-253. 
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capture in April 2011, the ICC Prosecutor opened an investigation and issued an arrest warrant 
for Gbagbo.    
 As covered in Chapter 5, these cross-cutting relationships continue to explain the 
dynamics of accountability following the end of the post-electoral crisis in April 2011. Having 
lost their perceived political value, and in light of their continued support among half of the 
population, Gbagbo was detained along with his entourage, reflecting the Ouattara 
administration’s continued exclusionary approach to Gbagbo. Tracing the decision-making 
around the arrest warrants issued by the ICC against Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé, and 
Simone Gbagbo reveals how the complementarity regime was interpreted as a burden-sharing 
strategy by transferring individuals whose domestic trials would be very costly. In light of 
Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé’s low perceived political value to the future Ivorian 
political arrangement of Côte d’Ivoire, and their strong spoiler power, the Ouattara 
administration agreed to transfer these two accused as trying them domestically was deemed 
too costly. Yet, they declined to transfer Simone Gbagbo and instead decided to conduct legal 
proceedings domestically. As explained in Chapter 5, in light of Simone Gbagbo’s lower 
spoiler power, and low perceived political value, a domestic trial against her was deemed less 
costly than one against Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé. Her national trial also entailed 
some advantages for the Ouattara administration.  
 As the state’s primacy in the Rome Statute system enables it to determine its 
(un)willingness and (in)ability to prosecute, Ivorian authorities pursued a rather inconsistent 
approach but one that was in line with their duties under the Rome Statute. The ability of 
Ivorian authorities to claim they were able and willing to try Simone Gbagbo domestically but 
unable and unwilling to try Charles Blé Goudé domestically highlights how the state’s margin 
for manoeuvre enables states to pursue their interests through the Rome Statute system.1007 The 
practice of states’ outsourcing of cases that would be costly to conduct domestically 
simultaneously undermines one version of the anti-impunity norm, that states must hold 
individuals accountable for abuses domestically, while fulfilling another contrasting version of 
the norm, that states do not need to hold individuals accountable in domestic courts.     
	
1007 This observation echoes the response of a Congolese army officer when asked why the 
Congolese judiciary could not prosecute high-level suspects. “International criminal justice is 
a jungle, in which only the strongest animals survive...You must understand, that the ICC is 
only a subsidiary court. States decide whom to prosecute in the first instance. This is 
complementarity.” Labuda 2017, viii. 
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 In one-sided victories, one of the risks of neutralising one’s opposition through judicial 
means is the assumption that those replacing the indicted leader will be moderate and work 
towards ensuring stability.1008 Over time, the Ouattara administration adopted an associational 
approach towards the moderate branch of the Gbagbo-affiliated opposition as it was deemed 
highly politically valuable to the future of the democratic country and to enabling the Ouattara 
administration to continue governing, especially in light of the legislative and presidential 
elections. In contrast, the administration adopted an exclusionary approach towards the radical 
branches of the Gbagbo-affiliated opposition. As illustrated in Chapter 5, this was reflected in 
the ways in which moderates and hard-line opposition members received contrasting treatment 
by the national courts. Needing an opposition with which to engage, one of the ways in which 
Ouattara administration sought to overcome the FPI’s decision to boycott elections was through 
leniency in the penalties for alleged criminal conduct for certain moderate politicians. In this 
sense, selectively supporting and obstructing anti-impunity measures helped both neutralise the 
opposition, through en masse arrests, long sentences, and transfers to the ICC, enabled a 
valuable moderate opposition to emerge, through more lenient accountability measures.    
 In parallel, the threat of justice and the promise of impunity helped regulate relations 
between the government and the security services, crucial to maintaining effective control over 
the country. The Ouattara administration depended heavily on the ability of the former 
ComZones to securitise the territory and to lead the military. Within this associational approach 
towards the ComZones, who had high perceived political value in light of their very strong 
spoiler power, elite actors took measures to obstruct accountability measures, including 
offering promotions and creating obstacles for judicial actors to pursue investigations against 
the ComZones who were accused of grave abuses in order to protect the loyalty of these key 
military figures. The scope for accountability was thus set in ways that would not derail 
stabilisation objectives through indictments of politically valuable commanders within the 
security apparatus, while nevertheless maintaining the threat of accountability as leverage of 
these key power-holders and thereby continuing to formally uphold the government’s professed 








 Since the beginning of the conflict in early 2012, the Malian authorities approached the 
idea of accountability as a source of coercive leverage and a means of selective neutralisation 
to shape the balance of power within the country in a way that favoured Malian authorities’ 
ability to regain control over the territory. First, the civilian authorities adopted an exclusionary 
approach towards Captain Sanogo, the leader of the coup against the government. Yet, Sanogo 
was crucial in organising a transition to a civilian government and key to mobilising the army 
to regain control over the north. In light of his high perceived political value as well as his 
strong spoiler power, and despite his alleged involvement in the execution of elite Red Berets 
members, civilian leaders set the parameters of accountability strategically. In order to 
incentivise Sanogo to cede power, he was offered a limited amnesty that formally respected 
the prohibition of amnesty for grave abuses while nevertheless clearly signalling to him that he 
would benefit from impunity. At the same time, Malian authorities issued a self-referral to the 
ICC, which could override any effort to protect Sanogo from criminal accountability and could 
be used as a source of leverage over him.  
 Over the next few years, Sanogo’s perceived political value diminished. After 
investigations by domestic judicial actors, Sanogo was charged in late November 2013 for 
alleged involvement in the murder of the Red Berets members. The new government, led by 
Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (IBK) saw value in neutralising Sanogo in order to reduce the 
influence of the former junta and consolidate its authority over the military hierarchy. The trial 
was opened in December 2016. However, successive procedural delays stalled the trial, which 
was still not reopened at the time of writing. This prompted many actors, including the defence 
lawyer, the victims’ lawyer, and the President of the Association of Prosecutors and Plaintiffs 
(Association des procureurs et poursuivants, AMPP) to accuse the government of showing a 
lack of political will.1009 This situation suggests that the cost of holding the trial of Sanogo was 
deemed too high, the cost of releasing Sanogo and others was also deemed high, and the cost 
of holding Sanogo in detention beyond the statutory limit was deemed acceptable. This 
suggests that Sanogo maintained a certain degree of perceived political value, likely due to his 
strong spoiler power in light of his continued support within the military, but not high enough 
to be released. At the same time, the selective release of other accused reveals bargaining 
	
1009 Studio Tamani 2019.  
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around accountability for individuals with high political value. Indeed, the interim release and 
subsequent promotion of Ibrahim Dembélé to Inspector General and later Minister of Defense, 
reflects the associational approach taken by the government towards certain accused such as 
Dembélé and points to the aim of protecting intra-group loyalties.  
 The relationships outlined in Table 3 also help explain the way in which authorities 
addressed the question of alleged criminal responsibility of the members of various northern 
armed groups. In the context of the protracted negotiations, during which the government 
adopted an associational approach towards certain armed groups, the threat of prosecution was 
lifted for selected individuals to incentivise them to join the negotiations and accept the peace 
agreement. As illustrated in detail in Chapter 7, this can be seen by tracing how the decisions 
to lift arrest warrants paralleled critical moments during negotiations as well as how certain 
valuable actors’ political trajectory was facilitated through transactional impunity. Despite 
their recent affiliations with deemed-terrorist groups, certain actors swiftly rehatted when the 
political circumstances changed, joined the negotiations, and benefitted from impunity.  
 In parallel, certain individuals with lower perceived political value to the negotiations 
and low spoiler power were eventually tried, such as Touré, Al Mahdi, and Al Hassan, while 
individuals who were deemed more politically valuable and who held leadership positions 
within the same and other armed groups were spared. As explained further in Chapter 7, 
Touré’s superior in the Islamic Police during the occupation in Gao, Yoro Ould Dah, was 
released from custody as part of the peace process and held a leadership position in a 
government-aligned coalition of armed groups. Similarly, Sanda Ould Bouamana, the 
spokesperson of the same armed group to which belonged Al Mahdi and Al Hassan, was 
released from custody in August 2015 despite the international arrest warrant against him 
issued by Mali, prompting outrage among both Malian military officials1010 and human rights 
groups.1011 Also, Houka Houka, the judge of the Islamic Tribunal in Timbuktu, was released. 
While the exact reasons for his release are shrouded in secrecy, it reflects his high political 
value.1012 All had been mentioned in criminal complaints submitted by human rights groups. 
	
1010 According to a senior Malian military official, “We’re baffled by the liberation of this 
terrorist, who was at the forefront of the jihadist occupation.” Bavier 2015b. 
1011 FIDH 2015b. 
1012 The case of Mohamed Ag Mousa (‘Hammar Mousa’) reflects similar dynamics. Mohamed 
Ag Mousa served as the Islamic Police officer in Timbuktu and was the feared chief of a militia 
that “made terror reign in Timbuktu during the occupation.”1012 Though he was accused by 
human rights groups of “crimes against humanity, including rape, torture, imprisonment or 
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The trials of Al Mahdi, Al Hassan, and Touré dispelled attention from these other, often higher-
level, individuals. The Mali case suggests that, to avoid prosecution, one should either make 
themselves politically valuable or so politically insignificant that one’s prosecution would not 
remotely satisfy the imperative of prosecuting “those most responsible” for abuses. Being in a 
‘middle management’ position decreases the likelihood that the threat of accountability will be 
lifted. Rather than unique to Mali, or to the Ouagadougou and Algiers peace processes, this 
practice of providing impunity based on patronage networks reflects a typical practice of 
“politics of the envelope,” in which politically valuable actors are “incorporated or at least 
temporarily neutralized by being paid illicit monies or granted posts that would facilitate their 
self-enrichment.”1013 Rather than posts or envelopes, impunity can also be offered.  
 To recapitulate, the cross-cutting relationships can be summed up in two general 
observations regarding how elites use anti-impunity measures to shape the balance of power 
with the opposition and optimise the government’s ability to extend control over the territory. 
First, in terms of obstructing accountability, even when the ICC has opened preliminary 
examinations and investigations, formal and informal amnesty measures are used to shape the 
conduct of politically valuable individuals by a) incentivising them to cede power, b) 
incentivising them to join negotiations and accept a political settlement and c) ensuring their 
loyalty. Second, in terms of supporting accountability, national authorities supported and 
cooperated with accountability measures in order to a) neutralise politically non-valuable 
opponents and b) dispel attention from other alleged perpetrators who were more valuable.  
 By tracing the micro-dynamics of decision-making, and showing when accountability 
was pursued and stalled, this thesis complicates the general expectation that state actors use 
justice to rid themselves of domestic opponents and protect the impunity of members of their 
political and military ranks. Acknowledging the status of the accused as an opposition member 
is already a valuable explanatory factor that is missing from studies that only measure the 
number of trials and amnesties, rather than who is being prosecuted or amnestied. However, as 
this thesis demonstrates, the selectivity in the justice landscape is not simply a function of an 
accused individual’s status as a domestic opponent nor of having been accused of grave abuses. 
Rather, what is key is the accused’s particular place within the patronage bazaar of the domestic 
	
other severe deprivation of physical liberty,” the arrest warrant against him was lifted on 15 
June 2015 and he was reportedly present in Bamako during the signing of the Algiers peace 
agreement. FIDH 2015b; FIDH and AMDH 2016a. 
1013 McGovern 2003, 45. 
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politico-military landscape and, by extension, of the cost-benefit analysis of holding them 
accountable. This approach thus supports the argument that the balance of power is a central 
influence on the design and effectiveness of transitional justice mechanism.1014 In parallel, it 
suggests that one should not focus simply on the balance of power between reformers and 
spoilers, but rather on the political bargaining among elites around particular individuals.1015 
 Based on these findings, is also helpful to consider the varying success in actors’ 
strategic use of anti-impunity norm to shape the political landscape to further a particular 
outcome and consider what this reflects about the norm more broadly. The frequent use of 
formal and de facto amnesties to often successfully incentivise parties to join negotiations and 
cede power in Cote d’Ivoire and Mali continues the trend that Hayner and others have noted 
elsewhere - that it is often necessary to provide some type of provisional amnesty to facilitate 
negotiations.1016 The case studies illustrate how, despite the strengthening of the anti-impunity 
norm and the existence of the ICC, and even in cases in which the government proactively 
expressed support for the norm and invited the ICC to investigate, it has not yet been strongly 
internalized by authorities and opposition parties. Authorities continue to issue amnesties and 
take measures to obstruct accountability by capitalising on the weak domestic judicial 
institutions. Although, normative pressure against doing so does mean that amnesties are often 
implicit and de facto and authorities often deny explicitly blocking justice. While the UN did 
block the offer of formal amnesties for international crimes during the negotiations in Mali, the 
silence from the broader diplomatic community and from the ICC regarding the lifting of 
accountability measures in both countries also mollifies concern that the anti-impunity norm 
and the ICC have fundamentally changed the practice and prospects of peace-making and 
reveals the limits of the norm’s internalization. 
 Opposition parties also display confidence in the amnesties and protections from 
prosecution, including when the ICC has opened preliminary examinations and investigations. 
This trend does not support the view that the credibility of amnesties is waning in light of cases 
such as Charles Taylor and Mathieu Ngudjolo in which the accused were transferred to 
international courts despite benefitting from amnesties.1017 More specifically, the contrasting 
	
1014 See, for instance, Bell 2017, 96. 
1015 Waldorf 2017, 61. 
1016 Hayner 2018. 
1017 This trend is particularly relevant for Gbagbo, who was aware of the experience of Charles 
Taylor in neighbouring Liberia, in which Taylor struck a deal to leave the presidency and go 
into exile in Nigeria, but was later transferred and tried at the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 
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cases of Sanogo and Gbagbo present an interesting way to analyse how threats and incentives 
are used to convince leaders to step down. Both leaders were accused of responsibility for 
human rights abuses and both were offered de facto amnesty to incentivise them to cede power. 
Sanogo accepted the offer and stood down, while Gbagbo did not. Analysing the micro-
processes behind elite decision-making suggests that both had confidence in the amnesty offer 
but differed as to their assessment regarding the acceptability of the nature of the offer. Indeed, 
Gbagbo’s refusal to cede power appears to provide evidence for the argument that the 
strengthening of the anti-impunity norm makes leaders reluctant to cede power due to fear of 
prosecution. However, according to the independent accounts of six key actors with first-hand 
knowledge of Gbagbo’s decision-making, the fear of prosecution, either nationally or by the 
ICC, was not the reason for his refusal to cede power. According to UN SRSG Choi, the 
Gbagbo entourage did not take the threat of international justice seriously. In a conversation 
with Minister of Foreign Affairs Djédjé, Choi asked if he realised “that his friends risked being 
charged for crimes against humanity.” Choi said that Djédjé demonstrated a “manifest lack of 
interest” in international criminal law. He “did not know and did not have the time to dedicate 
to that type of thing.”1018 A senior advisor to Choi confirmed that the threat of prosecution 
never came up as a potential reason for Gbagbo’s intransigence, neither during the crisis nor in 
their meetings with Gbagbo while he was detained in Korhogo following the crisis. 1019 
According to the French Ambassador, Gbagbo was not concerned with the ICC. “He ruled out 
the possibility. He did not take it seriously. His behaviour implied ‘If they want to send me, 
then they should send me.’ I do not think it was a factor. Possibly in the last few hours, but not 
during the crisis.”1020 Asked whether the ICC was mentioned within Gbagbo’s entourage, 
	
Curiously, in pressuring Gbagbo to step down, ECOWAS envoy Obasanjo referred to Taylor 
as a cautionary tale. “Be prudent, think of what happened to Charles Taylor and his associates. 
If you cross the red line, you will be chased as long as you live and wherever you are.” Notin 
2013, 238. Also, The experience of Mathieu Ngudjolo in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) provides another cautionary tale. In February 2008, Ngudjolo was arrested and 
transferred to the ICC, several months after he received a general amnesty in exchange for 
demobilizing his troops. The DRC government’s ‘bait and switch’ tactic may further weaken 
the credibility of amnesties in light of the threat of ICC prosecution. 
1018 Choi 2015, 273. This was also corroborated by Djédjé, who explained that Gbagbo declined 
to give a scheduled television speech due to pressure by the hard-line faction. Interview with 
Alcide Djédjé, Abidjan, 4 November and 2 December 2015. 
1019 Phone Interview with senior advisor to UN SRSG Choi, 27 August 2018. 
1020  Interview with former Ambassador Jean-Marc Simon, Paris, 25 May 2016. Also, 
According to Colonel Héry, Defense Attaché at the Embassy of France in Côte d’Ivoire, “When 
the Ivorian army began using heavy weapons against the civilian population, we warned our 
contacts: ‘Vous faites n’importe quoi! You will be strictly sanctioned!’ But they did not believe 
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Djédjé stated it was not discussed. “We did not talk at all about the ICC. We rather talked about 
amnesties.” Rather than a threat, the ICC was “very, very far” from his decision-making.1021 
This suggests that Gbagbo had confidence the amnesty would be upheld by the Ouattara 
administration, reflecting Gbagbo’s perception that the anti-impunity norm was not 
internalized by the administration.        
 A key difference between both cases is arguably the target’s perception of the nature of 
the offer. Sanogo’s decision to step down can be explained by his assessment that the exit offer 
was satisfactory as it included protection for prosecution and enabled him to maintain a position 
of power within the military. Indeed, members of the junta maintained power within the 
Ministries of the Interior, Defense, and Territorial Administration.1022 Importantly, in light of 
his unconstitutional claim to power, he was also aware that his rule was time-limited and 
blatantly illegitimate. In contrast, for Gbagbo, the exit offer did not fit with his perception of 
the legitimacy of his constitutional claim to power and his concern that the offer of amnesty 
and exile, either inside or outside of the country, would leave him effectively powerless. His 
decision was likely shaped by the belief that his proposals for a vote recount or a power-sharing 
agreement were reasonable in light of his constitutional claim to power and by the misguided 
perception that there was still scope to negotiate a better deal, drawing on the expectation that 
friendly African states would support him. The significant pressure on him by hard-line 
members of his entourage also likely reinforced his belief that his constitutional claim to power 
should be respected and that he should stand up to international meddling in Ivorian politics. 
According to his Minister of Foreign Affairs Djédjé, who was on the moderate side, the 
pressure by this ‘hard-core’ faction, composed mainly of First Lady Simone Gbagbo, Gbagbo’s 
Minister of Interior Desiré Tagro, Commander of the Republican Guard General Dogbo Blé, 
and First Vice-President of the FPI and political advisor Aboudramane Sangaré, was more 
influential than concern over possible prosecution.1023 These two cases show that both leaders 
	
us. They insisted that we, as French, were not targeted.” Notin 2013, 291. In January 2011, 
Robert Bourgi, a key governmental figure in France-Africa relations and historically close to 
Gbagbo, repeated the offer of a “golden exile” with the status of a former head of state to 
Gbagbo. Gbagbo’s reported response suggests his lack of concern for prosecution. “Tell your 
friend Sarkozy that I will be his Mugabe! I will never leave Côte d’Ivoire to Ouattara – I will 
drench it in blood!” Notin 2013, 257. 
1021 Interview with Alcide Djédjé, Abidjan, 4 November and 2 December 2015. 
1022 Jamestown Foundation 2013. 
1023 Interview with Alcide Djédjé, Abidjan, 4 November and 2 December 2015. Also, according 
to SRSG Choi, the influence of this internal division within Gbagbo’s entourage was evident 
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had confidence that the amnesty offer would protect them from prosecution but differed as to 
the suitability of other aspects of the exit offer.  
 Through in-depth analysis of actors’ interests and decision-making, these case studies 
do not support claims that the increased threat that leaders will be held accountable for abuses, 
in light of the greater normative pressure to provide justice for abuses and the existence of the 
ICC, necessarily disincentivises leaders from ceding power. For instance, drawing on statistical 
analysis of leader culpability and patterns of leaders’ exile from 1960 to 2010, Krcmaric argues 
that, while culpable and nonculpable leaders previously went into exile at nearly identical rates, 
culpable leaders have been about six times less likely to go into exile since 1998 – a watershed 
year in international criminal justice marked by the creation of the ICC and the arrest of 
Augusto Pinochet.1024 Rather, this analysis thus shows the importance of taking into account 
target individual’s underlying motivations, perception, and the environment in which they 
operate to understand the effectiveness of strategic offers of amnesties and threats of 
prosecution.1025  
 While this chapter has so far recapitulated how elites use anti-impunity measures to 
shape power relations and optimise the government’s ability to extend effective control over 
the territory, thereby boosting one criteria of legitimacy, this thesis also traces how the norm is 
used to frame the reputation of actors as legitimate political interlocutors. It shows how, as 
Nouwen and Werner argue, elites used international criminal law to simultaneously frame 
themselves as friends of the international community as supporters of human rights and 
international law and frame their opposition as enemies of mankind as abusers of human 
rights.1026 This thesis develops this idea further by showing how elites in both countries did not 
simply use accusations of responsibility for grave abuses as a means to villainise its opposition, 
but rather used the anti-impunity norm as a discursive axis around which to craft their 
reputation as legitimate political interlocutors and their opposition as illegitimate in different 
and shifting ways as their aims evolved over time.  
 In Côte d’Ivoire, during the post-electoral crisis, Ouattara invoked the norm as early as 
the first week of the crisis as doing so was one of the only means available to him to frame his 
	
as early as December 2010 when he realised the moderates would be favourable to the Kérékou 
option but their voices were drowned out by the hardliners. Choi 2015, 230.      
1024 Krcmaric 2018, 486-498.  
1025 Mendeloff 2017, 4.   
1026 Nouwen and Werner 2011. 
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government as a legitimate member of ‘the global village’ and frame the sovereigntist rhetoric 
of the Gbagbo side as merely a pretext for committing abuses against the civilian population. 
In the wake of the crisis, Ouattara’s portrayal of the opposition shifted as it reflected the need 
to associate with a moderate opposition and served as a discursive axis around which to portray 
some members of the opposition as legitimate and others as not legitimate political 
interlocutors. In Mali, transitional authorities invoked their commitment to the anti-impunity 
norm as a means to frame their fledgling government as a legitimate member of the 
international community, facing a collection of criminal enemies. Since one of the justifications 
of international criminal justice is the protection of human diversity, which was being attacked 
by groups seeking to impose fundamentalist rule in northern Mali, deploying the norm helped 
governmental actors brand its opposition writ large – conflating both separatist and terrorist 
groups – as international criminals. Doing so contributed to undermining a rival narrative that 
sought to distinguish between separatist and terrorist groups. Yet, in the context of 
Ouagadougou and Algiers negotiations, authorities used the idea of the ‘terrorist-as-
international-criminal’ as an axis around which to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate political interlocutors, thus creating an opposition with whom the government 
could negotiate. Doing so obscured and overlooked the shifting links between ‘non-terrorist’ 
and ‘terrorist’ groups, as it ‘repoliticised’ influential individuals who previously belonged to 
‘terrorist’ groups. Tracing the shifting portraits of actors in light of the political exigencies of 
elite strategy within a conflict-affected scenario reveals the fluidity in labelling actors 
(il)legitimate interlocutors. 
 Overall, the thesis joins other studies on the strategic use of justice by showing how the 
“aspirations of the normatively ambitious international society,” which fuel for instance the 
transnational human rights activist networks that work towards cosmopolitan conceptions of 
governance, must still reckon with the preferences and interests of power that dominate the 
aspects of the old pluralist order.1027 The findings in this thesis support Lake’s analysis of 
conflict-related justice proceedings in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which traces how 
backstage political manoeuvrings determine who ends up being tried for conflict-related 
violence. Lake similarly finds that the quest for personal and organization survival and power 
explains why elites use post-conflict peace-building efforts such as human rights prosecutions 
strategically and support accountability against some accused and not others. Lake identifies 
	
1027 Hurrell 2007, 9. 
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similar motivations for elites to support or thwart accountability, including facilitating the 
removal of a potential challenger, securing a particular deal, rallying troops for a return to war, 
and shielding valuable subordinates.1028 The similarity in the findings makes sense as the three 
cases – DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali – to some extent share key features: conflict-affected 
contexts, powerful political and military elites, strong executive influence over weak judicial 
institutions, and fluidity between armed groups and between armed groups and officials. This 
thesis also echoes the findings of Loken, Lake, and Cronin-Furman, who show that authorities 
in Sri Lanka prosecuted perpetrators of sexual violence in particular in order to generate 
legitimacy among key domestic audiences.1029 Though this thesis focuses on selectivity in 
perpetrators, rather than selectivity in types of crimes, both studies highlight how conflict-
related justice can be closely tied to elite objectives. 
 While this thesis argues that the selective approach to accountability is a function of 
internal political dynamics, other scholars analyse similarly selective approaches to 
accountability in other countries, though argue they are a function of responding to external 
pressure to pursue justice.1030 For instance, in a detailed study on the politics of justice in the 
Balkans, Subotić argues that states comply with transitional justice norms in response to 
different types of international pressure - coercive, symbolic, and bureaucratic – and in order 
to gain certain benefits, such as membership in the European Union. Subotić argues that the 
way in which elites approach transitional justice, in response to external pressure and 
incentives, leads to outcomes that directly undermine the fundamental goals of transitional 
justice and benefit authorities. 1031  Similarly, Cronin-Furman argues that elites establish 
ineffective, or quasi-compliant, institutions in order to avoid external penalties such as potential 
reduction in foreign military or development aid.1032 While supporting these studies’ findings 
that actors use the norm to resolve political contestation in ways that are favourable to elite 
interests, in part by limiting the effectiveness and independence of national judicial institutions, 
this thesis shows it was not necessarily done to placate international pressure but rather 
according to the exigencies of the domestic landscape. It would be interesting, in future 
research, to explore the influence of international pressure more systematically.   
	
1028 Lake 2017.  
1029 Loken, Lake, and Cronin-Furman 2018. 
1030 MacDonald 2019; Leclercq 2017.  
1031 Subotić 2009.  
1032 Cronin-Furman 2015. See also Leclercq 2017.  
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The ICC in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali 
  
 Having explored the feedback between elite political bargaining and anti-impunity 
measures in the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, the section below focuses on the decision-
making of the ICC Office of the Prosecutor and analyses why the ICC’s decisions aligned with 
the strategic objectives of elite state actors in both countries. It also considers what this means 
about international criminal justice more broadly. As introduced in Chapter 1, the ICC occupies 
a rather paradoxical position within the highly politicised contexts of armed conflict. Treading 
an interpretive high-wire, the ICC Prosecutor has identified one the Court’s aims as 
contributing to peace and security and has stated that the ICC does not want to be a spoiler, 
though also insists that “political considerations relating to peace and security” do not form 
part of the decision-making process of the OTP.1046 The paradox of the ICC’s position does not 
stem strictly from its nature as a legal institution that is predisposed to working in conflict 
zones. Rather, it emerges from its creation as a compromise between the project of international 
criminal justice and states’ sovereignty concerns. More precisely, highlighting how a “major 
purpose of law is to constrain power, and yet law requires power to be enforced,”1047 the ICC 
was designed to be independent from states and detached from politics while also being 
dependent on states and engaged in political contexts.1048    
 The way in which the OTP has navigated its position in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali 
continues a pattern seen in investigations based on self-referrals and Article 12(3) declarations, 
in which states and the Court establish a generally uncompetitive relationship and in which the 
ICC’s decisions align with elite officials’ interests. As Table 4 illustrates, the ICC arrest 
warrants in these cases, in contrast with cases based on proprio motu and UN Security Council 
referrals, focus only on the government’s opposition. Also, the referring governments have not 
been accused of non-cooperation and have issued only one admissibility challenge. Further, 
invoking the duty to respond and prosecute international crimes was used to mobilise support 
and convince UN Security Council members to authorize greater force against the opposition. 
This also echoes what some scholars view of Uganda’s instrumentalisation of its self-referral 
	
1046 Hayner 2018, 88-89. See also Bensouda 2013b. 
1047 Robinson 2015, 338. 
1048 Robinson 2011, 368. As former Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo stated, “[T]here seems to be 
a paradox: the ICC is independent and interdependent at the same time. It cannot act alone. It 
will achieve efficiency only if it works closely with other members of the international 
community.” Moreno-Ocampo 2003. 
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to the ICC to justify its military operations against the LRA.1049 On the other hand, unlike in 
Uganda and DRC, the ICC’s activities in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali have not been accused of 
complicating elite’s strategies within peace negotiations and undermining the use of national 
amnesties.1050 This is largely due to the timing of ICC arrest warrants, which were issued after 
the end of the negotiations and thus did not block the talks.1051   
 Many argue, especially regarding investigations based on self-referrals and Article 
12(3) declarations, that the alignment between the ICC and state interests is normatively 
objectionable and amounts to ‘lawfare’ in the pejorative sense, as it reflects how the ICC 
pursues ‘political’ justice to maintain states’ support. This argument takes the form of the 
apologia critique, or that the prosecutorial strategy is too close to power and the interests of 
states, lacking critical bite, and is thus unprincipled or unambitious. Schabas captures this 
critique by stating, “when a State is actively engaged in initiation of the process, there is 
potential for manipulation. In effect, the state quite predictably uses the international institution 
to pursue its enemies…”1052 Conversely, the utopia critique argues that the ICC is too removed 
from power, lacking in support, and thereby jeopardises its effectiveness - or even harms peace-
making initiatives.1053 
 Offering a path to move beyond this apologia criticism, this section argues that it is not 
inherently normatively objectionable and does not reflect ‘lawfare’ as the Court did not 
misapply its legal mandate in order to adapt to states’ preferences. Rather than being 
instrumentalized and assuming a submissive role to states, the OTP navigated its paradoxical 
	
1049 Rodman and Booth 2013, 273; Branch 2011, 191; Clark 2008, 43. 
1050 In the emblematic peace vs. justice situation in Uganda, the ICC arrest warrant for Joseph 
Kony was blamed for the inability of the parties to reach a peace deal. Branch 2011; Clark 
2011; Souaré 2009. In Libya, De Waal notes that the ICC arrest warrants against the elder and 
younger Gaddafi and Senussi weakened the viability of any peaceful resolution as it 
“threatened to close the door on any solution that involved Gaddafi going quietly into exile.” 
De Waal 2013, 71. See also Clark 2018. 
1051 In Côte d’Ivoire, the arrest warrants for Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé, and Simone 
were all issued after the end of the post-electoral crisis and thus did not block the termination 
of the crisis, but rather concretised the one-sided victory. In Mali, the ICC arrest warrants did 
not derail negotiations as they were issued on 18 September 2015 for Al Mahdi and on 27 
March 2018 for Al Hassan, both following the signing of the June 2015 Algiers Accord. This 
supports Gissel’s argument that low levels of ICC involvement allow mediators and parties to 
maintain politico-legal and discursive authority during negotiations. Gissel 2015. 
1052 Schabas 2008, 16. 
1053  Robinson 2011, 326. As Koskenniemi explains, the apologia critique highlights how 
decisions, when too close to power, can lack the normativity of law. The utopia critique 
highlights how decisions, when too far from power, can lack the groundedness of law. 
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position and pursued its objectives of holding at least some landmark trials without spoiling 
ongoing efforts to end the conflict. Indeed, while the patterns illustrated in Table 4 show how 
the ICC’s record as a constraint on states that request its intervention is so far limited, and thus 
prompts apologia critiques, the table also shows that the rate of successful enforcement of arrest 
warrants is slightly higher in cases of self-referrals and Article 12(3) declarations compared to 
other trigger mechanisms, thereby placating utopia critiques. 1054  Thus, even though its 
inevitable selectivity benefits some actors over others, considering its political embeddedness 
as it crafts its prosecutorial decisions does not inherently mean the OTP undermines its legal 
mandate. As the Prosecutor followed its legal mandate, the controversies surrounding whether 
the Prosecutor upheld the norms of impartiality and gravity actually reveal tensions within 
these prosecutorial norms themselves. More broadly, the way in which one evaluates this 
practice depends on one’s normative view of what the relationship between law and power, or 
between states and the ICC, should be, and whether the ICC should account for or ignore the 
reality that its pursuit of justice is inherently embedded in a political context.   
 Though created as a legal institution that is expected to contribute to the highly political 
project of ending conflict, it is arguably impossible for the ICC to simultaneously uphold its 
duty to pursue justice and contribute to ending conflict without compromising on its aspiration 
to not consider how its activities would shape, and be shaped by, the political environment. 
The prosecutorial strategies in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali are indeed the product of the ‘tactical 
rapport’ between the OTP and the government, i.e. of the relationship between the tactics used 
by the OTP to operate as an effective prosecutorial body and the tactics used by national 
authorities to navigate the post-crisis stabilisation.1055 The section below analyses the tactical 
rapport in both Côte d’Ivoire and Mali and explores how various factors, namely its dependence 
on state cooperation, shaped the OTP’s prosecutorial decisions in both countries in a way that 
aligned with state interests. 
  
	
1054 Koskenniemi’s framework shows how any “doctrine, argument or position” can plausibly 
be accused of either being “too political in the sense of being too dependent on State Policy” 
or “too political because founded on speculative utopias.” The versatility of the accusation 
makes it inescapable, so “the more it tries to escape from one, the deeper it sinks into the 
others.” Koskenniemi 2006, 23-24, 65. As a result, one can only choose “which forms of 
perfectly plausible criticism will be applied to your decision” and which criticism your decision 
will simultaneously placate. Robinson 2015, 336. 




The OTP’s decision to sequence its investigations, by prosecuting the pro-Gbagbo side 
first and committing to investigating the pro-Ouattara side subsequently, sparked huge 
controversy among Ivorians. Critics argue that the decision reflects pro-Ouattara bias and 
simply mirrors at an international level the victor’s justice pursued by the Ouattara 
administration at the national level. At the same time, reflecting the polarised nature of Ivorian 
politics, one survey recorded that 47% of respondents held positive views of the ICC.1056  
Knowing it would prompt fervent criticism, why, then, did the OTP pursue a sequenced 
prosecutorial strategy? To answer this question, one needs to analyse the tactical rapport 
between the sitting government and the OTP. The Ouattara administration had an interest in 
steering the country through the post-crisis transition. The OTP had an interest in serving as an 
effective prosecutorial body. Thus, the latter pursued a sequenced prosecutorial strategy to 
optimize its chances of conducting effective investigations and prosecutions against at least 
some alleged perpetrators. Indeed, at least three factors, both internal aspects as well as the 
opportunities and challenges inherent to the Ivorian context, explain the decision-making 
behind this pragmatic approach. This strategy nevertheless did not undermine the ICC’s 
impartiality. Rather, the controversy reveals a tension within the norm of prosecutorial 
impartiality itself as the Prosecutor adopted the legalist vision of impartiality enshrined in the 
Rome Statute, while critics adopted a political vision of impartiality.   
Regarding the tactical rapport, a first internal factor was the high stakes created by the 
possibility for the Court to send a strong message: that those at the highest ranks of power are 
still subject to being held accountable for grave crimes. Robert Jackson, referring to the 
Nuremberg trial, famously stated that “[c]ourts try cases, but cases also try courts.”1057 The trial 
of Laurent Gbagbo, the first former head of state tried by the ICC, is certainly one such case. 
The imperative to win may also have grown as the cases against Kenyan President Uhuru 
Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto concurrently disintegrated. The OTP could not risk 
losing such a similar case, in which abuses were committed in the wake of a contested election 
by two sides, with one side closely linked to high-ranking members of the sitting government. 
Another aspect of internal pressures is the impact of resource limitations, which is often 
	
1056 Pham and Vinck 2014, 26. 
1057 Jackson 1945, 15. 
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underestimated. The OTP consistently claimed that while investigations covered abuses 
committed by all parties, resource constraints and unforeseen developments, such as the Mali 
self-referral and the transfers of Bosco Ntaganda and Dominic Ongwen, forced them to 
prioritize the Gbagbo case.1058 Faced with a limited budget and multiple investigations with 
uncertain futures, the Prosecutor decided to “prioritize and focus on those investigations that 
seem most urgent or the most likely to move forward.”1059   
 Second, in light of external factors, the likelihood of successfully investigating the 
Gbagbo side appeared high. Laurent and Simone Gbagbo were already detained, President 
Ouattara had repeatedly committed to cooperating with the ICC, and the Prosecutor had 
valuable diplomatic support as international consensus viewed Gbagbo as the main obstacle 
towards peace.1060 Further, due to the presence of journalists, defectors from the Gbagbo side, 
and UN and French officials, there was significant evidence available regarding events that 
occurred in Abidjan, where pro-Gbagbo forces were accused of committing most of the 
abuses.1061 In the wake of the crisis, conducting investigations in Abidjan was more feasible 
than in the west due to continued insecurity, where most of the abuses by pro-Ouattara forces 
took place.1062 Thus, according to an advisor to the Prosecutor, the OTP was able to quickly 
open cases against the Gbagbo side. “There was a lot of information, videos and allegations 
about the events in Abidjan. These pieces of evidence pointed us fairly quickly to those persons 
who we believe were responsible for part of the crimes.”1063 It was also crucial to not let 
evidence succumb to the perils of time. “When you have a team working on a particular event 
- we prefer to talk about events, not one side or the other side - you don’t leave it and rush to 
another.”1064 As evidence is gathered, and the viability of a given case improves, increased 
resources are needed to process, translate, analyse the information, and take further steps. “We 
	
1058 Office of the Prosecutor 2013c, 14; Office of the Prosecutor 2015, 18. 
1059 Whiting 2014, 176. 
1060 The UN Security Council Resolution 1975 (2011) established targeted sanctions against 
Laurent Gbagbo, citing “obstruction of the peace and reconciliation process, rejection of the 
results of the presidential election.” UN Doc. S/RES/1975 2011. 
1061 Straus 2011, 483. 
1062 UN Doc. S/2012/766 2012, 3. 
1063 Leeuwen 2015.  
1064 Interview with two ICC officials, The Hague, 21 September 2016. 
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had to sequence investigations because we managed to achieve results.”1065 As Prosecutor 
Moreno Ocampo explained, “It was less complicated to get evidence against Laurent Gbagbo 
and Blé Goudé.”1066 
 Third, due to a factor beyond the OTP’s control, the strategy of sequenced prosecutions 
was pragmatic in light of the challenges of prosecuting both sides simultaneously. Even if the 
OTP had sufficient resources, it is unlikely that the Prosecutor would have launched 
simultaneous parallel investigations into both sides as this would have risked jeopardizing state 
cooperation due to the influence held by those most likely to be directly or indirectly affected 
by investigations into the pro-Ouattara side, namely the ex-ComZones. Put differently, the OTP 
risked sawing off the branch it was sitting on, i.e. the cooperation by Ivorian authorities. This 
is because, by cooperating with ICC investigations against influential individuals, the Ouattara 
government itself risked sawing off the branch it was sitting on, i.e. the support of the 
ComZones who were crucial figures in the security apparatus.1067 The OTP’s experience in 
Kenya also serves as a cautionary tale. Its decision to charge high-level influential individuals 
on both sides of the conflict simultaneously prompted significant political meddling that 
contributed to the case’s unravelling. Rejecting accusations of biased investigations in Côte 
d’Ivoire, the OTP’s Head of International Cooperation explained that the Office had “learnt 
from [its] experience in Kenya that it is better to first secure cooperation from the 
government.”1068 
 More concretely, parallel investigations would also have faced practical challenges. 
The risk of intimidation faced by victims and witnesses who would help to build a case against 
pro-Ouattara leaders was high. According to an observer very familiar with the dynamics 
within the security apparatus, some military leaders are unable to sanction the former 
ComZones. 1069  Ivorian Ministry of Justice officials acknowledged that lack of domestic 
protection measures may discourage witnesses and victims, particularly victims of crimes 
committed by pro-Ouattara forces, to come forward.1070 Another practical challenge relates to 
the difficulties in gaining the trust and cooperation of witnesses and victims of crimes by pro-
	
1065 Interview with two ICC officials, The Hague, 21 September 2016. 
1066 Interview with former ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Oxford, 12 May 2018. 
1067 Rosenberg 2017, 475. 
1068 Louw-Vaudran 2014. 
1069 Interview with senior official in an international organisation, Abidjan, 11 December 2015. 
1070 HRW 2013, 54. 
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Ouattara forces. Members of the truth commission noted reluctance in certain pro-Gbagbo 
communities to engage with justice-related mechanisms, as they deplore Gbagbo’s arrest and 
were sceptical of engaging with governmental or ICC initiatives.1071 Viewed together, the 
apparent feasibility of investigating crimes by pro-Gbagbo forces in Abidjan, the limited 
resources, the risk of jeopardizing cooperation by Ivorian authorities, and concerns regarding 
victims and witnesses rendered investigations into pro-Gbagbo forces first more likely to be 
effective. This higher likelihood of conducting effective investigations, of course, does not 
mean the case against Gbagbo and Blé Goudé will ultimately result in a conviction. 
 
Impartiality at Stake? 
 
 A range of actors, from Gbagbo’s supporters, to human rights organisations, to UN 
human rights monitors have expressed criticism of the OTP’s strategy.1072 Critics argue that 
upholding prosecutorial impartiality requires both sides to be prosecuted at the same time in 
order for the investigations not to weaken the pro-Gbagbo side while leaving the pro-Ouattara 
side untouched. This strand of criticism is the apologia critique of the ‘too close/too far’ dyad, 
featuring claims that “too much contact with states leads to fears about erosion of 
independence, secret ‘side agreements,’ or at least of the temptation to alter case selection to 
reflect the presumed wishes of the partner.” Conversely, the OTP’s strategy placated the utopia 
critique, which argues “you are not doing enough to maintain relations with partners and thus 
undermining your effectiveness.”1073 
 Even though the OTP’s strategy aligned with the government’s interest, and even 
bolstered its power position vis-à-vis its opposition, it does not mean the Prosecutor is 
undermining the mandate of acting impartially. Assessing whether this undermines the OTP’s 
mandate of impartiality depends on one’s vision of impartiality, and more broadly of what the 
relationship between the OTP and states should be. As this author has developed more 
	
1071 Respectively, interviews with former staff members of the Commission on Dialogue, Truth 
and Reconciliation, Abidjan, 11 November 2015 and 2 December 2015.  
1072 For example, the president of one of the foremost Ivorian human rights groups lamented 
that “the ICC regularly comes to Abidjan but is only prosecuting the pro-Gbagbo side, even 
though we know that … both sides are guilty and their responsibility has been established.” 
BBC 2014; Rosenberg 2017, 479 – 480.  
1073 Robinson 2015, 339. 
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extensively elsewhere, this is because the Prosecutor and her critics are speaking at cross-
purposes as they operate under two different visions of impartiality – the legalist and the 
political visions. 1074  These visions fundamentally disagree on two issues: whether 
investigations against both sides should be simultaneous and whether judicial proceedings 
should purposely avoid shaping the balance of power between parties.  
 According to the legalist vision, which is most clearly enshrined in the Rome Statute 
and the OTP’s policy guidelines, and which underpins the OTP’s approach, the Prosecutor shall 
“apply the same processes, methods, criteria, and thresholds for members of all groups, without 
any distinction based on grounds outlined in articles 27(1) and 21(3) of the ICC Statute.”1075 
Focusing on the Prosecutor’s ‘state of mind’ in relation to the issues and the parties, such 
impartial conduct must encompass even-handedness among possible targets of investigations 
and “fair-minded and objective treatment of persons and issues.”1076  Notably, there is no 
requirement of simultaneous impartiality, meaning sequenced investigations are perfectly in 
line with the OTP’s mandate. Relatedly, impartial judgment during decision-making does not 
have to ensure that the outcome of this treatment is the same. Though it may seem paradoxical, 
as outlined in the OTP’s Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation, pursuing an 
impartial strategy “may in fact lead to different outcomes for different groups.” The Prosecutor 
should not seek to establish “equivalence of blame” within a situation nor “create the 
appearance of parity between rival parties by selecting cases that would not otherwise meet the 
criteria.” 1077  In other words, the Prosecutor should not act in an arithmetic fashion and 
prosecute three from one side and three from the other just to appear impartial. Thus, if the 
domestic balance of power is tipped as a result of the Prosecutor’s actions, so be it. 
 However, criticism is grounded in the political vision of impartiality, which judges the 
Prosecutor’s impartiality based on its appearance of political neutrality. In contrast to the 
procedural and internal dimension of the legalist vision, the political vision can be understood 
as the perceptual and externalized dimension of the Prosecutor’s decision-making process. The 
key question to be asked is ‘did the Prosecutor’s decision appear to benefit one side of the 
conflict?’ As famously stated by a United States Supreme Court Justice, “[j]ustice must satisfy 
	
1074 Rosenberg 2017, 2017. 
1075  This includes gender, age, race, color, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth, or other status, or official capacity. Office of the 
Prosecutor 2016, 19-20.  
1076 Rhoads 2016, 27. 
1077 Office of the Prosecutor 2016, 19-20. 
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the appearance of justice.”1078 Also, in Daktaras v. Lithuania, the European Court of Human 
Rights concluded that “even appearances [of impartiality] may be of a certain importance.”1079 
Notably, underlying the expectation that all individuals must be seen to be treated equally and 
in a politically neutral and balanced manner is an implicit expectation that they be treated 
equally at the same time. Put simply, there is an expectation of simultaneous impartiality. As 
the leader of an Ivorian human rights organisation deplored, “[j]ustice delayed is justice 
denied.”1080 Relatedly, being impartial means being politically neutral and balanced. Counter-
intuitively, then, the Prosecutor should avoid tipping the balance of power by shaping 
prosecutions according to the balance of power. In sum, because of the tension within the norm 
of impartiality itself, the Prosecutor can reasonably argue she is acting impartially while 
reasonably being accused of bias, as both sides presume clashing visions of impartiality.1081 
Reflecting the “dual quality” of norms in international relations, these visions can be at odds 





 The OTP’s approach in Mali was much less controversial than its strategy in Côte 
d’Ivoire. Nevertheless, the trial of Al Mahdi, as well as the more recent transfer of Al Hassan, 
raise pertinent questions around the Prosecutor’s case selection. The OTP optimised its chances 
of conducting effective investigations and prosecutions against at least two alleged criminals 
whilst not undermining the Malian government’s interests. By questioning why more senior 
individuals were not prosecuted and why the charges left out the crime of sexual violence, 
	
1078 Offut v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
1079 Judgment, Daktaras v. Lithuania, ECtHR (2000), Appl. no. 42095/98, 30-32.   
1080 Interview with the president of an Ivorian human rights organisation, Abidjan, 3 December 
2015.   
1081 Commenting on the Côte d’Ivoire strategy, the ICC Deputy Prosecutor James Stewart 
insisted that the OTP was impartial but, ‘[s]ometimes … [y]ou have to make a choice between 
action and paralysis and between pragmatism and ideals. And I think if you choose pragmatic 
action, you really shouldn’t be criticized.” Kersten 2013.    
1082 Wiener 2007.  
 240 
critics questioned whether these cases fulfilled the ICC’s raison d’être - to prosecute those most 
responsible for the most serious crimes.   
 Whereas the question at the heart of the controversy in Côte d’Ivoire was the legal 
concept of impartiality and the broader idea of equilibrium, or whether the ICC was unduly 
exacerbating the political balance of power, the question at the heart of the debate surrounding 
the prosecutorial strategy in Mali is the legal concept of gravity and the broader idea of 
hierarchy, or whether the ICC was pursuing a strategy that undermined the Court’s telos of 
prosecuting those who bear the greatest responsibility for the gravest crimes. As argued below, 
the prosecutorial strategy did not undermine the gravity criterion of the ICC’s mandate as the 
Prosecutor adopts the legalist vision of gravity enshrined in the Rome Statute, while critics 
adopt the teleological vision of gravity. The section below first analyses the tactical rapport, 
showing how at least three factors, based on internal factors as well as the opportunities and 
challenges inherent to the Malian context, shaped the Prosecutor’s strategy. It then presents 
how the concerns raised by observers reveal a tension within the concept of gravity in 
international criminal law. 
 Why did the OTP pursue a rather minimalist prosecutorial strategy, first targeting Al 
Mahdi for only one charge more than three years after the opening of its investigation?1083 First, 
this strategy represented the possibility for the Court to break new ground as it set a number of 
firsts. The Al Mahdi conviction marked the first time the ICC prosecuted the crime of directing 
an attack against buildings dedicated to religion and historic monuments which were not 
military objectives, pursuant to Article 8(2)(e)(iv), the first time this charge was the sole charge 
of any case at the ICC, ICTY, and ICTR, and the first time a defendant at the ICC pled guilty. 
It was hailed by academics and human rights organisations as a landmark moment in 
international justice that “send[s] a powerful message of international condemnation,”1084 a 
“victory for the victims of crimes committed in Mali since 2012,”1085 and a “clear message on 
attacking world’s treasures.”1086  
 It also marked the first time an Islamist was prosecuted in The Hague and thus the first 
the ICC could so actively position itself as a partner in the “war on terror” against, as Al Mahdi 
	
1083 As the Al Hassan case had not begun at the time of writing, this section focuses primarily 
on the case against Al Mahdi.   
1084 Rosenberg 2017b. 
1085 FIDH 2016b. 
1086 HRW 2016b. 
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characterised them, the “deviant people from Al Qaeda and Ansar Dine.”1087 In announcing the 
investigation just five days after Operation Serval began, Prosecutor Bensouda stated, “Justice 
can play its part in supporting the joint efforts of the ECOWAS, the AU, and the entire 
international community to stop the violence and restore peace to the region.” 1088  By 
prosecuting the destruction of the world-renowned Timbuktu mausoleums, it served as a 
message of international condemnation of similar acts elsewhere, to which the international 
community was unable to respond either by force or by law.1089 At a regional level, this strategy 
was also helpful in countering the confrontation between the ICC and African states, as it 
illustrated cooperation between the Court and both Mali and Niger. As Prosecutor Bensouda 
stated, “Key regional and international organizations have acknowledged the need for justice 
as part of the resolution of the crisis in Mali.”1090 This framing was particularly advantageous 
in light of the broader anti-ICC mobilisation amongst African state leaders and the AU. 
 Second, the likelihood of successfully investigating Al Mahdi appeared high. Mali’s 
request for ICC intervention in July 2012 signalled its intention to cooperate with the Court, 
Al Mahdi was already detained in Niger and committed to cooperating with OTP investigators 
early on, and, most importantly, much damning evidence presented against him was easily 
accessible. This footage includes videos showing Al Mahdi in a blue vest with the label 
“Comité Al-Hisbah, Timbuktu,” carrying a Kalashnikov and explaining to journalists the 
reasons why the buildings needed to be destroyed: “We are going to wipe out from our 
landscape all that does not belong there.”1091 The videos also show him at the mausoleums, 
sometimes holding a pickaxe, encouraging other men to destroy the tombs. He basically took 
a ‘selfie’ while committing a war crime. Other accessible evidence includes satellite imagery 
of the mausoleums, archive photographs of the mausoleums before their destruction, and legal 
documents regarding the protected status of the buildings. This availability of evidence reduced 
the need for ICC investigators to grapple with the security challenges in Timbuktu, not only 
	
1087 Transcript of Al Mahdi Hearing, 9. 
1088 Office of the Prosecutor 2013a. 
1089 These include the destruction of archaeological sites like Nimrud in Iraq or Palmyra in 
Syria, as well as the destruction of huge Buddhist shrines in Bamiyan by the Taliban in 2001. 
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1090 Office of the Prosecutor 2013a. 
1091 Rosenberg 2016b. 
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for themselves but also for the people with whom they interact.1092 These factors made the Al 
Mahdi case an evidentiary “slam dunk,” enabling the Prosecutor to carry out a landmark case 
while spending few precious resources. 
 These factors also meant that investigations into the destruction of cultural heritage 
were easier than investigations into other crimes, namely sexual violence. As Heller notes, “It’s 
difficult to prove sexual violence…You have to investigate, to get witnesses. It’s not like 
cultural monuments that people saw. This is time-consuming and expensive.”1093  This is 
particularly the case in Mali, where sexual violence is a taboo subject and in which many 
individuals potentially responsible for crimes committed in Timbuktu still reside in or around 
the area.  According to a member of the OTP, the ICC did not have evidence that was solid 
enough to broaden the charges against Al Mahdi but the investigation for crimes such as sexual 
violence was “still in progress.”1094 These investigations indeed led to the charge for sexual 
violence issued against Al Hassan, a case built upon the Al Mahdi case. 
 Third, due to a factor beyond the OTP’s control, the strategy of prosecuting Al Mahdi, 
and later Al Hassan, rather than individuals at higher levels of the echelon, was pragmatic in 
light of the dynamics of the Malian context. A quick scan of those potentially responsible for 
alleged crimes during the Timbuktu occupation shows that most other individuals who served 
in the leadership circles during the occupation are either dead, in hiding, or – more importantly 
- protected through political interests. At the highest levels of AQIM leadership in Timbuktu 
was Abou Zeid, the “Governor” of Timbuktu during the occupation, and Yahia Abou Al 
Hammam, who is AQIM’s Emir for the Sahara and a US and UN-designated terrorist. The 
former was confirmed dead in March 2013 and the latter is in hiding. Abdallah Al Chinguetti, 
a religious scholar within AQIM and member of the Presidency in occupied Timbuktu, who 
was named by the OTP as “a member of the common plan”1095 to destroy the mausoleums, was 
also confirmed dead in June 2013.  
	
1092 Highlighting the high feasibility of the Al Mahdi case is not to say the ICC took an 
“armchair” approach. Between September 2014 and September 2017, the OTP conducted 91 
missions to at least nine countries to collect evidence and build cooperation with states 
regarding the Mali situation. ICC Assembly of States Parties 2015; ICC Assembly of States 
Parties. 2016; ICC Assembly of States Parties 2017. 
1093 Forestier 2016. 
1094 Forestier 2016. 
1095 Prosecutor Submission on Sentencing, para 33.   
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 Further, as explained in Chapter 7, several individuals (in addition to Al Mahdi and Al 
Hassan) were named by human rights groups in criminal complaints as bearing alleged 
responsibility for human rights abuses. Of these, the most influential is Iyad Ag Ghaly, the 
leader of Ansar Dine and present in Timbuktu during the occupation, who allegedly took the 
decision to destroy the mausoleums.1096 To illustrate his politico-military weight, one official 
referred to him as the “Darth Vader” of Mali.1097 Though he is the head of a recently-formed 
alliance of terrorist groups – the al Qaeda’s Group for Support of Islam and Muslims (Jama'a 
Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin,' JNIM) – he is also seen by many as crucial for the conflict’s 
resolution.1098 Also named in criminal complaints were individuals who formed the local level 
of leadership and who were recruited from the Timbuktu region in order to administer the new 
institutions. These included the spokesperson of Ansar Dine, Sanda Ould Bouamana, who was 
also named in an ICC briefing and was, as mentioned previously, released from custody as part 
of the negotiations and is now in hiding.1099 Also, despite the widely known accusations against 
him, Houka Houka, the judge of the Islamic Tribunal of Timbuktu, was arrested by Malian 
authorities based on charges of human rights abuses and then released. He now lives freely in 
the Timbuktu region, with the tacit acceptance of Malian authorities. 
 These examples reveal how other individuals at equal or higher echelons of leadership 
as Al Mahdi and Al Hassan are beyond the reach of the ICC and show how the ICC must 
navigate the vagaries of killings, captures, and releases of actors in the Sahelian ‘war on terror.’ 
In contrast, the apprehension of Al Mahdi and Al Hassan was feasible, as there was both state 
willingness and ability to transfer them to the ICC, likely due to their low political value in the 
eyes of Malian or regional states. Ironically, in the age of the ICC, these individuals then 
become “‘larger-than-life’ characters, who stand in for all the numerous others who could not 
be found or who could not feasibly be tried.”1100 Viewed together, his detention, the evidentiary 
basis against him, and his particular political profile rendered the prosecution of Al Mahdi for 
the destruction of cultural heritage in Timbuktu highly likely to be effective and swift.  
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 244 
Gravity at Stake? 
 
 Critics of the ICC Prosecutor’s strategy to first charge Al Mahdi with one charge of 
destruction of cultural heritage argue that the ICC is erring in not prosecuting an individual 
with greater responsibility and for crimes deemed graver.1101  This is a two-fold criticism 
highlighting the degree of participation of the alleged perpetrator and the impact of the crime. 
This criticism is the apologia critique of the ‘too low and too easy / too high and too hard’ dyad, 
in which critics argue that the prosecutor’s opportunism steers her away from powerful actors 
and fails “to fulfil the true ambitions of the project.” Conversely, the prosecutor’s strategy 
placated the utopia critique, which argues that the Court errs by focusing unrealistically on ‘big 
fish,’ rather than manageable cases, thereby undermining its effectiveness.1102  
 These visions disagree as to whether the Prosecutor’s decision to charge certain 
individuals with certain crimes reflects her judgment that these are the worst individuals and 
the worst crimes. According to the legalist vision, the one enshrined in the Rome Statute and 
that underpins the OTP’s policies, the OTP “will select cases for investigation and prosecution 
in light of the gravity of the crimes, the degree of responsibility of the alleged perpetrators and 
the potential charges.”1103 However, the notion of gravity, which is not defined in the Rome 
Statute, allows room for prosecutorial discretion, including starting with lower-level 
perpetrators. Identifying who is most “most responsible” can be determined in various ways 
based on the facts of the case and on a number of criteria.1104 The Rome Statute also does not 
necessarily equate the responsibility to the de jure status of an individual within a structure. 
Various policy documents also indicate that the OTP is open to “a strategy of gradually building 
upwards” in order to ultimately have a reasonable prospect of conviction for the most 
responsible and will also “consider prosecuting lower level perpetrators where their conduct 
has been particularly grave or notorious.” 1105  During the trial, the Prosecutor indeed 
	
1101 In an unrelated criticism of the case, Schabas argues that Al Mahdi’s destruction of the 
mausoleums did not constitute an “attack” and should not have led to his conviction. Schabas 
2017.     
1102 Robinson 2015, 336-337. 
1103 Office of the Prosecutor 2016, para 6, 34. 
1104 These include the nature of the unlawful behaviour; the degree of their participation and 
intent; the existence of any motive involving discrimination; and any abuse of power or official 
capacity. Office of the Prosecutor 2016, para 43.   
1105 Office of the Prosecutor 2013c; Office of the Prosecutor 2014; Office of the Prosecutor 
2016, para 42. 
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highlighted that Al Mahdi bore great (not greatest) responsibility as a leading member of a 
group of people pursuing a common plan. Further, while the crimes covered by the Rome 
Statute are deemed the worst crimes, there is no legal hierarchy within these crimes. In other 
words, while the spotlight has recently increased on sexual and gender-based crimes as 
particularly heinous, and while genocide is deemed the “worst of the worst” crimes, there is no 
formal ranking of crimes as graver than others. Rather than arguing the destruction of the 
Timbuktu mausoleums was the worst crime perpetrated in Mali, the OTP went to great lengths 
to argue that the landmark case would show the need to treat this crime as equally grave as the 
others.1106 Importantly, the trial of Al Mahdi for attacks on bricks-and-mortar likely helped 
built the case against Al Hassan, who served as Al Mahdi’s colleague in Timbuktu, and who is 
charged for both attacks on cultural buildings but also for crimes against people, including 
torture, rape and sexual slavery, and persecution.  
 However, criticism is grounded in the teleological vision of gravity, which argues that, 
since the purpose of the ICC is to hold accountable those most responsible for the gravest 
crimes, then the Prosecutor’s decision to pursue Al Mahdi reflects her assessment that Al 
Mahdi is the most responsible and that the destruction of cultural heritage was the worst crime 
committed in Mali during the occupation. This also assumes there is a common metric by which 
this could be reasonably judged, which opens up a debate over who is the most responsible and 
which crime is the worst. In other words, this vision argues that the ICC’s prosecutorial strategy 
reflects the Prosecutor’s general normative judgment on the hierarchy of responsibility of all 
perpetrators and the hierarchy of all crimes committed. This criticism is captured by a 
fascinating op-ed written by Fatouma Harber, a teacher in Timbuktu, who questioned whether 
Al Mahdi was “deserving of the role in which he is being cast – as a major player in the 
occupation?...[Al Mahdi] is just a little fish.” Harber also argues that “[t]he cutting off of 
people’s hands and the executions that took place during Ansar Dine’s “new style” sharia for 
almost a year appear to be lesser crimes than the destruction, in which Al Faqi played a part, 
of UNESCO World Heritage sites.”1107 This is a much more widely noted criticism among 
those working in Mali and argues that physical harm, and especially sexual violence, should 
be deemed more heinous than the abstract harm caused by the destruction of the Timbuktu 
	
1106 According to an advisor within the OTP, “It’s important to send the message that this is a 
grave crime that must be punished and that attacking the identity of people and their values 
cannot be left as a secondary crime.” Forestier 2016. 
1107 Harber 2015 [emphasis added]. 
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mausoleums. Al Mahdi is indeed among various individuals accused of sexual violence during 
the occupation against roughly 100 women, a low estimate.1108 Put differently, while defending 
humanity, one should not overlook the humans. Overall, assessing whether the alignment 
between the OTP’s strategy and the government’s interest undermines the OTP’s mandate of 
prosecuting the most responsible for the worst crimes depends on one’s assessment of whether 
one adopts a legalist or teleological vision of gravity. 
 Beyond the impact of the ICC’s reliance on state cooperation in navigating its particular 
paradoxical position, another axis that enables a mutually advantageous relation is the 
complementarity regime. The complementarity regime enables states to deploy different 
versions of the norm as it fits their strategic objectives. Indeed, it enables states to deploy one 
version of the norm – that states do not need to prosecute international crimes and can instead 
outsource the cases through a burden-sharing approach to the ICC – while undermining the 
other version of the norm - that states have a duty to prosecute international crimes. As Schabas 
puts it, states can “respect its obligation to prosecute by failing to prosecute.”1109 This potential 
for strategic burden-sharing was already flagged during the Rome negotiations, when a 
representative noted that the Court “should not be used as a ‘garbage can’ into which national 
court systems dump criminals that they should be punishing at the national level.”1110 If these 
two versions of the norm can be reconciled into a broader imperative – that states investigate 
and prosecute nationally and, when unable or unwilling, cooperate with legal proceedings by 
international courts – then the inaction and unwillingness expressed by states can be understood 
as not normatively problematic.1111 
	
1108  Phone Interview with Malian human rights lawyer, 2 February 2017. Interview with 
researcher for a human rights organisation, Paris, 23 November 2016. 
1109 Schabas 2008, 7. For example, regarding the transfer of Al Mahdi to the ICC, Volgevang 
and Clerc argue that “the decision to prosecute Al Mahdi [at the ICC] seems to be contrary to 
the complementarity principle of the ICC, and against the rationale of establishing the ICC in 
the first place.” Volgevang and Clerc 2016. 
1110 L/2773 1996. 
1111 For further discussion, see Robinson 2011, 376. 
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 To facilitate such burden-sharing, governments in both Côte d’Ivoire1116 and Mali1117 
expressed a strategic admission of incapacity to prosecute grave crimes domestically. Further, 
neither government contested the admissibility of any case - except for that of Simone Gbagbo. 
As detailed in Chapter 5, the Ivorian government anticipated that a domestic trial of Gbagbo 
and Blé Goudé would be very costly and transferring them to The Hague would weaken its 
opposition. Regarding Simone Gbagbo, it deemed that a domestic trial would generate high 
costs, but that a transfer to the ICC would generate even higher costs.1118 Also, in Mali, even 
though investigations had been opened by investigative judges in Bamako into a criminal 
complaint lodged by human rights organisations that identified both Al Mahdi and Al Hassan 
as potential perpetrators, no case had officially been launched. The trial of Aliou Mahamane 
Touré for abuses showed it was not necessarily unable to try similar cases. Rather, the 
government’s decision to transfer them showed it was unwilling to carry out their prosecutions 
nationally, likely due to a lack of interest and resources. It also reflects how transferring them 
was not costly, as they were politically insignificant in the peace process. 
 Overall, by analysing the decision-making of the ICC, it explains why its prosecutorial 
approach led to the opening of some cases while also paralleling elite interests and strategy 
within the conflictual landscapes in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali. Examining the tactical rapport in 
both countries highlights how the OTP’s strategy was shaped by both opportunities for 
landmark and effective investigations while navigating the patronage bazaar of post-crisis 
transitions. Its approach arguably upholds a certain “ethic of responsibility” in balancing its 
objective of upholding (at least some) justice for (at least some) victims with the risks of 
derailing existing efforts to stabilise a politically volatile context. Rather than straightforward 
	
1116 In Côte d’Ivoire, the Prosecutor noted that “no national investigations or proceedings are 
pending in Côte d’Ivoire against those bearing the greatest responsibility for the most serious 
crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the Court allegedly committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 
28 November 2010”, referring to statements by President Ouattara and the Minister of Justice 
who informed him that “the most serious crimes should be addressed by the ICC.” OTP Further 
Information for Authorisation to Investigate, paras 3-4. 
1117 In Mali, the ICC Prosecutor noted that “the Malian authorities in referring the situation in 
Mali to the Court on 18 July 2012…informed the Office that Malian courts were, following the 
withdrawal of the judicial services from the northern cities, unable to prosecute crimes 
allegedly committed by armed groups in Mali.” Office of the Prosecutor 2013b, para 137.  
1118 Reflecting the different cost-benefit analysis depending on the accused, Ivorian authorities 
thereby used somewhat inconsistent reasoning. In September 2013, Côte d’Ivoire refused to 
transfer Simone Gbagbo, arguing it was able and willing to try the case in domestic courts, 
though agreed to transfer Blé Goudé six months later in March 2014, arguing it was unable and 
unwilling to try the case in domestic courts. 
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and objective, determining whether this mutually beneficial outcome is normatively 
problematic depends on one’s underlying vision of what the relationship between the ICC and 
states, or law and power, should be. Constructive debate over the appropriateness of this 
burden-sharing pattern seen particularly in cases of self-referrals and where governments 
request ICC intervention would thus benefit from addressing why one view is normatively 




 As of September 2018, four individuals find themselves living behind bars in The 
Hague. This was not the trajectory that Laurent Gbagbo, Charles Blé Goudé, Ahmad Al Mahdi, 
and Al Hassan had envisioned for themselves. The detention of these two pairs of ‘partners in 
crime’ is the result of a step change in the laws, treaties, and institutions aimed at ensuring 
criminal accountability for grave abuses – a significant shift that was driven by the work of 
transnational networks of human rights activists, scholars, and diplomats over several decades. 
By illustrating the challenges that continue to block the pursuit of justice for grave abuses, this 
thesis combines a cautious optimism about cosmopolitan normative ambition with a clear-eyed 
awareness that such progress takes place in an environment strongly shaped by sovereigntist 
concerns and elite interests.     
 This thesis seeks to explore head-on the implications of the real-world conditions of 
pursuing justice for grave abuses. It shows that elite actors used the anti-impunity norm as a 
resource as part of the political bargaining processes to favour certain outcomes over others, 
furthering its legitimation strategy in the context of internal conflict. This opened parallel paths 
of accountability for some and impunity for others. In other words, adopting a pragmatic 
approach to the normative expectation that states hold perpetrators of grave abuses criminally 
accountable, by selectively supporting or obstructing anti-impunity efforts, enabled actors to 
pursue objectives in the midst of conflict – including favouring the success of peace 
negotiations and stability – but in a way that clearly undermined the government’s expressed 
commitment to curbing impunity irrespective of the consequences. In this sense, the normative 
commitment to the imperative to hold individuals accountable for grave abuses expressed by 
elites and displayed through certain measures is not strong enough to convince actors to pay 
the high costs of doing so when it would complicate elite strategic interests.  
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 Overall, by offering novel theoretical and empirical insight, this thesis highlights the 
value of considering how elite political bargaining shapes the design and implementation of 
anti-impunity measures and the need to scrutinise not only the existence or absence of anti-
impunity measures but also their quality and their selectivity. It encourages both academics 
and practitioners within the fields of human rights advocacy and conflict resolution to prioritize 
context-specific approaches that analyse the messiness of the landscape of impunity in conflict-
affected contexts by considering how the anti-impunity norm is supported or subverted. Such 
questions include: Who benefits and who loses from the way justice was pursued? What cost-
benefit calculations have taken place regarding accountability? Does the existence of the ICC 
pressure, or relieve, states from the imperative to hold individuals accountable for grave 
abuses? Future scholars will hopefully apply this framework to generate rich findings in 
comparable cases. For instance, to what extent does it help explain the peace and justice 
dynamics in the case of Central African Republic, in light of on-going negotiations amidst ICC 
investigations and national anti-impunity measures? To what extent does this thesis translate 
to cases in which national authorities have initiated justice measures but in which the ICC has 
not yet opened an investigation, such as Guinea and Colombia? The thesis also contributes to 
the study of norms in practice, showing the value in studying how norms are used by actors 
and encouraging future scholars to draw upon the concept of ‘norm exploitation’ to reveal more 
about the interaction between norms and practice.       
 When asked how the question of justice for human rights abuses was being addressed 
during peace negotiations in Mali, the former European Union Special Representative to the 
Sahel replied, “It’s an impossible question.” 1119  This thesis has offered a better way to 
understand how this “impossible question” is answered in practice. While expedient, the 
consequences of the pragmatism seen in both Côte d’Ivoire and Mali may indeed prove that 
strategically compromising on holding perpetrators accountable for grave abuses in the short-
term is in fact a display of collectively irresponsibility in the long-term. Just as a country’s 
present political reality shapes and constrains the way justice is pursued today for past crimes, 
the way justice is pursued inevitably shapes the country’s political future. This thesis leaves it 
to future research to assess the long-term effects of striking political bargains around 
accountability in both countries. 
	
1119 Informal conversation with former European Union Special Representative for the Sahel 
Michel Reveyrand de Menthon, Cambridge, 18 March 2015. 
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Table 4:  
Profile of Indicted Parties, Admissibility Challenges, and Non-cooperation Findings in ICC Investigations 2002-2018 (arranged by referral type) 
Situation Referral Type Arrest Warrant 
for Gov. or Gov.-
Affiliated Actor   
Arrest Warrant 
of Opposition   
Enforced / Total  
Arrest Warrants 
Admissibility 
Challenges issued by 
Governments 




Uganda  Self-Referral 0 5 1/21121  No 01122 
DRC  Self-Referral 0 7 6/7 No 0 
CAR I Self-Referral 0 2 2/0  No 0 
CAR II Self-Referral 0 0 -- -- -- 
	
1121 Five arrest warrants were issued by the ICC. One accused, Joseph Kony, is still in hiding. Another accused, Dominic Ongwen, was transferred 
in 2015. Three other accused, Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, and Okot Odhiambo, have died. 
1122 The ICC judges issued a non-cooperation finding against Uganda in 2016. However, this related to its failure to arrest President Omar Al-




Côte d’Ivoire  Proprio Motu/ 
(Article 
12(3))1123 
0 3 2/3 Yes, Prosecutor v. 
Simone Gbagbo1124 
0 
Mali  Self-Referral 0 2 2/2 No 0 
Darfur/Sudan  UNSC Referral 4 2 0/6 No1125 Trial Chamber IV referred 
Sudan to the ASP in 
November 2015 for failure 
to cooperate1126  




Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi 
Pre-Trial Chamber issued 
a finding of non-
compliance and referred 
Libya to the UN Security 
	
1123 While Côte d’Ivoire investigation is formally based on the Prosecutor’s proprio motu capabilities, Côte d’Ivoire is tantamount to a self-referral, 
in light of the various requests made by Ouattara’s government in 2010 and 2011 via Article 12(3) declarations.   
1124 The government of Côte d’Ivoire did not contest the admissibility of Prosecutor v. Laurent Gbagbo or Prosecutor v. Charles Blé Goudé. It 
contested the admissibility of The Prosecutor v. Simone Gbagbo in September 2013. See ICC-02/11-01/12-11-Red, 30 September 2013.  
1125 While Sudan could have challenged ICC jurisdiction over the case, it chose not to engage in a judicial manner with the Court. Sudan Tribune 
2007.  
1126 Decision on Prosecution’s Request for Non-Compliance Finding 




and Abdullah Al 
Senussi1128 
Council for failure to 
cooperate1129  
Kenya  Proprio Motu 4 5 0/3  Yes, The Prosecutor 
v. Francis Muthaura, 
Uhuru Kenyatta, and 
Mohammed Hussein 
Ali1130 
Trial Chamber V(b) 
referred Kenya to the ASP 
in September 2016 for 
failure to cooperate1131  
Georgia  Proprio Motu n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Burundi  Proprio Motu n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
	
1128 PTC Rejection of Admissibility Challenge for Saif Al Islam Gaddafi 
1129 PTC Decision on the non-compliance by Libya 
1130 Muthaura, Kenyatta and Ali Request for Rejection of Admissibility 
1131 Finding of Kenyan Non-Compliance 
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